THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF AL-ʿALLĀMA AL-ḤILLĪ
VOLUME I



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The Collected Writings Of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī

The Collected Writings of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī is the first comprehensive attempt to translate the key works of a single scholar of the post-classical period of Islam. This collection provides translations of some of the major works composed by the fourteenth century Shīʿī-Imāmī scholar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), better known as al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, in a range of disciplines including logic, law, legal theory, philosophy and theology. The texts are accompanied by extensive annotations and scholarly commentary which serve to showcase the breadth of al-Ḥillī's knowledge and expertise, as well as to illuminate the rich intellectual heritage of the Islamic middle ages.

تسليك النفس
إلى حظيرة القدس

المؤلف

الحسن بن يوسف بن المطّهر الحلّي

المعروف بـ

العلاّمة الحلّي



Clearing the Soul for Paradise

Taslīk al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds

by

AL-ḤASAN IBN YŪSUF IBN AL-MUṬAHHAR AL-ḤILLĪ
(d. 726/1325)

also known as

AL-ʿALLĀMA AL-ḤILLĪ

*A parallel English-Arabic text translated,
introduced and annotated by*

JARI KAUKUA

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


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
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
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Foreword to the Series

Wahid M. Amin
Editor-in-Chief


These collected writings of the fourteenth century Imami scholar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, otherwise better known as just al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), represent an important juncture in the history of Islamic studies in the west. Never before has a project of this kind been attempted in the English language, and though the challenges faced in preparing the translations and organizing their publication has taken a considerable amount of effort on the part of many individuals, the final result is one that is hoped will serve students and scholars of Islamic intellectual history for years to come. The Collected Writings of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī is a landmark initiative of AMI Press and its parent organization the Al-Mahdi Institute, and the first of what is hoped will be a series of translations and studies on the great figures and personalities of the Shiʿi tradition. By way of inaugurating this initiative, it gives me tremendous pride to announce the launch of this series focussing on the career and writings of one of the most influential Imami scholars of the post-classical period of Islam.

Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī was an important figure in his day and played a crucial part in the growth of the Shiʿi intellectual tradition. His corpus of writings touches on almost every important discipline of chief concern to scholars trained in the religious sciences, and his contributions in jurisprudence, legal theory, logic, theology and philosophy have played a major role in the development of a more advanced curriculum of Shiʿi studies within the centres of Imami scholarship since the mid-fourteenth century. He is, in many ways, the archetypal image of the perfect scholar who combined




expertise in all the major rational (*ʿaqlī*) and religious (*naqlī*) sciences of his day, and in many respects is the first notable Shiʿi personality to do so in an age when scholars were becoming increasingly multidisciplinary. This is true especially given the post-Avicennan setting in which al-Ḥillī's career took shape, which was a period in which the study of philosophical sciences became a gradually integral part of a scholar's education and training. His importance to, and impact upon, the later Imami tradition cannot be overstated; a firm grasp of his ideas and acquaintance of his work allows one to have a better historical appreciation of what came after him. Indeed, it could be argued that it was his formulation of that curriculum that has since been developed through the centuries and which continues to exert its influence on large parts of Shiʿi scholarship in the modern period. There is an extensive body of commentary literature on al-Ḥillī's writings and many of his works continue to be studied and commented on in Shiʿi seminaries today. We hope that the publication of the volumes in this series will help shed further light on this rich but largely untapped period within Shiʿi intellectual history and provide future scholars with a springboard from which to explore the commentarial tradition developed by al-Ḥillī's successors up to the Safavid period and beyond.

The volumes translated in this series have been carefully chosen to showcase the breadth and depth of al-Ḥillī's knowledge across a wide variety of Islamic disciplines. Each one is translated by a specialist in the field and is accompanied by annotations that explain the meaning and surrounding intellectual context of al-Ḥillī's remarks. They are further supplemented by scholarly introductions, an index, and in some instances a glossary of key terms. Each volume is presented in professionally typeset facing pages, English on the left, Arabic on the right. Before publication, the quality and accuracy of each work is checked and evaluated by myself and another member of the editorial team, as well as an external blind reviewer. Al-Ḥillī was a prolific author and composed several dozen texts, many of which are published in multivolume Arabic editions. This series cannot obviously translate all of his writings, and so our aim initially is to translate and compile ten of the major works in al-Ḥillī's oeuvre, though this list may increase depending on future funding and support. It goes without saying that without the assiduous hard work and dedication of the people who have laboured on this project none of this would have come to bear any fruit. I am grateful to them, the individuals who supported this series financially, and the divine hand that has helped and guided us to prepare the publication of the first volume in the series.



Jari Kaukua's translation of *Taslīk al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds* (Clearing the Soul for Paradise) is in many respects the perfect work with which to inaugurate the series. Being a work that is relatively unknown to western scholarship, the parallel Arabic edition and English translation provides what will be for many people a first glance into an important theological summa by an Imami thinker of the so-called post-Avicennan period. As a work that deals with the central tenets and beliefs of Islam, it sets out to cover all the major issues within the study of *kalām* from a Twelver Shiʿi perspective. Furthermore, it is translated by an award-winning author who has published several important studies on Ibn Sīnā (or Avicenna as he was known in the Latin Middle Ages) and the philosophical legacy of his commentators. In addition to the translation, the volume includes an authoritative introduction to al-Ḥillī's career and his opinions on a variety of theological topics, as well a helpful index of the key terms, names and concepts mentioned in the text and its supporting footnotes.



INTRODUCTION

Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, better known as al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, is a formative figure in the Shīʿī amalgamation of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's (d. 436/1045) Muʿtazilī theology and Avicennian philosophy.[1] Born into a learned family in 648/1250 in al-Ḥilla in central Iraq, Ḥillī began his studies in *ḥadīth*, theology, Qurʾānic exegesis, and grammar in his hometown, and proceeded to study Avicennian philosophy, astronomy, and theology with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675/1277), possibly at the famous observatory complex in Marāgha.[2] Ḥillī wrote commentaries on the works of both of his teachers, and especially Ṭūsī's importance to his thinking is difficult to overestimate.

Probably from the mid-670s/1270s onwards, Ḥillī split his time between al-Ḥilla and Baghdād, where he may have become acquainted with Ibn ʿArabī's (d. 638/1240) thought through Shams al-Dīn al-Kīshī (d. 695/1296). Around the same time, he also studied dialectic with Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 687/1288), grammar with Jamāl al-Dīn al-Naḥwī (d. 681/1282–3), and Qurʾānic exegesis with the Ḥanafite scholar Taqī al-Dīn al-Kūfī. In addition, he may have studied Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī's (d. 586/1190) philosophy, on whose *Talwīḥāt* he also wrote a commentary, with ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Wāsiṭī (d. 694/1292–3).[3]

Ḥillī's fame as a scholar and teacher also brought him close to the political power of his time. The Ilkhanid rulers of Iran had converted to Islam in the 690s/1290s, with sultan Ūljāytū declaring Islam the state religion in 703/1304. Initially Sunnī, Ūljāytū turned to Shīʿism in 709/1310, possibly under Ḥillī's influence. Regardless of the truth of this famous story, attempts to influence the cultural and religious policies of his time may have motivated at least some of Ḥillī's philosophical work.[4] Towards the end of Ūljāytū's reign, in 715–6/1315–6, Ḥillī left the court to return to al-Ḥilla. He spent his remaining years teaching and writing, mostly at his hometown, where he died in 726–7/1325.[5] The number of *ijāzāt* traced back to him sug-

1 Schmidtke 1991, 4.

2 Schmidtke 1991, 9-19.

3 Schmidtke 1991, 19-21.

4 Wisnovsky 2018 argues that Ḥillī's commentary on Avicenna's *Shifāʾ* arose from a politically loaded discussion with the vizier Rashīd al-Dīn al-Hamadānī (d. 718/1318).

5 Schmidtke 1991, 23-34.

gest that Ḥillī was a highly venerated teacher. One of his most celebrated students is the famous logician and philosopher Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 766/1365).[6]

Turning to his literary output, the first theological work Ḥillī wrote was *Manāhij al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn*, which was completed in 680/1281 and remained one of his most important works on the subject. Around the same time, he composed the much more concise *Nuẓum al-barāhīn*, to which he also wrote an autocommentary, and began commenting on the *Kitāb al-yāqūt* by a certain Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm ibn al-Nawbakhtī, completing the commentary in 684/1285.[7] In 687/1288, he completed the theological part of *Muntahā l-wuṣūl*, another work more concise in scope than the *Manāhij*. Then, having gained some experience as a theologian, he started composing the *Kashf al-murād*, which was the first commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's widely read *Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād* (also known as *Tajrīd al-ʿaqāʾid*) and one of Ḥillī most famous works. Ḥillī completed the *Kashf* in 696/1297,[8] but probably already before finishing this commentary, he began writing his theological *magnum opus*, the *Nihāyat al-marām*. The composition of this work took him several decades, and it is quite possible that it remained incomplete at his death. Its expansive scope notwithstanding, or indeed perhaps because of it, the *Nihāya* was not as widely circulated as some of Ḥillī's other theological works.[9]

In addition to the aforementioned titles, Ḥillī composed three relatively concise theological works at the request of his son and close associate Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥillī, better known as Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn (d. 771/1369), who was a prominent scholar of law and theology in his own right. The first of these was the *Nahj al-mustarshidīn*, completed in 699/1299, followed by the *Kashf al-fawāʾid*, a commentary on Ṭūsī's *Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* completed in 703/1304, and the present work, *Taslīk al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds*, completed in 704/1304.[10] Apart from these concise *summae*, Ḥillī's tenure at the Ilkhānid court yielded a number of polemical theological works on specific topics. Among these works, written at Ūljāytū's request, are the *Minhāj al-karāma fī l-imāma*, defending the Shīʿī doctrine of the imamate, the *Istiqṣāʾ al-naẓar fī l-qaḍāʾ wa-l-qadar* on the

6 Schmidtke 1991, 35-40.
7 Schmidtke 1991, 47-49.
8 Schmidtke 1991, 49-50.
9 Schmidtke 1991, 50-51.
10 Schmidtke 1991, 51.

Muʿtazilite doctrine of human freedom, and the *Kitāb nahj al-ḥaqq wa-kashf al-ṣidq*, which challenges Ashʿarite theological doctrine. These works gave rise to a series of refutations and counter-refutations by Sunnī and Shīʿī authors, respectively. During the same period, Ḥillī also wrote several smaller treatises on specific theological topics.[11] One of his last theological works was *al-Bāb al-ḥādī ʿashar*, a concise creed composed for the wider public. This remains his most popular work, and along with a ninth/fifteenth-century commentary by al-Miqdād al-Fāḍil al-Ḥillī (d. 826/1423), it was translated into English as a representative text of Shīʿī doctrine by an American missionary in the 1920's.[12] Apart from the aforementioned works, several theological titles ascribed to Ḥillī are lost.[13]

By Ḥillī's time, a strict division between theology (*kalām*) and philosophy (*ḥikma*) is somewhat anachronistic, given how thoroughly Avicennian concerns had influenced the theological debates. It would be even more misleading to assume that the distinction tallies with our modern understanding of philosophy; from this point of view, texts from both *kalām* and *ḥikma* belong in the same basket. With these qualifications in mind, a number of texts in Ḥillī's œuvre has an approach or a source text that warrants classifying them as more philosophical than the aforementioned theological works. Ḥillī's first treatise of this kind, the *Kitāb al-asrār al-khafīya*, was also the most important one. According to Sabine Schmidtke, several parts of the *Asrār* were probably finished already before the completion of Ḥillī's first theological treatise in 680/1281. The work has a traditional Peripatetic structure of three parts, with an introductory section of logic preceding ones on physics and metaphysics. As a sign of the tenuous distinction between philosophy and theology, even in this philosophical work Ḥillī is openly critical of the Avicennian doctrine whenever it conflicts with his preferred theological views.[14]

Ḥillī was also a capable logician,[15] as evidenced by two of his logical works that survive. The earlier of these, a commentary on Kātibī's *Shamsīya* called *Qawāʿid al-jalīya,* was completed in 679/1280, and the second, a commentary on Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-manṭiq* called *al-Jawhar al-naḍīd*, shortly after that.[16] Apart from the partial remains of two further philosophical

11 Schmidtke 1991, 52-53.
12 See Ḥillī, *Bāb*.
13 Schmidtke 1991, 54-55.
14 Schmidtke 1991, 56-57.
15 For a favourable assessment of his work in logic, see Street 2016.
16 Schmidtke 1991, 61.

works, including an incomplete commentary on Avicenna's *Shifāʾ*,[17] all of Ḥillī's other philosophical writings are lost. Judging by the titles, his focus was mainly on Avicennian philosophy, but he may also have commented on Suhrawardī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210).[18]

Ḥillī was a formative authority in Shīʿī law. During his career, he composed several legal works, starting from his inaugural work, the first part of which he completed in 684/1285-6.[19] He also composed a number of works in *uṣūl al-fiqh*, biography, grammar, Qurʾānic exegesis, and traditions.[20]

*

In broad terms, Ḥillī's approach to philosophy takes its cue from his teacher Ṭūsī's way of combining Avicennian philosophy with the later Muʿtazilite theology of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers. The aim was a concerted attempt at challenging the reformed Ashʿarism of authors like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.[21] This can be illustrated by a brief review of a select number of common points of debate.

For the entire earlier history of Islamic theology, one of the central problems had been the relation between God's essence and His attributes. By Ṭūsī's and Ḥillī's time, three main alternatives were available as answers to this question, all of which came with problematic consequences.[22] One could adopt the Ashʿarite view, according to which the attributes were really distinct from God's essence. This, however, came at the cost of violating God's unicity: if eternality is characteristic of the divine, and if not only the essence but also the attributes are eternal, how is this different from the abomination of polytheism (*shirk*)? What is more, the postulation of really distinct attributes threatened to lead into an infinite regress: if God is eternal (*qadīm*) by an attribute of eternality, one may ask whether the attributes, including the attribute of eternality, are also eternal on the same grounds, and so forth. An attempt at mitigating such problems was to hold that the attributes were neither identical with nor different from God's essence, but this was recognised to violate the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle. A second alternative was the early Muʿtazilite

17 On this work, see Wisnovsky 2018.

18 Schmidtke 1991, 58-59.

19 Schmidtke 1991, 62-65.

20 Schmidtke 1991, 66-70, 72-73.

21 See, now, Pourjavady & Schmidtke 2016, 456-462. The Shīʿī theologians' affiliation with Muʿtazilism went back several generations before Ṭūsī (Ansari & Schmidtke 2016).

22 The *locus classicus* for the problem of divine names is Gimaret 1988.

theory, according to which the attributes are not distinct from God's essence. This, however, threatens to collapse the attributes into one: if both 'knowing' (*ʿālim*) and 'powerful' (*qādir*) are identical to God's essence, then by virtue of the transitivity of identity, 'knowing' should be identical to 'powerful' – which is evidently absurd. Moreover, such a deflationary account was perceived to be ill at ease with the Qurʾān's bold statements about the attributes. Finally, a third alternative was introduced with the Muʿtazilite Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī's (d. 321/933) metaphysical use of the grammatical term *ḥāl*, or "mode of being". Modes are features, which are grounded in existing things but which themselves neither exist nor do not exist. For instance, being a knower is grounded in a really existing quality of knowledge inhering in a really existing person, but it is not a further third entity in addition to the person and her knowledge. Abū Hāshim held that God's attributes are modes, which are grounded in God's essence but the metaphysical status of which is different from the essence, because they neither exist nor do not exist. This allowed him to do away with the problems of polytheism and infinite regress, but it left the theory vulnerable to the charge that the modes violate the principle of excluded middle.[23]

Ḥillī's favoured solution to the problem of God's attributes was to adopt the Avicennian notion of mental existence. In extramental reality, God is absolutely one. However, when we think about such an absolute unity, we realise that it entails a number of further features, and insofar as we conceive these features as distinct separate from the essence that entails them, they can be said to be distinct – but only in the mind.[24] Ḥillī also followed Avicenna in conceiving of God's essence as consisting of necessary existence (He is *wājib al-wujūd*)[25] and inferring the other attributes, like unicity, goodness, knowledge, or voluntariness, from it. Similarly, he endorsed other metaphysical views underlying the Avicennian doctrine, in particular, the distinction between essence and existence, the theory of modalities that is based on this distinction,[26] and the view that existence is predicated

23 On the Bahshamite doctrine of *aḥwāl* and its later reception, see Frank 1978, Thiele 2016, and Benevich 2016.

24 Schmidtke 1991, 169-179.

25 Schmidtke 1991, 180-186.

26 In other words, the view that what exists is either necessary by essence (*wājib bi-dhātihi*) or possible by essence (*mumkin bi-dhātihi*). Only God is necessary by His essence, whereas all other existents are contingent, or things, the essences of which do not entail their existence. On the other hand, insofar as a contingent thing actually exists, it is necessary due to an extraneous cause, or necessary due to another (*wājib bi-l-ghayr*). This classification also allows us to speak of things that are impossible by essence or through another, although the question of

of God and created things in one and the same sense (*ishtirāk maʿnawī*) but according to differences in priority and posteriority (*bi-l-tashkīk*).[27]

In the question of God's knowledge, however, Ḥillī departs from the Avicennian doctrine. According to Avicenna, God only knows particular things "in a universal way" or "through their causes".[28] This is because were He to know the particulars as such, His knowledge would have to change as those things change. If God knew me in one and the same way, say as a presently living person, prior to my birth, now, and after my death, He would have to have first been wrong, then got it right for a number of decades, only to lapse into error again. For Avicenna, the alternative of allowing change in God's knowledge, and thereby in God Himself, was equally unpalatable. Instead of this kind of reasoning, Ḥillī seems to have followed Rāzī in endorsing Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's relational theory, according to which knowledge only amounts to a relation or connection (*taʿalluq*) between its subject and its object. The benefit of this view was that it allowed its proponent to deny that change in the object entails change in the subject – only the relation between the divine subject and the created object comes into existence or ceases to exist together with the object.[29] Interestingly, in the case of the related attributes of seeing (*baṣīr*) and hearing (*samīʿ*), Ḥillī was more cautious than either Abū al-Ḥusayn or his student Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141), for he declined both from their literal assertion and from their interpretation as mere metaphors for knowledge in a more general sense. Instead, he thought one must assert these attributes, because the Qurʾān is explicit about them and because no inconsistency follows from their assertion.[30]

In his ethics,[31] Ḥillī endorses the moral realism of the Muʿtazilites and the philosophers. For him, moral value is independent from both divine command and purely hedonistic calculus, and equally binding on both God and man. On these grounds, he also rejects the Ashʿarite theory of action, according to which the immediate agent of morally praise- and blameworthy human acts is the omnipotent God, whereas human beings

which thinkers, if any, actually allowed such things in their metaphysics, remains a question for further investigation.

27 Schmidtke 1991, 183-186; Wisnovsky 2018; cf. I.2.2 below.

28 For the first formulation, see Marmura 1962 and Adamson 2005. The second is put forth in Avicenna's posthumous *Taʿlīqāt*; see, for instance, §636, 358-360.

29 Schmidtke 1991, 191-197.

30 Schmidtke 1991, 198-201.

31 Schmidtke 1991, 99-135.

are agents only by virtue of a relation of acquisition (*kasb*, *iktisāb*) that they have to their acts. Were this the case, God would be unjust in condemning or rewarding men for something He Himself has done. This does not mean that Ḥillī postulates a radically free will in human beings. Instead, like his main opponent Rāzī, he endorses the philosophical doctrine, according to which human acts are indeed voluntary, but only in a specific, moderate sense. In this view, only a *determined* (*jāzim*) will, or a combination of power and motive, can constitute the complete cause of an act, and since all motives in turn have an extraneous cause, the theory comes very close to a moderate form of determinism.[32] In line with his moral realism is also Ḥillī's theory of prophecy. He claimed that God had sent the prophets only to consolidate people's abidance by the rational moral values through the promise of reward and the threat of punishment, and to inform human beings of the specific rulings and matters of ritual that cannot be grasped merely by means of reason.[33]

*

The present work, *Taslīk al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds*, or 'Clearing the Soul for Paradise', is a relatively short *summa* of theology that Ḥillī completed in 704/1304, a few years before his tenure at the Ilkhānid court. In his preface Ḥillī tells us that he wrote the book for his son, whom we can identify as Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn al-Ḥillī, a prominent scholar in his own right. The result is a very concise, indeed at times overly condensed review of the various views theologians and philosophers had voiced on the central questions of metaphysics, theology, ethics, prophetology and imamology, and eschatology. The impression one receives is that of a textbook or a teaching manual, and perhaps Ḥillī intended it as such for his son, who at the time of the book's completion would have been in his very early twenties. Occasionally Ḥillī declares his own view, but by no means always, and further research is required to clarify the relation of the book to Ḥillī's more extensive theological works. At least eight manuscripts of the text survive, and a certain Niẓām al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn Abī l-Fawāris Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Aʿrajī wrote a commentary on it with the title *Īḍāḥ al-labs fī sharḥ Taslīk al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds*.[34]

32 Interestingly, Ḥillī seems to have extended this concept of will to God as well (Schmidtke 1991, 202-206).

33 Schmidtke 1991, 136-141.

34 Schmidtke 1991, 83.

The *Taslīk* does not fit the rule observed by Heidrun Eichner,[35] according to which post-classical theological *summae*, including formative Shīʿī works by Ṭūsī and Ḥillī, follow the structural outlines of Rāzī's *Mulakhkhaṣ fī l-ḥikma*. There are similarities, of course, but the *Taslīk* is considerably closer to another work by Rāzī, namely the *Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīna wa-l-mutaʾakhkhirīna min al-ʿulamāʾ wa-l-ḥukamāʾ wa-l-mutakallimīna*. It begins with a section, or an "observation" (*marṣad*),[36] on general matters that is further divided into concise chapters on the principles of logic (I.1), on existence and non-existence (I.2), and on the modalities (I.3). Notable for its absence here is a chapter dedicated to quiddity; the concept and the term are simply introduced in the section on how things are made known (*taʿrīf*, I.1.2). The second observation, dealing with general ontology, is divided into a chapter, or an "aim" (*maqṣid*), on the theologians' classification into eternal and temporally initiated things (II.1), and another on the Aristotelian category analysis (II.2). This observation corresponds to the second *qāʿida* in Ḥillī's much more extensive *Nihāyat al-marām*.

The third observation is an account of physical things, which takes its cue from theological atomism, presenting arguments *pro* and *contra* (III.1), and then proceeds to a similar review of arguments in favour of and against Aristotelian hylomorphism (III.2). This survey of arguments is followed by a discussion of the various accidents that physical things can have (III.3). It is interesting that Ḥillī here refrains from taking a strong stance in favour of either atomism or hylomorphism. However, later on in IV.2.1 on substances, Ḥillī focuses on the atomists' notion of substance, all but ignoring the hylomorphist concept. Another peculiar feature of this section is that although Ḥillī's treatment of accidents is superficially similar to the long discussion of different kinds of quality (*kayf*) in the *Nihāyat al-marām*, the latter work conducts its analysis within the framework of the Peripatetic ontology of ten categories.

Ḥillī concludes his study of general metaphysics with the fourth observation's discussion of the concepts of unity (IV.1.1), identity (or similarity) and difference (IV.1.2), and causation (IV.1.3), as well as of further discus-

35 Eichner 2009, 351-356, 363-368

36 The main chapters are consistently called 'observations', but the naming of the subsections varies. Throughout this introduction and the explanatory notes, Roman numerals refer to the observation, and each subsequent Arabic numeral to the sections and subsections according to the order in that observation.

sions of atoms (IV.2.1), bodies (IV.2.2), incorporeal substances (IV.2.3), and accidents (IV.2.4). The second aim of the fourth observation (IV.2) has a parallel in the *Nihāyat al-marām*, where it follows the discussion of the accidental categories.

The fifth observation is a study of God and His attributes. It begins with a chapter devoted to proving God's existence (V.1), in which Ḥillī makes use of both Avicenna's proof, based on the modalities, and the *kalām* proof, based on the necessary temporal emergence of accidents, and then concludes that Avicenna's is the superior one. Having established God's existence, Ḥillī engages in a lengthy discussion of God's positive and negative attributes (V.2).


The sixth observation is a discussion of theological ethics. Here Ḥillī comes across as a Muʿtazilite moral realist, which seems to have been his considered view, as Schmidtke has argued at length.[37] The observation on ethics is followed by two observations on prophecy and the imamate, respectively. The concluding observation is a discussion of eschatological questions.

*

I owe a great debt of gratitude to the anonymous reviewer of the manuscript of my translation. S/he pointed out a number of mistakes and infelicities, and in a number of cases offered constructive suggestions, going way beyond the call of duty of a reviewer. I can only hope that one day, unbeknownst to me, I will be able to return the favour. I am also very grateful to my colleague Yusuf Daşdemir whose logical and linguistic expertise saved me from a number of awkward mistakes. Having said all that, I am of course solely responsible for all the remaining errors.

Finally, I would like to recognise the generous funding of the European Research Council (grant agreement no. 682779), which enabled the research that went into this volume.

37 Schmidtke 1991, 99-135.




In the name of God, the lord of mercy, the giver of mercy.

Praise belongs to God, beginningless and eternal, everlasting and endless, the almighty deity, necessary and self-sufficient, the powerful king, eternal and omnipotent, wise and noble, most high, mighty and forgiving, knowing and wise, the benevolent giver of mercy, the charitable and condoning one. I praise Him for His abundant gift, I thank Him for His copiously flowing blessings, I ask Him for success in this abode so that my lot in the permanent abode will be beautiful. God bless our lord Muḥammad, the chosen prophet, as well as his family of immaculate imams and his tribe of the good and the pious, with blessings succeeding each other through the ages.

Now, I have answered your request, my virtuous son Muḥammad – may God make me your ransom – by composing this book, which is titled *Clearing the Soul for Paradise* and which contains important and sublime questions as well as subtle and far-reaching remarks. In it I have explained to you – may God grant you success in satisfying Him and liberate you to follow His orders and prohibitions – the entire core of theological remarks and elucidated for you – may God lead you – the principles of intellectual inquiries, may God make you happy in the two abodes and by His grace and benevolence bestow you with perfect supervision in both of them.

I have laid out this book in nine observations.



بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله القديم الأزليّ، الدّائم الأبديّ، الإله القهّار، الواجب الغنيّ، المالك القويّ، القدير الجبّار، الحكيم الكريم، العليّ العظيم الغفّار، العليم الحكيم، الرؤوف الرّحيم، العطوف الستّار.

أحمده على إنعامه المدرار وأشكره على آلائه المسيلة الغزار، وأسأله التّوفيق في الدّار الحسن العقبى في دار القرار؛ وصلّى الله على سيّدنا محمّد النبي المختار وعلى آله الأئمّة الأطهار وعترته الأخيار الأبرار، صلاةً تتعاقب عليهم تعاقب الأعصار.

أمّا بعد فقد أجبت سؤالك أيّها الولد الصّالح محمّد جعلني الله فداك في تصنيف هذا الكتاب المسمّى بتسليك النفس إلى حظيرة القدس مشتملاً على المسائل المهمّة الشريفة والنكت العظيمة اللّطيفة، وبيّنت لك فيه وفقك الله لمراضيه وأعانك على امتثال أوامره ونواهيه جميع لبّ النكت الكلاميّة، وأوضحتُ لك (فيه) أرشدك الله أصول المطالب العقليّة، أسعدك الله في الدّارين ورزقك تكميل الرّئاستين بمنّه ولطفه.

وقد رتبت هذا الكتاب على مراصد تسعة.

Observation I:
On General Things*

* Since Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), a section on general or common things (*al-umūr al-ʿāmma*) commonly began the metaphysical section of a theological *summa*. It was commonplace to devote this section to those features of existing things, which are common to all regardless of the mode of their existence, such as essence and existence or the modalities. Unlike most other authors, however, Ḥillī begins from the basic concepts of logic, although he does include metaphysical themes as well, and my choice of 'general' as a translation of *ʿāmm* reflects this – the topics discussed here hold generally of all further questions. Ḥillī's focus finds a partial parallel ʿAbdallāh al-Bayḍāwī's (d. *c.* 685/1286, but perhaps as late as 716/1316) *Tawāliʿ al-anwār* (see Eichner 2007, 183-188).

المرصدُ الأوّل
في الأمور العامّة وفيه فصول

Chapter 1: On Premises

Premise 1: [On Conception and Assent]

Knowledge is either conception, which is the occurrence of the form of something in the intellect without a judgment, or assent, which is an affirmative or negative judgment of some conception holding of another conception. Both of them are either necessary or acquired.

The necessary conception is that whose occurrence does not depend on study or acquisition, such as the conception of heat or coldness, and the acquired conception is that which is dependent, such as the conception of substance or accident. The necessary assent is that in which the conception of its two terms suffices for the judgment, like the judgment that the whole is greater than the part, and the acquired assent is that in which it does not suffice, like the judgment concerning the world's having come to be.

Conception is acquired by definition, which is making known by means of the parts,[1] or by description, which is making known by means of extrinsic accidents. Assent is acquired by argument, which is a syllogism, if it infers the specific by means of the common, an induction, if it is the other way around, or an analogy, if it infers the equal by means of the equal.[2] The first one is certain and the two latter ones opinionative.

1 These are not just any parts but the constitutive parts of the *definiendum*, that is, its genus and differentia.

2 This means equality in epistemic terms. In analogical reasoning, one arrives at a conclusion concerning a given case based on another case that is similar in one way or another. Both cases, however, are on the same level of generality. For instance, one might conclude something about the donkey based on what one knows about the horse, relying on perceived similarities between the two animals. In the case of a syllogism, by contrast, one concludes something about the donkey based on its constitutive features.

الفصل الأوّل: في المقدمات

المقدّمة الأولى: [في التصوّر والتصديق]

العلم إمّا تصوّرٌ، وهو حصول صورة الشّيء في العقل من غير حكم؛ وإمّا تصديقٌ، وهو الحكم ببعض المتصوّرات على بعض إيجابًا أو سلبًا. وكل منهما ضروريٌ ومكتسبٌ.

فالضروري من التصوّرات ما لا يتوقّف حصوله على طلب وكسب كتصوّر الحرارة والبرودة؛ والمكتسب ما يتوقّف كتصوّر الجوهر والعرض. والضّروري من التصديقات ما يكفي تصوّر طرفيه في الحكم كالتّصديق بأنّ الكلّ أعظم من الجزء؛ والمكتسب ما لا يكفي كالحكم بحدوث العالم.

وكاسب التصوّر الحدّ وهو التعريف بالأجزاء، أو الرسم وهو التعريف بالأعراض الخارجية. وكاسب التّصديق هو الحجّة؛ وهي إمّا قياسٌ إن استدلّ بالعامّ على الخاصّ، وإمّا استقراءٌ إن كان بالعكس؛ وإمّا تمثيلٌ إن استدلّ بالمساوي على المساوي. والأوّل يقينيّ والأخيران ظنّيان.

Premise 2: [On Making Known]

Know that what is known in all respects and what is unknown in all respects cannot be inquired, because what already obtains cannot be obtained, nor is there desire for what one is not at all aware of. Hence, there is no doubt that it must be known in some respect and unknown in another. The two respects are different from one another, and what is inquired is neither of them, but rather that to which they have occurred, that is, the quiddity which has the two respects.

If the quiddity is composite, it can be defined, but if not, it is made known only by description. If it is part of another, that other can be defined by means of it, but not otherwise. If the definition encompasses all constituents, it is complete, but if not, it is deficient. If the description helps to distinguish the quiddity from all else, it is complete, but if not, it is deficient. The definition is composed only of a genus and a differentia.

The genus is the perfection of the shared part, and it is a universal said of many things that differ in their reality in response to the question of what it is. The differentia is the distinguishing part, and it is a universal said of many in response to the question of which it is in its substance.[3] What is composed of them is the species.

The genera are arranged one above the other, until one ends at a genus with no genus above it, which is called the genus of genera, and in a descending order down to a genus with no genus below it, which is the low genus. The species are like that as well.

If that which is extrinsic to the quiddity is exclusive to it, it is a proprium, but if not, it is a common accident.

Universals are these five, none other: genus, differentia, species, proprium and common accident.[4]

3 That is, the differentia gives the conceptual means to distinguish one of the many species that share one genus. In this sense, it is an answer to the question *which*, that is, which of these many species the *definiendum* is. However, the differentia distinguishes the species "in its substance", that is, by virtue of an essential feature, as opposed to any accidental feature.

4 These are the five predicables (*maqālāt*) laid out in the *Eisagōgē* by the late ancient Neoplatonist Porphyry (d. *c.* 305 CE). Notice that this analysis is different from the Aristotelian theory of ten categories (substance, quantity, quality, the relative, place, time, position, having, acting, and being acted upon), which are referred to as *al-maqūlāt*.

المقـدّمة الثـانية: [في التـعريف]

اعلم أنّ المعلوم من كلّ وجه والمجهول من كلّ وجه لا يمكن طلبهما لإستحالة تحصيل الحاصل؛ وعدم الاشتياق إلى ما لا شعور به البتّة؛ فلا بدّ وأن يكون معلومًا من وجه ومجهولاً من آخر، والوجهان متغايران. والمطلوب ليس كلّ واحد منهما بل معروضهما، وهو الماهيّة ذات الوجهين.

والماهيّة إن كانت مركّبةً جاز تحديدها وإلّا عُرِّفت بالرسم لا غير؛ وإن كانت جزءًا من غيرها جاز التحديد بها وإلّا فلا. والحدّ إن اشتمل على جميع المقوّمات فهو التامّ، وإلّا فهو الناقص. والرسم إن افاد تمييز الماهية عن جميع ما عداها فهو التامّ وإلّا فهو الناقص؛ والحدّ إنّما يتألّف من الجنس والفصل.

والجنس هو كمال الجزء المشترك، وهو الكلّيّ المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالحقائق في جواب ماهو .والفصل هو الجزء المميّز، وهو الكلّيّ المقول على كثيرين في جواب أيّما هو في جوهره. والمركّب منهما هو النوع.

وتترتّب الأجناس بعضها فوق بعض الى أن ينتهي إلى جنس لا جنس فوقه، ويسمّى جنس الأجناس، وفي التنازل إلى جنس لا جنس تحته، وهو الجنس السّافلُ؛ والأنواع كذلك.

والخارج عن الماهيّة إن اختصّ بها فهو الخاصّة، وإلّا فهو العرض العامّ.

فالكليّات هي هذه الخمسة لا غير: الجنس والفصل والنوع والخاصّة والعرض العامّ.

Premise 3: [On Syllogism]

Know that every syllogism is composed of only two premises, no more and no less. The premises share a term, that is, the middle term, and they differ with regard to the two other parts, which are the minor and the major term.

If this shared term is the predicate in the minor premise and the subject in the major premise, the syllogism is of the first figure, and its converse is the fourth.[5] If the shared term is the predicate in both premises, the syllogism is of the second figure, and if it is the subject in both, the syllogism is of the third figure.[6]

It is a condition in the first figure that the minor premise be affirmative and the major premise universal.[7] In the second, the condition is that the two premises differ in terms of affirmation and negation and that the major premise be universal. In the third, the condition is that the minor premise be affirmative and one of the premises universal. In the fourth, the condition is that the two weak ones not be combined, except when the minor premise is an affirmative particular proposition, and that only a negative universal major premise be used together with an affirmative particular.[8]

5 An example of a first figure syllogism is 'all B are C (major); all A are B (minor); therefore, all A are C' (the Barbara of mediaeval Latin logicians), and one of a fourth figure syllogism as described here is 'all C are B (major); all B are A (minor); therefore, some A is C' (Bramantip). A distinct fourth figure was first introduced by Galen (d. *c.* 200 CE), who divided the first figure in two distinct classes depending on whether the middle term is the predicate of the minor premise and the subject of the major or the other way around (as the figures are distinguished here by Ḥillī). By contrast, Aristotle had defined the first figure in a more inclusive way, as a syllogism in the premises of which the middle term figures in different positions. The legitimacy of the fourth figure was subsequently subject to a long debate. Avicenna denied its independence, but after Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Islamic logicians (like Ḥillī here) seem to have accepted it without much ado. (Rescher 1966, 1-12.)

6 An example of the second figure is 'no C is B (major); all A are B (minor); therefore, no A is C' (Cesare), and of the third 'all B are C (major); some B is A (minor); therefore, some A is C' (Datisi).

7 That is, the major premise must have universal quantification ('all B are...'), as opposed to particular quantification ('some B is...').

8 The two "weak ones" (*al-khiṣṣatayn*) are particularity and negation. Thus, a valid fourth figure syllogism must not be composed of a particular and a negative premise, or include a particular negative premise – with the exception mentioned. The second condition is subject to the first: combination of weak premises is allowed when the minor premise is particular, but even then only with a universal negative major premise. The only valid syllogism composed of weak premises is Fresison ('no C is B [major]; some B is A [minor]; therefore, some A is not C').

المقـدّمة الثـالثة: [في القـياس]

اعلم أنّ كلّ قياس إنّما يتركّب من مقدّمتين لا أزيد ولا أقلّ، ويشترك المقدّمتان في حدّ (واحد) هو أوسط، وتتباينان بجزأين آخرين هما الأصغر والأكبر.

وهذا المشترك إن كان محمولاً في الصغرى موضوعًا في الكبرى فهو الشّكل الأوّل؛ وعكسه الرّابع؛ وإن كان محمولاً فيهما فهو الثّاني؛ وإن كان موضوعًا فيهما فهو الثّالث.

ويشترط في الأوّل إيجاب الصغرى وكلّيّة الكبرى. وفي الثّاني اختلاف المقدّمتين بالإيجاب والسلب، وكلّيّة الكبرى. وفي الثّالث إيجاب الصغرى وكليّة إحداهما. وفي الرّابع عدم اجتماع الخسّتين إلّا إذا كانت الصغرى موجبة جزئيّة، واستعمال السّالبة الكليّة الكبرى مع الموجبة الجزئيّة الصغرى لا غير.

Premise 4: [On the Matters and the Forms of Syllogisms]

If the two premises of an argument are decisive, the conclusion is also like that, and if they are opinionative, or one of them is, the conclusion is opinionative, because it follows the weaker one of the two premises.

There are six kinds of necessary propositions: first principles, observations, experiential propositions, intuitive propositions, reports with unbroken chains, and propositions that come with their syllogisms.[9]

The mere occurrence of two premises is not sufficient for the acquisition of a conclusion, for there is no doubt that they must be ordered in a specific way, which is the formal part of reflection, the two premises being the material parts. When both are sound, the reflection is sound, and when both are unsound or one of them is unsound, the reflection is unsound.

This is a condensed pointer to how objects of inquiry are acquired; a detailed report is given in our intellectual books.[10]

9 A proposition is necessary (*ḍarūrī*) if it cannot be reasonably doubted, that is, if accepting its truth is necessary. The same list of necessary premises is given by Avicenna, e.g. *Ishārāt* VI, 55-58; and Bāqillānī, *Tamhīd* I, 9-11. The first principles of intellection are such axiomatic truths as the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of the excluded middle, or the principle that the whole is greater than any of its parts. Observations (*al-mushāhadāt*) are propositions based on either immediate sense perception of external things or immediate perception of the states of one's own body or soul, such as pain, pleasure, emotions, or thoughts. Experiential premises (*al-mujarrabāt*) are premises based on frequent occurrences of one observable fact (for a study of Avicenna's concept of experience, see McGinnis 2003). Intuitive premises (*ḥadsīyāt*) are very much like experiential premises, but in their case the soul may have a strong conviction of their truth by intuitively grasping the cause (or the middle term) that connects the predicate to the subject. Avicenna's example is our conviction that the Moon receives its light from the Sun. Reports with reliable chains (*al-mutawātirāt*) are eye-witness reports of things, which one has not experienced in person but which one has no reason to doubt, such as the existence of distant cities or historical persons. Finally, propositions that come with their syllogisms (*qaḍāyā qiyāsātuhā maʿahā*) are propositions, which one could demonstrate simply by knowing their terms, such as the analytically true statement that two is the half of four.

10 Here, 'intellectual' (*ʿaqlī*) is used in contrast to *naqlī*, that is, sciences or books based on revealed sources.

المـقدّمة الرابعـة: [في موادالأقـيسة وصورهـا]

مقدّمتاالدّليل إن كانتاقطعيّتين فالنتيجة كذلك، وإن كانتاظنّيّتين أو إحداهما فالنتيجة ظنّيّة؛ لأنها تتبع أخس المقدّمتين.

والضّروريّات ستةٌ: الأوّليات والمشاهدات والمجرّبات والحدسيّات والمتواترات وقضايا قياساتها معها.

ولا يكفي حصول المقدّمتين في اكتساب النتيجة، بل لا بدّ من ترتيب مخصوص بينهما، وهوالجزء الصوريّ للنظر، والمقدّمتان أجزاءٌ ماديّةٌ، وبصحّتهما يصحّ النظر وبفسادهماأوفساد إحداهما يكون فاسدًا.

فهذه إشارةٌ مختصرةٌ إلى كيفيّة اكتساب المطالب، والتفريع مذكورٌ في كتبنا العقليّة.

Chapter 2: On the Investigation of Existence and Non-Existence

There are four investigations here.

[Investigation] 1: [The Conception of Existence and of Non-Existence]

Conceiving of existence and of non-existence is self-evident, for no conception is clearer than them. It may be told, by way of making terms known, that what exists is that which is asserted and what does not exist is that which is denied.

Existence may be mental and it may be external.

Both existence and non-existence are either necessary or possible to a quiddity by virtue of its essence. What exists necessarily by virtue of its essence is God, high is He, whereas what exists possibly by virtue of its essence is anything besides Him. That whose non-existence is necessary by virtue of its essence is impossible, but if this is by virtue of another, it is possible. Hence, when existence is related to any quiddity, it exists necessarily or possibly, or existing is impossible for it, by virtue of its essence.

الفصل الثاني: في مباحث الوجود والعدم

وهي أربعةٌ:

[البحث] الأوّل: [تصوّر الوجود والعدم]

تصوّر الوجود والعدم بديهيٌّ إذ لا تصوّر أجلى منهما. وقد يذكر على سبيل التعريف اللفظي أنّ الوجود هو الثابت العين، والمعدوم هو المنفي العين.

والوجود قد يكون ذهنيًّا وقد يكون خارجيًّا.

وكلٌّ من الوجود والعدم إمّا أن يكون واجبًا للماهية لذاتها أو ممكنًا. فواجب الوجود لذاته هو الله تعالى؛ وممكن الوجود لذاته هو ما عداه؛ وواجب العدم لذاته هو الممتنع؛ ولغيره هو الممكن؛ فكلّ ماهية إذا نُسِبَ الوجودُ إليها إمّا أن تكون واجبة الوجود لذاته أو ممكنة أو ممتنعة.

Investigation 2: That Existence is a Shared Meaning

It is widely accepted that existence is a meaning shared by existing things, but Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī[11] and Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī[12] have said that existence is a shared term but not a shared meaning, and that the existence of each thing is identical with its reality.[13]

The truth is the first view.[14] We may divide existence into the necessary and the possible, and the starting point of division is shared. Since non-existence is one, for it is impossible to distinguish, differentiate, and assimilate in terms of non-existence, its opposite, namely existence, is one as well, for otherwise the exhaustiveness of what exists and what does not exist would be false.[15]

They argue that if the substrate of existence does not exist, then as a consequence what does not exist is attributed with existence, which is certainly false, whereas if it does exist, a circle or a regress follows. The answer is that the substrate is the quiddity without the consideration of the two conditions.[16]

11 Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1045) was a Muʿtazilite theologian who had an important influence on Ḥillī (see introduction).

12 Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936) started as a student of the Muʿtazilite Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/915) but subsequently turned against the teachings of the Muʿtazila, allying with the more literalist approach of the Hanbalīs. Thereby he inaugurated the mainstream Sunnī school of theology that bears his name.

13 The widely accepted view means that 'existence' is applied to univocally to all things that are said to exist: you and the book you are reading exist in the same sense. The alternative endorsed by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ashʿarī is that 'existence' is said equivocally: existing means one thing for the book, and something quite different for you.

14 That is, the view that existence is univocal. What follows are two traditional arguments supporting this view.

15 That is, were it not the case that both existence and non-existence are one, the principles of bivalence and of the excluded middle would not hold.

16 When we consider the quiddity as a substrate of existence, we consider it in abstraction from both existence and non-existence: it can be attributed with either existence or non-existence, because it has neither in itself. However, this does not mean that there is, independent of our abstracting consideration, a quiddity that neither exists nor does not exist. It is only an abstraction, or alternatively, something that exists in the mind.

البحث الثـاني: في أنّ الوجود مـعنى مشـترك (بين الموجودات)

(المشهور أنّ الوجود معنى مشترك بين الموجودات) وقال أبو الحسين البصريّ وأبو الحسن الأشعريّ إنّه مشترك لفظًا لا معنى، ووجود كلّ شيء نفس حقيقته.

والحقّ الأوّل. لنا، أنّا نقسّم الوجود إلى الواجب والممكن، ومورد التقسيم مشترك فيه.

ولأنّ العدم واحد لإستحالة التميّز والاختلاف والتماثل في العدم، فيكون مقابله وهو الوجود]واحدًا[، وإلّا لبطل الحصر في الموجود والمعدوم.

احتجّوا بأنّ محلّ الوجود إن كان معدومًا لزم اتّصاف المعدوم بالوجود، وهو باطلٌ بالضّرورة؛ وإن كان موجودًا لزم الدّور أو التسلسل. والجواب المحلّ الماهيّة لا باعتبار القيدين.

Appendix

Since it has been established that existence is shared, it is established that it is additional to quiddities. This is because it cannot be identical with them, for otherwise it would follow that different realities share completeness of quiddity.[17] Nor can it be a part of them, for otherwise it would be a genus, because it is the most common of the shared parts, and it would be in need of a differentia. But the differentia of existence would be an existent, so that the genus would be included in the differentia, and this would go on regressively.

Investigation 3: [What is That Which Does Not Exist?]

Those who have reached the truth hold the view that what does not exist is pure denial and that it is nothing. A group from the Muʿtazila holds the view that it is something established outside the mind. The Agent has no effect upon it, His effect being rather in making an essence exist, and those non-existents are distinct from each other as individuals. There is an infinite number of established things of each species, yet they all coincide in being essences and are only distinguished by their attributes.[18]

17 If existence were univocal *and* identical with quiddities, then by transitivity of identity, the quiddities would be identical to each other, that is, existing things of different kinds would "share completeness of quiddity" with each other.

18 In other words, these Muʿtazilites hold that there are individual things, which do not exist but which God has the power to create by bestowing existence on them, and that these things subsist, or are "established" (*thābita*), as mind-independent individuals. They are infinite in number, yet they are organised into species and distinguished by unique bundles of properties, just like the ordinary *existing* individuals that we find around us.

تـذنيبٌ

لما ثبت أنّ الوجود مشترك ثبت أنّه زائدٌ على الماهيّات لإستحالة أن يكون نفسها، وإلّا لزم اشتراك الحقائق المختلفة في تمام الماهية؛ وأن يكون جزءًا منها وإلّا لكان جنسًا لكونه أعمّ الأجزاء المشتركة، فيفتقر إلى فصل؛ وفصل الوجود موجود، فيكون الجنس داخلاً في الفصل ويتسلسل.

البحث الثالث: [ماهو المعدوم؟]

ذهب المحقّقون إلى أنّ المعدوم نفيٌ محضٌ وليس بشيءٍ. وذهب جماعةٌ من المعتزلة إلى أنّه شيءٌ ثابتٌ خارجَ الذّهن ولا تأثير للفاعل فيه، بل في جَعْلِ الذات موجودةً؛ وتلك المعدومات متباينة بأشخاصها. والثابت من كلّ نوع عدد غير متناه، وإنّها بأسرها متّفقة في كونها ذواتًا، وإنّما تتباين بالصّفات.

We may say that the concept of being established is nothing but existence, and so if that which does not exist were established in non-existence, it would exist, which is absurd. Moreover, when God most high brings one of them into existence, if they remained as they were, then this would be like something with another being just as it is without the other, which is necessarily false. If there were fewer of them, they would be finite, and so the things that are in the power of God most high would be finite, which is absurd.[19] Besides, it follows that they would be independent of the Agent, for the essences would be eternal and therefore not subject to the power.

According to them, existence is a kind of state,[20] and so it is not subject to the power. But being attributed is not anything additional to the quiddity and the attribute, for otherwise a regress would follow. Hence, the existing essence is independent of the Agent. This is preposterous.[21]

19 Thus, the crux of the argument is whether the things that do not exist but are established, or have *thubūt*, are finite or infinite. If they are infinite, nothing changes about them when God bestows existence on some, which is absurd. If they are finite, then there are limits to what is subject to God's power to create (*qudra*), which is also inadmissible. Let me also note at this point that the word *maqdūr*, which I have translated as "that which is in God's power" or "that which is subject to God's power", is ambiguous and could also mean that which is included in God's creative decree (*qadar*).

20 The concept of 'state' (*ḥāl*) was initially introduced by the Muʿtazilite theologian Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933) in an attempt to solve the problem of God's attributes. Denying the reality of God's attributes runs the risk of denying God's explicit self-ascriptions in the Qurʾān, whereas simply admitting them as entities in their own right threatens to violate God's unity. In this conundrum, Abū Hāshim suggested that the attributes are states, which neither exist nor do not exist, but are rather modes of being of God – what we would today perhaps call adverbial ascriptions. The theory of states was subsequently extended to hold of a number of created phenomena, including the existence of created things, for instance by the Ashʿarite theologian Abū l-Maʾālī al-Juwaynī (d. 479/1085). For a more detailed discussion, see Frank 1978, Benevich 2016, and Thiele 2016.

21 This argument is extremely dense, but perhaps it can be reconstructed as follows. Suppose, with these Muʿtazilites, that there are essences that do not exist but subsist by themselves. Now, what does God bestow on them when He creates them and brings them into existence? He cannot bestow existence as a distinct attribute, because then this existence would also have to exist, which gives rise to infinite regress. Hence, these Muʿtazilites argue, it is best to think of existence as a state of being attributed with existence that neither exists nor does not exist itself. However, there seems to be no new attribute that God thereby relates to the self-subsisting essence, and Ḥillī can drive home his point: since the essences subsist independent of God, and since their existence is a state of being attributed with existence, without any distinct attribute thereby bestowed by God, the essences can have the state of existing independently of God.

لنا أنّ المفهوم من الثبوت إنّما هو الوجود؛ فلو كان المعدوم ثابتًا في العدم لكان موجودًا وهو محال؛ ولأنّه إذا أوجد الله تعالى منها شيئًا فإن بقيت كما كانت كان الشيء مع غيره كهو لا مع غيره وهو باطلٌ بالضّرورة؛ وإن نَقَصَتْ تَنَاهَتْ، فيتناهى مقدورات الله تعالى وهو محال؛ ولأنّه يلزم الاستغناء عن الفاعل، إذ الذّوات أزليّة فلا تكون مقدورةً. والوجود من قبيل الأحوال عندهم فلا يكون مقدورًا، والاتّصاف ليس أمرًا زائدًا على الماهية والصفة، وإلّا لزم التسلسل فتكون الذات الموجودة غنيّةً عن الفاعل، هذا خلفٌ.

احتجّوا بأنّ المعدوم متميزٌ، وكلّ متميّزٍ ثابتٌ. أمّا الصغرى فلأنّ المعدوم معلوم؛ لأنّا نعلم طلوع الشمس غدًا من المشرق، وكلّ معلوم متميّزٌ؛ ولأنّ الحركة المقدورة لنا متميّزة عن الممتنعة وإن كانتا معدومتين؛ ولأنّ بعض المعدومات يراد وقوعها كاللّذات، وبعضها لا يرادُ، فتكون متميّزةً. وأمّا الكبرى فلأنّ المتميّز هو الموصوف بصفةٍ لا يشاركه فيها غيرُه، وذلك يستدعي كونه متعيّنًا في نفسه متحقّقًا. ولا نعني بالثابت إلّا ذلك.

They argue: What does not exist is distinct, and all that is distinct is established. As regards the minor premise,[22] it is due to the non-existent's being known, for we know that the Sun will rise tomorrow from the east, and all that is known is distinct,[23] as well as to the fact that the motions in our power are distinct from those that are impossible, even if neither exist, and to the fact that some non-existing things, like pleasures, are wanted to take place whereas others are not, and so they are distinct from each other. As regards the major premise,[24] it is because what is distinct is attributed with an attribute which is shared by nothing else, and that entails its being realised and instantiated in itself. And we only mean that by 'established'.

The answer is as follows. Distinction may be mental and it may be external, and what does not exist is distinct in the first sense but not in the second, just as one may conceive of impossible things, composite things, and existence, without any of them being established.[25]

Investigation 4: [There Is No Intermediate Between What Exists and What Does Not Exist]

There is no intermediate between what exists and what does not exist, for the intellect judges necessarily that our statement 'a thing either exists or does not exist' is exhaustive, so that an intermediate is not intelligible.

22 That is, 'what does not exist is distinct'.

23 Our specific knowledge of the Sun's rising *tomorrow* is distinct from our general knowledge of the Sun's motion as well as our knowledge of its rising on any other day. This entails that the known sunrises are distinct from each other in our knowledge.

24 That is, 'what is distinct is established'.

25 The latter point seems to be directed against those theologians who do not accept mental existence. Ḥillī's argument does not depend on mental existence, but on the generally recognised fact that impossible things and existence are conceivable, and thereby distinct. Since the opponent will not accept that these things subsist by themselves, he has to give up the crux of his argument, namely that distinctness and conceivability entail self-subsistence (or *thubūt*).

والجواب: التّميّز قد يكون ذهنيًّا وقد يكون خارجيًا؛ والمعدوم متميّزٌ بالاعتبار الأوّل دون الثاني، كما يتصوّر الممتنعات والمركّبات والوجود، وليس شيءٌ منها بثابتٍ.

البحث الرابع: [لا واسـطة بين الموجود والمـعدوم]

لا واسطة بين الموجود والمعدوم؛ لأنّ العقل قاضٍ بالضّرورة بأنّ قولنا: الشّيء إمّا أن يكون موجودًا أو معدومًا حاصرٌ، فالواسطة غير معقولة.

Abū Hāshim asserted an intermediate between the two, which is an attribute of the existent, neither exists nor does not exist, and is not known, and he called it 'state'. He argued that existence is not attributed with existence, first, because regress is impossible,[26] and secondly, because every essence that has the attribute of existence exists, whereas existence is not an essence and therefore not attributed with existence. But existence is not attributed with non-existence either, since existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive, and what does not exist is every essence that does not have the attribute of existence.

The answer is that the error emerges from specifying the existent and the non-existent as essences. It does not follow that if something is attributed with neither itself nor its contradictory, then an intermediate is affirmed between it and its contradictory.[27]

26 This is the point mentioned in n. 23 above: if existence is attributed with existence, then this second-order existence must also be attributed with existence, and so on *ad infinitum*.

27 Ḥillī's answer is extremely elliptic, but it resembles an argument found, for instance, in ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Qūshjī's (d. 879/1474–5) commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's (d. 672/1274) *Tajrīd al-ʿaqāʾid* (I, 153–154). First, it is simply assumed as evident that affirming anything of the thing itself is inconceivable. Secondly, affirming non-existence of existence amounts to negating the affirmation of existence of itself. Since a negative statement requires the prior conception of the affirmative statement it negates, the negation of self-affirmation is also inconceivable. Third, and finally, denying both existence and non-existence of existence is just a conjunction of the negations of the two first alternatives, and since both were inconceivable to begin with, so must their negations be, for which reason the conjunction of their negations cannot be conceivable either.

وأثبت أبو هاشم واسطةً بينهما وهي صفة لموجود لا موجودة ولا معدومة ولا معلومة، وسمّاها بالحال. واحتجّ بأنّ الوجود لا يوصف بالوجود، أمّا اوّلاً فلإستحالة التسلسل، وأمّا ثانيًا فلأنّ الموجود كلّ ذاتٍ لها صفة الوجود، والوجود ليس بذات؛ فلا يوصف بالوجود ولا يوصف بالعدم للتغاير بين الوجود والعدم، فإن المعدوم كلّ ذات ليس لها صفة الوجود.

والجواب: الغلط نشأ من تخصيص الموجود والمعدوم بالذوات، ولا يلزم من عدم اتّصاف الشيء بنفسه ونقيضه ثبوت واسطة بينه وبين نقيضه.

Chapter 3: On The Investigation of Necessity and Its Counterparts

There are three investigations here.

Investigation 1: [Necessity, Possibility, and Impossibility]

Necessity, possibility, and impossibility are self-evident conceptions, and none of them is established, for otherwise regress and the existence of the non-existent would follow, because they are relational matters and depend on the existence of relata,[28] and necessity and possibility would be subsequent to existence, which is preposterous. Impossibility depends on what does not exist, and so it does not exist.

The ancestors asserted external possibility, for otherwise there would remain no distinction between the denial of possibility and denied possibility.[29] They are in error, because the distinction holds of intellectual judgments just as it holds of concrete things. If that entailed being established, it would follow that impossibility is established.[30]

28 That is, the modalities are not established *in mind-independent reality*. If they were, then one could ask, for instance, what the modal status of the possibility of the birth of my great-granddaughter is. Whatever the answer, one can ask the same thing about the modal status of that second-order modality, and so forth *ad infinitum*. (The other problematic consequence of the mind-independent reality of modalities, that is, the existence of the non-existent, is spelled out by Ḥillī in what follows immediately.)

29 In this context, Ḥillī's "ancestors" (*al-awāʾil*) are early theologians, for the distinction between the denial of possibility (*nafy al-imkān*) and denied possibility (*al-imkān al-manfī*) is related to the aforementioned discussion of things that subsist, and are therefore possible, but do not exist. Denied possibility refers to those self-subsisting things that are never brought into existence, in other words, unrealised possibilities. Denial of possibility refers to what is impossible *per se*, for instance, a partner to God.

30 Again, being established means having a mind-independent metaphysical status. If the early theologians' possibility were a real feature of the world, impossibility, in the sense of denial of possibility, would also have to be such a feature.

الفصل الثالث: في مباحث الوجوب وقسيميه

وهي ثلاثة:

[البحث الأوّل:]الوجوب والإمكان والإمتناع]

الوجوب والامكان والامتناع من التصوّرات البديهيّة، لا شيء منها بثابتٍ، وإلّا لزم التسلسل ووجود المعدوم، ولأنّها أمورٌ نسبيّة، فتتوقف على وجود المنتسبين. والوجوب والإمكان متأخّران عن (هذا) الوجود، هذا خلفٌ. والامتناع يتوقّف على ما لا يوجد، فلا يكون موجودًا.

وأثبت الأوائل الإمكان في الخارج، وإلّا لم يبق فرقٌ بين نفي الإمكان والإمكان المنفيّ. وهو خطأ؛ لأنّ التمايز يقع في الأحكام العقليّة كما يقع في الأمور العينيّة. ولو اقتضى ذلك الثبوت لزم كون الامتناع ثبوتيًّا.

Investigation 2: [On the Propria of the Necessary]

One thing is not necessary both by virtue of its own essence and by virtue of another, because the Necessary by virtue of His essence[31] is independent of another, whereas what is necessary by virtue of another is not independent of that other, and so two contradictories would be combined.

The Necessary by virtue of His essence is simple, for whatever is composite needs its part and its part is other than it. His existence is identical with His reality, because if it were additional to Him, it would be contingent,[32] for then it would be an attribute of His, and every attribute needs that to which it is attributed. The consequent is false, because if the effective principle in it were anything other than God most high, it would follow that He needs that other, and so He would be contingent. If it were God most high, then it would follow that what does not exist would act on what does exist, a quiddity would exist twice, or a circle would result.[33]

Investigation 3: [On the Accidence of Possibility to Quiddity]

Possibility is necessary to quiddities, for otherwise they could pass from possibility to necessity or impossibility, which is absurd.[34]

31 This passage makes an interesting shift, not unparalleled in other Arabic philosophical and theological texts, from a theologically neutral distinction between necessity due to essence and necessity due to an extrinsic cause to a theological distinction between God and creation, which is made explicit only at the first mention of the word 'God' in the last paragraph of the section. This is possible because the Arabic is ambiguous between the masculine and neutral readings of *wājib*. Since I have not been able to reproduce the shift in English, I have decided to capitalise the relevant term and to use the third person masculine throughout this section – which is technically not wrong, but does lose an aspect of the original text.

32 Here and below, 'possibility' and 'contingency' (as well as 'possible' and 'contingent') are alternative translations of the same Arabic term, *imkān* (or *mumkin*). There is no single English term that brings the two meanings together naturally.

33 In other words, if we suppose that something other than God is the cause of God's having necessity, then that other thing is the cause of God. But since God is the cause of the existence of everything, He must also be the cause of the existence of His alleged cause. In this impossible situation, either of the two alternatives (God's cause either does or does not exist before God brings it into existence) gives rise to absurd consequences: either a non-existing cause causes God's existence, or a cause existing before God is brought into existence again by God, and in both cases the cause would cause itself by God's mediation.

34 That is, possibility is intrinsic, and therefore necessary, to the quiddities of created things, because otherwise they could change their modal status without any reason. Their intrinsic possibility means that they can become necessary or impossible due to an extrinsic cause, as Ḥillī states in what follows immediately.

[البحث الثـاني:]في خواص الواجب]

الشيء الواحد لا يكون واجبًا لذاته ولغيره، لأنّ الواجب لذاته مستغنٍ عن الغير، والواجب لغيره غيرُ مستغنٍ عن ذلك الغير، فيجتمع النّقيضان.

والواجب لذاته بسيطٌ، لإفتقار كلّ مركّب إلى جزئه، وجزؤه غيره. ووجوده نفس حقيقته؛ لأنّه لو كان زائدًا عليه لكان ممكنًا؛ لأنّه حينئذٍ يكون صفةً له، وكلّ صفة مفتقرةٌ إلى الموصوف؛ والتالي باطلٌ، لأنّ المؤثّر فيه إن كان غير الله تعالى لزم افتقاره إلى غيره، فيكون ممكنًا، وإن كان هو الله تعالى لزم تأثير المعدوم في الموجود أو وجود الماهيّة مرّتين أو الدّورُ.

البحث الثالث: [في عروض الإمكان للماهيّة]

الإمكان واجب للماهيّة، وإلّا جاز انتقالها منه إلى الوجوب أو الإمتناع، وهو محال.

All that is possible in terms of existence exists or does not exist only by virtue of a distinct cause, because it is impossible that one of two equal alternatives could be preponderated to hold over the other without a preponderant. Furthermore, what is possible is made necessary with that cause, for were that not the case, the equality would remain and it would need something else. If it did preponderate, then it would be more appropriate for that which is preponderated over to take place at one time but not to exist at another.[35] That existence is specified at one of the two times entails the need for a cause other than the first one, and so it is not possible that one of the two extremes be more appropriate.

Possibility is the reason why an effective principle is needed, for the intellect's verdict of possibility is based on the effective principle and the verdict of its rejection on the absence of the effective principle. That reason cannot be coming to be in time, as some of the early theologians held, because coming to be is a quality of existence and therefore posterior to it. Existence is posterior to bringing into existence, which in turn is posterior to a need, and this in turn posterior to the reason for the need. If coming to be were the reason, it would follow that something is prior in status to itself.

35 The priority (*awlawīya*) here means the realisation of one of two alternatives without a decisive causal principle, which Ḥillī here rejects as incompatible with the notion of possibility.

وكلّ ممكن الوجود فإنّه لا يوجد ولا يعدم إلّا بسبب منفصل، لإستحالة ترجيح أحد الطرفين المتساويين على الآخر لا لمرجّحٍ؛ ثمّ مع ذلك السبب يجب وإلّا فإن بقي الاستواء افتقر إلى غيره؛ وإن ترجّح أمكن وقوع المرجوح مع الأولويّة في وقتٍ وعدمِه في آخر. فاختصاص أحد الوقتين بالوجود يقتضي الاحتياج إلى سبب غير الأوّل، فلا يجوز أن يكون أحد الطرفين أولى.

والإمكان علّة الاحتياج إلى المؤثّر، لقضاء العقل به عنده وبإنتفائه عند عدمه. ولا يجوز أن يكون هي الحدوث، كما ذهب إليه بعض قدماء المتكلّمين، لأنّه كيفيّة للوجود فيتأخّرُ عنه، والوجود متأخّر عن الإيجاد المتأخّر عن الاحتياج المتأخّر عن علّة الاحتياج؛ فلو كانت هي الحدوث لزم تقدّم الشّيء على نفسه بمراتب.

Appendix

Since it has been established that the reason of the need is possibility, which is established also for permanent things, what is entailed by it is established as well, namely the need for an effective principle. Yet some early theologians maintained that permanent things are independent. They argued that if the effective principle has no effect on them, they are definitely independent, whereas if it does have an effect on them, then either the effect is the existence that had occurred in the first place, with the consequence of bringing about something that already obtains, which is absurd, or the effect is something new, but then the efficiency concerns that which is new, not that which is permanent, and so the permanent is independent.

The answer is to reject the last implication, because what is permanent does need renewed permanence.

تـذنيبٌ

لمّا ثبت أنّ علّة الاحتياج هي الإمكان وهو ثابت للباقي ثبت معلوله، وهو الاحتياج إلى المؤثّر. وذهب بعض قدماء المتكلّمين إلى استغنائه. واحتجّوا بأنّ المؤثّر إن لم يكن له فيه أثرٌ كان مستغنيًا قطعًا؛ وإن كان له أثرٌ فإن كان هو الوجود الحاصل أوّلاً لزم تحصيل الحاصل، وهو محال؛ وإن كان أمرًا جديدًا كان التّأثير في الجديد لا في الباقي، فيكون الباقي مستغنيًا.

والجواب: المنع من الملازمة الأخيرة، لأنّ الباقي مفتقرٌ إلى البقاء الجديد.

Observation II
On the Classification of Existents

المرصد الثّاني
في تقسيم الموجودات وفيه مقصدان

Aim 1: On the Classification According to the Theologians' View

They have said: An existent is either eternal or has come to be, because if its existence does not have a beginning, it is eternal, that is God most high, and if its existence does have a beginning, it has come to be and is something beside Him.

They explained the eternal by saying that it is that which is not preceded by non-existence, and what comes to be as that which is preceded by non-existence. Here there are three investigations.

Investigation 1: On the Investigation Concerning the Eternal

The meaning of our saying 'God most high is eternal' is that even if we postulated infinite moments of time in the past direction, God most high would accompany them. But time cannot be considered as subject to eternity and coming to be, for otherwise time would have another time regressively.[1] Eternity and coming to be are not established attributes but mental considerations, for were this not the case, regress would follow, contrary to ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saʿīd of the Ashʿarites in the case of the first[2] and the Karrāmites in the case of the second.[3]

1 The temporal attributes of eternity and coming to be cannot be attributed to time itself. If time were eternal, in the aforementioned sense of eternity, it would have to accompany an infinite series of past moments of another order of time. Had time come to be, then since we do not have any non-temporal way to distinguish the period before its coming to be from the period after it, there must be a second-order time underlying time. In both cases, the question can be repeated about the second-order time, and so forth *ad infinitum*. Cf. the philosophers' second argument for the eternity of the world in Ghazālī, *Tahāfut* I.1.80, 31. The problem is addressed in a very similar way, albeit slightly more extensively, by Rāzī, *Muḥaṣṣal*, 82. For discussion of similar arguments in Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, see Lammer 2018b, 229-239; and Adamson and Lammer 2020, respectively.

2 This could be ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saʿīd ibn Kullāb who, however, died in 240/855 and thus cannot have been a follower of Ashʿarī. However, Ḥillī most probably draws this mention from Rāzī, *Muḥaṣṣal*, 83, according to whom "ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saʿīd [is] one of us". Perhaps Rāzī counted Ibn Kullāb as one of the Ashʿarites, because of his endorsement of Ashʿarite doctrines *avant la lettre*, such as the reality and eternity of God's attributes. For Ibn Kullāb's theological views, see Bin Ramli 2016, 216-219.

3 The Karrāmīya were a notorious sect mainly active in Khorasan and Afghanistan from the tenth to the thirteenth century. One of the theological doctrines, for which representatives of the school were most maligned, was the idea that God's constant creative involvement with the world is due to temporally occurring (*ḥādith*) changes in Him, which then result in

[المقصد] الأوّل: في التقسيم علي رأي المتكلّمين

قالوا: الموجود إمّا أن يكونَ قديمًا أو مُحدثًا، لأنَه إن لم يكن لوجوده أوّل، فهو القديمُ وهو الله تعالى، وإن كان لوجوده أوّلُ فهو المحدث، وهو ما عداه.

وقد يفسّرون القديمَ بأنَه الّذي لا يسبقه العدمُ، والمحدَث بما سبقه العدم. فها هُنا مباحث ثلاثةٌ:

[البحث] الأوّل: في مباحث القديم

معنى قولنا الله تعالى قديم هو أنَّا لو قدرنا أزمنةً لا نهاية لها في جانب الماضي لكان الله تعالى مصاحبًا لها. ولا يعتبر في القدم والحدوث الزمان وإلّا لكان لِلزّمان زمانٌ آخر ويتسلسل. وليس القدم والحدوث من الصّفات الثّبوتيّة، بل من الاعتبارات الذّهنيّة، وإلا لزم التسلسل؛ خلافًا لعبد الله بن سعيد من الأشعريّة في الأوّل، والكرّاميّة في الثاني.

Investigation 2: On the Propria of the Eternal

What is eternal cannot be traced back to an effective principle that chooses, because an agent by choice acts by means of an intention and a choice, and the intention can only turn towards what does not exist in order to make it exist, not towards what exists. However, what is eternal can be traced back to a necessitating principle, and the conflict between the wise and the theologians is removed by this analysis.[4]

What is eternal cannot not exist, because its non-existence would be either necessary by virtue of its essence or caused, and this either absolutely or due to an eternal condition. But the non-existence of its cause is impossible in all suppositions, and so its non-existence is impossible.[5]

One should not say: Why should it not depend on a pre-eternal privative condition? The pre-eternal condition can cease, because it is privative, and then what is eternal will become non-existent due to the non-existence of its condition.[6] For we say: What entails the existence of the disposition respective to that privation is neither the eternal and what it causes, for they are mutually exclusive, nor its cause, for it is impossible that two contraries emerge from one cause.[7]

temporally occurring (*muḥdath*) created things. Despite the opposite claims of Ibn Kullāb and the Karrāmīya that Ḥillī introduces here, both can be seen to derive from literalist interpretations of the theological doctrine of God's attributes. Hence, the key phrase in Ḥillī's dense presentation is that the attributes are mental considerations (*al-iʿtibārāt al-dhihnīya*) – concepts that, although they are not entirely without foundation in reality, nevertheless do not have distinct things or attributes as their referent.

4 In Avicenna's philosophical theology ("the wise" [*al-ḥukamāʾ*] here refers to the *falāsifa*), God is a creator in the sense that He necessitates (*mūjib*) the world by His essence. No choice (*ikhtiyār*) is involved, for prior to a choice, God would have had to refrain from acting according to His essence, which is inconceivable. It is not entirely clear to me why Ḥillī thinks that the point he has made dissolves the debate between the *falāsifa* and the theologians. Perhaps he means that the debate about the eternity of the world boils down to different views about God.

5 An eternal created thing cannot not exist due to its essence, for that would mean that it is impossible for it to exist at all. It cannot not exist due to an eternal causal condition, for then it would never exist, the condition being always fulfilled. But why could it not become non-existing due to a cause that comes to be in time? Ḥillī does not tell us, but perhaps he thinks that in the infinite past of an eternal thinig, this cause should already have occurred.

6 The underlying presupposition seems to be that a *negative* condition, such as the removal of an obstacle, can both be pre-eternal (*azalī*) and cease to be fulfilled at some point in time – though it is puzzling why exactly negative conditions should be different from positive ones in this regard.

7 Ḥillī argues that the alleged cessation of a negative condition is inexplicable. The cessation cannot be caused by the eternal thing or anything it causes, because nothing can cause the condition of its own non-existence. If we presume that the cause of the eternal thing's existence is also the cause of the sufficient condition of its non-existence, the same principle would cause two contrary things, which is impossible. Since these alternatives are exhaustive, the opponent's argument has been refuted.

البحث الثاني: في خواص القديم

لا يمكن إسناد القديم إلى المؤثّر المختار، لأنّ الفاعل بالاختيار إنّما يفعل بواسطة القصد والاختيار، وإنّما يصحّ توجّه القصد إلى معدوم ليوجده ولا يصحّ توجّهه إلى موجود. نعم يصحّ إسناده إلى الموجِب؛ والتنازع بين الحكماء والمتكلّمين يرتفع بهذا التّفصيل.

والقديم لا يصحّ عليه العدم؛ لأنّه إمّا واجب لذاته أو معلول له مطلقًا أو بشرطٍ قديم؛ وعلى كلّ تقدير يستحيل عدم علّته، فيستحيل عدمُه.

لا يقال: لم لا يتوقّف على شرطٍ عدميٍ أزليٍ، ويجوز زوال الشّرط الأولي، لكونه عدميًّا، فيعدم القديم لعدم شرطه. لأنّا نقول: المقتضي لوجود ملكة ذلك العدم ليس هو القديم ولا معلوله للتنافي بينهما؛ ولا علّته لإستحالة صدور المتنافيين عن علّة واحدة.

The eternal cannot be more than one in number, because the Necessary Existent is one and chooses, as will be elaborated, and all other existing things have come to be.

Investigation 3: On the Propria of What Comes to Be

Since what has come to be exists after not existing, its quiddity is attributed with two things, and so it must be contingent. All that is contingent is in need of another, and so all that has come to be is in need of another.

The ancients established a prior matter and period of time for all that comes to be, because before its existence it is possible, and its possibility has a substrate, for it is not a non-existing quiddity. Hence, there is inevitably a substrate, which is matter. The priority of non-existence entails that in which it occurs, and that is time.

This is an error, first, because possibility is privative, as we have shown in the beginning,[8] for otherwise a regress would follow. Second, matter is contingent, and so it would need another matter, and there would be regress. Third, since matter is different from quiddity whereas possibility is an attribute of quiddity, how can possibility accede to what is different from that to which it is attributed?

When it comes to the priority, it depends on our consideration and is not realised in concrete, for otherwise a regress would follow. Furthermore, several befores and afters accede to time, and if all that is attributed with one of them were in need of time, time would need another time, and there would be regress. If not, then that is what we were seeking.

8 This must be a reference to the elliptic argument in I.2.1.

والقديم لا يجوز أن يكون أكثر من واحد؛ لأنّ واجب الوجود واحدٌ مختارٌ، على ما يأتي، فباقي الموجودات محدثة.

البحث الثالث: في خواصّ المُحدَث

لما كان المحدَث هو الموجود بعد العدم كانت ماهيّته موصوفة بالأمرين، فتكون ممكنةً بالضَرورة، وكلّ ممكن مفتقرٌ إلى غيره، فكلّ محدث مفتقرٌ إلى الغير.

وأثبت الأوائل لكلّ حادث مادّةً ومُدّةً سابقتين عليه؛ لأنّه قبل وجوده ممكن، فلإمكانه محلّ، فليس هو الماهيّة المعدومة، فلا بد من محلّ هو المادّة، وقبليّة العدم تستدعي معروضًا لها، وهو الزّمان.

وهذا خطأ: أمّا أوّلاً، فلأنّ الإمكان عدميّ، لما بيّنا أوّلاً، وإلّا لزم التَسلسل. وأمّا ثانيًا، فلأنّ المادّة ممكنة فتفتقرُ إلى مادّة أخرى، ويتسلسل. وأمّا ثالثًا، فلأنّ المادّة مغايرة للماهيّة، والإمكان صفة للماهيّة، فكيف يصحّ عروضه لغير الموصوف به؟

وأمّا القبليّة فهي أمرٌ اعتباريٌ لا تحقّق له في الأعيان وإلّا لزم التَسلسل. وأيضًا فإنّ الزّمان يعرضُ له قبليّات وبعديّات، فإن افتقر كلّ موصوف بهما إلى زمان افتقر الزّمان إلى زمان آخر ويتسلسل، وإلّا فالمطلوبُ.

Aim 2: On the Classification According to the Ancients' View

What exists either exists necessarily due to its essence, and this is exclusive to God most high, or it exists possibly. This is ten in number: substance, quantity, quality, where, when, the relative, possession, position, acting, and being acted upon.[9]

One of them is a substance and nine are accidents, because the possible either is in a subject, that is, in a substrate that subsists by itself and is independent of what inheres in it, and it is the accident, or it is not but can be in a substrate, which is the substance. If it is a substrate to its like, it is matter, if it inheres, it is form, if it is composed of both, it is a body, and if it is separate, it is a soul when connected to bodies by a connection of governance, and when not, it is an intellect. Hence, substance is existence not in a subject. Matter is a substance that is receptive to form. Form is a substance that is continuous by virtue of its essence and inheres in matter. The body is a substance, which is receptive to the three dimensions that intersect at right angles. The soul is the first perfection of a natural body for potentially having life. The intellect is a substance separate from the body in terms of both inherence and governance.

Quantity is that which is by essence receptive to equality and its privation. It is either continuous, which is a line if it is divisible in one dimension, a plane if it is divisible in two dimensions, a mathematical body if it is divisible in three dimensions, and time if it is not stable, or it is discrete, which is number and nothing else.

Quality is an accident, the conception of which is not based on a conception of another and which has neither division nor non-division in its substrate as its primary entailment. Its species are four. Sensible qualities are passions, if they are firm, and feelings, if they are not. Qualities specific to quantities are either continuous, like straightness and curvedness, or discrete, like evenness and oddness. Qualities of the soul are character traits, if they are firm, and states, if they are not. Dispositional qualities are potencies, if they are in the manner of inciting, and impotencies, if they are not.[10]

9 These are the ten Aristotelian categories. What follows are standard definitions for the central concepts of Peripatetic ontology.

10 A potency in this specific sense is a capacity, the exercise of which is up to the entity to whom it belongs. For instance, I can exercise (or "incite into act") my potency of writing at will.

المقصد الثاني: في التقسيم على رأي الأوائل

الموجود إمّا أن يكونَ واجب الوجود لذاته، وهو الله تعالى خاصّةً، وإمّا أن يكون ممكن الوجود. وهو عشرة: الجوهر والكم والكيف والأين ومتى والمضاف والملك والوضع وأن يفعل وأن ينفعل.

واحدٌ منها جوهرٌ والتسعة أعراضٌ؛ لأنّ الممكن إمّا أن يكون في موضوع، أي في محلّ متقوّم بذاته مستغن عن الحالّ فيه، وهو العرض؛ وإمّا أن لا يكون وجاز أن يكون في محلّ وهو الجوهرُ. فإن كان محلاً لمثله فهو المادّة، وإن كان حالّاً فهو الصّورة، وإن كان مركّبًا منهما فهو الجسم، وإن كان مجرّدًا فهو نفسٌ إن تعلّق الأجسام تعلّق التّدبير؛ وإلّا فعقلٌ. فالجوهر هو الوجود لا في موضوع. والمادّة هي الجوهر القابل (للصّورة). والصّورة هي الجوهر المتّصل لذاته في المادّة. والجسم هو الجوهر القابلُ للأبعاد الثّلاثة المتقاطعة على زوايا قوائم. والنّفس كمالٌ أوّل لجسم طبيعيّ آلي ذي حياة بالقوّة. والعقل جوهرٌ مجرّدٌ عن الجسم حلولاً وتدبيرًا.

والكم هو القابل لذاته المساواةَ وعدمها. وهو إمّا متّصل وهو الخطّ إن انقسم في بعد واحد، والسّطح إن انقسم في بعدين، والجسم التّعليميّ إن انقسم في ثلاثة أبعاد، والزّمان إن لم يكن قارّا؛ وإمّا منفصلٌ هو العدد لا غير.

والكيف هو العرض الذي لا يتوقف تصوّره على تصوّر غيره ولا يقتضي القسمة واللّاقسمة في محلّه اقتضاء أوّليًّا، وأنواعه أربعةٌ: الكيفيّات المحسوسة، فإن كانت راسخةٌ فهي انفعاليّات وإلّا فهي الإنفعالات؛ والكيفيّات المختصّة بالكميّات، إمّا متّصلةٌ كالاستقامة والانحناء وإمّا منفصلةٌ كالزّوجيّة والفرديّة؛ والكيفيّات النّفسانيّة، فإن كانت راسخةٌ فهي الملكات وإلّا فهي الحالات. والكيفيّات الاستعداديّة: فإن كان نحو الدّفع فهو القوّة وإلّا فهو اللاقوّة.

Where is the relation of a thing to its place.

When is the thing's relation to its time or its limit.

The relative is a reciprocated relation.[11]

Possession is the relation of possessing.

Position is the configuration that accedes to a body because of the relation of its parts to one another as well as the relation of its parts to things that are external to it, like standing or being upside down.

Acting is effecting.

Being acted upon is being affected.

The truth is that matter is not established, for otherwise regress would follow.[12] The quantities that are bodies, lines, or planes, are individual substances that will be investigated in detail.[13] When and what follows it belong to relation. If they were asserted as real, regress would follow.[14] The qualities specific to the discrete are derived from asserting it, but it is not asserted, for otherwise it would follow that an accident subsists through two substrates.[15]

11 Strictly speaking, this characterisation of the relative (*muḍāf*) by means of relation (*nisba*) seems circular. However, Ḥillī is making a point familiar from Aristotle (*Cat.* 7, 6b27-7a30): as a category of its own, the relative consists of things that are what they are only in a reciprocal (albeit not necessarily symmetrical) relation to their counterparts.

12 Here Ḥillī begins a series of revisions to Peripatetic ontology by first denying the reality of prime matter. The argument was already given in I.1.3: if matter were real, it would have to be contingent, and as a contingent thing, its possibility would have to be grounded in a more primordial matter, and so forth *ad infinitum*.

13 Cf. III.1 and IV.2.2 below.

14 If position in time were real, there could not be a first moment of time, and thus no beginning to the world's existence, because it would always have a before.

15 Take the number two, that is, a set with two elements. As a quantity, twoness needs a subject in which it exists. The only available candidates are the two elements, neither of which is two on its own. If we suppose that it inheres in both of them together, Ḥillī's problem follows, namely one accident inhering on several substrates. Since discrete quantity is not real, the qualities specific to it cannot be real either. Both depend on the arithmetician's consideration.

والأين نسبة الشّيء إلى مكانه.

والمتى نسبته إلى زمانه أو طرفه.

والمضاف وهو النّسبة المتكرّرة.

والمِلك وهو نسبة التملّك.

والوضع وهو هيئةٌ تعرض للجسم بسبب نسبة أجزائه بعضها إلى بعض، ونسبة أجزائه إلى أمور خارجة عنه، كالقيام والانتكاس.

وأن يفعل وهو التّأثير.

وأن ينفعل وهو التَأثّر.

والحقّ أنّ المادّة ليست ثابتةً، وإلّا لزم التّسلسل. والكمُّ هو الجسم أو الخطُّ أو السّطحُ وهي جواهرُ أفراد يأتي البحثُ فيها. والمتى وما بعده من النّسبيّة؛ لو كانت ثبوتيّةً لزم التّسلسل. والكيفيّات المختصّة بالمنفصل فرع على ثبوته وليس، وإلّا لزم قيام العرض بمحلّين.

Observation III
On Investigating the Classes of Existents

المرصد الثالث
في البحث عن أقسام الموجودات وفيه مباحث

Investigation 1: On the quiddity of body

The theologians maintain that body is made up of isolated substances,[1] each of which has a position, does not allow division either actually or potentially, and is put in a relation such that length, breadth, and depth come to be for it. The wise hold the view that it is made up of matter and form. The investigation of this question relies on whether the part that cannot be partitioned is asserted or denied.

Those who assert it infer on various grounds.

First, time has a past and a future, neither of which exists, and it has a present, but if the present were divisible, then not all of it would be present, and this is preposterous.[2] If it is not divisible, then if motion through it were divided, it follows that it too would be divided, because the time in which half of the motion has taken place is half of the time in which the whole motion has taken place, yet we supposed the time to be indivisible, and this is preposterous. Hence, it has been established that motion taking place in the now is indivisible.[3] The interval, in which that motion takes place in that time, is indivisible, because if it were divided, then the motion to its midpoint would be half of the motion to its end, and the motion that was supposed to be indivisible would be divisible, which is preposterous. Hence, it has been established that there exists an impartitionable part of the interval, which is what was sought for.

1 Here and throughout, it is important to note that the term 'substance' (*jawhar*) denotes two very different kinds of thing, namely the Peripatetic ontological category and the theologians' atom. It is common, and often reasonable, to translate the latter use straightforwardly as 'atom'. I have opted against this, because that hides an important functional similarity between the two kinds of substance: they both denote the ontologically foundational kind, albeit in different metaphysical systems. In this abstract sense, 'substance' means the same thing in both cases.

2 That is, if time were *infinitely* divisible, as the *falāsifa* hold and as the atomist theologians deny, then we could not attribute any duration to the present. Any duration we assume would be further divisible into past, present, and future, and so the time we supposed to be the present would not be present in its entirety. Hence, time is only divisible into atomary units.

3 The argument is somewhat dense, but the last sentence provides the key: we should think about a motion that takes place in the present. If that motion were infinitely divisible, the present would be such as well, and the aforementioned absurdity would follow. The conclusion is that motion, like time, consists of atomary units.

[البحث] الأوّل: في ماهية الجسم

المتكلّمون زعموا أنّ الجسم مؤلّفٌ من جواهر أفراد، (و) كلّ واحد منها ذو وضع لا يقبلُ القسمةَ بالفعل ولا بالقوّة، يتألّفُ على نسبةٍ مّا بحيث يحصل له طولٌ وعرضٌ وعمقٌ. والحكماء ذهبوا إلى أنّه (مؤلف) من المادّة والصّورة. والبحث في هذه المسألة يتوقّفُ على ثبوت الجزء الّذي لا يتجزّئ ونفيه.

وقد استدلّ مثبتوه بوجوده:

الأوّل: أنّ الزّمان منه ماضٍ ومنه مستقبلٌ، وهما معدومان، ومنه حاضرٌ، فإن كان منقسمًا لم يكن كلّه حاضرًا، هذا خُلفٌ. وإن لم يكن منقسمًا فالحركة المقطوعة فيه إن انقسمت لزم انقسامه، لأنّ الزّمان الّذي يقع فيه نصفُ الحركة نصفُ الزّمان الّذي يقع فيه كلّ الحركة، وقد فرضنا الزّمان غير منقسم، هذا خُلفٌ. فثبت أنّ الحركة الواقعةَ في الآن غيرُ منقسمة. فالمسافة الّتي يقع فيها تلك الحركة في ذلك الزّمان غيرُ منقسمة، لأنّها لو انقسمت لكانت الحركة إلى نصفها نصف الحركة إلى آخرها، فتكونُ الحركة الّتي فرضَت غيرَ منقسمةٍ منقسمةً، هذا خُلفٌ، فثبت وجودُ جزء لا يتجزئ من المسافة، وهو المطلوب.

Second, the point is something that has a position but no parts, and if it is a substance, what was sought for has been established. Were it an accident, then if its substrate is divided, it follows that the point is divided, because what inheres in a divisible [thing] is divisible. For if it inheres in all parts of the substrate, it is necessarily divisible, since it is impossible for what inheres in one of two parts to be identical with what inheres in another,[4] and if it inheres in some of the parts, then what we supposed to be a substrate turns out not to be a substrate, and this is preposterous. If, however, the substrate is indivisible, this is what was sought for.

Third, if we posit a perfect sphere on an even plane, it will contact the plane at what is not divisible, for otherwise the plane would be curved. If the sphere rolls so that it ends up elsewhere on the plane, it will have contacted the plane at a point next to the other one, which is what was sought for.

The deniers have argued in various ways.

First, if we posit three substances in contact with one another,[5] and if the one in the middle does not prevent the two outermost ones from touching each other, then interpenetration will result, and it is known to be false. If it does prevent them, then the side touching one of the two outermost ones is different from that touching the other, and division follows as a consequence.

Second, if we suppose a moving sphere that has completed a rotation about itself, then every part supposed on the surface of that sphere will have completed one circle. If we suppose a part on a belt to have moved one indivisible part, then if what is closer to the pole has moved a similar amount, the two circles will be equal, which is necessarily false, but if it has not moved at all, disruption will follow. If it has moved a smaller part of the way, what was sought for will be established.[6]

4 One might think that this part of the argument against the indivisibility of the point's alleged substrate begs the question. The debate is over whether an indivisible accident can inhere in a divisible substrate, but the appeal is to the principle that an accident is divided through the division of its substrate. The opponent could object by saying, for instance, that the division of the substrate simply annihilates the indivisible accident.

5 Throughout these three arguments against atomism, 'substance' denotes the atom.

6 Suppose two different "belts", or sections formed by two parallel planes that intersect a sphere. The circumferences of these sections are different in length, and so when the circle rotates, points on these sections must have travelled different distances, regardless of the duration that we choose for measuring them. Now, if the atomists are right, there must be a shortest possible time and distance the point on the larger section can travel – namely the length of an atom. But then the point on the smaller section must have either travelled a distance shorter than this, which contradicts atomism, or not have moved at all, which breaks the sphere into really distinct sections. As a consequence, atomism cannot be true.

الثاني: إنّ النقطةُ شئٌ ذو وضع لا جزء له، فإن كانت جوهرًا ثبت المطلوبُ، وإن كان عرضًا فمحلهُ إن انقسم لزم انقسامُها، لأنّ الحالّ في المنقسم منقسمٌ، لأنّه إن حلّ في جميع أجزائه كان منقسمًا بالضّرورة، لاستحالة كون الحال في احد الجزأين عين الحال في الآخر، وإن حل في بعضها لم يكن ما فرضنا محلاً بمحلّ، هذا خلفُ؛ وإن كان غيرَ منقسم ثبت المطلوب.

الثالث: إذا وضعنا كرةً حقيقيةً على سطح مستوٍ لاقته بما لا ينقسمُ، وإلّا كانت مضلّعة. فاذا دحرجت حتّى انتهت إلى آخر السّطح كانت ملاقية له بنقطة عقيب أخرى، وهو المطلوب.

واحتج النافون بوجوه:

الأوّل: إذا وضعنا جواهرَ ثلاثةً متماسةً فالوسط إن لم يحجُب الطرفين عن التماس لزم التداخل، وهو معلوم البطلان، وإن يحجبهما كان الجانب الملاقي لأحد الطرفين غيرَ الملاقي للآخر، فيلزم الانقسام.

الثاني: إذا فرضنا كرة متحرّكة أكملت الدّورة على نفسها، فإن كلّ جزء يفرضُ على سطح تلك الكرة قد أكمل دورةً واحدةً، فإذا فرضنا جزءًا على المنطقة تحرّك جزءًا غيرَ منقسم فالقريبُ من القُطب إن تحرّك مثله تساوي المداران، وهو ضروريّ البطلان، وإن لم يتحرّك اصلاً لزم التفكيك، وإن تحرك أقلّ من جزء ثبت المطلوب.

Third, if we suppose a line composed of three substances and then posit at both ends two parts that start moving, they will encounter each other in the middle of the third so that the five turn out to be divisible.

Fourth, the diagonal of a square composed of sixteen parts will consist of four parts. If they are in contact with one another, the diagonal will be equal to the side, and this is preposterous. Should they be disconnected, then if what is between each of every two parts is wide enough for another part, the diagonal will be equal to two sides,[7] but this is preposterous by the donkey theorem,[8] and if it has a smaller extension, divisibility will have been established.

There are other arguments from both sides, which we have recounted in the book *Nihāyat al-marām*.[9]

7 The sum of atoms in the diagonal would of course be seven and not eight, which would be the sum of the sides of a corresponding geometrical square. However, the argument is not concerned with a geometrical square but a square constituted by sixteen atoms. The sum of atoms constituting two adjacent sides of the square is seven, the atom in the corner being counted only once.

8 I have translated *shakl al-ḥimār* somewhat liberally here. This refers to a Euclidian theorem, according to which for any triangle, the sum of any two sides of it is greater than the remaining side. The name 'donkey theorem' probably refers to a later mocking remark by Epicureans, according to whom the theorem needs no proof, since even a donkey knows that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line.

9 In *Nihāyat al-marām* III.1.1.1, II.420-438, Ḥillī goes through fourteen arguments for atomism, together with possible counterarguments and defences. The first and the third argument of our text are included with much more extensive discussion (the first and the second argument in the longer list, respectively), and argument six in the longer list closely resembles our second argument.

الثالث: إذا فرضنا خطاً مركباً من ثلاثة جواهر، ثمّ وضعنا على طرفيه جزأين وتحرّكا تلاقيا على منتصف الثالث، فتقسمُ الخمسة.

الرّابع: المربّع المركّب من ستّة عشر جزءاً يكون قطرهُ من أربعة. فإن تلاقت ساوى القطر الضّلعَ، هذا خلفٌ، وإن تباينت فإن اتّسع ما بين كلّ جزأين الآخر ساوى القطر الضّلعين، هذا خلفٌ بشكل الحمار، وإن اتّسع لأقل ثبت الانقسام، وههنا حججٌ أخرى من الطرفين ذكرناها في كتاب نهاية المرام.

Investigation 2: On Refuting the Arguments of the Wise Concerning Matter

The wise have said:[10] A simple body is one in itself and continuous, for it is impossible that it be composed of isolated substances. There is no doubt that it is receptive of division, which is the privation of continuity from something that should be continuous.[11] If that which is receptive were the continuity, something would be receptive of its own privation, which is absurd, for that which is receptive and that which is received are combined. If it is something else, that is what was sought for, because by matter we mean nothing but that.

Objections are made in a number of ways. The first is denying the unity of the body, and we have already demonstratively established the part which cannot be partitioned. The second is that the known division is only supposed to be established, not such that it really separates. The first does not entail that matter is established, but the second would. Third, combining that which receives and what is received does not have the absolute consequence that the two are combined in existence. Reception of this sort is not based on existence, since what is meant by it is the possibility of attributing something with what it receives, and there is no doubt that a contingent quiddity, insofar as it is such, is different from both existence and non-existence but receptive of both, yet no impossibility follows from that, and similarly here.[12] Fourth, matter is divisible through the division of form. If the division of form needed a substrate, matter would need another matter, and there would be regress.[13]

10 Again, "the wise" refers to Peripatetic philosophers. I have refrained from translating straightforwardly as philosophers in order to differentiate between the terms *ḥākim* and *faylasūf*, the latter of which I translate as 'philosopher'.

11 I translate *min shaʾnihi* somewhat loosely as "should be". The Arabic idiom is used in connection with features that something ought to have by virtue of its essence, but it is free of explicit references to essentialist terminology. Thus, a dysfunctional eye is blind only because it should be seeing by virtue of its essence, but does not see because of circumstantial factors. Rocks are not blind because they should not be seeing to begin with.

12 Ḥillī is trying to turn the Avicennian idea of the neutrality of quiddity with respect to existence and non-existence against the philosophers' argument for matter. It seems to me that the counterargument relies on the ambiguity of the Arabic word *ʿadam*, which is used to mean both the Aristotelian concept of privation (Gr. *sterēsis*), or the non-being of a specific attribute, and non-existence in an absolute sense. The philosophers' argument for matter is based on the former, Ḥillī's counterargument on the latter. His idea is that since quiddities are neutral with respect to existence and non-existence, the quiddity of continuity should be able to receive its non-existence, even if this means division, its specific non-existence.

13 This argument is puzzlingly weak. It may be true that real divisions of matter always take

البحث الثّاني: في إبطال حجّة الحكماء في المادّة

قالت الحكماء الجسم البسيط واحد في نفسه متصل لا ستحالة تركّبه من الجواهر الأفراد. ولا شكّ في أنّه قابل للقسمة، وهي عدم الاتّصال عمّا من شأنه أن يكون متّصلاً. فالقابل إن كان هو الاتّصال كان الشّيء قابلاً لعدمه، وهو مُحالٌ لاجتماع القابل والمقبول، وإن كان شيئًا آخر فهو المطلوب لأنّا لا نعني بالمادّة سواه.

والاعتراض من وجوه. الأوّل المنع من وحدة الجسم، وقد برهنا على ثبوت الجزء الّذي لا يتجزى. الثاني إنّ الانقسام المعلوم ثبوته إنّما هو الفرضيّ دونَ الانفكاكيّ. والأوّل لا يقتضي ثبوت المادّة، بل الثّاني. الثالث لا يلزم من اجتماع القابل والمقبول مطلقًا اجتماعهما في الوجود؛ فإن مثل هذا القبول لا يتوقفُ على الوجود؛ إذ المراد به إمكان اتّصاف الشّيء بمقبوله، ولا شكّ في أنّ الماهيّة الممكنة من حيث هي هي مغايرةٌ للوجود والعدم وقابلة لهما، ولا يلزم من ذلك استحالةٌ فكذا هنا. الرّابع المادّة تنقسمُ بانقسام الصورة. فلو افتقر انقسام الصّورة إلى محلّ افتقرت المادّة إلى مادّة أخرى وتسلسل.

Investigation 3: On Accidents

Accidents need either a substrate but nothing else, and these are the sensible qualities and modes of being,[14] or a substrate *and* a structure,[15] and these are life and what is conditioned by it. There are nine of them: power, belief, opinion, reflection, will, disgust, desire, aversion, and pain and pleasure, these two being of one species.

When it comes to sensible accidents, they are through sight, namely light and colour, or hearing, namely sounds and letters, or taste, namely flavours, or smell, namely fragrances, or touch, namely heat and coldness, moistness and dryness, heaviness and lightness, and softness and hardness. When it comes to the modes of being, they are motion, rest, combination, and separation.

Let us now treat assertively, albeit in a concise manner, various questions concerning each of these classes.

Question 1: On Those That Are Seen

These are two by essence, light and colour. As regards light, it is said to be a body, because it is moved by the motion of that which illuminates. This is mistaken, because bodies are equal in terms of corporeality but differ in terms of whether or not they illuminate. Furthermore, motion is precluded, and instead, light appears anew whenever there is something new that encounters it.[16]

place through forms – for instance, when a sphere is divided, two hemispheres come into being. However, this does not mean that the hemispheres have second-order matter that subsists on the sphere's first-order matter, which is precisely what is required to yield an infinite regress of matters from infinite divisibility. Instead, it is the same first-order matter, albeit in smaller increments with each actualised division, that functions as the substrate and thereby the necessary condition of division.

14 The phrase 'mode of being' translates the Muʿtazilite technical term *kawn*, which Frank 1978, 93-104, renders as 'presence in space'. It is an attribute proper to the atoms, which by nature occupy some spatial position. Thus, the term could naturally be translated as 'mode of being in space', a choice which would also be corroborated by the fact that the term for space, *makān*, is derived from the same root. However, because the theologians sometimes explicitly speak of an atom's *kawn* in a *makān*, I have refrained from this explanatory translation, but the reader should bear in mind that in this context, 'mode of being' signifies exclusively the atoms' modes of being, that is, modes of being in space.

15 This structure (*binya*) is a specific arrangement of atoms that some accidents require.

16 This point about motion is unclear to me, but perhaps the idea is that if light were in motion, it could not appear immediately on a new surface, regardless of the distance between that surface and the source of light.

البحث الثالث: في الاعراض

العرض إمّا أن يفتقر إلى المحلّ لا غير، وهي الكيفيّات المحسوسة والأكوان، وإمّا أن يفتقر إلى المحلّ والبنية، وهوالحياة وماهومشروط بها، وهوتسعةٌ: القدرة والاعتقاد والظنّ والنّظر والإرادة والكراهة والشّهوة والنّفرة والألم واللّذة وهمامن نوع واحد.

وأمّا المحسوسات فإمّا بالبصر وهوالضّوء واللّون، وإمّا بالسّمع وهي الأصوات والحروف، وإما بالذّوق وهي الطعوم، وإمّا بالشّمّ وهي الرّوائح، وإمّا باللّمس وهي الحرارة والبرودة والرّطوبة واليبوسة والثّقل والخّفة واللّين والصّلابة. وأمّا الأكوان فهو الحركة والسّكون والاجتماع والافتراق.

فلنبحث عن كّل واحد من هذه الأقسام على سبيل الاختصار في مطالب.

المطلب الأوّل: في المبصرات

وهي بالذّات شيئان، الضوء واللّون. أمّا الضّوء فقيل إنّه جسمٌ لتحرّكه بحركة المضيء وهوخطأ لتساوي الأجسام في الجسميّة واختلافها في الإضاءة وعدمها والحركة ممنوعة بل يتجدّد بتجدّد المقابلة. وقيل إنّه اللّون.

It is also said to be colour and it is said to be its appearance, such that absolute appearance is light and absolute concealment darkness, and what is in between is shadow. This is mistaken, because illumination is common to black and white yet they differ by their quiddities.[17] The truth is, rather, that light is a simple quality on an opaque body and comes to be at an encounter with that which illuminates, and that both the first and the second, that is, the shadow, are from it.[18] As regards darkness, it is the privation of light from what should be luminous. Some of the Ashʿarites say that darkness is positively existing, because it is sensed, but the minor premise is false.[19]

As regards colour, according to the Muʿtazilites it is the genus of black, white, red, yellow, and green, and they have rendered the remaining colours composites of these. Al-Balkhī[20] has also asserted the colour of dust. Some of the ancients held pure colour to be black, and when it came to white, it was imagined to be due to the mixture of air with small transparent bodies, like in the cases of snow or the foam on water, but this is an error, because white is sensed and therefore positively existing. Indeed, some of its causes may be those, but they may also be something else, like in the case of the whiteness of a boiled egg, for it is seen to be white, although fire has not brought airiness into it, given that it is heavier after the boiling.

The two masters[21] concur that it is within God's, high is He, power to add to the five colours. The individuals of each genus resemble each other, and so the appearance sensed of one of two blacks is sensed of the other. These genera are opposed to each other. When it comes to black and white, they are opposed in an absolute sense, whereas the others are opposed, if extreme difference is not posited as a condition for two opposites. Al-Murtaḍā[22] and a group among the ancients allowed the combination of black and white, for instance in dust.

17 It is unclear to me why this should be a valid argument against the claim that light is colour. If light were the genus for both black and white, like colour is, they could still differ by having distinct differentiae.

18 That is, both of the two alleged types of seen light (colour, or the qualified appearance of light, and shadow, or the intermediate state between absolute light and absolute darkness) are effects of light, not light itself.

19 That is, the premise that darkness is sensed. The idea is that as a privation, darkness is inferred from *not* seeing light, but it is not seen as such.

20 Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d. 319/931), also known as al-Kaʿbī, was the head of the Baghdad Muʿtazilites in the early tenth century CE.

21 The two masters are the two Jubbāʾīs, father and son (see nn. 14 and 22).

22 Abū l-Qāsim ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044) was an important Shīʿī theologian.

وقيل ظهوره، فالظهور المطلق هو الضّوء والخفاء المطلق هو الظلمة والمتوسّط هو الظلّ؛ وهو خطأ لاشتراك السّواد والبياض في الإضاءة واختلافهما بماهيّتهما. بل الحقّ أنّه كيفيّة منبسطة على الجسم الكثيف يحصل عند مقابلة المضيء ومنه أوّل وثان هو الظلّ. وأمّا الظلمةُ فهي عدم الضّوء عمّا من شأنه أن يكون مضيئًا. وقال بعض الأشاعرة إنّها وجوديّة لأنّها محسوسة، والصّغرى كاذبة.

وأمّا اللّون فعند المعتزلة أنّه جنسٌ للسّواد والبياض والحمرة والصّفرة والخضرة، وجعلوا البواقي مركّبة منها. وأثبت البلخيّ الغُبرةَ. وبعض الأوائل جعل الخالص هو السّواد، وأمّا البياضُ فإنّه يتخيّل عند مخالطة الهواء للأجسام الشّفّافة الصّغيرة كما في زَبَدِ الماء والثّلج، وهو خطأ لأنّه محسوس فيكون وجوديًّا. نعم قد يكون بعض أسبابه ذلك وقد يكون غيره كما في بياض البيض المسلوق، فإنّه يرى أبيض مع أنّ النّار لم تحدث فيه هوائيّة لأنّه بعد الطبخ أثقل.

واتّفق الشّيخان على تجويز زائد على الخمسة في مقدوره تعالى. وأشخاصُ كلّ جنس متماثلةٌ، فإنّ الهيئة المحسوسة من أحد السّوادين هي المحسوسة من الآخر. وهذه الأجناسُ متضادّةٌ. أمّا السّوادُ والبياضُ فمطلقًا وأمّا البواقي فإذا لم يشرط في الضّدّين غايةُ الاختلاف. وجوّز المرتضى وجماعةٌ من الأوائل اجتماعَ السّواد والبياض كما في الغبرة.

Colour does not need a structure, *pace* al-ʿAllāf,[23] for otherwise it would be lacking when the structure ceases through crushing. It is not within our power, for otherwise we could change our colours to what we want. The implication requires reflection, because it is possible that His, high is He, power applies to our colours, and resisting Him is impossible to us.[24] Some of the Baghdadians[25] say that colour is within our power, because when we strike the body of a living being, red becomes apparent, just as pain comes into existence. Hence, it is necessarily generated from the strike. This is undermined by saying that that is the red of the blood insofar as it is drawn by the strike, but it is not generated thereby, because the generating causes are familiar and what has generated it is not among them.[26]

The Baghdadians maintain that it is generated from another, persisting colour,[27] based on the judgment that what we witness later is what we witnessed earlier,[28] and that its existence is not dependent on light, *pace* Avicenna, based on the decisive judgment that colour persists in the dark. He has argued that we do not see it in the dark, and this is not because what is dark has a quality that precludes seeing, for otherwise a distant and a close fire would be equally unseen at night. Since the consequent is false, the antecedent is likewise, and all that remains is that this is due to the privation of colour. [29]

The answer is to reject the restriction of alternatives. Instead, not being seen is due to the lack of a condition, which is light.

23 This is Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. *ca* 226/841), one of the most important early Muʿtazilites.

24 In other words, Abū l-Hudhayl's argument is not decisive, because it leaves open the possibility that colours are indeed "naturally" subject to our power, were it not that God has decided to overrule our power with His.

25 That is, Baghdad Muʿtazilites.

26 The generating causes (*asbāb muwallida*) are accidents endowed with the power of causing other accidents. Note that Ḥillī is here using the Muʿtazilites' own doctrine to refute them, not necessarily committing himself to their view of the generating causes.

27 This is a further attempt, related to the argument above, at explaining in what sense redness is indeed brought into being by the drawing of blood. Concealed in the veins, blood is not red, for the appearance of red is generated from the blood's inherent colour once blood is drawn. The active cause of drawing blood, and thereby of the blood's appearance as red, is the strike.

28 The idea might be that once blood coagulates and becomes black, its inherent colour becomes visible again. Since there is no change in light, the cause of the blood's redness is the blood's being drawn by the strike.

29 Cf. Avicenna, *Shifāʾ: Nafs* III.1, 92-94. Since colour is a qualification of light, it is actual only when there is light. The material properties of opaque bodies of course do determine the kind of colour light receives when it is reflected from the bodies, but those properties themselves are not colours.

ولا يفتقرُ اللّونُ إلى البنية خلافًا للعلّاف، وإلّا لنقص عند زوال البنية بالسّحق. وليس مقدورًا لنا وإلّا لأمكننا تغييرُ ألواننا إلى ما نشتهيه. وفي الملازمة نظرٌ لجواز أن يتعلّق قدرته تعالى بألواننا، ويتمنعُ منّا مقاومته. وقال بعضُ البغداديين إنّه مقدورٌ لنا لأنّا نضربُ جسما لحيّ فيظهر حمرةٌ، كما يوجد ألمٌ. فيجبُ تولّدهما عن الضّرب. ويُضعّفُ بأنّ تلك حمرةُ الدّم حيث انزعج بالضّرب ولا يقع متولّدًا، إذ الأسباب المولّدة معروفةٌ وليس منها ما يولّده.

وذهب البغداديّون إلى أنّه متولّدٌ عن غيره من الألوان وهو باق؛ للحكم بأنّ ما شاهدناه ثانيًا هو ما شاهدناه أوّلاً، ولا يتوقفُ وجوده على الضّوء خلافًا لابن سينا، للحكم القطعيّ ببقاء اللون في الظلمة. احتجّ بأنّا لا نراه في الظلمة، وليس [كذلك]؛ لأنّ المظلم فيه كيفيّةٌ مانعةٌ عن الإبصار وإلّا لتساوى البعيدُ من النّار والقريبُ منها ليلاً في عدم الرّؤية، والتّالي باطلٌ فكذا المقدّم، فلم يبق إلّا لعدمه.

والجواب منعُ الحصر، بل عدمُ الرؤية لعدم الشّرط الّذي هو الضوء.

Question 2: On Sounds and Letters

Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām[30] maintained that sound is a body that comes to an end by motion and it is heard when it is transmitted to the ear. This is an error, for corporeality as well as being tangible and visible are common to bodies, but sound is not like that.

It is said that sound is hard bodies colliding, being torn or being struck, or undulation of the air. All of that is false, because collision and being struck are kinds of contact, whereas being torn is separation, and undulation is motion, and all those are visible, unlike sound. Yes, its cause is the undulation of air, albeit not in the sense of a certain volume of air being transmitted, but as a state that resembles the incessant undulation of water, one collision after another accompanied by one rest after another. The cause of undulation is a violent contact, that is, a strike, or a violent separation, that is, being torn. This is within our power, for it emerges at our will, although we only perform it due to a cause, namely a tendency.

Sound cannot persist, for otherwise we would perceive it a second and a third time. Hearing 'Zayd' would not be more appropriate than hearing the other five permutations of the letters.[31] Sensing it depends on the arrival of the air that carries it on the membrane of the eardrum, because the voice of the muezzin from the minaret inclines from one direction to another when winds are blowing. It is said against this that either the carrier of each letter is each part of the air, in which case one who is delivering a speech would have to be heard repeatedly by one hearer, in order that the many parts of air are conveyed to the latter's eardrum, or the carrier is the air as a whole, but then the speech would be heard at one instant by only one hearer, because the whole is transferred at one instant to only one hearer. Moreover, it would be transferred in a changed form to a hearer behind a wall, when the wall is hit.[32]

30 Abū Iṣḥāq Ibrāhīm ibn Sayyār ibn Hāniʾ al-Naẓẓām (d. *c.* 220–30/835–845) was an early Muʿtazilite theologian.

31 This is a rather strange argument, but the point seems to be that if sounds were not fleeting but persistent, the phonemes of the word 'Zayd' (*z-y-d*) could be perceived in any of their six possible permutations. The argument is spelled out in slightly greater detail in *Nihāyat al-marām* II.2.3.2.2.4.1.5, I.569. It is not clear to me why persistence of sound should annihilate the initial temporal order in which the phonemes were initially produced.

32 The last point seems to hinge on the idea that if sound were air in motion, it would be impossible for any two persons to hear the same sound at exactly the same time, because one's place as well as the intervening objects would affect the air's motion – which seems sound in terms of physical acoustics, although the differences are often imperceptibly small.

المطلب الثّاني: في الأصوات والحروف

ذهب إبراهيم النّظّام إلى أنّ الصّوت جسمٌ ينقطعُ بالحركة، تسمعهُ بانتقاله إلى الأُذن. وهو خطأٌ، فإنّ الأجسام مشتركةٌ في الجسميّة وفي كونها ملموسةً ومبصرةً، وليس الصّوتُ كذلك.

وقيل إنّه اصطكاك الأجسام الصّلبة أو القلع أو القرع أو تموّجُ الهواء، والكلّ باطلٌ؛ فإنّ الاصطكاك والقرع مماسَةٌ والقلع تفريقٌ والتّموّجَ حركةٌ، وكلّ ذلك مبصرٌ بخلاف الصّوت. نعم سببه تموّج الهواء، لا بمعنى انتقال هواء معيّن، بل حالةٌ شبيهةٌ بتموّج الماء الحاصل بالتّدارك، لصدم بعد صدمٍ مع سكون بعد سكون. وسبب التّموّج إمساسٌ عنيفٌ هو القرع أو تفريقٌ عنيفٌ هو القلع، وهو مقدورٌ لنا لصدوره باختيارنا وإن كنّا لا نفعله إلّا بسببٍ هو الاعتماد.

ويستحيلُ بقاؤه وإلّا لأدركناه في الزّمن الثّاني والثّالث، ولم يكن سماعُ زيد أولى من أن يسمع على سائر تقاليب حروفه الخمسة ويتوقّفُ الإحساسُ به على وصول الهواء الحامل له إلى سطح الصّماخ، لميل صوت المؤذّن على المنارة من جانب إلى آخر عندَ هبوب الرّياح. وقيل بالمنع؛ لأنّ حامل كلّ واحد من الحروف إمّا كلُّ واحد من أجزاء الهواء، فيجبُ في من تكلّم بكلمة أن يتكرّر سماعُها للسّامع الواحد بأن تتأدّى إلى صماخِه أجزاء كثيرةٌ من الهواء، أو المجموعُ؛ فكان لا يسمع الكلام دفعةً واحدةً إلّا سامعٌ واحدٌ؛ لأنّ المجموعَ لا ينتقلُ دفعةً إلّا إلى سامع واحد، وللسّامع من وراء الجدران مع تغيير الشّكل عند صدم الجدار.

Some sounds resemble each other, some differ from each other. They differ in terms of opposition. The two masters maintained that there is opposition in what differs in terms of sound, but Qāḍī l-Quḍāt[33] and Abū ʿAbdillāh[34] hesitated about that. When air undulates and a body, such as a mountain or a smooth wall, resists that undulation, so that it rejects the undulation by sending it back with the same form as the first undulation and in the same configuration, a sound comes to be from that, namely the echo.

When it comes to the phoneme, it is a configuration which accedes upon sound and through which another sound is aurally distinguished from its like in terms of sharpness and weight. Phonemes are either voiced, which are prolonged and soft phonemes and with which one cannot begin, or they are silent, which are other than those.

Speech is composed of phonemes that are organised into a specific relation. The two masters differ, for Abū Hāshim says that speech is a specific sound, whereas Abū ʿAlī says that it is added to sound. He maintains that speech remains after the sound and asserts that it is heard when sound is connected to it. The Ashʿarites maintain that speech is a meaning in the soul, and subsists through the speaker, either manifestly or hidden. The Kullābites[35] assert a hidden but not manifest speech in the soul.

According to Abū Hāshim, an idea is concealed speech, which God produces in the hearing of the subject or which the angel produces at His order, high is He. Abū ʿAlī's statement is different, for he sometimes makes the idea to be a thought, while in other cases he says that it is a belief, and sometimes that it is an opinion, but he rejects its being speech.

A wish, according to Abū Hāshim, is a meaning that exists in the soul, whereas according to Abū ʿAlī, it is a specific statement, which inevitably includes belief and intention, so that if someone says, 'if only such and such were the case', he both believes that he would benefit from it and intends this statement, for it is thereby that he wishes. The foundation is a statement and what is beside it is a condition, because the people of language have included it among the classes of speech.[36]

33 This is Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), the towering figure of late Muʿtazilism who served as the chief judge (*qāḍī l-quḍāt*) of the province of Rayy during his career.

34 This is probably the prominent Shīʿī theologian al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022).

35 Kullābīya refers to the followers of Ibn Kullāb, a pre-Ashʿarī critic of the Muʿtazilites (see p. 34, n. 2).

36 The "people of language" (*ahl al-lugha*) may mean either a linguistic community, that is, the speakers of a language, or experts in the science concerning language. In any case, it denotes people with authority in matters concerning a language, either because of their experience as native speakers or because of their scientific learning. For the same term in Ḥillī's jurisprudential works, see Gleave 2012, 41-44.

وفي الأصوات متماثلٌ ومختلفٌ. واختُلف في التّضاد. فذهب الشّيخان إلى تضادّ ما اختلف فيها وتوقّف قاضي القضاة وأبو عبد الله في ذلك، وإذا تموّج الهواء وقاوم ذلك التّموّجَ جسمٌ كجبل أو جدار أملس بحيثُ يردّ ذلك التموّج بصرفه إلى خلف، ويكون شكله شكل الأوّل، وعلى هيئته حدث من ذلك صوتٌ هو الصّدى.

وأمّا الحرف، فهو هيئة عارضةٌ للصّوت يتميّز بها صوت آخر مثله في الحِدّة والثّقل تميّزًا عن المسموع. وهو إمّا مُصوّتٌ وهو حروف المدّ واللّين ولا يمكن الابتداء بها؛ وإمّا صامتٌ وهو ما عداها.

والكلام المركّب هو الحروف المنتظمة على نسبة مخصوصة. واختلف الشّيخان، فقال أبو هاشم إنّه هو الأصوات المخصوصة، وقال أبو علي إنّه رائدٌ على الأصوات، وذهب إلى بقاء الكلام دونَ الصّوت وأثبته مسموعًا عند مقارنة الصّوت له. وذهبت الأشاعرة إلى أنّ الكلام معنىً في النّفس قائمٌ بالمتكلّم شاهدًا أو غائبًا. والكلابيّة أثبتوا الكلام النفساني غائبًا لا شاهدًا.

والخاطر عند أبي هاشم كلامٌ خفيٌّ يفعله الله في داخل سمع المكلّف، أو يفعله الملك بأمره تعالى. واختلف قول أبي عليّ فتارةً جعله فكرًا وأخرى إنّه اعتقادٌ، وتارةً إنّه ظنٌّ، ومنه من كونه كلامًا.

والتّمنّي عند أبي هاشم معنىً يوجد في النّفس، وعند أبي عليّ إنه قول مخصوصٌ لا بدَّ فيه من اعتقاد وقصد؛ فإن من قال «ليت كان كذا» واعتقد أنّه كان ينتفع به وقصد إلى هذا القول؛ فإنّه متمنّ. والأصلُ هو القولُ، وما عداه شرط؛ لأنّ أهل اللغة عدّوه من أقسام الكلام.

Appendix

The two masters differ, and Abū ʿAlī as well as Abū al-Hudhayl say that narration is what is narrated, because they made speech to be a persisting meaning that is different from sound, making 'reading' to mean the sound and 'what is read' to mean the persisting letter, and said that this that is heard is identical with what God most high brought into existence.[37]

Abū ʿAlī asserted speech to exist in a substrate through another, just as he made the existence of a substance in an area to require another. He said: If it is recited, it exists with sound, if it is memorised, it exists with memory, and if it is written, it exists with writing. Hence, he asserted speech with memory and writing just as he asserted it with recitation, because if what is heard were different from what God most high brought into existence, the miracle would be annihilated, for one of us would have the power of performing something similar.[38]

Abū Hāshim said that narration is not what is narrated, because speech does not persist, and so what is heard is not what God most high brought into existence. If narration were what is narrated, then one who narrates about fire would burn, and if there were speech in what is written, it would be heard, and likewise for preservation.

Question 3: On Flavours and Fragrances

A body may lack flavour either really or with regard to sensation, such that even if it had flavour in itself, due to the high degree of its density nothing dissolves from it that would mingle with the tongue. If one manages to dissolve and refine its parts, one will sense its flavour, like in the cases of copper and iron, and such a body is called bland. Alternatively, a body may have a flavour.

37 Here 'reading' (*al-qirāʾa*) means the reading of the Qurʾān. The discussion concerns the early theological question about the relation between God's word and its human recitation.

38 Speech here is the speech of God in the revealed text, which is why its miraculousness is an issue. However, the theory about the relation of meaningful speech to its various modes of reproduction holds more generally. The point is to have a theory of speech that is applicable both to ephemeral speech acts and the theologically loaded case.

تـــذنيبٌ

اختلف الشّيخان، فقال أبو عليّ وأبو الهذيل الحكاية هي المحكيّ؛ لأنهما جعلا الكلام معنىً باقيًا غيرَ الصّوت، وجعلا المراد بالقراءة الصّوتَ وبالمَقرُوِّ الحرف الباقي، وقالا بأنّ هذا المسموع نفس ما أوجده الله تعالى.

وأثبت أبو عليّ الكلامَ موجودًا في المحلّ بغيره كما أوجب وجودَ الجوهر في جهة بغيره، وقال إذا كان متلوًّا وجد مع الصّوت، وإذا كان محفوظًا فمع الحفظ، وإذا كان مكتوبًا فمع الكتابة. فأثبت مع الحفظ والكتابة كلامًا كما أثبته مع التّلاوة، لأنّ المسموع لو كان غير ما أوجده الله تعالى لبطلت المعجزة، إذ كان أحدُنا قادرًا على الإتيان بمثله.

وقال أبو هاشم الحكايةُ غيرُ المحكيّ؛ لأنّ الكلام غيرُ باقٍ، فالمسموعُ غيرُ ما أوجده الله تعالى. ولو كانت الحكاية هي المحكيّ لكان من حكى من النّار محترقًا، ولو كان في المكتوب كلامٌ لكان مسموعًا، وكذا الحفظ.

المـــطلب الثالث: في الطـعوم والرّوائح

الجسم إمّا أن يكونَ عديمَ الطعم إمّا حقيقةً أو حسًّا بأن يكونَ له طعمٌ في نفسه، لكنّه لشدّة تكاثفه لا يتحلّلُ منه شيءٌ يخالط اللّسان. فإذا احتيل في تحليل أجزائه وتلطيفها أُحسّ طعمه، مثل النُحاس والحديد، ويسمّى التَّفِه؛ وإمّا أن يكون ذا طعم.

The simple flavours are eight, because the body that carries flavour is subtle, dense, or balanced, and what is efficient in the three is heat, coldness, or a potency balanced between the two.[39] If the hot acts on the dense, hotness comes into being, if it acts on the subtle, pungency comes into being, and if its acts on the balanced, saltiness comes into being. If the cold acts on the dense, acridity comes into being, if it acts on the subtle, sourness comes into being, and if it acts on the balanced, astringency comes into being. If the balanced acts on the dense, greasiness comes into being, if it acts on the subtle, sweetness comes into being, and if it acts on the balanced, blandness comes into being. The Muʿtazilites made the simple ones to be five: sweetness, sourness, bitterness, saltiness, and pungency.

Two flavours may be combined in one body, like bitterness and astringency in the state of decay, and it is called repugnance, bitterness and saltiness in a salty lake, and it is called tainted, bitterness, pungency and saltiness in the eggplant, or bitterness and blandness in the endive.

Flavours are not within our power, and they can persist.

The Qāḍī l-Quḍāt made it a condition of perceiving flavour that the palate must touch the substrate of the flavour, but Abū Hāshim and Abū ʿAbdillāh did not make that a condition. According to their statement, even if a flavour exists without a substrate, it can be perceived, *pace* the Qāḍī.

When it comes to fragrances, no name has been posited for their species, except with respect to approval and disapproval, so that it is said, 'a fragrance is pleasant or foul', or a name has been derived for them from associated tastes, so that it is said, 'a fragrance is sweet or sour', or it is related to the substrate, so that it is said, 'the fragrance of musk or camphor'. There is similarity and opposition between fragrances.

39 It is unclear why there should be eight basic tastes when nine classes are arithmetically derivable from these two sets of three principles, as below.

وبسائطُ الطعوم ثمانيةٌ؛ لأنَّ الجسمَ الحاملَ للطّعم إمّا أن يكونَ لطيفًا أو كثيفًا أو معتدلاً. والفاعل في الثلاثة إمّا الحرارة أو البرودة أو القوّة المعتدلة بينهما. فالحارّ إن فعل في الكثيف حدثت الحرارة، وإن فعل في اللّطيف حدثت الحرافة، وإن فعل في المعتدل حدثت الملوحة. والبارد إن فعل في الكثيف حدثت العفوصةُ، وإن فعل في اللّطيف حدثت الحموضةُ، وإن فعل في المعتدل حدث القبضُ. والمعتدل إن فعل في اللّطيف حدثت الدّسومة، وإن فعل في الكثيف حدثت الحلاوةُ، وإن فعل في المعتدل حدثت التّفاهةُ. والمعتزلة جعلوا البسائط خمسةً: الحلاوة والحموضة والمرارة والملوحة والحرافة.

وقد يجتمع طعمان في جسم واحد، كالمرارة والقبض في الحُضض ويسمّى البشاعة، والمرارة والملوحة في السّبخة ويسمّى الزّعوقة، والمرارة والحرافة والقبض في الباذنجان، والمرارة والتّفاهة في الهِندبا.

وليست الطعوم مقدرةً لنا ويصحّ عليها البقاء.

وشرط قاضي القضاة في إدراك الطعم مماسّة اللّهاة لمحلّ الطعم، ولم يشرط أبو هاشم وأبو عبد الله ذلك. فعلى قولهما لو وجد طعمٌ في محلّ يصحُ إدراكه، خلافًا للقاضي.

أمّا الرّوائحُ فإنّها لم توضع لأنواعها اسم إلّا من جهة الموافقة والمخالفة، فيقال رائحةٌ طيّبةٌ ومنتِنَةٌ، أو يشتقّ لها من الطعوم المقارنة لها اسمٌ فيقال رائحةٌ حلوةٌ وحامضةٌ، أو يُضافُ إلى المحلّ فيقال رائحةُ المسك أو الكافور. وفيها متماثلٌ ومتضادٌّ.

Question 4: On Heat and Coldness

One of the properties of heat is vaporisation, and from that there happens the concentration of similar composite things and the separation of different composite things. If the cohesion is strong, a circular motion is generated when the subtle and the coarse are equal, but when the subtle predominates, it is evaporated, and when the coarse predominates greatly, the fire will not be able to soften it, like in the case of talc, otherwise the fire will have the effect of softening it, like in the case of iron. Other properties of heat are blackening of the moist and whitening of the dry, and the acquisition of stability, like in the case of the egg white. According to experience, heat is generated by motion. It is not a consequence of the elements becoming fire, because there is no receptivity in the celestial spheres.[40]

Some people among the ancients maintained that coldness is the privation of heat. It is an error, because we perceive coldness in a body as a quality that is added to corporeality, whereas privation is not perceivable. Instead, coldness is a positively existing quality that is opposed to heat.

There is disagreement among the Muʿtazilites concerning whether the two are subject to our power, and likewise concerning their persistence. According to them, no sense is needed to perceive either of them, a substrate of life suffices for this. Heat is said of what is sensed due to its warmth, like fire, as well as of that from which a quality becomes manifest due to an encounter with the body of an animal, like food or medicine, heat being a genus for that which is in fire and in the animal body, and it is emanated from the celestial bodies.

Question 5: On Moistness and Dryness

Water, which is attributed with moistness, has two attributes. The first of them is the quality due to which it easily attaches to and detaches from another. The second is the quality due to which it is easily shaped by an extraneous container and easily leaves it behind. Moistness has been explained by each of the two attributes. The first is refuted by their statement that air is moist by nature, for it does not attach to another, and the second by fire, for it has this attribute but is not moist. Dryness is said to be the quality, which resists the reception of extrinsic shapes. The two are mutually opposed.

40 In *De caelo* II.7, 289a19-21, Aristotle argues that the heat in the celestial spheres and bodies, such as the Sun, must be due to the only kind of change they allow, that is, their rotation. It cannot be due to fire, because the celestial spheres are not constituted of the four elements.

المطلب الرّابع: في الحرارة والبرودة

من خواصّ الحرارة التصعيدُ، فيعرض من ذلك الجمعُ بين المتماثلات، والتّفريق بين المختلفات من المركّبات، ولوكان الالتحام شديدًا حدثت حركةٌ دوريّةٌ إن تساوى اللّطيف والكثيف، وإن غلب اللّطيف تَصَعَّدَ، وإن غلب الكثيف جدًّا لم تقو النّار على تليينه كالطلق، وإلّا أثّرت في تليينه كالحديد؛ وتسويدُ الرّطب وتبييضُ اليابس. وإفادةُ القوام كما في بياض البيض وقد تَحدث بالحركةِ للتّجربة. ولا يلزم صيرورةُ العناصر نارًا، لعدم القبول في الفلكيّات.

وزعم قومٌ من الأوائل أنّ البرودة عدمُ الحرارة وهو خطأ؛ لأنّا نُدرك من الجسم البارد كيفيّةً زائدةً على الجسميّة والعدم لا يدركُ، بل هي كيفيّة وجوديّة مُضادّةً للحرارة.

وفي كونهما مقدورتين لنا خلافٌ بين المعتزلة وكذا في بقائهما. ولا يحتاج في إدراكهما إلى حاسّة عند هم، بل يكفي فيه محلّ الحياة. والحارّ يقال لِما يُحَسُّ بسخونته كالنّار، ولِما يكونُ ظهور الكيفيّة منه موقوفًا على ملاقاة بدن الحيوان كالغذاء والدّواء والحرارة جنسٌ للّتي في النّار وفي بدن الحيوان والفائضةِ عن الأجرام الفلكيّة.

المطلب الخامس: في الرّطوبة واليبوسة

الماء الموصوف بالرّطوبة له وصفان، أحدهما الكيفيّة الّتي بها يكون سهلَ الالتصاق بالغير سَهل الانفصال عنه؛ وثانيهما الكيفيّة الّتي بها يكون سهلَ التّشكّل بالحاوي الغريب سهلَ التّرك له. وقد فسّرت الرّطوبة بكلّ واحدٍ من الوصفين. ويبطل الأوّلُ بقولهم الهواء رطبٌ بالطبع فإنّه لا يلتصقُ بالغير، والثّاني بالنّار؛ فإن لها هذا الوصفُ وليست رطبةً.

واليبوسةُ قيل إنّها جنسًا لرطوبة الماء والدّهن والعسل والزّيبق وغيرها، أو نوعًا خلافٌ. واختلف الشّيخان، فذهب أبو علي إلى أنّهما مدركان لمسًا ومنعه أبو هاشم.

There is disagreement about whether moistness is a genus for the moistness of water, oil, honey, mercury, and others, or a species. The two masters differ, for Abū ʿAlī maintains that both are perceivable by touch, whereas Abū Hāshim denies this.

Softness is the privation of resistance to what intrudes, and so it is privative according to the ancients, but the theologians say that it is positive, because it is sensible, and according to them it is a species of moistness.

Flow is a movement in bodies, which are really distinct but sensed as conjoined, because they push each other, even if they were dry, like dust.

Heat and coldness are active, and moistness and dryness are acted upon by them.

Thinness is said of the delicateness of stature, of receptivity to division into small parts, of quick affection by what is encountered, and of transparency.

Viscosity is a quality, through which a body is easily shaped but difficult to partition, stretching out as continuous instead.

Brittleness is a quality due to which a body is difficult to shape but easy to partition.

Reminder
If the species of a body entails moistness, it is moist, and if not, it is not. If what is moist is attached to it, it is soaked when immersed in it, otherwise it is merely wetted. If what is moist is not attached to it, it is dry.

Question 6: On Tendency

It is a sensed ground, and the wise call it inclination. Al-Kaʿbī has denied it. Sensation points towards it, for resistance that tends upwards prevails in an inflated skin that is held under water by force, and a resistance tending downwards is sensed in a rock that is held in air.[41]

41 Hence, tendency (*iʿtimād*) or inclination (*mayl*) primarily mean the elements' innate motions to their natural places, air and fire tending upwards, water and earth downwards. However, Ḥillī also recognises the notion of forced inclination, which was introduced as an explanation of projectile motion by John Philoponus (d. 570 CE) and subsequently adopted by Avicenna. Here the idea is that the mover gives to the projectile an impulse, which is sustained in it as a forced inclination, and the course of the projectile's motion will be determined as the sum of its forced and natural inclination, as well as other circumstantial factors. For a more detailed discussion, see Lammer 2018a, 240-251.

واللّينُ عدمُ ممانعة الغامر فهو عدميّ عند الأوائل، والمتكلّمون قالوا إنّه ثبوتيّ لأنّه محسوس وهو نوع من الرّطوبة عندهم.

السّيلانُ حركة في أجسام متفاصلة حقيقةً متواصلة حسًّا لدفع بعضها بعضًا وإن كانت يابسةً كالتّراب.

والحرارة والبرودة فعليّتان. والرّطوبة واليبوسةُ منفعلتان عنهما.

واللّطافةُ تُقال على رقّة القوام وقبول الانقسام إلى أجزاء صغيرة وسُرعة التأثّر من الملاقي والشّفافيّة.

واللّزوجيّة كيفيّة يكونُ بها الجسمُ سهلَ التّشكل عَسِرَ التّفريق، بل يمتدُّ متّصلاً.

والهشاشة كيفيّةٌ يكونُ بها الجسمُ صعب التّشكل سهلَ التّفريق.

تنبيــهُ

الجسمُ إن اقتضى نوعُه الرّطوبةَ فهو الرّطبُ، وإلّا فلا. فإن التصق به الرّطب فهو المنتقعُ إن كان غائصًا فيه؛ وإلّا فهو المبتلّ والجافّ إن لم يلتصق به الرّطبُ.

المــطلب السّــادس: في الاعــتماد

وهو معنى محسوسٌ، وتسمّيه الحكماء ميلاً. وقد أنكره الكعبيُّ. والحسُّ يدلّ عليه؛ فإنّ المدافعةَ ثابتةٌ في الزَّقِّ المنفوخ المُسكّن تحتَ الماء قسرًا نحوَ الصّعود، والحجر المسكّنِ في الجوّ يحسُّ فيه بالمدافعة نحوَ السّفل.

This resistance is not the same as the nature, because the two exist without each other, like psychic resistance and the natural body in its place,[42] nor is it motion, because it exists without motion in what is at rest by force. It is a ground that necessitates motion, either upwards, and then it is called lightness, or downwards, and then it is called heaviness.

Hence, heaviness is a natural power through which a body is moved to where its centre is next to the centre of the world, in case the heaviness is absolute, or close to that, in case it is relative. The absolutely light is that which floats above the other elements, and it is fire, whereas the relatively light is that which moves towards the circumference for most of the interval extended between the centre and the circumference, such as air.

Inclination is natural, like the resistance of a rock held in the air, psychic, like in an animal tending towards another, or forced, like in a rock thrown upwards by force. The natural directions are up and down, and so there are two natural tendencies. Two natural inclinations that differ in direction cannot be combined, because it is impossible that a body be naturally turned both towards and away from a direction. It is possible to combine a natural and a forced inclination that are to two directions, so that there occurs a composite motion towards the direction of the superior of the two, if there is one, or rest, if there is not, or to one direction with an increased motion. If the direction is different,[43] the inclination aims at an intermediate direction in relation to the two.

In order to assert inclination, the ancients have argued that were it not for it, motion with a resistance would be equal to motion without resistance, for if something moves a certain distance with an inclination, it moves that distance in a shorter time without it. But then, with an inclination that is lesser in correlation to the two times, it will equal the time of that which lacks inclination.[44]

42 There is no inclination when an elemental body is in its natural place. Psychic resistance is tendency due to a soul, as explained in what follows.

43 That is, if the direction of the composite inclination is different from the directions of both constitutive inclinations.

44 The argument is extremely dense, but it is explicated in *Nihāyat al-marām* II.2.3.2.2.2.4.9, I.517-518. The hindrance here is the contrary natural inclination in an object that is moved by force. If we suppose that the natural inclination is not a necessary feature of all bodies, but continue to appeal to it in explaining differences between the movability of different bodies by an identical force, we end up with the absurdity that a body with a small natural inclination moves as easily as a body without inclination. The only remaining alternative is to say that a body without inclination moves instantaneously, which is also absurd. Hence, our way of explaining differences in motion requires that all bodies have a natural inclination.

وليست هذه المدافعة نفس الطبيعة لوجود كلّ منهما دونَ الأخرى كالمدافعة النّفسانيّة والجسم في مكانه الطبيعيّ؛ ولا الحركة لوجودها في المسكّن قسرًا دون الحركة. وهو معنى يوجبُ الحركةَ إمّا إلى فوق فيُسمّى خفّةً أو إلى أسفل فيُسمّى ثقلاً.

فالثّقل قوّةٌ طبيعيّةٌ يتحرّك بها الجسم إلى حيثُ ينطبقُ مركزه على مركز العالم إن كان مطلقًا أو يقربُ من ذلك إن كان مضافًا. والخفيف المطلق هو النّار في على سائر العناصر وهو النّارُ، والمضافُ هو الذّي يتحرّك أكثر المسافة الممتدّة بين المركز والمحيط حركةً إلى المحيط كالهواء.

والميلُ إمّا طبيعيٌّ كمدافعة الحجر المسكّن في الجوّ، وإمّا نفسانيٌّ كما يعتمدُ الحيوان على غيره، وإمّا قسريٌّ كالحجر المرميّ إلى فوق قسرًا. والجهاتُ الطبيعيّةُ الفوقُ والسّفل؛ فالاعتمادُ الطبيعيُّ اثنان. ولا يجتمع ميلان طبيعيّان مختلفا الجهةِ، لاستحالة توجّه الجسم طبعًا إلى جهة وعنها. ويجوز اجتماعُ الطبيعيّ والقسريّ إلى جهتين، فيحصل حركةٌ مركّبة نحوَ جهة الفاضل منهما إن كان أو سكونًا إن لم يكن، وإلى جهة واحدةٍ فتزدادُ الحركة. ولو اختلفت الجهةُ قصد جهة متوسّطة بينهما على النّسبة.

واستدّل الأوائلُ على ثبوته بأنّه لولاه لساوت الحركة مع العائق الحركةَ بدونه، فإنّه لو تحرّك مع ميل مسافةً وبدونه تلك في زمان أقلّ ومع ميل أقلّ على نسبة الزّمانين ساوت زمانَ عديم الميل.

The theologians have argued for that by saying that if a rope is pulled with an equal power at both ends, it stays still because of the balance between the two acts upon it. This, however, is not rest, because the act of one is of the same genus as the act of the other, and two likes do not preclude each other, and so it is tendency.

Tendency is momentary, because it exists at the moment it is acquired, as well as persistent, because it is the cause of transferring, and so it exists together with it. It allows for intensity and weakness.

Natural tendency intensifies well by small resistance but forced tendency does so in a medium, because heat occurs by means of friction, and even if the potency becomes weaker, the subtleness contributed by heat compensates for what is lost through the weakening.[45] When the contrary push matches the potency, it becomes weaker and the heat no longer suffices to compensate for the weakening.

According to Abū Hāshim, tendency is perceivable by touch, and so there is no need for evidence in order to establish it, although evidence is needed to establish variation in tendency, because when one considers what is perceived, they may be similar. Abū ʿAlī opposed him.

Some tendencies are similar, namely those which are determined to the same direction, for unity in what is caused entails unity in the cause, and some are different, namely those whose directions are many. According to Abū ʿAlī, they are opposites, because they cannot be combined in a single body, whereas according to Abū Hāshim, they are not opposites, because two equal pulls perform two tendencies in two opposite directions, and so they have been combined.[46] If they were opposites, their combination would not be possible.

45 In other words, the heat produced by friction makes the matter of the medium subtler and thus easier for the moving object to penetrate. Hence, the object may move at constant speed because the decrease of its power of movement (or its tendency) is commensurable with the increase in the surrounding matter's subtlety.

46 Consider, for instance, the earlier example of a rope being pulled at both ends. According to Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī, the two mutually opposing tendencies produced by the two efforts of pulling are combined in the rope. Since that is the case, the tendencies cannot be opposites in the metaphysical sense, on the grounds of the general principle that two opposite qualities cannot inhere in one subject at the same time. The elder Jubbāʾī, Abū ʿAlī, relies on the same principle when he denies the inherence of the two tendencies in the rope.

والمتكلّمون بأنّ الحبلَ إذا جذبه متساويا القدرة وقف لتكافي فِعليهما له؛ وليس السّكون، لأنَّ فعلَ أحدهما من جنس فعل الآخر، والمثلان لا يتمانعان، فهو الاعتماد.

وهو آنيٌّ لوجوده آن الوصول، وباقٍ لأنّه علّة الإيصال فيوجدُ عنده. وهو قابلٌ للشدّة والضّعف.

فالطبيعيّ يشتدُّ خيرًا لقلّة المعاوقة، والقسريّ في الوسط لحصول السّخونة بواسطة المُحاكّة، ويضعفُ القوّة، إلّا أنّ التّلطيفَ المستفادَ بالسّخونة يوفي على ما يفوتُ بالضّعف. فإذا ترادف الصكّ على القوّة ضعفت ولم تبلغ السّخونة مبلغًا يفي بتدارك الضّعف.

وهو مُدرك باللّمس عند أبي هاشم فلا يحتاجُ في إثباته إلى دليل، بل يحتاجُ إلى ثبوت التّغاير؛ فإنّ المدركات قد تشتبه باعتبارها، ومنعه أبو عليّ.

والاعتماد منه متماثل، وهو ما اختصّ بجهة واحدة لاستلزام الاتّحادِ في المعلول الاتّحادَ في العلّة؛ ومنه مختلفٌ، وهو ما تعدّدت جهاته. فعندَ أبي عليّ أنّه متضادٌّ لامتناع اجتماعهما في جسم واحد، وعندَ أبي هاشم أنّه غيرُ متضادّ، لأنّ الجاذبين المتساويين فَعَلا اعتمادين إلى جهتين متضادّتين فقد اجتمعا. ولو كانا ضدّين لما صحّ اجتماعهما.

The genera of tendency are six, in accordance with the number of directions. That which can persist, according to the Muʿtazilites, is the concomitant tendency downwards and upwards,[47] because if the tendency did not persist in a rock, then it would be either impossible or very easy for us to carry a heavy rock. The consequent is intuitively false in both cases, [and likewise the antecedent]. The implication is shown by saying that if God most high made a tendency in it, we would not be able to counteract it, but if He did not, its movement would be easy, because there would be no resistance.[48] What is neither of those two tendencies cannot persist and so it is imported, for there is no accident one can point at that could not be brought into existence without any of these genera remaining with it.[49]

According to Abū Hāshim, heaviness goes back to inherent downward tendency. Abū ʿAlī has said that it goes back to an increase of the parts of a substance. This is falsified by the inflated skin, for it is filled with air, yet it is lighter than the fewest parts of lead.

47 I understand Ḥillī's term *al-lāzim al-iʿtimād* as referring to the motion that naturally follows from, or is concomitant to, an essence.

48 The idea here seems to be that the only constraint for God's creation of accidents is posed by those properties that are natural or concomitant to the essence that will bear those accidents. Hence, if there is no natural inclination in the rock, and thereby no natural downward pressure that we experience as weight, God could create it as either extraordinarily heavy or weightless. But we know that rocks are neither weightless nor extraordinarily heavy, but rather their weight is comparable to their size.

49 This is a very complicated way of saying that the remaining four genera of inclination (to the four horizontal directions) are not concomitant to any essence. The criterion for their accidentality is that any essence can be conceived to have an accident that rules them out.

وأجناسُ الاعتماد ستّةٌ بحسب تعدّد الجهات. فالذي يصحّ بقاؤه عند المعتزلة وهو اللّازم الاعتمادُ سفلاً وصعداً؛ لأنّه لولم يبق الاعتمادُ في الحجر لامتنع علينا حمل الحجر الثّقيل أوكان سهلاً جدّاً، والتّالي بقسميه باطلٌ بالوجدان (فالمقدم مثله). بيانُ الملازمة أنّ الله تعالى إن فعل فيه الاعتمادَ امتنع علينا ممانعته، وإن لم يفعل سهل حركته لعدم المانع. وماعداهما لا يصحّ بقاؤه وهو المجتلب، إذ لا عرضَ يشار إليه إلّا وقد يوجد ولا يبقى معه شيءٌ من هذه الأجناس.

والثّقل عند أبي هاشم راجعٌ إلى الاعتماد اللازم سفلاً، وأبو عليّ يقول إنّه يرجعُ إلى تزايد أجزاء الجوهر وهو باطلٌ بالزّق المنفوخ، فإنّه يمتلئ بالهواء وهو أخفُّ من أجزاء يسيرة من الرّصاص.

Tendency produces three kinds of thing. The first is that which it produces by itself, namely the modes of being. Being in its own substrate, tendency produces them in what is not its own substrate on the condition that there is contact.[50] The second is that which it produces under some condition, such that it could not produce this at all, were it not for the condition, namely sounds, for it produces them on the condition of beating.[51] The third is that which it does not produce by itself but through an intermediary, namely composition and pain, for it produces proximity, which produces composition, and it produces rupture in the body of a living being, from which weakness and pain are produced.[52] Apart from tendency, there are no causes that produce anything like it, and tendency produces nothing that it produces without producing another tendency thereby.[53]

Question 7: On Modes of Being

Mode of being is a genus, and there are four things under it: motion, rest, conjunction, and separation.

[There are four reflections concerning this question.]

Reflection 1: On the Ground Shared by All Four

The occurrence of a substance in space is something established as a fact. Now, is it caused by a ground[54] or not?

50 Imagine a rock in its natural downward movement hitting a stationary balloon and setting it in downward motion.

51 That is, a surface must be struck in order to produce a change in air pressure, which in turn can be perceived as sound. The capacity to produce the air pressure, a kind of inclination, is inherent in the sounding thing, but it can only be brought into act by the strike. On a related note, see Gimaret 2009, 304-305.

52 That is, the rupture caused by inclination will only result in pain if it is inflicted on a *living* body. Life is the medium that is required between the effect of an inclination and pain.

53 Interestingly, Ḥillī seems to treat the concept of tendency as equivalent to physical efficient causation, and what is more, he seems to reduce all causation of motion to it.

54 The polysemous term *maʿnā* is notoriously difficult to understand, let alone translate. According to Frank 1967, 249, in its present use, cases of which are found as early as Abū al-Hudhayl, *maʿnā* is equivalent with 'accident'. In later Muʿtazilites, such as ʿAbd al-Jabbār, the term denotes the principle for a manifest activity; for instance, man is powerful (*qādir*) because of a *maʿnā* of power (*qudra*) in him (Frank 1967, 249-250). A *maʿnā* in this sense is needed when the subject does not possess the attribute in question due to its essence. I think it is this latter sense, which I render as 'ground (for the object's having the relevant attribute)', that Ḥillī has in mind here.

وأقسام توليده ثلاثةٌ أحدها ما يولّده بنفسه وهو الأكوان والاعتماد في محلّه ويولّدها في غير محلّه بشرط المماسّة. وثانيها ما يولّده بنفسه بشرط، ولا يصحّ أن يولّده على وجه إلّا بشرط وهو الأصوات، فإنّه يولّدها بشرط المصاكّة. وثالثها ما يولّده لا بنفسه بل بواسطة، وهو التّأليف والألم؛ لأنّه يولد المجاورة الّتي تولّد التأليف، ويولّدُ التّفريق في جسم الحيّ. والوهنُ والألم متولّدٌ عنه وليس في الأسباب ما يولّد مثله سوى الاعتماد ولا يولّد الاعتماد شيئًا ممّا يولّده إلّا ويولّد اعتمادًا آخر معه.

المطلب السابع: في الأكوان

الكونُ جنسٌ، تحته أُمورٌ أربعة: الحركة والسّكونُ والاجتماعُ والافتراق

[وفيه أربعة نظراتٍ]:

النّظر الأوّل: في المعنى المشترك بين الأربعة

حصول الجوهر في الحيّز أمر ثبوتيّ. وهل هو معلّل بمعنى أم لا.

Abū Hāshim held that. He stipulated that when we move or halt a body, we bring into effect a tendency in it, akin to a pull or a push, and so motion and rest occur. Abū Hāshim said that we bring into effect an additional ground called motion, and that ground necessitates the body's being in motion. That ground is additional to tendency and being in motion. Hence, he asserted a mode of being, what is entailed by it, and a state caused by it, and this is being in a certain mode.[55] Other theologians contradicted him.

We might say that if we brought that into effect, we would know it either summarily or in detail, but the consequent is intuitively false, for we find in ourselves that we do not know it at all, and so the antecedent is likewise false. The conditional proposition is necessary, for one endowed with power only brings into effect what he knows. Furthermore, if that ground could not exist before the substance has occurred in that space, there would be a circle, whereas if it could, it would entail the substance's occurrence in that space, and so it would be a tendency,[56] for otherwise the substance would not occur in that space rather than another.

55 Thus, in Abū Hāshim's somewhat profuse ontology, the event of moving entails three distinct metaphysical items in addition to the moving body: the body's tendency to move (a ground), the motion in the body (an additional ground), and the body's state of actually being in motion (a mode of being, or in Abū Hāshim's novel terms, a "state").

56 In other words, there is no additional ground of motion for the body's moving into a certain space, but only the body and its combined inclination to move in a certain direction.

ذهب أبو هاشم إلى ذلك. وتقريره أنّا إذا حرّكنا جسمًا أو سكّناه فَعَلنا فيه اعتمادًا نحوَ الجذب والدّفع، فيحصل التحرّك والسّكون. وقال أبو هاشم إنّا نفعلُ معنى زائدًا يسمّى حركة، ذلك المعنى يوجب كون الجسم متحرّكًا. وذلك المعنى زائدٌ على الاعتماد وعلى التّحرّك؛ فاثبت الكونَ والمقتضى له والحالةَ المعلّلةَ به وهي الكائنيّةُ ونفاه باقي المتكلّمين.

لنا أنّا لو فعلناه لعلمناه إجمالاً أو تفصيلاً، والتّالي باطل بالوجدان، فإنّا نجدُ من أنفسنا أنّا لا نعلمه البتّةَ، فالمقدّم مُثله والشّرطيّةُ ضروريّةٌ؛ فإنّ القادرَ إنّما يفعل ما يعلمه. ولأنّ ذلك المعنى إن لم يصحّ وجوده إلّا بعدَ حصول الجوهر في ذلك الحيّز دار، وإن صحّ فإن اقتضى حصوله في ذلك الحيّز فهو الاعتمادُ، وإلّا لم يكن بأن يحصل في ذلك الحيّز أولى من غيره.

He has argued by saying that if we had the power to bring a body to be in a certain mode without the mediation of a ground, we would have power over its essence and its other attributes. The consequent is necessarily false, and likewise the antecedent. The conditional is shown by means of an analogy to speech.[57] Moreover, because the attribute of being in a mode can increase, it does not take place due to an agent.[58] The antecedent is shown by the fact that the strong prevents the weak from moving what it has halted, and so it has brought into effect in it something additional to what there was when it was not set to prevent the weak.[59] Furthermore, when one of two things endowed with power pushes a part while the other pulls it, the result of their exercise of power cannot be one, because no single result can come to be from two things endowed with power.[60] The conditional is shown by saying that the agent is like a cause, and just as a cause does not have an effect in terms of more than one attribute, neither does the agent. Furthermore, since existence is due to an agent, increase is impossible in terms of it, and similarly here.

The answer is to reject the conditional. The analogy is weak in itself and false in this case, for it makes the branch into a root.[61] Increase is unintelligible in the case of being in a mode, because it amounts to occurrence in space or a body's being next to another. The strong one brings into effect an additional tendency, not an additional mode of being, for according to them, modes of being have no part in preventing. We deny the impossibility of one result of the exercise of power taking place through two things endowed with power, and we deny the equivocation between agent and cause, and with the root being denied, we deny the inference that the increase of existence is impossible, because it is due to the agent.

57 Speech, as a certain type of sound, is an accident we bring about in the substrate of air. We are capable of modifying various aspects of it, such as what is said, or the volume and pitch of the sound.

58 This is a distinct argument for Abū Hāshim's claim, but its formulation is rather elliptic. The point is that only in strict terms, what is an effect of an agent's act must be intended by the agent. Now, a mode of being, such as motion, may vary independently from an agent's intention, and thus is not an effect of the agent's act. For a very helpful discussion of the relevant concept of agency, see Frank 1978, 124-134.

59 The weak agent did not cause the thing's being in motion in the first place, because as brought out by the stronger agent's intervention, it depends on factors extrinsic to the agent's intention. All that the weak agent caused is the ground for motion in the thing it attempts to move, and this ground persists in the thing even when the stronger agent prevents it from resulting in the thing's being in motion.

60 The two agents bring about two distinct grounds of motion in the thing. The thing's being stationary is the combined effect of the two contrary grounds.

61 The root here is the principle, according to which one cause, insofar as it is one, can have only one effect. The branch, I presume, is the agent considered as a cause. The fallacy is due to replacing the one cause, insofar as it is one, with agent without the necessary qualifications.

احتجّ بأنّا لو قدرنا على جعل الجسم كائنًا من غير توسّط معنىً لَقَدرنا على ذاته وسائر صفاته، والتّالي باطلٌ بالضّرورة فالمقدّم مُثلُه. وبيانُ الشّرطيّة القياس على الكلام؛ ولأنّ صفةَ الكائنيّة يصح فيها التزايد، فلا تقع بالفاعل. بيانُ المقدّم أنّ القويّ يمنعُ الضّعيف عن تحريك ما سكّنه، فقد فعل فيه أمرًا زائدًا على ما إذا لم يقصد منعه؛ ولأنّ القادرين إذا دَفع أحدهما جزءًا حال جذب الآخر لم يكن مقدورهما واحدًا، لاستحالة وقوع مقدور بقادرَين. وبيان الشّرطيّة أنّ الفاعل كالعلّة، فكما أنّها لا تؤثّرُ في أزيد من صفة واحدة كذا الفاعل؛ ولأنّ الوجودَ لما كان بالفاعل امتنع فيه التزايدُ فكذا هنا.

والجوابُ المنعُ من الشّرطيّة، والقياسُ ضعيفٌ في نفسه وباطل هُنا؛ فإنّه جعل الفرع أصلاً، والتزايد غير معقول في الكائنيّة لأنّها عبارةٌ عن الحصول في الحيّز. أو محاذاة الجسم لآخر، والقويّ فعل اعتمادًا زائدًا، لا كونًا زائدًا؛ فإنّ الأكوانَ عندهم لا حظَّ لها في المنع، ونمنعُ استحالةَ وقوع مقدور بقادرَين، ونمنع مساواة الفاعل العلّةَ، مع أنّ الأصل ممنوعٌ؛ ونمنع تعليل امتناع تزايد الوجود بكونه بالفاعل.

Reflection 2: On the Classification into Branches According to What the Bahshamites Say

Some modes of being are similar while others are opposed to each other. Those modes of being that are specified by one position are similar, regardless of whether they are specific to one substance or many, when they replace each other in that position, and regardless of whether they are specific to one moment or many moments, because what is caused is common to them.[62] The mutually opposed ones are those through which a substance comes to be in two positions, because combining is impossible. The opposites are either mutually exclusive, namely those which can exist successively,[63] or not mutually exclusive, namely those which succeed each other, like being in a first place and being in the third.[64] When the substrate is multiple, the two modes of being are opposite in genus.

According to Abū Hāshim, all modes of being can persist. Abū ʿAlī and Abū al-Hudhayl have said that motion cannot persist, for otherwise it would become rest, which follows for Abū Hāshim. Modes of being are perceivable by touch and sight, according to Abū ʿAlī, but Abū Hāshim rejected this. The truth is that they are secondarily perceivable by sight, and they are within our power. Mode of being produces composition under the condition of proximity, for otherwise the ceasing of possibility in the substrate would not have been a condition.[65]

62 The "similar" (*mutamāthil*) mode of being is the one an atom has by virtue of the position (*jiha*), in which it is. It is the foundation of the "mutually opposed" (*mutaḍādd*) modes of being, all of which are relational, either with regard to other atoms in other positions (conjunction and separation) or with regard to the same atom's positions at different moments (motion and rest). For a helpful discussion of the background to this very dense passage, see Frank 1978, 95-104.

63 The mutually exclusive modes of being are conjunction and separation, which can exist at successive moments.

64 The modes of being that are not mutually exclusive are motion and rest, which only emerge from the successive positions of one substance. The reason why they are not mutually exclusive is probably that considered at one moment, one substance can be both in motion and in rest. Supposing that the substance is in a different position than at the previous moment, it is in motion, *and* supposing that it is in the same position in the next moment, it is at rest.

65 That is, atoms are composed into bodies when they are conjoined, that is, when they have the mode of being of conjunction, and proximity between the atoms is a necessary condition for this mode of being. The point about the negative condition of the ceasing of possibility is somewhat puzzling, but perhaps the point is that a negative condition can only be grounded in its positive counterpart, such as the proximity between atoms.

النظر الثاني: في التفريع على قول البهشمية

الكونُ منه متماثلٌ ومنه متضادٌّ، فما اختصّ بجهةٍ واحدةٍ من الأكوان فهو متماثلٌ، سواء اختصّ بجوهرٍ واحدٍ أو بأكثر إذا كانت في تلك الجهة على البدل، وسواءً اختصّ بجوهرٍ واحدٍ أو بأكثر إذا كانت في تلك الجهة على البدل، وسواءً اختصّ بوقتٍ أو أوقات، لاشتراكها في المعلول، والمتضادّ ما يصير به الجوهرُ في جهتين لاستحالة الجمع. والمتضادُّ إمّا متنافٍ، وهو الذي يصحّ وجودُه على التعاقب، وإمّا غيرُ متنافٍ، وهو ما يتعاقبُ، كالكون في المكان الأوّل مع الكون في الثالث. وإذا تعدّد المحلّ تضادّ الكونان في الجنس.

وكلّ الأكوان عند أبي هاشم يصحّ بقاؤها. وقال أبو علي وأبو الهذيل لا يصحّ بقاءُ الحركة وإلّا لصارت سكونًا والتزمه أبو هاشم؛ والأكوان مُدركةٌ لمسًا ورؤيةً عندَ أبي عليّ ومنعه أبو هاشم. والحقّ أنّها مدركةٌ بالرؤية ثانيًا وهي مقدورةٌ لنا. والكونُ يولّدُ التأليفَ بشرط المجاورة، وإلّا لم يشرط انتفاء الصّحة عن المحلّ.

Reflection 3: On Motion

Motion is the first occurrence of a substance in a space after it was in another space. According to the ancients, it is "the first perfection of what is in potency insofar as it is in potency",[66] for it is impossible that an existent be in potency in every respect, rather, it is in act either in every respect or in some respect. In the latter case, it proceeds to act either instantaneously or gradually, and the latter is motion. Hence, motion's existence in act, which is the prior of two perfections, requires a certain potency in that which moves, and when it exists, it becomes a second perfection. It differs from other perfections, the existence of which does not entail any potency in that which has the perfection.

There is debate concerning its existence. Those who have verified it have done so, because it is a secondary percept. One group has denied it, because it does not exist when something is sedentary in the first space, for it is not moving then, nor does it exist in the second space, because the motion has ended, and there is nothing between them. It is countered by rejecting the atom.

There is no doubt that six things belong to motion: where it is from, where it is headed, what it is in, through what it is, what it belongs to, and time.

No body can move by virtue of its essence, for otherwise motion would persist through the persistence of the body. Motion is only possible in place. A group of Muʿtazilites has said that motion does not occur in place, because it inheres in the substance itself, and so it needs nothing else, just like colour. Yes, but there is no doubt a direction. If God most high creates a heavy body, it will fall when there is no support, but if there were no place, it would not move in place. This depends on how place is explicated, and what they mean by it is that which prevents the tendency of what is heavy from descending.[67]

Locomotion can be in terms of the where, in terms of position, and in terms of quantity.[68]

As regards qualitative motion, it is motion in terms of quality, like when a body is gradually transferred from heat to coldness or from black to white. Motion does not take place in other categories than those.

66 Cf., for instance, Ar. *Phys.* III.2, 201a11.

67 In other words, these Muʿtazilites' have to admit that place is essential to motion on the grounds of their own definition of place.

68 In other words, a body can move in space in three ways: it can move from one place to another, it can change its spatial position while remaining in one place, or it can grow in its spatial dimensions.

النظر الثالث: في الحركة

الحركة هي حصولٌ أوّل للجوهر في حيّز بعد أن كان في حيّز آخر. وعندَ الأوائل أنّها «كمالٌ أوّلُ لما بالقوّة من حيث هو بالقوّة»، فإنّ الموجود بالقوّة من كلّ وجه مُحالٌ، بل إمّا بالفعل من كلّ وجه أو من بعض الوجوه. والثّاني إذا خرج إلى الفعل إمّا دفعةً أو على التّدريج، والثّاني هو الحركة، فوجودها بالفعل الذي هو أسبقُ الكمالين يستدعي قوّةً مّا للمتحرّك، فإذا وجدت صارت كمالاً ثانيًا، وهي تفارقُ سائرَ الكمالاتِ الّتي يستعقب وجودَها قوّةٌ لذي الكمال.

وقد اختُلِفَ في وجودها، فالمحقّقون عليه لأنّها من المحسوساتِ الثّانية، وأنكره جماعةٌ لأنّ وجودها ليس حال كون المتمكّن في الأوّل لأنّه بعدُ لم يتحرّك، ولا في الثّاني لانقطاع الحركة، ولا واسطةَ بينهما. وهو إنّما يردُ على نفاة الجزء.

ولا بدّ لها من ستّة أمور: ما منه وما إليه وما فيه وما به وما له والزّمان.

ولا يمكن أن يتحرّك جسمٌ مّا لذاته وإلّا لبقيت ببقائه. ولا تصحّ الحركة إلّا في مكان. وقال جماعةٌ من المعتزلة إنّها تقعُ لا في مكان؛ لأنّها يحلُّ نفس الجوهر فلا يفتقر إلى غيره، كاللّون. نعم لا بُدّ من الجهةِ. ولو خلق الله تعالى جسمًا ثقيلاً لهوى عند فَقْدِ العلائق، وإن لم يكن مكانٌ فقد تحرّك لا في مكان. وهو مبنيٌّ على تفسير المكان؛ وهؤلاء عنوا به ما يمنع اعتماد الثّقيل من النّزول.

والحركةُ المكانيّة قد تكون في الأين وقد تكونُ في الوضع وقد تكون في الكم.

وأمّا الكيفيّةُ فهي الحركة في الكيف، كما ينتقلُ الجسم من حرارة إلى برودة ومن سواد إلى بياض على التّدريج، ولا تقع الحركة في غير ذلك من المقولات.

Motion may come to be divided, when division of time is considered, for motion in a given time is twice the motion in half of that time, or when division of the distance is considered, for motion through half of a distance is half of the motion through the whole, or when the division of the mover is considered, for it is one of the pervasive accidents.[69] When the subject, time, and what it is in, are one in the sense of undivided, motion is thereby one in that sense. The difference of subjects in species does not entail any difference in motion, only difference in one of these three does, namely where it is from, where it is headed, and what it is in.

Motion is either fast, namely that which traverses a longer distance in an equal or shorter time, or an equal distance in a shorter time, or it is slow, namely that which is contrary to the former. The cause of fast and slow motion is subject to debate. According to the theologians, it is the motions' being and not being devoid of phases of rest, but according to the ancients, it consists of qualities that subsist through the motions, for otherwise, the phases of rest of a galloping horse would eventually be manifest and its movements hidden, when compared to the movements of the celestial sphere.[70] Opposition in motion is due to opposition in terms of where it is from and where it is headed, that is, by considering accidents. It is a relation to the origin and the end point, even if they were one in the substrate, like in the case of rotation.

Motion may be linear, circular, and composite.[71]

It is a matter of debate whether there must be rest between two mutually opposed motions. One group has asserted it, because the cause of a motion to one direction exists in the moment of arrival, and it is different from the cause of departing, so that this is inevitably in another moment. The two moments are not successive, and so there is inevitably a time of rest. This is based on the denial of the substance and on the impossibility of conjoining two inclinations.[72]

69 That is, movement is in every part of a moving body in the same way as it is in the whole. If a projectile were split in the course of its motion, both halves would continue in the motion – assuming, *per impossibile*, that the split is not due to any additional force.

70 If the speed of motion were reducible to the proportion of morsels of motion to those of rest, then presumably the motion in these primitive morsels would be uniform in speed. The argument then is that if we take as our standard a very fast motion (the rotation of the celestial sphere) that we perceive as continuous, then a comparably slow motion (that of the galloping horse) should appear to us as a series of phenomenally distinct moments of motion and rest.

71 That is, composed from linear and circular phases.

72 This position resembles that of Avicenna in *Shifāʾ: al-Samāʾ al-ṭabīʿi* IV.8. According to Avicenna, there cannot be two opposite inclinations in the moving body; instead, the natural inclination of the body must inhere in it as a potency for movement that is actualised once the forced motion has run its course. The reason why there must be a moment of rest between

ويعرضُ للحركة الانقسامُ باعتبار انقسام الزّمان؛ فإنّ الحركةَ في زمان ضعفُ الحركة في نصفه؛ وباعتبار انقسام المسافة، فإنّ الحركةَ إلى نصف المسافة تصفُ الحركة إلى جميعها؛ وباعتبار انقسام المتحرّك، فإنّها من الأعراض السّارية. وعندَ وحدة الموضوع والزّمان وماهي فيه بالشّخص تكونُ الحركة واحدةً به، واختلاف الموضوع نوعًا لا يوجبُ اختلافَ الحركة، بل اختلافَ أحد الثّلاثة - مامنه، وماإليه، ومافيه.

والحركة إمّا سريعةٌ، وهي الّتي تقطع الأطول في الزّمان المساوي أوالأقصر أوالمساوي في الأقصر؛ وإمّا بطيئةٌ وهي مايقابلها.

واختُلِفَ في سببهما، فعند المتكلّمين خلّوُّ الحركات من السّكنات وعدمه، وعند الأوائل كيفيّاتٌ قائمةٌ بها، وإلّا لظهرت سكناتُ الفرس السّريع العَدْوِ في الغاية وخفيت حركاته إذا قيست إلى حركات الفلك. وتضادُّ الحركات لتضادّ ما منه وما إليه باعتبار العارض. وهو إضافة المبدأ والمنتهى وإن اتّحد المحلّ، كالدوريّة.

والحركةُ قد تكونُ مستقيمةً ومستديرةً ومركّبةً.

واختلف في وجوب السكون بينَ المتضادّتين، فأثبته قومٌ لأنّ علّة التحريك إلى جهة موجودة آن الوصول، وهي غيرُ علّة المفارقة فلا بدّ من آن آخر، والآناتُ غير متتالية فلا بدّ من زمان سكون؛ وهو مبنيٌّ على نفي الجوهر وعلى امتناع اجتماع الميلين.

Others deny it, for otherwise the rock's return would not be necessary. Its halting would be due to a cause, and it is impossible that the cause's non-existence be due to its essence, nature, or the body or anything existing in it, otherwise it would not exist together with anything of the cause. Hence, only an extrinsic cause remains. If the rock's arrival is necessary, the existence of the cause is impossible, otherwise the arrival would be due to chance.[73]

Motion is by virtue of to an essence, namely natural motion, forced, or voluntary, or it is due to an accident, like in the case of contents that are moved by the movement of a vessel. Forced motion involving departure is subject to debate.[74] It is said that the mover produces a tendency, that tendency necessitates motion, and then that motion produces a tendency and that tendency produces a motion, until the production ends due to the weakness that results from the penetrated air. On the other hand, it is said that the mover bestows the moved with the power to move to a determined direction, and the power remains to the end of the motion but begins to weaken because the penetrated air strikes back, until the weakness increases and is vanquished by the natural power, so that the body begins to move downwards.[75]

the two motions is that there must be a moment at which the first motion has ended and the body has reached the zenith of its motion, but in which the second motion is not yet actual. For a more detailed discussion of the debate concerning the *quies media* in Avicenna and Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. *ca* 547/1152), see Nony (2010). The denial of substance here means Avicenna's denial of the theologians' concept of substance, namely the atom.

73 This argument resembles Abū al-Barakāt's rejection of the Avicennian theory of a *quies media* in *Muʿtabar* II.24, 101-102; see, again, Nony (2010). Abū al-Barakāt holds that when a rock is thrown upwards, two inclinations inhere in it: a forced inclination upwards that it receives from the person throwing it, and its natural inclination downwards. The trajectory of the rock is caused by the natural inclination gradually cancelling out the forced inclination, and then immediately causing the rock's return downward. If the rock were to rest in between the upward and downward motions, the rest would have to be due to a third, extrinsic cause apart from the two inclinations. Then one would have to explain why this extrinsic cause ceases to keep the rock at rest. If this is explained by means of the natural inclination, the extrinsic cause becomes impossible, given that the sufficient reason for the rock's fall is already there. If it is not explained, then also the rock's fall is inexplicable, or a matter of chance.

74 That is, the forced motion of an object away from the mover, like in throwing a rock.

75 The first of these views resembles Abū al-Barakāt's theory, whereas the second seems to be that of Avicenna.

ونفاه آخرون وإلّا لم يجب رجوعُ الحجر، لأنّ وقوفه إنّما يكونُ لعلّة ويستحيل عدمُها لذاتها ولا للطبيعة أو الجسم أو لشيء ممّا وُجِدَ فيه، وإلّا لما وُجدَ مع شيء منها، فلم يبق إلّا سببٌ خارجيّ؛ فإن كان وصوله واجبًا امتنع وجودُها وإلّا كان اتّفاقيًّا.

والحركة إمّا بالذّات، وهي طبيعيّة أو قسريّة أو إراديّة، أو بالعرض كالمحويّ المتحرّك بحركة الحاوي. واختُلِفَ في الحركة القسريّة مع المفارقة، فقيل إنّ المحرّك يولّد اعتمادًا وذلك الاعتماد يوجِب حركةً، ثمّ تلك الحركة تولّد اعتمادًا، وذلك الاعتماد يولّد حركةً إلى أن ينتهي التوليد بسبب الضعف الحاصل من الهواء المخروق. وقيل إنّ المحرّك يفيدُ المتحرّك قوّةً محرِّكةً إلى جهة مخصوصةٍ وهي باقيةٌ إلى آخر الحركة، لكنّها تأخذ في الضعف بسبب مصاكّات الهواء المخروق إلى أن يبلغ الضعف بحيث يغلبه القوّة الطبيعيّة، فتتحرك الجسمُ إلى أسفل.

Reflection 4: On the Remaining Modes of Being

Rest is a body's occurrence in a space after it has occurred in that same space. According to the ancients, it is the "privation of motion in what should be moving".[76] According to us, it is a positive fact because it belongs to the species of motion, for there is no difference between the two with regard to persistence or lack thereof. The dispute is terminological, because what is at rest both has factual relations and is deprived of motion. If 'rest' is said in the first sense, it is positive, but if it is spoken of in the second sense, it is privative. A persisting body cannot be devoid of both motion and rest.

As regards that which comes to be when it comes to be, its occurrence in a place is neither motion nor rest, yet it is called a mode of being. It is said that it is rest, because all modes of being are rests, but some of them are motions in another consideration, and it is said to be motion and the substrate to be moving.[77]

Conjunction is two substances' being in two spaces such that no third comes in between them. Separation is their being in two spaces such that a third one does come in between them. Abū al-Hudhayl made separation a ground that is additional to modes of being, and this was also Abū ʿAlī's statement initially. Abū Hāshim made it to amount to two modes of being, through which two bodies occur in two distant places.

Question 8: On Life

It is an accident, which inheres in the body of the living, entails sound power and knowledge, and is conditioned by a balance of mixture, and it is in relation to it that the whole becomes like a single thing. It no doubt has a specific structure, *pace* the Ashʿarites, for otherwise it could exist in the impartitionable part.[78]

76 Cf., for instance, Ar. *Phys.* V.6, 229b25-30.

77 This point is related to the two types of mode of being in a spatial position mentioned above in p. 84, n. 62.

78 The "impartitionable part" (*juzʾ lā yatajazzaʾ*) is the atom.

النظر الرابع: في باقي الأكوان

السكون هو حصول الجسم في الحيّز بعدَ حصوله في ذلك الحيّز بعينه. وعند الأوائل إنّه «عدمُ الحركة عمّا من شأنه أن يتحرّك». وعندنا إنّه ثبوتيّ لأنّه من نوع الحركة؛ إذ لا فارقَ بينهما سوى البقاء وعدمه؛ والنّزاعُ لفظيٌّ؛ لأنّ للساكن نِسبًا ثابتةً وعدمَ حركة، فإن أُطلِقَ السكونُ على الأوّل فهو ثبوتيٌّ، وإن أُطلق على الثّاني فهو عدمي؛ ولا يمكن خلوُّ الجسم الباقي عن الحركة والسكون.

أمّا الحادثُ حالَ حدوثه فإنّ حصوله في مكان ليس حركةً ولا سكونًا، ويسمّى كونًا؛ وقيل هو سكونٌ؛ لأنّ الأكوانَ كلّها سكونات وتكون بعضها حركات باعتبار آخر. وقيل إنّه حركةٌ والمحلّ متحرّكٌ.

والاجتماع هو كون الجوهرين في حيّزين بحيث لا يختلّهما ثالثٌ. والافتراقُ هو كونُهما في حيّزين بحيثُ يتخللهما ثالثٌ؛ وجعل أبو الهذيل الافتراقَ معنىً زائدًا على الأكوان، وهو قول أبي عليّ أوّلاً؛ وأبو هاشم جعله عبارةً عن الكونين اللّذين يحصلُ بهما الجسمان في مكانين بعيدين.

المطلب الثامن: في الحياة

وهي عرضٌ يحلّ بدنَ الحيّ يقتضي صحّة القدرة والعلم منه، مشروطٌ باعتدال المزاج، وباعتبارها يصيرُ الجملةَ كالشّيء الواحد. ولا بدّ لها من بنيةٍ مخصوصة؛ خلافًا للأشعريّة، وإلّا لصحّ وجودها في جزء لا يتجزى.

They argue by saying that if that which subsists through conjunction were one life, it would follow that one accident subsists through two substrates. If it were many, then *either* a circle would follow, given that the subsistence of some through a substrate would depend on the subsistence of others through it, and conversely, *or*, in case they are not convertible, there would be preponderance without a preponderating factor.[79]

The answer is that the subsistence of all life is through its substrate, which depends on a conjunction of the parts, not on an accident subsisting through the parts, and just as it needs the structure, it needs moisture.

People differ concerning whether life needs spirit. Abū Hāshim affirmed it, because life is lost when spirit is lost. Abū ʿAlī denied it, for otherwise the need would pervade every substrate in which there is life, and life would be similar, with no difference and no opposition between them, because what it causes would coincide.[80] Life is not within our power, and it persists and is without an opposite. It is ended by killing in the sense that the killing is traced back to the severance of the structure, so that life no longer exists because its condition does not exist, and similarly in the cases of strong coldness or strong heat, because severance occurs in both cases.

The Ashʿarites, Abū ʿAlī, al-Kaʿbī, as well as Abū Hāshim initially, have asserted death as the opposite of life, because He most high has said: *who created death and life*.[81] The truth is that it is the privation of life from that which should be alive, after it has been attributed with life.

Question 9: On Power

It is an accident, which entails its substrate being such that it acts whenever it wants to act and refrains whenever it wants refrain from acting. It is not the same as the mixture, because the mixture is a quality intermediate between the hot and the cold, and so it is of their genus and its effect is of the same genus as their effect, whereas the effect of power is opposed to their effect.

79 The principle of sufficient reason would be violated, because there would be no reason why one inherence would be a condition for the others.

80 The elder Jubbāʾī seems to be saying that if life were due to the presence of spirit in the living body, all lifeforms would be similar. It is unclear why this would be the case, but perhaps the idea is that if the need for spirit were the *only* explanatory factor for life, then the variation in different forms of life would be inexplicable. Thus, for him, having spirit is a differentiating factor between forms of life.

81 Q 67:2. Unless otherwise mentioned, the Qurʾān is quoted in M. A. S. Abdel Haleem's translation (see bibliography).

احتجّوا بأنّ القائمَ بالمجموع إن كان حياةً واحدةً لزم قيامُ العرض الواحد بمحلّين؛ وإن تعدّدت لزم الدّور إن كان قيامُ البعض بالمحلّ موقوفًا على قيام الآخر به وبالعكس، أو الترجيح من غير مرجّح إن لم ينعكس.

والجواب قيامُ كلّ حياة بمحلّها موقوفٌ على مجامعة الأجزاء، لا على قيام العرض بالأجزاء؛ وكما احتاجت إلى البنية فهي محتاجةٌ إلى الرطوبة.

واختُلِفَ في حاجتها إلى الرّوح، فأثبته أبو هاشم لفقدانها عندَ فقدان الروح. ونفاه أبو عليّ وإلّا لشاعت الحاجة في كلّ محلّ فيه حياة وهي متماثلةٌ لا اختلافَ فيها ولا تضادَّ؛ لاتّفاق معلولها؛ وليست مقدورةً لنا؛ وهي باقية ولا ضدّ لها، وزوالها عند القتل باعتبار أنّ المرجع بالقتل إمّا تفريقُ البنية، فعدِمَت لعدم شرطها، وكذا عند البرد الشديد والحر الشديد لحصول التّفريق فيهما.

وأثبتت الأشاعرة وأبو عليّ والكعبيّ وأبو هاشم أوّلاً الموتَ ضِدًّا للحياة؛ لقوله تعالى ﴿الَّذِي خَلَقَ المَوتَ والحَيَاةَ﴾. والحق أنّه عدمُ الحياة عمّا من شأنه أن يكونَ حيًّا بعدَ اتّصافه بها.

المطلب التاسع: في القدرة

وهي عرضٌ يقتضي كونَ محلّه إذا شاء أن يفعلَ فعل، وإذا شاء أن يترك ترك، وليست نفس المزاج؛ لأنّه كيفيّةٌ متوسّطةٌ بينَ الحار والبارد، فيكونُ من جنسهما، فيكون تأثيره من جنس تأثيرهما، وتأثيرُ القدرة مضادّة لتأثيرهما.

Power is prior to act, *pace* the Ashʿarites, for otherwise it would be wrong to oblige the unbeliever. They argue that since it is an accident, it does not persist. The answer is to contest the major premise.[82]

Power pertains to two opposites, since that is the meaning of power, and it is known necessarily that one who has the power to move to the right also has the power to move to the left, even when no other power is conceived. The Ashʿarites contest that, lest it follow that the two exist together, for neither of them deserves to take place rather than the other. The answer is that the determining factor is will.

Among the acts of the limbs, power pertains to five things: modes of being, composition, tendency, sound, and pain. Among the acts of hearts, it pertains to five things: will, aversion, thought, belief, and opinion.

An act can only take place through power directly, namely so that it is initiated in the substrate of power, or as a product, namely so that it takes place in accordance with another act, on which its greater or lesser degree depends, either in the substrate of power or beyond it.[83] Inventing is exclusive to the Eternal, high is He.[84]

82 That is, that accidents do not persist.

83 Whenever we exercise our power, we must first bring about a direct effect in our body. Such a direct effect is an accident, which can produce other accidents either in our body or in other bodies, such as in the objects of our activity or the instruments we apply. For a much more elaborate account of the *maqdūrāt* in Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, see Peters 1976, 205-208.

84 "Inventing" (*ikhtirāʿ*) is the direct production of effects outside the powerful agent's own substrate, or indeed without any substrate, in the sense of invention, or creation, *ex nihilo*. A special case of inventing is the production of bodies, of which only God is capable. All other agents endowed with power are only capable of producing accidents *in* bodies. For *ikhtirāʿ* in Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, see Peters 1976, 203 and 234-238.

وهي متقدّمةٌ على الفعل خلافًا للأشعريّة، وإلّا لقبح تكليفُ الكافر. احتجُوا بأنّها عرضٌ فلا يبقى. والجوابُ الطعنُ في الكبرى

وتتعلّق بالضّدَّين إذ هو معنى القدرة، وللعلم الضّروريّ بأنّ من قدر على الحركة يمنةً قدر عليها يسرةً، وإن لم يتصّور قدرة أخرى. والأشاعرة نازعوا في ذلك، وإلّا لزم وجودهما معًا؛ إذ ليس أحدهما أولى بالوقوع من الآخر. والجوابُ المخصّصُ الإرادةُ.

وتتعلّقُ من أفعال الجوارح بخمسةٍ: الأكوان والتّأليف والاعتماد والصّوت والألم؛ ومن أفعال القلوب بخمسة: الإرادة والكراهة والفكر والاعتقاد والظنّ.

ولا يصحّ الفعل بالقدرة إلّا مباشرةً - وهو أن يبتدي به في محلّها - أو متولّدًا. وهو أن يقع بحسب فعل آخر يقفُ كثرته وقلّته عليه، إمّا في محلّ القدرة أو متعدّ عنه. والاختراعُ مختصٌّ بالقديم تعالى؛

One power pertains to infinite things from one genus at one and the same time, if the substrate is multiple, for we can move an infinite number of light bodies.[85] It also pertains to infinite things from one genus in one substrate, albeit at different times, for any act emerging from the power can have its like brought into existence at its departure. However, if the genus, the time, and the substrate are all one, the power cannot pertain to more than one part, for otherwise it would pertain to infinite parts, because none would be more appropriate than the others.[86] This would refute the disparity in excellence between two powerful things, and it would enable the weak to lift mountains just as much as one endowed with strong potency can.[87] One power also pertains to an infinite number of different things, although the substrate and time are one, for there is nothing we cannot actively will, and that would not be possible if our power did not pertain to all these different volitions.

85 The point is not that we can actually move an infinite number of light bodies, but that given an infinite number of alternative light bodies, our power enables us to move any one of them.

86 Although the term 'part' (*juz'*) usually means the atom, here it probably refers to a part of the entire living body. We can think of the power of the living entity as divided into different "subpowers", according to the specific functions of the organs: your power relative to your hand is different from your power relative to your heart, for instance. Thus, the atom-parts that constitute the organ are considered as a single part in their relation to the specific powers. If we held that the power's substrate is an atom, we would run into the problem Ḥillī mentions, namely that no atom would be more appropriate to function as a substrate than another. For this use of 'part', see Frank 1978, 108, who renders it as 'discrete unit' or 'quantum'.

87 Another problem with the view that power inheres in an individual atom is that the physical differences between a strong and a frail person would be inexplicable: differences in power are only explicable by virtue of the substrate, and the individual atoms, which are the substrates of the two persons' respective powers, are identical in every relevant respect.

والقدرة الواحدة تتعلّقُ بما لا يتناهى من الجنس الواحد في الوقت الواحد إذا تعدّد المحلّ، فإنّه يمكننا أن نحرّك جسمًا خفيفًا غير متناه. وتتعلّقُ من الجنس الواحد في المحلّ الواحد بما لا يتناهى مع تغاير الأوقات؛ إذ كلّ فعل يصدرُ عنها يمكن إيجادُ مثله مع السّلامة؛ وإذا كان الجنسُ والوقت والمحلّ واحدًا لم يجز أن تتعلّقَ بأكثر من الجزء الواحد وإلّا لتعلّقت بما لا يتناهى لعدم الأولويّة، فينتفي التفاضل بين القادرَين، فيمكن رفع الجبال من الضعيف كما يمكن من ذي القوةِ الشديدة. وتتعلّق من المختلف مع اتّحاد الوقت والمحلّ بما لا يتناهي؛ إذ لا شيء إلّا ويصحّ منّا أن نفعل له إرادةً؛ ولولا تعلّقُ قدرتنا بجميع هذه الإرادات المختلفة لما صحّ ذلك.

The two masters differ. Abū Hāshim allows power to be devoid of both seizing and refraining, unless a motive for one of the two exists. If either were necessary, it would be such by virtue of something that is traced back to just being endowed with power, and the like would follow for the most high Eternal as well.[88] Alternatively, it would be necessary by virtue of something that is traced back to the power, which is equally related to what is produced and what is initiated, so that if this is possible in one case, it is possible in the other as well. However, the consequent is absurd.[89] Were this not the case, then if someone strong kept a body at rest, he would have made it reside by all his power at every moment, so that someone weak would not succeed in moving it. Yet we can move what someone mighty, and indeed, He who is powerful by virtue of Himself, has kept at rest.[90]

Abū ʿAlī and al-Kaʿbī have said: One who is powerful due to a power cannot neither seize nor refrain in the case of direct acts, unless there is an obstacle, for if avoiding both were possible at some moment, it would be possible always, and that would entail the possibility of him being neither obedient nor disobedient, and deserving neither praise nor blame. Moreover, even if it were possible for him to avoid acting, it would be necessary that when one enters the house of another at the other's invitation and then keeps him from being seated, that beautiful act is transformed into a sin. Hence, the mode of being is inevitably renewed from moment to moment, and so the blame is deserved.[91]

88 In other words, if power were not undetermined with regard to acting and refraining, one of the two alternatives would necessarily result from power alone. But then the act, and by the same token God's creative act, would no longer be voluntary.

89 The argument is extremely dense, but here is one plausible reconstruction. If power necessarily entailed either acting or refraining, this would have to be so in both types of act, namely direct and indirect acts. Indirect acts, however, depend on conditions additional to the power, and for this reason cannot be necessitated by the power alone. Since the consequent states just this, it is incoherent and therefore false. The antecedent is false by *modus tollens*.

90 If power necessarily entailed indirect acting or refraining, then once realised, the indirect effect will remain in act indefinitely. Thus, what has once been laid rest by a supremely powerful agent can never be moved by anyone else, which is evidently false, given our capacity to move things laid in place by an omnipotent God, who is powerful by virtue of Himself (*li-nafsihi*) and not by virtue of a delimited power that is specific to a certain act. For the distinction between being powerful by oneself and being powerful by way of a power, see Peters 1976, 237-239.

91 The example is strange, but perhaps the idea is that even passive behaviour, such as not offering a seat to a guest, may be counted as morally culpable, and therefore an act.

واختلف الشّيخان، فجوّز أبو هاشم خلوّ القدرة عن الأخذ والتّرك إلّا مع وجود داع إلى أحدِهما؛ فإنّه لو وجب فإمّا الأمر يرجع إلى كونه قادرًا فقط، فيلزم مثله في القديم تعالى، أو لشيء يرجع إلى القدرة مع تساوي نسبتها إلى المتولّد والمبتدأ؛ ولو جاز في أحدهما لجاز في الثّاني، لكن التّالي باطلٌ وإلّا لكان الجسم إذا اسكَنه القوي يكون قد فعل في كلّ حال فيه من السكون بجميع قدرة، فلا يتأتّى من الضّعيف تحريكه، لكن يصحّ منّا تحريك ما سكّنه القويّ بل القادرُ لنفسه.

وقال أبو عليّ والكعبيّ لا يجوزُ خلوّ القادر بقدرة من أخذٍ أو ترك في المباشر من الأفعال إلّا عندَ منع؛ إذ لو جازَ الخلوّ وقتًا مّا لجازَ دائمًا، وذلك يقتضي جواز خلوّه من الطاعات والمعاصي ومن استحقاق المدح والذّمّ؛ ولأنّه لو جاز خلوّه من الفعل لوجب إذا دخل دار غيره بإذنه ثمّ نهاه عن القعود أن ينقلب ذلك الحَسنُ قبيحًا، فلا بُدّ من تجديد الكون حالاً فحالاً ليثبت استحقاق الذّمّ.

This requires reflection, for in the first case, the holding back may be rejected but modes of being persist,[92] whereas in the second case the implication is rejected, because it happens due to motives of need, so that he is inevitably an agent at some moment.[93] The one who denies the seat deserves blame, even if modes of being were not renewed, because he has not acted as he should have at the outset, just as he would deserve blame, if he had laid out his furniture after the invitation and then denied their use, even in case modes of being were not renewed.

92 This is an objection to Abū Hāshim's last point. We do not have to think that a stationary object is such, because a powerful agent (or God) actively keeps it still, for although its mode of being at rest has been caused by a powerful agent in the past, it henceforth persists on its own. Thus, a weaker agent may move the object, because it only has to overpower the object's state of rest, not the power of the stronger agent.

93 This is an objection to the first point made by Abū ʿAlī and Kaʿbī. Muʿtazilite ethics makes a distinction between motives of need (*dawāʿī l-ḥājja*), which are based on the agent's own good, and motives of charity (*dawāʿī l-iḥsān*), which are based on the good of others. Necessities of survival, such as procuring nourishment, inevitably give rise to motives of need. Thus, even if being endowed with power allowed for the possibility of neither acting nor refraining at some moment, a motive of need, and thereby an act, would certainly arise at another moment. This suffices to invalidate the implication ("if avoiding both were possible at some moment, it would be possible always").

وفيه نظرٌ؛ لمنع الحصر في الأوّل وبقاء الأكوان، ومنع الملازمة في الثّاني، لأنّه يعرض لدواعي الحاجة فلا بدّ من كونه فاعلاً وقتًا مّا، والمنهيُّ عن القعود مستحقٌّ للذّم وإن لم يُجدّد الأكوان؛ لأنّه لم يفعل ما وجب عليه من الخروج كما يستحق الذّم لو وضع متاعه بعدَ الإذن، ثمّ حَظرَ عليه مع أنّه لم يجدّد الأكوان فيه.

The Muʿtazilites reject one object of power pertaining to two subjects endowed with power, because their motives may differ, so that one knows its beauty and the motive motivates him to bring it about, whereas the other believes it to be bad and this belief averts him from bringing it about. Hence, two contradictories would be combined in it.[94] Since the difference between the objects of power is necessary, the difference between powers is necessary. Hence, they are neither similar nor opposed, because things that pertain to something can be opposed only when that to which they pertain is one, and then one of them would pertain to it conversely to the way in which the other pertains. This is impossible with powers, because their pertaining does not vary. Hence, this could only be if that to which they pertain is one, and then they would be similar. If they were different, many of them could exist in one substrate.[95] Powers could persist without this depending on the persistence of an object of power, although they would not be subject to our power, for otherwise we could increase our own potency.[96]

Incapacity is privation of power in one who should have power. According to the Ashʿarites, Abū ʿAlī, and Abū Hāshim initially, it is a positively existing attribute that is opposite to having power, because neither is more appropriately a privation of the other than the other way round. This is weak, because possibility does not necessitate decision.

94 At first glance, the argument seems obviously flawed: knowledge that something is good is not contradictory to a belief that the thing is bad. The key to its validity, I think, is that an object of power is specific to each power considered together with the epistemic specifications it is appended with. Thus, someone who is endowed with the power over an act *and* believes that the act is preferable has power only over that act, not over its omission. If that is the case, then the same object of power pertaining to two agents with the contrary epistemic specifications would have to be both good and bad.

95 If, *per impossibile*, two powers could have one object, nothing would rule out one person being endowed with both. Thus, I could have both of the aforementioned epistemically specified powers.

96 This inference is not entirely clear to me, but perhaps the idea is that if there is no strict correlation between powers and objects of power, powers are independent of their objects. This raises the question of what determines the independent powers. The only other candidate is that the person endowed with the power has a second-order power to determine it. This, however, contradicts empirical evidence – we do not have the power to decide what powers, or how great powers, we are endowed with.

ومنعن المعتزلة في تعلّق المقدور الواحدِ بقادرين؛ إذ يجوزُ اختلاف دواعيهما فيعلم أحدهُما حُسنه، فيدعوه الدّاعي إلى إيقاعه ويعتقد الآخر قبحه؛ فيصرفه هذا الاعتقادُ عن إيقاعه، فيجتمع فيه النقيضان. وإذا وجب تغايرُ المقدور وجب اختلاف القُدَر، فليست متماثلةً ولا متضادّةً لأنّ تضادّ المتعلّقات إنّما يصحّ إذا كان المتعلّق واحداً؛ ثمّ يتعلّقُ أحدهما بالعكس من تعلّق الآخر؛ وهذا ممتنعٌ في القُدر، لأنّ تعلّقها غير مختلف، فليس إلّا لأنّ متعلّقها واحدٌ، وحينئذ تكون متماثلةً. وإذا كانت مختلفةً صحّ وجود الكثير منها في محلّ واحد ويصح البقاء على القُدر من غير توقّف على بقاء المقدور وليست مقدورةً لنا وإلّا لأمكننا أن نزيد في قوانا.

والعجزُ عدمُ القدرة عمّا من شأنه أن يكون قادرًا؛ وعند الاشاعرة وأبي عليّ وأبي هاشم أوّلاً إنّه صفةٌ وجوديّة مضادّةٌ للقدارة؛ لأنّه ليس كون إحداهما عدمًا للأخرى أولى من العكس؛ وهو ضعيفٌ لأنّ الاحتمال لا يوجب الجزم.

Question 10: On Belief

It is something mental, which one who is alive finds in himself and which he necessarily perceives to be different from another. He can judge negatively or assertively about it, and this judgment is either decisive or not. In the first case, it is either adequate or not, and if it is adequate, it is either established or not. If it is established, it is knowledge, and if not, it is true belief based on imitation. Inadequate belief is the belief of someone ignorant. If a belief that is not decisive preponderates, it is opinion, if it is preponderated upon, it is an erroneous estimation, and if it is equal, it is doubt.

Differences prevail concerning knowledge, and it is said that it ought to not be defined, for otherwise a circle ensues. It is also said that knowledge is negative, which is an error, for otherwise it would not be the negation of just anything, but the negation of its counterpart. If the counterpart is a negation, knowledge will be positive, whereas if it is an assertion, then its privation will be true of privation, and so knowledge will be true of what does not exist. It is also said that knowledge is the impression of the form of what is known in the knower.[97] This is refuted by saying that one who conceives heat would then be hot, which is no good, for what occurs is not a quiddity but a form.[98] The truth is that knowledge is a real attribute, which has a relation to what is known as its concomitant.[99]

Those who speak of states have rendered knowledge an accident that requires being a knower, and asserted that being a knower pertains to what is known, and just as knowledge pertains to what exists, it also pertains to what does not exist. For instance, we know that the Sun rises tomorrow. They differ from others, insofar as the others answer that knowledge pertains to what exists, because what is known is distinct, and all that is distinct is positive.[100]

97 This is an abridged formulation of the Peripatetic definition of knowledge or perception (*idrāk*); cf., for instance, Avicenna, *Ishārāt*, namaṭ 3, 122.

98 In effect, Ḥillī says that the counterargument is invalid because it confuses the form of heat, which is a representation, with a real instantiation of heat, which is a quiddity.

99 Although sixth/twelfth-century readers of Avicenna, such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī or Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), pitched the relational theory of knowledge against Avicenna's theory of knowledge as the impression of forms, the view that Ḥillī recognises as true can also be traced back to Avicenna; cf. Avicenna, *Ishārāt*, namaṭ 7, 183-184.

100 Ḥillī's account is extremely concise, but the debate between the *ḥāl* theorists and the others seems to revolve around the question of how we can know things that do not presently exist, such as future states of affairs. The advantage of grounding knowledge on *ḥāl*, or a state that neither exists nor does not exist, is that the *ḥāl* is neutral with respect to the existence of the object of knowledge. The other alternative, motivated by the problems resulting from the *aḥwāl*, restricts objects of knowledge to existing things, but tacitly introduces the option of mental existence: it is sufficient for the object of knowledge to exist in the mind. This is the view that Ḥillī endorses in the next paragraph.

المطلب العاشر: في الاعتقاد

وهو أمر ذهنيّ يجده الحيُّ من نفسه ويدرك التفرقة بينه وبين غيره بالضّرورة؛ ويمكن أن يحكم فيه بنفي أو إثبات؛ وهذا الحكمُ إمّا أن يكون جازمًا أولا، والأوّل إمّا أن يكون مطابقًا أولا، فإن كان مطابقًا فإمّا أن يكون ثابتًا أولا، والثّابتُ هو العلم وغيره هو الاعتقاد الحق المستندُ إلى التقليد، وغير المطابق هو اعتقادُ الجاهل، وغير الجازم إن كان راجحًا فهو الظنُّ، وإن كان مرجوحًا فهو الوهمُ، والمتساوي الشّكّ.

واختُلف في العلم، فقيل لا يُحدُّ وإلّا دار. وقيل إنّه سلبيّ؛ وهو خطأٌ، وإلّا لم يكن سلب أيّ شيء كان، بل سلب مقابله؛ فإن كان سلبًا كان العلمُ ثبوتيًّا، وإن كان إيجابًا لكان عدمُه صادقًا على العدم، فيكونُ العلم صادقًا على المعدود. وقيل إنّه انطباعُ صورة المعلوم في العالِم؛ وأبطِلَ بأنّ من تصوّر الحرارة كان حارًّا، وليس بجيّد فإنّ الحاصل ليس الماهيّة بل الصّورة؛ والحقّ أنّه صفةٌ حقيقةٌ يلزمها الإضافةُ إلى المعلوم.

القائلون بالأحوال جعلوا العلمَ عرضًا يوجبُ العالميّةَ، وأثبتوا تعلّقًا للعالميّة بالمعلوم، وكما يتعلّقُ العلمُ بالموجود كذا يتعلّق بالمعدوم، كما نعلم طلوعُ الشّمس غدًا؛ خلافًا لبعضهم، حيث أوجبوا تعلّقه بالموجود؛ لأنّ كلّ معلوم متميّزٌ، وكلّ متميّز ثابت.

The answer is that being positive is more general than the mental and the external. Besides, if that which does not exist is simple, it is known through a relation, like when we say, God most high has no opposite, His relation to it is like the relation of black to white. If it is composite, knowledge depends on its existing parts, like knowledge concerning the non-existence of a combination of two opposites, for we understand black, white, and combination, and then we understand that combination will not occur between black and white. Knowledge follows that which is known and reports it in the sense that the principle in the state of adequacy is what is known, even if knowledge could be prior, like a report may be prior.

There is a doubt concerning whether knowledge depends on the knower's soul, insofar as dependence requires a relation between two different things.[101] The defence by saying that his being a knower is different from his being known, or by means of the difference between the particular and the universal, is false,[102] because the difference between being a knower and being known is posterior to knowledge, and so there is a circle. The universal is a part of the quiddity, not the same as it.

Abū al-Hudhayl has said that knowledge is a ground distinct from belief, for otherwise all beliefs would be knowledge. This is false, for knowledge is a specific belief. Abū ʿAlī has said that it is of the same class as belief, for otherwise it would be either opposite to belief, so that the two could not be combined, or different from it, so that they would not be contradicted by one and the same opposite. Hence, he opts for similarity.

101 Although Ḥillī does not explicate it, the problem arises from self-knowledge. If knowledge is a relation that depends on two relata, that is, the knowing subject's soul and the object of knowledge, how do we explain self-knowledge, in which the latter relatum is missing?

102 These are two attempts at explaining self-knowledge according to the relational model. Either there is a difference between two aspects of the knowing subject, namely as subject and as object of knowledge, or we have a particular subject knowing herself by knowing the universal of which she is an instantiation, such as the concept of human in the case of a human subject.

والجواب أنّ الثبوتَ أعمُّ الذّهنيّ والخارجيّ، ثمّ المعدومُ إن كان بسيطًا عُلِمَ بالنّسبة، كما نقول: ليس لله تعالى ضدٌّ، نسبته إليه نسبةُ السواد إلى البياض؛ وإن كان مركّبًا تعلّق العلمُ بأجزائه الوجوديّة، كالعلم بعدم اجتماع الضّدين؛ فإنّا نعقلُ السوادَ والبياض والاجتماعَ، ثمّ نعقلُ أنّ ذلك الاجتماع غيرُ حاصل بين السواد والبياض؛ والعلمُ تابعٌ للمعلوم وحكايةٌ عنه، بمعنى أنّ الأصل في هيئة التطابق هو المعلوم، وإن جاز تقدّمُ العلم كما يتقدمُ الحكاية.

وفي تعلّقه بنفس العالم إشكالٌ من حيث وجوب تعلُّق الإضافة بالمتغايرين. والاعتذارُ بأنّ كونه عالمًا مغايرٌ لكونه معلومًا، أو بتغاير الجزئيّ والكلّيّ باطلٌ، لأنّ التغاير بالعالميّة والمعلوميّة متأخّرٌ عن العلم فيدورُ. والكلّيّ جزء الماهيّة، لا نفسُها.

قال أبو الهذيل إنّ العلم معنىً مغايرٌ للاعتقاد، وإلّا لكان كلُّ اعتقاد علمًا. وهو خطأ؛ فإنّه اعتقادٌ خاصٌّ. وقال أبو عليّ إنّه من قبيل الاعتقاد وإلّا لكان ضدًّا، فيمتنعُ اجتماعُهما أو مخالفًا، فلا ينتفيان بضدٍّ واحدٍ، فتعيّن التّماثل.

Knowledge is within our power, since the order applies to it,[103] although necessary knowledge is of His doing, high is He. Since adequacy is a condition for knowledge, one knowing cannot pertain to two known things.[104] Al-Kaʿbī did allow one knowing to pertain to two known things that entail each other, for what is known summarily is known in one respect and unknown in another. However, the two respects are different, and the known respect is not a mere summary, whereas the unknown respect is not known at all.[105] Yes, when the two respects are combined about something, the opinion arises that the summary and the detailed are different, and the contrariety between the two beliefs concerning the two opposites is essential.

Knowledge can pertain to knowledge. They differ on this, the two masters saying that it is knowledge of what is known, whereas Abū ʿAbdillāh, Abū Isḥāq,[106] and Qāḍī al-Quḍāt say that it is knowledge that knowledge is in a certain state, or a judgment. There is no opposition in knowledge, but there is similarity and difference in it. Two beliefs may be opposed, regardless of whether both are ignorance or one is knowledge and the other ignorance.

Knowledge of Him is necessary, as is acquaintance with Him, high is He, because it is induced by the fear that results from the disparity, and because gratitude is necessary but cannot be completed without it. By the same token, knowledge of what He has assigned is necessary.

Negligence, according to the two masters and Abū Isḥāq, is a ground opposed to knowledge. Qāḍī al-Quḍāt and Abū Isḥāq also say that it is privation of knowledge concerning things, which are customarily known. The truth is that it is privation of knowledge after knowledge has occurred. As regards doubt, according to Abū ʿAlī and Abū al-Qāsim, it is a ground opposed to knowledge, *pace* Abū Hāshim.

103 This is the moral order or obligation to acquire knowledge.

104 Adequacy must be understood in the sense of a correspondence between the belief of the knowing subject and its intentional object. One act of knowing can only correspond to one object. This does not rule out knowledge of universals, though – but we must properly identify its one object, namely the universal that remains one and the same despite the variation of its particular instantiations.

105 This is a counterargument against Kaʿbī: when we investigate the two aspects of summary knowledge (*al-maʿlūm ijmālan*), we find that it consists of knowledge and ignorance, and the aspect of knowledge pertains to one specific object in a non-summary fashion.

106 This is probably the Ashʿarite theologian Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī (d. 418/1028).

والعلمُ مقدورٌ لنا، لتوجّه الأمر به. نعم الضروريّ من فعله تعالى، ولما شرطت المطابقةُ في العلم امتنع تعلُق علم واحد بمعلومين. وجوّز الكعبيّ تعلّقَ العلم الواحد بمعلومين متلازمين؛ والمعلومُ إجمالاً معلومٌ من وجه ومجهول من آخر، والوجهات متغايران. فالوجهُ المعلوم لا إجمالَ فيه، والمجهول غير معلوم البتّة. نعم لما اجتمعا في شيء ظنّ مغايرةُ الإجمالي للتفصيلي، والتنافي بينَ اعتقادي الضدين ذاتيّ.

ويصحّ تعلّق العلم بالعلم، واختلفوا فقال الشيخان إنّه علمٌ بالمعلوم، وقال أبو عبد الله وأبو إسحاق وقاضي القضاة إنه علمٌ بكون العلم على حال أو حكم. ولا تضادَّ في العلوم، بل فيها متماثلٌ ومختلفٌ. ويصحّ تضادُّ اعتقادان، سواء كانا جهلين أو أحدهما علمًا والآخرُ جهلاً.

والعلمُ منه واجبٌ؛ كمعرفته تعالى؛ لأنّها دافعةٌ للخوف الحاصل من الاختلاف، ولأنّ الشكر واجبٌ ولا يتمّ بدونها، وكالعلم بمكلّف به.

والسهو عند الشّيخين وأبي إسحاق أنّه معنىً يضادُّ العلم. وقال قاضي القضاة وأبو إسحاق ايضًا أنّه عدمُ العلم بالأمور الّتي جرت العادة بأن تُعلم. والحقُّ أنّه عدمُ العلم بعدَ حصوله.

The two masters concur concerning the possibility that acts of knowing remain within their genus.[107] Abū Isḥāq and Qāḍī al-Quḍāt reject altogether that acts of knowing and different species of belief remain, for otherwise they could only be annihilated by their opposites, but the consequent is false, for one of us may cease to be a knower due to negligence or doubt. Since knowledge is an occurrence, and according to the consideration of the considerate ones, an occurrence is not separable from an occurrence of the occurrence, knowledge of something necessitates knowledge of the knowledge of it, *pace* the two masters.

Intellection, which according to one group is a matter of obligation, is knowledge of the necessity of necessary things and the impossibility of impossible things, for otherwise one could be separated from the other, which would be weak due to the possibility of mutual implication.[108] In addition to the foregoing, the Muʿtazilites say that intellection is knowledge concerning the goodness of the good and the badness of the bad. Judge Abū Bakr[109] says that it is knowledge of the necessity of necessary things, of the impossibility of impossible things, and of the habitual course of customs. The truth is that it is an instinctive faculty, from which self-evident knowledge of this sort follows when the senses are sound.

Question 11: On Opinion

It is making one of two possible things preponderant, despite the possibility of its alternative. The preponderance of a belief is not a belief concerning the preponderance. According to Abū Hāshim, it belongs to the class of beliefs, for opinion covers a scope that could be mistaken for that of knowledge, and something can only be mistaken for that which is of the same genus with it. However, the major premise is denied, for will can be mistaken for desire.[110]

107 The question here is whether a cognitive act, say, *S*'s believing that *P*, remains of the same genus when its truth value changes.

108 If something is necessary, its contradictory is impossible, and if something is impossible, its contradictory is necessary.

109 This is the famous Ashʿarite theologian Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013).

110 The argument is not neatly reconstructed in any of the basic figures, but the following might be close to the idea: 'opinion can be mistaken for knowledge (minor); what can be mistaken for knowledge is of the same genus as knowledge, namely a belief (major); therefore, opinion is of the same genus as knowledge, namely a belief'. The major premise is debatable, because there is a counterexample of the general principle.

وأمّا الشك فعند أبي عليّ وأبي القاسم أنّه معنىً مُضادٌّ للعلم خلافًا لأبي هاشم.

واتفق الشيخان على جواز بقاء العلوم في جنسها. ومنع أبو إسحاق وقاضي القضاة من بقاء العلوم وأنواع الاعتقادات أجمعَ، وإلّا لم تنتف إلّا بالضد، والتّالي باطلٌ؛ فإنّ أحدنا يخرجُ من كونه عالمًا بسهو أو شك. ولما كان العلمُ هو الحصول وكان الحصول لا ينفكُّ عن حصول الحصول عندَ اعتبار المعتبرين وجب من العلم بالشيء العلمُ بالعلم به، خلافًا للشّيخين.

والعقلُ الذي هو مناطُ التكليف عند جماعة هو العلمُ بوجوب الواجبات واستحالة المستحيلات، وإلّا لصحّ انفكاك أحدهما من الآخر؛ وهو ضعيفٌ لإمكان التلازم. وقالت المعتزلةُ زيادةً على ما تقدّم - العلمُ بحُسن الحسن وقبح القبيح. وقال القاضي أبو بكر هو العلمُ بوجوبِ الواجبات واستحالة المستحيلات ومجاري العادات. والحقّ أنّه قوةٌ غريزيةٌ تلزمها هذه العلومُ البديهيّة عندَ سلامة الحواسّ.

المطلب الحادي عشر: في الظنّ

وهو ترجيح أحد المجوّزين مع تجويز خلافه، ورُجحانُ الاعتقاد غيرُ اعتقاد الرجحان. وهو من قبيل الاعتقاد عند أبي هاشم؛ فإنّ الظنّ قد يبلغُ مبلغًا يلتبسُ بالعلم، والشّيء إنّما يلتبسُ بما هو من جنسه؛ والكبرى ممنوعةٌ، فإنّ الإرادةَ تلتبس بالشّهوة.

Abū ʿAlī, Abū Isḥāq, Abū ʿAbdillāh, and Qāḍī al-Quḍāt say that it is different from belief, because there is a difference between our being in the state of opinion and our being in the state of belief.

The verified account is for us to say that if decision is made a condition for belief, it is different from opinion, but if not, it is its genus, and opinion is opposite to knowledge. If it pertains conversely to what knowledge pertains to, like knowledge that Zayd is in a house and the opinion that he is not in it, then opposition also takes place between instances of opinion, like the opinion of Zayd's being in a house and the opinion that he is not in it. An opinion may depend on an opinion. There are good, bad, and obligatory opinions.

Question 12: On Reflection

The best of its definitions is the way we have defined it in our other books, namely that it is ordering mental things so that something else is acquired by means of them, for it brings together the four causes.[111] Some reflections are similar, namely when what they cause coincide, and some are different, namely when that is not the case.

111 The formal cause of reflection is the order, the efficient cause the act of ordering, the material cause the mental content that is ordered, and the final cause the acquisition of further mental content.

وقال أبو عليّ وأبو اسحاق وأبو عبد الله وقاضي القضاة إنّه مغايرٌ له للفصل بين حالنا عند الظنّ وعندَ الاعتقاد.

والتّحقيقُ أن نقولَ إن شُرِطَ في الاعتقاد الجزمُ كان مغايراً للظنّ، وإلّا كان جنسًا له، وهو مضادٌّ للعلم إذا تعلّق بمتعلّقه على العكس؛ كالعلم بأنّ زيداً في الدّار، والظنّ أنّه ليس فيها. ويقع المضادّةُ بينَ أفراده، كظنّ كون زيد في الدّار وظنّ أنّه ليس فيها. ويقع المضادّةُ بين أفراده، كظنّ كون زيد في الدّار وظنّ أنّه ليس فيها. وقد يتعلّق الظنّ بالظنّ. ومن الظنّ حسنٌ وقبيحٌ وواجبٌ.

المطلب الثّاني عشر: في النظر

أجودُ حدوده ما حدّدناه نحن في سائر كتبنا. وهو: «أنّه ترتيبُ أمور ذهنية ليتوصّل بها إلى آخر»، فإنّه جامع للعلل الأربع. ومنه متماثلٌ وهو ما اتفق معلوله؛ ومختلفٌ، وهو ما عداه.

On whether there is opposition in it, Abū ʿAlī has said that reflections concerning two things that are opposite in every respect are opposite. He is challenged by Abū Hāshim, because it is a condition for the opposition of those which pertain to something that that to which they pertain is one, and when two reflections pertain to one object reflected upon, they are similar.[112] According to the Muʿtazilites, it cannot persist, because one of us may cease to reflect without any opposite, for due to the foregoing, there is no opposition within the reflection, nor is anything else opposed to it, for there is nothing that could not be combined with it, except knowledge of something with evidence, since reflection cannot be combined with evidence.[113] This, however, is not due to an opposition between knowledge and reflection, for otherwise reflection could not be combined with opinion, because opinion is opposed to knowledge, and what cannot co-exist with one of two opposites cannot co-exist with the other either. The consequent is false, since opinion concerning something with evidence can be combined with reflection – indeed reflection requires that the contradictory contrary to knowledge is possible.[114]

112 According to a generally valid principle, opposition between two things requires a shared foundation. For instance, black and white are opposed in terms of the shared property of being colour. Such a shared foundation is lacking, when our reflections aim at a statement and its negation. These are two distinct mental contents, and the two inferential processes are thereby necessarily distinct.

113 The question concerns whether one act of reflection can persist from one object of reflection to another. The Muʿtazilites, perhaps with the exception of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʿī, deny this because there is no shared basis, which would allow us to speak of one reflection when the contents differ. All sorts of considerations, with the exception of evidence that brings the matter to a close, can be included in the process of reflection, however.

114 The point here is that we cannot deliberate or reflect on something that we know based on sufficient and indubitable evidence or argument. However, we *can* deliberate about something that we know by a less secure method, as well as about something for which there is some evidence but which is nevertheless a matter of opinion.

وهل فيه تضادٌّ؛ قال أبو عليّ النظرُ في أمرين يتضادّان على كلّ وجه متضادّ. ومنعه أبو هاشم لإشراك اتّحاد المتعلّق في تضادّ المتعلِّق، وإذا تعلّق النظران بمنظور واحد تماثلا. ولا يجوز عليه البقاء عند المعتزلة لخروج أحدنا عن كونه ناظرًا من دون ضدّ، إذ ليس في النظر تضادٌّ لما تقدم، ولا يضادّه غيره؛ إذ لا شيء إلّا ويصحّ مجامعته له إلّا العلم بالمدلول، فإنّه لا يجامعُ النظر في الدّلالة، لا لتضادّهما وإلّا لم يجامع الظنَّ، لأنّه يضادُّ العلمَ، وما يستحيل وجوده مع أحد الضّدّين يستحيل وجوده مع الآخر؛ والتّالي باطلٌ؛ إذ ظنُّ المدلول يجامع النظرَ، بل لافتقار النّظر إلى تجويز النقيض المنافي للعلم.

Let it not be said that it ceases with what is equivalent to its opposite, namely knowledge of that which has evidence. For we say: Reflection may cease before the occurrence of knowledge. Sustained thinking is not one but many thoughts renewed by the one reflecting, and its being attributed with length is metaphorical. It is within our power, because it emerges according to intention and motive. It is not produced by anything else, for induction shows that there is nothing that produces it.[115] It cannot be from intention and motive, because otherwise all acts would be produced by them, and because they cannot both be its reasons, for it is impossible to have many causes when what is caused is one. It is not from will either, because what emerges from will is merely possible, and so it is not counted as a necessitating reason, nor is it from a motive, because a motive may consist of necessary knowledge so that what is produced by it is necessary, nor is it from reflection, for otherwise the existence of what is infinite would follow.

115 That is, the following induction reveals that there is nothing that could produce reflection. It just emerges, without a cause as it were, when we have the motive and the intention to reach a certain conclusion by way of a process of reflection.

لا يُقال يزول بما يجري مجرى الضّدّ، وهو العلم بالمدلول. لأنا نقول قد يزول نظره قبل حصول العلم، والفكر المستمرّ ليس واحدًا، بل أفكارٌ متجدّدةٌ يجدّدها الناظر، ووصفه بالطول مجازٌ. وهو مقدورٌ لنا؛ لصدوره بحسبِ القصد والدّاعي لا متولّدًا عن غيره بالاستقراء الدّالّ على نفي ما يولّدهُ، ولا يصحّ عن القصد والدّاعي، وإلّا لكانت جميعُ الأفعال متولّدةً عنهما؛ ولامتناع كونهما معًا سببين، لاستحالة تكثّر العلّة مع وحدة المعلول، ولا عن الإرادة؛ إذ الصّدور عنها جائزٌ، فلا تعدّ سببًا موجِبًا ولا الدَّاعي؛ لأنه قد يكون علومًا ضروريّةً، فيكون المتولّد عنه ضروريًّا، ولا عن النظر وإلّا لزم وجودُ مالا يتناهى.

It necessarily yields knowledge, for one who knows that the world is changeable and that all that is changeable has been brought into being, knows necessarily that the world has been brought into being. The Sumnites'[116] objection is sophistry. They argue that the knowledge of a belief, which occurs at the heels of two premises, being knowledge is not certain, because it is often revealed false, nor is it due to reflection, for otherwise there would be regress. Since divine things are hidden, and we are even incapable of perceiving our own essences, how could knowledge be acquired about them? The answer is: The knowledge, that the conclusion of a supposed syllogism is knowledge, is due to reflection and occurs from two premises, one of which is that that conclusion follows necessarily from two necessary things, and whatever follows from two necessary things is necessarily knowledge. Hence, the conclusion of the supposed syllogism is necessarily knowledge. This conclusion is due to reflection and acquired from two premises.[117] Besides, knowledge that the conclusion of the supposed syllogism is necessarily knowledge is self-evident and occurs from just conceiving them both, and so the regress is interrupted. Difficulty is not evidence of impossibility.[118]

116 This is an Indian sect notorious for their endorsement of transmigration.

117 The argument is potentially confusing because it is a second-order syllogism that concerns the supposed first-order syllogism: 'the (first-order) conclusion of the supposed syllogism follows necessarily from two necessary premises (minor); what follows necessarily from two necessary premises is necessarily knowledge (major); thus, the (first-order) conclusion of the supposed syllogism is necessarily knowledge (second-order conclusion)'. This last conclusion is acquired by reflection, namely the syllogism just laid out. The Sumnites could still challenge Ḥillī's major premise, which seems to beg the question. This may be Ḥillī's target in the next sentence.

118 If one has correct conceptions of what it is to be the conclusion of a syllogism and what it is to be knowledge, one immediately realises that a conclusion of a syllogism is knowledge. The fact that acquiring these correct conceptions may be difficult does not entail that it is impossible.

وإفادته للعلم ضروريّة، فإن من علم أنّ العالَم متغيرٌ وأنّ كلّ متغيّر مُحدَثٌ علم بالضّرورة كون العالَم محدثًا. وإنكار السُّمنيّة سفسطةٌ؛ احتجّوا بأنّ العلم بكون الاعتقاد الحاصل عقيب المقدّمين علمًا ليس ضروريًّا، لانكشاف فساده كثيرًا، ولا نظريًّا، وإلّا تسلسل؛ ولأنّ الأمور الإلهيّة خفيّة مع عجزنا عن إدراك ذواتنا فكيف يحصل العلم بها. والجوابُ، العلم بأنّ نتيجة القياس المفروض علمٌ نظريٌّ حصل من مقدَمتين، إحداهما أنّ تلك النّتيجة لازمةٌ بالضّرورة لضرورتين، وكلّ لازم لضرورتين علمٌ بالضّرورة، فإذن نتيجةُ القياس المفروض علمٌ بالضّرورة وهذه النّتيجة نظريّة مستفادة من مقدّمتين. ثمّ العلمُ بأنّ نتيجةَ القياس المفروض علمٌ بالضّرورة بديهيّ يحصل من نفس تصوّرهما فينقطعُ التّسلسل، والصّعوبة لا تدلّ على الامتناع.

Knowledge occurs necessarily at the heels of what is sound, for it is absurd to hesitate about the necessary.[119] The Ashʿarites differ, however, because the servants' acts are traced back to Him most high, and they only occur according to a custom. The minor premise is false and thus eliminated.[120] The Muʿtazilites have said that it takes place by way of production, because it occurs from the one reflecting by means of reflection, for it is arrived at in accordance with the reflection by way of a uniform method, provided the states are valid, in the sense that a conclusion that concerns coming to be, and not prophecy, for instance, occurs from a reflection that concerns coming to be. The Ashʿarites' analogy with recollection, which is agreed to not be produced, does not yield certainty, because the analogy is weak, nor does it oblige, if one speaks about that, because the cause for the non-existence of production in recollection is that it sometimes occurs without any intention from the one recollecting, unlike reflection. If that is possible, the difference is evident, and if not, they have withheld a judgment concerning the foundation.[121]

119 If the conclusion of a syllogism follows logically from the premises, then having understood the truth of the premises, one cannot fail to immediately understand the truth of the conclusion.

120 The Ashʿarites' counterargument is an application of occasionalism to the psychological equivalent of logical consequence: if there are no worldly causes, then it is perfectly possible that at time t_1, a person (or a "servant", the term here used in the sense of human beings, who are obliged to serve God) understands the premises 'all A are B' and 'all B are C', but God withholds from creating the understanding of the conclusion 'all A are C' at time t_2. The minor premise that Ḥillī objects to is 'the servant's acts are traced back to (i.e. caused immediately by) God', which is little more than a flat denial of occasionalism about human affairs,

121 In other words, if it is possible to recall something without a prior intention but *not* impossible to arrive at a conclusion without an intention, the Ashʿarites' analogy fails. If unintentional recollection is not possible, the Ashʿarites must say why that is the case, that is, they must further specify the foundation of the analogy.

وحصول العلم عقيب الصّحيح واجبٌ؛ لاستحالة التخلّف بالضرورة، خلافًا للأشعريّة؛ لأنّ أفعال العباد مستندةٌ إليه تعالى، فحصوله عاديّ، والصّغرى كاذبةٌ [و] سيأتي. وقالت المعتزلةُ على سبيل التوليد؛ لأنّه يحصل من الناظر بتوسّط النظر، لوقوعه بحسبه على طريقة واحدة مع سلامة الأحوال، بمعنى أنّ النظر في الحدوث يحصل منه نتيجة الحدوث، لا النّبوة مثلاً؛ وقياسُ الأشاعرة على التذكير المجمع على عدم توليده لا يفيد اليقين؛ لضعف القياس، ولا الالزام لوقيل به؛ لأنّ علّة عدم التوليد في التذكّر حصوله في بعض الأوقات من غير قصد المتذكر بخلاف النظر، فإن صحّت ظهر الفرق وإلّا منعوا حكم الأصل.

When it comes to flawed reflection, they concur that it does not produce ignorance, for otherwise someone ignorant would be absolved from guilt.[122] Furthermore, no ignorance results when someone who is right reflects on the doubts of someone who is wrong, whereas the one who is wrong will be refuted when he reflects on the evidence of the one who is right, and so there is inevitably belief in the truth of the premises. The validity of the reflection is due to the validity of its order, which is its formal part, as well as the soundness of its premises, which are its material part. Reflection is flawed due to the invalidity of either both or one of the two, and there is no doubt that this is due to the first alternative, for otherwise those endowed with understanding would agree about matters of reflection, and error would vanish.[123] They both vary the way in which something inhering in a substrate does, and there is no regress, because reflection holds between the material parts, not absolutely.[124]

122 The idea that ignorance is morally culpable but flawed reflection is not might seem strange at first glance. The background is the widely held theological principle, according to which intellectual reflection on the central articles of faith and the arguments in their favour is a necessary condition for sound religious belief, and thus obliged upon every Muslim endowed with sound cognitive capacities. However, failure in a sincere reflective effort is different from failing to engage in the effort; among other things, the two failures have different moral status: failed reflection is not culpable, whereas failure to reflect is. On the question of understanding and *taqlīd* about the principles of faith, see Pessagno 1979 (on Māturīdī), Frank 1989 (on classical Ashʿarism), and El-Rouayheb 2015, 173-203 (on later Ashʿarism).

123 In other words, it must be the case that errors in reflection are due to both logically invalid inferences and false premises. All inferences are ultimately based on indubitable first principles, and if people did not make invalid inferences, no invalid posterior premises could be derived from these principles.

124 There is no regress, because not all premises, which are the material parts of syllogism, are acquired by way of reflection.

أمّا الفاسد فقد إتفقوا على عدم توليده الجهل، وإلّا لكان الجاهل معذورًا، ولأن المحقُ لا يحصل له الجهل بنظره في شبهة المبطِل؛ وينتقض بالمبطل لو نظر في دليل المحق فلا بد من اعتقاد حقيّة المقدّمات وصحّة النظر بصحّة ترتيبه، وهو جزؤه الصوريّ؛ وصحّة مقدّماته، وهي الجزء الماديّ، وفساده بفسادهما أو فساد أحدهما ولا بد من الأوّل، وإلّا لشارك العقلاء في النظريّات وانتفى الغلط، وهما متغايران تغاير الحالّ للمحلّ، ولا تسلسل؛ لأنّه ثابتٌ بينَ الأجزاء المادية لا مطلقًا.

Insofar as it has been established that knowledge necessarily follows from valid reflection, there is no need for a teacher in knowing Him most high like there is in other knowledge, *pace* the heretics. The disagreement is due to a flaw in the condition that concerns reflection,[125] and they have to face the consequences of a regress that is due to the teacher's need of another teacher, as well as of a circle, because knowing His truth depends on knowing that one has assented Him most high due to the evidence of a miracle by *His* hand, which depends on knowing Him most high. The first is refuted by adding understanding of Him to us, and the second by sharing in intellection, so that the teacher helps by pointing towards evidence.[126] The answer comes from the doubts, some of which point at its truth, so that the intellect judges by way of a pointer.[127]

Reflection is a search, and its condition is lack of knowledge, for it would be absurd to acquire what already obtains, even if this were only in the judgment of someone who is inattentive to the objective sought.[128] The search for secondary evidence is guidance, and it constitutes an inference to the objective. The privation that is due to composite ignorance is because one has decided without having searched.[129] The incompatibility[130] is essential, according to Abū Hāshim, because reflection is associated with doubt and ignorance with decision, and the incompatibility of concomitants entails the incompatibility of that to which they are concomitant. According to the forefathers, one can attend to the existence of reflection even when doubt is absent.

125 The heretical view is that God's existence is not demonstrable by way of reflection. The fallacy they commit is the assumption that reflection must begin from something accepted that is accepted on authority, say, from a teacher of transmitted knowledge. This is not the case, because some principles are known simply because they are self-evident or indubitable to a sound intellect.

126 In other words, the heretics could answer that the first teacher's knowledge of God is received from without, presumably by way of revelation, and a divine miracle is recognised as such by the help of a teacher.

127 That is, the arguments from regress and vicious circularity that were brought against the heretics include the elements of an answer to their defence. In the case of the regress argument, one could say that everyone endowed with sound intellection is bestowed with the same foundational knowledge as the first teacher. This foundational knowledge, possibly accompanied with further knowledge about the world, also gives the ground for the recognition of miracles.

128 We may fail to realise that one is in possession of all that is needed to infer to the desired conclusion, if we are inattentive to what we know and its relation to the conclusion. This inattention is a sufficient lack of knowledge to make reflection feasible.

129 Unlike simple ignorance, which is the mere lack of a piece of knowledge, composite ignorance involves a contradictory false belief. Thus, one has made a commitment without properly investigating the matter.

130 That is, reflection and composite ignorance are incompatible, because being compositely ignorant of something entails the erroneous belief that one knows that thing, which precludes any motive to investigate it by means of reflection.

وحيثُ ثبت وجوب العلم عقيب النظر الصحيح فلا حاجة إلى المعلِّم في معرفته تعالى كغيرها، خلافًا للملاحدة. والاختلافُ لا اختلال شرط في النظر، وألزموا التّسلسل لافتقار المعلّم إلى معلّم آخر، والدّور لتوقّف العلم بصدقه على العلم بتصديقه تعال بإظهار المعجزة على يده المتوقّف على العلم به تعالى. ويندفع الأوّل بزيادة عقله علينا والثّاني بالمشاركة للعقل، فيفيدُ المعلّمُ التنبيهَ على الأدلّة. والجواب عن الشّبهات الّتي من جملتها ما يدلّ على صدقه، فيحكم العقل عند التنبيه.

والنظر طلبٌ فشرطه عدمُ العلم لاستحالة تحصيل الحاصل وأن لا يكون في حكم الساهي عن المطلوب؛ والطلب في الدليل الثاني الدلالة ويشكّل إنتاج المطلوب وعدم الجهل المركّب لعدم الطلب مع الجزم. والتنافي ذاتيّ عند أبي هاشم لأنّ النظر مقارن للشك، والجهل للجزم، وتنافي اللوازم يقتضي تنافي الملزومات. وعند الأوائل للصارف لوجود النظر مع عدم الشك.

Reflection is obligatory because acquaintance depends on it, for it is not necessary due to logical necessity,[131] nor is there any method apart from reflection, otherwise those endowed with intellection would have come upon it at some point in time. Imitation entails it, for otherwise preponderance without a preponderating factor would follow.[132] The harm of fear is not dispelled through mere opinion, for if the condition of engagement were not obligatory in an absolute sense, then either the absolute would cease to be absolute or what is unfeasible would have been assigned.[133] The obligation to reflect is intellectual, for otherwise it would follow that the prophets have been silenced, because it is only through reflection that one can become acquainted with what one has heard.[134] Performing it is not obligatory before the obligation is known, *pace* the Ashʿarites. His, high is He, saying *nor do We punish*[135] means that punishment is denied for those orders, which must be heard, before messengers have been sent or employed, and it holds metaphorically of the intellect, namely innate deduction, and so the silencing does not follow.[136]

131 That is, we are not acquainted with God's existence simply because the sentence 'God exists' is logically valid, or analytically true simply by way of the meaning of the terms and their logical order.

132 Imitation of authority is based on reflection in the sense that the authority must have knowledge by virtue of reflection. Were that not the case, the commitment to a piece of alleged knowledge, instead of its negation, would be arbitrary.

133 This point concerns reflection as a religious duty. Ḥillī is saying that the fear of failing to meet the duty is not dispelled by merely having an opinion of matters of religious importance. The requirement of reflection is valid absolutely, for otherwise the duty would be assigned arbitrarily to individual believers.

134 The obligation to reflect cannot be based on revelation, because the revelation cannot be understood without engaging in reflection.

135 Q 17:15.

136 In metaphorical terms, sound intellection, as a necessary condition of understanding the prophets' message, is one of the messengers of an obligating order.

والنظر واجبٌ لتوقّف المعرفة عليه؛ إذ ليست ضروريّةً بالضّرورة، ولا طريقَ سواه وإلّا لا لتجأ العقلاء إليه في بعض الأزمان، والتقليد يستلزمه وإلّا لزم الترجيح من غير مرجّح. ولا ينتفي ضرر الخوف بالظنّ ولو لم يجب شرط إيقاع المطلق، خرج المطلق عن إطلاقه أو لزم تكليف ما لا يطاق، ووجوبه عقليّ وإلّا لزم إفحام الأنبياء؛ إذ لا يصحّ معرفة السمع إلّا بالنظر. ولا يجب فعله قبل العلم بوجوبه خلافًا للأشعريّة. والمرادُ من قوله تعالى: ﴿وَمَا كُنَّا مُعَذِّبِينَ﴾ نفي التعذيب على الأوامر السمعيّة قبل البعثة أو استعمال الرسول في العقل مجازًا، وهو فطريّ القياس، فلا يلزم الإفحام.

Reflection is the first of the obligations, according to the Muʿtazilites. It is said to be intention, it is said to be acquaintance, and Abū Hāshim has said that it is doubt. The truth is that if one means that which it is by essence, then it is acquaintance, otherwise it is an intention. What results from reflection is knowledge of what was sought, followed by knowledge of the evidence, which is different, because it is relative and therefore posterior. Nothing that is acquired occurs without reflection, because matters of tradition are all traced back to the truth of the messenger, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, and so no premise, on which knowing his truthfulness depends, can be obtained from tradition, for otherwise there would be a circle. That for which there is no intellectual evidence is acquired by way of tradition, and what belongs to neither is possible by means of them.[137] It is said that matters of tradition need a tradition of language, grammar, and inflection, as well as absence of equivocity, figurative meaning, specification, abrogation, ellipsis, priority, posteriority, and intellectual objection, for otherwise there would be a circle, but these are matters of opinion. The truth is that these are denied in the case of the decisive verses of the Qurʾān.

Question 13: On Will and Aversion

People differ here, and one group has said that will is a motive, and it amounts to a living person's knowledge, belief, or opinion concerning something useful, which is up to him or to another who makes something good for him out of it, and which he or that other can obtain without any trouble, opposition, or other such thing preventing them. Others have asserted something in addition, because we find in ourselves an inclination ordered according to this knowledge, and it is the truth about us but not about Him most high.

137 Knowledge of things that are neither self-evident nor stated in the revelation may be acquired by inference from these two types of principle.

وهو أوّلُ الواجبات عند المعتزلة، وقيل القصدُ إليه، وقيل المعرفةُ. وقال أبو هاشم الشكُّ. والحقّ أنّ المرادَ إن كان ما هو بالذّات فالمعرفة، وإلّا فالقصد إليه. والحاصل من النظر العلم بالمطلوب ويتبعه العلم بالدلالة، وهي مغايرة؛ لأنّها نسبيّةٌ فتتأخّر؛ ولا يحصل الكسبيُّ بدون النظر، فإنّ النقليّات كلُّها مستندةٌ إلى صدق الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلّم، فكلّ مقدّمة يتوقّف عليها العلم بصدقه لا يستفاد من النقل وإلّا دار. ومالا دليل عقليّ عليه، فطريق اكتسابه النقل وما عداهما يجوز بهما. قيل النقليّات تفتقر إلى نقل اللغة والنحو والتصريف وعدم الاشتراك والمجاز والتخصيص والنسخ والإضمار والتقديم والتأخير والمعارض العقليّ وإلّا دار، وهي ظنيّة. والحق أن هذه منفيةٌ في محكمات القرآن.

المطلب الثالث عشر: في الإرادة والكراهة

اختلف الناسُ، فقال قومٌ الإرادة هي الدّاعي، وهو عبارة عن علم الحيّ أو اعتقاده أوظنّه بماله أولغيره ممّن يؤثّر خيره فيه منفعة يمكن وصولها إليه أو إلى ذلك الغير من غير مانع من تعب أو معارضة أو غيرهما. وأثبت آخرون أمرًا زائدًا؛ لأنّا نجد من أنفسنا ميلاً مرتّبًا على هذا العلم، وهو حقّ فينا، لا فيه تعالى.

Willing something is not aversion towards its opposite, for one may pay no heed to the opposite in the state of willing, although the aversion is concomitant to the will under the condition of noticing the opposite. It is different from desire, for a patient has a will to drink the medicine but does not desire it. According to one view, there is an essential incompatibility between willing opposite things, for willing one of them preponderates that to exist, as does willing the other, and just as they are counterparts, so are the wills towards them. According to others, willing one turns away from willing the other, and this is within our power to initiate without any cause producing it, because it takes place according to our intention and motives, and because the will to sin is sinful, and so it cannot emerge from Him most high. It is not possible to point at anything that produces it, for we may will without any preceding thought so that it cannot be produced from this, nor is it from any motive, because the knowledge can be necessary. The agent of the reason and what it is a reason for is one and the same, and God most high is not the agent of sin, whereas sinning is not precluded from this will. Hence, it is not produced from a motive, nor is it produced from a will, for otherwise there would be a regress.

The will either concerns something that pertains to it, namely that which can come to be, or it does not, namely that which cannot come to be, such as persistence and other such things,[138] *pace* Abū Hāshim, insofar as he has said that if one believes that something persisting comes to be from one moment to another, one can will it. How could something that does not pertain to anything come to really pertain merely by considering the belief of the one who so believes?[139] Will can pertain to its own coming to be, like in blessing we order someone to become closer to God most high, so that we will his will, although we do not necessitate it, for there is no way to necessitate it insofar as he lacks the motives to it. Will does not take place as something intended in itself, but rather it acts following another, and so there is no point in obliging its own willing. When willing is willed, it is not willed by itself but by another will, and so it only pertains to what comes to be in turns, nor does one willing pertain in a detailed way to more than one object willed, like knowledge.

138 The point, not entirely clear in Ḥillī's formulation, is that will can be directed at something that the willing agent is able to produce as well as something that is not within her power. An example of the latter are things that already exist (or "persist") and which thus cannot be brought into being by a voluntary act.

139 In other words, it is highly implausible that the persisting thing should become subject to the power of the willing agent merely because she believes it to be such.

وليست إرادة الشّيء كراهة ضدّه؛ للغفلة عن الضدّ حالةَ الإرادة. نعم تلزمها بشرط التَفطّن للضدّ، وهي مغايرة للشهوة؛ فإنّ المريضَ يريد شرب الدواء ولا يشتهيه. وبين إرادة الضدّين تناف ذاتي على رأي؛ فإنّ إرادة أحدهما ترجيحُ وجوده وكذا إرادة الآخر، وكما أنّهما متقابلان فكذا إرادتهما. وعند آخرين إرادة أحدهما تصرف عن إرادة الآخر، وهي مقدورة لنا ابتداءً من غير سبب يولدها، لوقوعها بحسب قصدنا ودواعينا؛ ولأنّ إرادة القبيح قبيحة، فيستحيل صدورُها منه تعالى. ولا يمكن الإشارة إلى مولد وقد نريدُ من غير سابقة فكر، فلا يتولّد عنه ولا الدّاعي لإمكان كون العلم ضرورياً؛ وفاعل السّبب والمسبّب واحدٌ، والله تعالى لا يفعل القبيح، وهذه الإرادة لا يمتنع قبحُها، فلا تتولّد عن الداعي ولا الإرادة وإلّا تسلسل.

والإرادة إمّا أن يكون لها متعلّقٌ، وهو ما يصحّ حدوثه، وإمّا أن لا يكونَ، وهو ما لا يمكن حدوثه، كالبقاء وغيره؛ خلافاً لأبي هاشم حيث قال: لو اعتقد صحّة حدوث الباقي حالاً فحالاً صحّت إرادته؛ لأنّ ما لا متعلَّقَ له كيف يصيرُ متعلّقاً في الحقيقة باعتبار اعتقاد المعتقد، ويصحّ تعلقها بنفسها لحدوثها، كما نأمر غيرنا بالصلاة تقرّباً إلى الله تعالى، فنريد إرادته ولا نجب إذ لا وجهَ لوجوبه من حيث فقدت الدّواعي إليها، فإنّها لا تقع مقصودةً في نفسها، بل تفعل تبعاً لغيرها، فلا وجه لوجوب إرادتها. فإذا أُريدَت لم ترد بنفسها بل بإرادة أخرى، ولا تتعلّق إلّا بالحادث بالدوران ولا تتعلق الواحدة على التفصيل إلّا بمراد واحد، كالعلم.

There is similarity in terms of will, namely when that to which it pertains, the time, the respect, and the way coincide due to a similarity that emerges from the will. There is difference, namely when that is not the case due to a difference in respect, so that one wills something to come to be in one respect and another thing in another respect, or difference in terms of the way, so that one wills something in a summary way and another in a detailed way, or due to a difference in terms of time.

There is no opposition in will, according to Abū Hāshim, because one of the two opposites, to which it pertains, would have to pertain to the converse of what the other pertains to, and if what is willed changes, the opposition ceases and the two are merely different. When the will pertains to something in one and the same respect, then if the things, to which the two pertain, coincide, they are similar. According to Abū ʿAlī, two wills for two opposites are opposed by virtue of their incompatibility, but the will's opposite is nothing but aversion. It cannot persist, for otherwise it would be non-existent only due to an opposite, yet one of us may cease to will without proceeding to an opposite. The good and the bad of both will and aversion follow from that to which they pertain, not from the will or the aversion itself.

The ending of willings in an eternal will does not lead to the denial of choice, because choice means bringing into existence by means of power and will, regardless of whether they are of His, high is He, doing mediately or immediately.

Resolution is a prior or determined willing that comes to be after hesitation. Abū ʿAlī has asserted it as a ground that is different from will. Intent is an associated willing, and both are possible only when the resolution or intent and the act come from one. Love is willing, but from God most high, concerning the desert of the servant, it is the will of reward, whereas from the servant, concerning what He most high deserves, it is the will to obey. Satisfaction is willing, and it is said, 'stop resisting'.

ومنها متماثلٌ وهو ما اتحد فيه المتعلَّق والوقت والوجه والطريقة؛ لتماثل ما يصدر عنها، ومختلفٌ، وهو ما عداه لتغاير الوجوه بأن يريد أحدهما حدوثَ الشّيء على وجه والآخر على غيره، أو الطريقة بأن يريده أحدهما على طريق الجملة والآخر مفصّلاً، أو يتغاير الوقت.

ولا تضادّ فيها عندَ أبي هاشم لوجوب تعلّق أحد الضدّين المتعلّقين بما تعلّق به الآخر على العكس؛ إذ لو تغاير المرادُ زال التضادُّ، وكانتا مختلفتين. وإذا كان تعلّق الإرادة على وجه واحد لا غير، فلو اتّحد متعلَّقهما تماثلتا. وعند أبي عليّ «إرادتا الضدّين يتضادّان»، للتنافي، ولا تضادّ ها إلّا الكراهة. ولا يصحّ عليها البقاء، وإلّا لم يعدم إلّا بضدّ. وقد يخرج أحدُنا عن كونه مريداً لا إلى ضدّ. وحسنُ الإرادة والكراهة وقبحهما تابعان لما يتعلّقان به لا بإرادة أو كراهة.

وانتهاء الإرادات إلى إرادة قديمة لا يستلزم نفي الاختيار؛ لأنّ معناه الإيجاد بتوسّط القدرة والإرادة، وإن كانا من فعله تعالى بتوسّط أو غير توسّط.

والعزم إرادة سابقة أو جازمة حصلت بعدَ التردّد. وأثبته أبو عليّ معنىً مغايراً للإرادة.

والنّيّة إرادةٌ مقارنةٌ، وإنّما يصحان إذا كان العزمُ أو النيّة والفعل من واحد. والمحبّة إرادةٌ، لكنّها من الله تعالى في حقّ العبد إرادةُ الثواب، ومن العبد في حقّه تعالى إرادةُ الطاعة. والرضا إرادة، وقيل ترك الاعتراض.

Question 14: On Desire and Dislike

They belong to the soul's qualities that one endowed with understanding finds in himself by a necessary intuition. They judge about pleasure or pain in perception, but they do not perceive by sensing. They can only exist in a substrate, unlike will and aversion, according to what the Muʿtazilites have asserted. There is no doubt that their substrate has life and structure. They do not exist in more than one substrate. Although they do need structure, increase in them does not need additional structure, *pace* al-Kaʿbī, due to the power of desire in a weak patient.

Like power but unlike will, desire's pertaining to sin does not entail its sinfulness, because it pertains to the bad and the good under one definition. If it sins, the whole sins. It only pertains to perceived things, albeit not in the sense of pertaining to just that which exists, but also to things that do not exist insofar as they are perceived, because as soon as something comes to be perceived, desire and dislike can pertain to it, and as soon as it ceases to be such, the pertaining ends. Hence, they do not pertain to the things themselves or to that whose existence is required, but to its simile, for it would be unfeasible to reinstate it.[140]

They do not persist, for otherwise they would only cease to exist through an opposite. However, one of us may cease from either without proceeding to an opposite.

140 By its very nature, desire entails a preference for something that does not yet exist, or for a counterfactual state of affairs: something should be otherwise than it factually is, or it should be in a certain way in a future moment. Thus, it makes no sense to have a desire directed at something that already obtains.

المطلب الرابع عشر: في الشهوة والنفار

وهما من الكيفيّات النفسانيّة يجدُهما العاقل من نفسه وجدانًا ضروريًّا، وحكمهما وقوع لذّة عند الإدراك أو ألم، وليسا بمُدركين حِسًّا، ولا يصحّ وجودهما إلّا في محلّ بخلاف الإرادة والكراهة عند مثبتي المعتزلة، ولا بدّ لمحلّهما من حياة وبنية، ولا توجد في أكثر من محلّ واحد وإن افتقرت إلى البنية، ولا يفتقر كثرتهما إلى زيادة البنية، خلافًا للكعبيّ؛ لقوة شهوة المريض الضعيف.

وتعلّق الشهوة بالقبيح لا يوجب قبحها كالقدرة بخلاف الإرادة لتعلّقِها بالقبيح والحسن على حدّ واحد. فلو قبحت قبح الجميع. ولا تتعلّق إلّا بالمدركات لا بمعنى تعلّقها بالموجود، بل وبالمعدوم على أن يدركه، لأنّه متى حصل للشّيء كونه مدركًا صحّ تعلّق الشهوة أو النفرة به، ومتى انتفى انتفى التعلّق فلا تتعلّق بنفسها، ولا بما يقتضي وجوده بل بمثله لتعذّر إعادته.

وليسا باقيين وإلّا لما عدما إلّا بالضدّ. لكنّ أحدنا قد يخرج عنهما لا إلى ضدّ.

They are opposites, for it is impossible to combine them, but there is no opposite for them together, for it is impossible to establish a ground, which has no characteristics.[141] It is known that there is no medium between perceiving something and deriving pleasure from it or between perceiving it and suffering from it, except the ceasing of the two judgments, and this is a denial, for which no grounds needs to be established. Two desires are equal when that to which they pertain is one, and when that to which they pertain varies in genus, they vary as well, like the desire for the sweet differs from the desire for the sour. Yet there is no opposition between them, because the condition for an opposition between two things that pertaining to something is that that to which they pertain is one, but when these pertain to one thing, they are similar.

Desire and dislike are not within our power, for otherwise one of us could bring about a desire for something that is within his power, such as unrefined food when the exquisite tastes that he strongly desires are in short supply. It is the foundation of benefits, for a living thing only benefits from perceiving what it desires. It is a principle of blessings, because it is not possible to benefit life without desire and a capacity to acquire what is desired.

Question 15: On Pleasure and Pain

They are things that anyone endowed with understanding perceives and distinguishes from one another, so that they cannot be defined by saying that pleasure is perceiving what is appropriate and pain perceiving what is inappropriate'.[142] Both of them are positively existing things. Ibn Zakarīyā[143] maintained that pleasure is returning to the natural state after leaving it, as well as freedom from pain, taking an accident in the place of what is essential, for since perception only takes place when that which senses is acted upon, it entails the alteration of some state. He is countered by the observation of a beautiful form of which one was not aware at first, so that that pleasure is produced without the pain of desire.

141 The characteristics (*aḥkām*) are manifest features of things, which are grounded in attributes, which the thing has but which are not always manifest. For instance, life is manifested by the capacity to perceive or to move voluntarily. For an excellent overview of the Muʿtazilite concept of *ḥukm*, see Frank 1978, 58-64.

142 The point here is that since pleasure and pain are primitive percepts, they cannot be captured by means of a definition. This does not mean that the suggested definitions are not valid characterisations of pain and pleasure.

143 This is Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 313/925). On Rāzī's theory of pain and pleasure, see Adamson 2008.

وهما متضادّان لا متناع اجتماعهما ولا ضدّ لهما لا متناع إثبات معنى لا حكم له، ومعلومٌ أنّه لا واسطة بين إدراك الشّيء فيلتذُّ به وبين إدراكه والتّألم منه إلّا زوال الحكمين، وهذا نفي لا يفتقر إلى إثبات معنى، ويتساوى الشّهوتان مع اتحاد المتعلّق، وإذا اختلف المتعلّق في الجنس اختلفتا كشهوة الحلاوة تخالف شهوة الحموضة، ولا تضادّ فيهما؛ لأنّ شرط تضادّ المتعلّقات اتّحادُ المتعلَّق. ومتى تعلّقتا بواحد تماثلتا.

وليست الشهوةُ والنفرة مقدورةً لنا، وإلّا لكان الواحد منّا يفعل شهوة لما هو قادرٌ عليه من المأكول الخشن عند تعذُّر ما اشتهاه قويًا من الطعام الرفيع وهي أصل المنافع، فإنّ الحيّ إنّما ينتفع بإدراك ما يشتهيه وهي من أصول النعم؛ إذ لا يمكن الانتفاعُ بالحياة من دون الشّهوة والتمكّن من المشتهى.

المطلب الخامس عشر: في اللّذة والألم

وهما أمران يدركهما كلّ عاقل ويفرقُ بينهما وبين غيرهما، فلا يمكن تعريفهما بأنّ اللّذّة «إدراك الملائم»، والألم «إدراك المنافي»، وهما وجوديّان. وذهب ابن زكريّا إلى أنّ اللّذّة عودٌ إلى الحالة الطبيعيّة بعد الخروج عنها وخلاصٌ عن الألم، فإخذ بالعرض مكان مّا بالذّات، إذ الإدراك إنّما يحصل بانفعال للحاسّة يقتضيه تبدّل حال مّا. وينتقض بمشاهدة صورة جميلة لم يكن له شعورٌ بها أوّلاً، حتّى يجعل تلك اللّذّة خلاصًا عن ألم الشّوق.

According to the ancients, the cause of pain is severance of connection. This is an error, because that is privative, and it also occurs in what brings pleasure, like being nourished, as well as in what is devoid of it, such as cutting a finger quickly or cutting something that lacks sensation or is unaware. Instead, it is the foulness of a different mixture. It is an error to say that deficiency is caused like the privation of motion causes rest, the privation of hearing causes deafness, or the privation of nourishment causes hunger, because according to them, rest is privative and the privation of motion is not an efficient but a preparatory cause. According to us, rest is prepared for the efficient cause and the privation of motion is a condition as a privation of the opposite. Deafness is privative, hunger is by reason of a foul mixture, and pain in the moment of severance is not evidence for the latter's being a cause.

There is no opposition between pain and pleasure, *pace* al-Kaʿbī, because both may be entailed by one thing, like the scratching of an itch, for it necessitates both pleasure and pain, if it is healthy.

The two masters differ, for Abū ʿAlī and al-Kaʿbī posit life as a condition for its substrate, not allowing it to exist in what is inanimate, but Abū Hāshim rejects this, allowing its genus to exist in what is inanimate. However, he does not call it pain, because calling it that entails the occurrence of dislike towards it when it is perceived. The truth is the first view.

It is within our power, because it takes place in accordance with our states, except that it only takes place from us as something we produce.[144] The same holds for pleasure, according to Abū Hāshim, because the two are really one. Abū ʿAlī rejects our power over them.

Pain does not persist, because it has no opposite that could remove it and persist through the persistence of the substrate, for according to Abū Hāshim, there is no condition apart from it. All pain is similar, for individual instances of it share the possibility of being perceived by virtue of there being a substrate of life in their substrate.

144 That is, we are not able to bring about pain directly, but we can perform an act on a living body that causes pain intermediately.

وعند الأوائل أنّ سبب الألم تفرق الاتصال، وهو غلط؛ لأنّه عدميّ وحاصلٌ في الملتذّ به، كالغذاء ومنتفٍ عنده، كقطع الإصبع بسرعة وقطع فاقد الحسّ والحذر، بل سوء المزاج المختلف والنّقص بعليّة عدم الحركة للسّكون وعدم السّمع للخرس وعدم الغذاء للجوع، خطأ؛ لأنّ السّكون عند هم عدميّ وليس عدمُ الحركة سببًا فاعلاً، بل مُعدّاً. وعندنا السّكون مستندٌ إلى الفاعل، وعدم الحركة شرطٌ كعدم الضدّ؛ والخرسُ عدميّ والجوع بسبب سوء المزاج وحصول الألم عند التّفرّق لا يدلّ على أنّه السبب.

ولا تضادّ بينَ الألم واللذّة، خلافًا للكعبيّ، لأنّ المقتضي لهما قد يكون واحدًا، كحكّة الأجرب، فإنّها توجبُ اللّذّة والألم لو كان سليمًا.

واختلف الشيخان، فشرط أبو عليّ والكعبيّ في محلّه الحياة، ولم يجوّزا وجوده في الجماد، ومنعه أبو هاشم وجوّز وجود جنسه في الجماد، لكن لا يُسمّى ألمًا؛ لأنّ التسمية بذلك تقتضي حصول النفرة عنه مع إدراكه. والحقّ الأوّل.

وهو مقدورٌ لنا؛ لوقوعه بحسب أحوالنا، إلّا أنّه لا يقعُ منّا إلّا متولّدًا. وكذا اللّذّةُ عند أبي هاشم لاتّحادهما في الحقيقة. ومنع أبو عليّ من قدرتنا عليها؛

والألم غير باق، إذ لا ضد له يُنفيه، فكان يبقى ببقاء المحلّ، إذ لا شرط عند أبي هاشم سواه، وكلّه متماثلٌ لاشتراك أفراده في صحّة ادراكه لمحلّ الحياة في محلّها.

Question 16: On Perception

People differ here, and according to the ancients as well as Abū l-Ḥusayn, it amounts to affecting the sense. What results from it is a specific knowledge. According to the others, it is a species distinct from knowledge as well as from affecting the sense. This is because of the difference between the state of knowing something while perceiving it and afterwards. Perception is divided by virtue of the division to the five senses. What is attributed with this attribute is the whole but not the parts, *pace* Bishr ibn al-Muʿtamir,[145] for one perceives through the senses, but the attribute of perception cannot be traced back to them.

Abū al-Hudhayl asserted perception as a ground, making our being perceivers depend on it and allowing that our being alive occurs together with the conditions stipulated for perception, but a perceiver fails to perceive due to the lack of that ground. This is the doctrine of the Ashʿarites. Abū Hāshim did not make it a ground, but instead he posited that we perceive because we are alive, what is perceived exists, the senses are healthy, and there are no obstacles, so that being affected is due to our being alive. These things are conditions under which our being alive entails our perceiving. This is the truth, because the perceiver's perceiving is an attribute that is necessary, if it is possible, and every attribute that is necessary when possible is independent of a ground entailing it, since that which entails its necessity is its very essence. The first premise is shown by saying that if it were not necessary under the assumption of possibility, a sophism would follow, for this would allow the possibility that high mountains and terrifying sounds be present to us, our senses healthy, obstacles removed, and the conditions fulfilled, yet we would not perceive.

Sense means a body that has a specific structure added to the structure of life, so that one perceives by it what is not perceived by a different body. It does not mean every substrate in which there is life, for otherwise it would follow that there are senses in all organs. It was on these grounds that Abū Hāshim denied that touch senses, because the substrate of life would then share the possibility of perceiving hot and cold, but this is an error, for it is possible to pose things added to the structure of life as a condition for some senses but not others.

145 Bishr ibn al-Muʿtamir (d. 210/825) was a crucial figure in the earliest phase of Baghdad Muʿtazilism.

المطلب السّادس عشر: في الإدراك

اختلف الناس هنا، فعند الأوائل وأبي الحسين، أنّه عبارة عن تأثر الحاسّة. والحاصل منه هو علمٌ خاصّ. وعند الباقين أنّه نوعٌ مغايرٌ للعلم، ولتأثر الحاسّة للفرق بين حالة العلم بالشّيء حال إدراكه وبعده؛ وينقسمُ بانقسام الحواسّ الخمس. والموصوف بهذه الصّفة الجملة دون الأجزاء، خلافًا لبشر بين المعتمر. فالحواسُّ تدرك بها ولكن صفة الإدراك لا يصحّ رجوعها إليها.

وأثبت أبو الهذيل الإدراك معنى، وجعل كون أحدنا مدركًا، موقوفًا عليه وجوّز حصول كونه حيًّا مع الشّرائط المتعبرة في الإدراك ولا يدرك المدرك لفقد ذلك المعنى. وهو مذهب الاشاعرة. ولم يجعله أبو هاشم معنى، بل جعل أحدنا مدركًا؛ لكونه حيًّا ووجود المدرك وصحّة الحواس وزوال الموانع، فيكون التأثّر لكونه حيًّا، وهذه الأمورُ تكون شروطًا في اقتضاء كونه حيّا كونَه مدركًا. وهو الحقّ؛ لأنّ كونَ المدرك مدركًا صفةٌ تجب لو كانت صحيحةً وكلّ صفة تجب عند صحّتها فإنّها تستغني عن معنى يقتضيها، إذ المقتضي لوجوبها نفسُ ذاتها. وبيان الأولى، أنّها لو لم تجب على تقدير الصّحة لزم السفسطة، لتجويز أن يكون بحضرتنا جبالٌ شاهقةٌ وأصواتٌ هائلةٌ والحواس صحيحة والموانع مرتفعة والشرائط حاصلة، ونحن لا ندركها.

ويرادُ بالحاسّة جسمٌ ذو بنية مخصوصة زائدة على بنية الحياة، فيدرك به ما لا يدرك بغيره، ولا يُراد به كلّ محلّ فيه حياةٌ، وإلّا لزم في جميع الأعضاء أن تكون حواسٌ. ولهذا المعنى نفى أبو هاشم اللّمسَ حاسَة، لأنّ محلّ الحياة يشترك في صحّة إدراك الحرارة والبرودة؛ وهو غلطٌ، لاحتمال اشتراط بعض الحواس بأمور زائدة على بنية الحياة دونَ البعض.

The sense of touch is more useful than others, because an animal is composed of the elements and its health is due to their balance and the persistence of their mixture, whereas its corruption is due to their conflict and some of them exceeding the balance. It is a necessary entailment of divine wisdom to bring to existence a faculty that operates in all parts of the animal in order that the animal perceives and is wary of what is incompatible by means of it, and this is touch. Other senses, such as taste and smell, are intended for acquiring benefit and repelling harms before acquiring the benefit.

Every animal that has the faculty of touch must have a faculty of moving, in order that it approach what is appropriate and depart from what is incompatible.

The faculties of touch are four: one judges between hot and cold, one between moist and dry, one between hard and soft, and one between coarse and smooth. This is on the basis that two things do not emerge from one faculty, which is precluded.

It is a proprium of touch that its bearer is the medium. One of the conditions for a medium is lack of the qualities, which touch conveys to the perceiver, in order that he be thoroughly acted upon and that awareness of this be complete. Hence, what is closer to a balance senses more intensely. Some of the ancients posited sense for the simple elements, due to their intimacy with what is appropriate and distance from what is incompatible, but the argument is weak and what it seeks far-fetched.

Taste requires the moistness of saliva emitted by the salivating faculty. It is inevitable that it lacks flavour, for otherwise it would not be fond of it in the proper way, like in the case of the sick person. Either this moistness is capable of being acted upon by that which has flavour, so that the sensation is not through a medium, or the moistness is mixed with parts of that which has flavour and then the moistness is submerged in the tongue until it mixes with it, and so the sensation is through a medium.

Smell perceives by means of parts transmitted from what has fragrance, which parts have dissolved through evaporation, mixed with the intermediate air, and arrived at the nostrils, because squeezing that which has fragrance necessitates that the intermediate air is acted upon by that quality. Furthermore, that which has fragrance decreases when there are many smellers. As to him who makes smell pertain what is smelled, since that which has fragrance is more remote in name, no doubt there are subtle parts in that which has fragrance that are capable of being mixed with air. It is because of this that the fragrance is not perceived when straws or ambergris are cut but not set into fire.

وحاسة اللّمس أنفع من غيرها، لأنّ الحيوان مركّبٌ من العناصر، وصلاحُه باعتدالها وبقاء مزاجها، وفساده بخروج بعضها من الاعتدال وتغالبها. فيجبُ في مقتضى الحكمة الإلهيّة إيجادُ قوّة سارية في جميع أجزائه ليدرك بها المنافي، فيحترز عنه وهو اللّمس، وغيره كالذّوق والشّمّ يُرادُ لجلب النفع ودفع الضّرر أسبقُ من جلب النفع.

ويجبُ في كلّ حيوان له قوّةُ لمس أن يكونَ له قوّةُ حركة ليقربَ من الملائم ويبعدَ عن المنافر.

وقوى اللّمس أربعٌ: الحاكمة بين الحارّ والبارد، وبين الرطب واليابس، وبينَ الصلب واللّين، وبين الخشن والأملس، بناءً على أنّ القوّة الواحدة لا يصدرُ عنها أمران، وهو ممنوع.

وخاصّةُ اللّمس أنّ حامله هو الواسطة. ومن شرط الواسطة الخلوّ عن الكيفيّة الّتي يؤدّيها إلى المدرك لينفعل جيدًا فيتمُّ الشّعور به، فالأقرب إلى الاعتدال أشدّ إحساسًا. وأثبت بعضُ الأوائل الحسّ لبسائط العناصر لقربها من ملائمهما وبُعدها عن منافرها؛ والحجّة ضعيفةٌ والمطلوب مستبعد.

والذوق يفتقر إلى الرطوبة اللعابيّة المنبعثة عن القوّة الملعّبة. ولا بُدّ من خلوّها عن الطعوم وإلّا لم يودّ كما ينبغي كالمرضى، وهذه الرطوبة يحتملُ أن تنفعل عن ذي الطعم فالإحساس لا بواسطة أو يخالطها أجزاء ذي الطعم. ثمّ تغوصُ في اللسان حتى تخالطه، فالإحساس بواسطة.

والشّمّ يدرك بتوسط انتقال أجزاء من ذي الرّائحة يتحلل بواسطة التبخير، ويخالط الهواء المتوسّط ويصلُ إلى الخيشوم، لأنّ الدّلك يوجبه أن ينفعل الهواء المتوسّط بتلك الكيفيّة، وإلّا لنقص ذو الرائحة عند كثرة الشّامّين. ومن جعل الشّمّ يتعلّق بالمشموم حيث هو أبعد في المقام ولا بُدّ في ذي الرّائحة من أجزاء لطيفة قابلة لاختلاطها بالهواء، ولهذا لا يدرك الرائحة في قطع العُود والعنبر ما لَم يتخلل بالنّار.

Hearing requires that the air that is compressed between what strikes and what is struck arrives at the membrane of the eardrum, according to the ancients, al-Naẓẓām, al-Kaʿbī, and Abū ʿAlī in particular. It has already been dealt with.[146]

The ancients differ concerning sight, some of them holding that it takes place due to the form of what is seen being impressed in the eye, whereas for others it is through the emission of uniform rays from the eye in the shape of a cone, the tip of which is in sight and the base in what is seen.[147] This is endorsed by Abū Hāshim, but he attributed error to the eye, because when a ring in a finger approaches the eye, it is seen as greater than it actually is, for the rays are distributed broadly, so that due to their breadth the ring is imagined to be broad, and when it recedes, it is seen as small due to the thinness of the other end.

The two statements are both false in my view, due to the impossibility of the large being impressed in the small. Furthermore, if vision were due to impression, we would not perceive distance, so that we would not perceive the close in its closeness and the distant in its distance.[148] Moreover, if what emerges from the eye were a body, it could not encounter the half of the sphere, for a body of these dimensions cannot emerge from the eye, small as it is. According to you, the spheres cannot be penetrated, for otherwise they could not be change their position. Furthermore, its motion cannot be natural, otherwise it would only be in one direction, nor can it be forced, for then it would be subsequent to a natural motion, nor can it be voluntary at all. Finally, seeing occurs without any disturbance even during strong winds that uproot large trees. Instead, the truth is that the eye's being faced with what is seen, when the conditions have been met, is a preparatory or necessitating cause for perception.

146 See III.3.2 above.

147 These are the so-called intromission and extramission theories of vision. The most prominent intromission theories in the Islamic context are those of Avicenna and the great optician Ibn al-Haytham (d. 430/1040), who managed to integrate the explanatory strengths of the extramission theory. Notable representatives of the extramission theory were Euclid (d. mid-third century BCE) and Galen.

148 Ḥillī seems to completely neglect Ibn al-Haytham's extensive theory of how distance, among other features perceivable by sight, can be explained by means of the immediate perception of light and colour. This raises the question of whether he was ignorant of Ibn al-Haytham's elaborate intromission theory or simply chose to ignore in the present work. Cf., however, the next note.

والسّمع يفتقر إلى وصول الهواء المنضغط بين قارع ومقروع إلى سطح الصّماخ عندَ الأوائل والنّظام والكعبيّ وأبي عليّ أوّلاً، وقد سبق.

واختلف الأوائل في الإبصار، فبعضهم أنّه يحصل لانطباع صورة المرئيّ في العين، وآخرون بخروج شعاع من العين مُصمت مخروط الشّكل رأسه عندَ البصر وقاعدتُه عندَ المرئيّ. وهو اختيار أبي هاشم، لكنّه جعل الغليظ عند العين؛ لأنّ حلقة الخاتم إذا قربت من العين يراها أكثر فإذا تباعدت رآها صغيرةً، لاستدقاق الطرف الآخر.

والقولان عندي باطلان؛ لامتناع انطباع العظيم في الصغير، ولأنّه لو كان بالانطباع لما أدركنا البُعد، فكنّا لا نرى القريب على قربه ولا البعيد على بعده، ولأنّ الخارج من العين إن كان جسمًا استحال أن يلاقي نصف الكرة، لامتناع خروج جسم بهذا المقدار من العين مع صِغَرها، وامتنع أن يخرق الأفلاك عندكم، وإلّا استحال عليه الانتقال، ولأنّ حركته ليست طبيعيّة، وإلّا لكان إلى جهة واحدة ولا قسريّة لأنّها تابعةٌ لها، ولا إراديّةً قطعًا؛ ولأنّ الإبصار يحصلُ مع حصول الأهوية القويّة القالعة للأشجار الكبار من غير تشوّش فيه. بل الحقّ أنّ مقابلةَ العين للمرئيّ مع حصول الشرايط سببٌ مُعدةٌ أو موجبٌ للإدراك.

For our part, perception depends on ten things apart from the health of the sense: the opacity of what is seen, in the sense that it has colour or radiation, radiation taking place on it, being faced with something or its temporal equivalent, the transparency of the medium, the absence of excessive smallness, radiation, distance, or closeness, the attention of the one who has the organ of sight, and that what necessitates error is not involved. When the conditions are met, sight follows necessarily, according to the ancients and the Muʿtazilites, *pace* the Ashʿarites. The parts of what is distant are not equally positioned in the pupil, because the column supposed to extend from the eye to the base that is supposed in what is seen is shorter than the two extremes, for it shoots out acutely whereas they shoot out in right angles.[149] The reason why the distant thing is small is either that it is impressed in an angle, which is smaller due to the distance of the two supposed lines, or that the rays have been dispersed so that no perfect perception results.

The equal relation of a polished surface to both the eye and what is seen is a preparatory cause for perceiving it, but not for the impression of a form first in the polished surface, and then from that form in the eye. Were that the case, the form would not change its place when a third thing ceases. For instance, if a wall is green because green is reflected on it, it will not change when the one regarding moves. Nor is the relation of the polished surface to the eye and what is seen the cause for the reflection of rays from the eye to the polished surface and then from it to what is seen.[150]

149 The comparison here is between the axis and the sides (or the "extremes") of the visual cone. Suppose that the base of the cone lies on a level surface that is seen, and the apex in the eye. It is a simple geometrical fact that the axis will be longer than the sides of the cone. The next sentence suggests Ḥillī thinks this observation can be used to explain the reason why distant objects appear small to us. This idea would be somewhat similar to Ibn al-Haytham's theory; perhaps Ḥillī was drawing from it in his own view.

150 The phenomenon under consideration here is, of course, our seeing things in mirrors. It was often considered fatal for both the intramission and the extramission theory; see, for instance, Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* I.3.4.104, 72-73.

والإدراك في حقّنا يتوقّف على عشرة أمورٍ بعدَ سلامة الحاسّة: كثافةُ المبصَر، بمعنى أن يكون له لون أو ضوء، ووقوع الضوء عليه، والمقابلة أو حكمها زمانًا، وشفافيّة المتوسّط، وعدم إفراط الصّغر والضّوء والبعد والقرب وتعمّد ذي الآلة الإبصار، وعدم اقتران ما يوجبُ الغلط.

ومع حصول الشّرائط يجب الإبصارُ عند الأوائل والمعتزلةُ بالضّرورة، خلافًا للأشعريّة. وليست أجزاء البعيد متساويةَ الوضع عندّ الحدقة، لأنّ العمود المفترض من العين على القاعدة المفروضة عند المرئيّ أقصرُ من الطرفين، لأنّه يُوتِر الحادّة، وهما يؤتران قائمتين. وسببُ صغره إمّا انطباعه في زاوية صغرت لبُعد الخطّين المفروضين أو لتفرق الأشعّة فلا يحصل الإدراك التّامّ.

وتساوي نسبة الصّقيل إلى العين والمرئيّ سببٌ مُعدٌّ لإدراكه فيه، لا لانطباع صورة فيه، ثمّ في العين من تلك الصّورة، وإلّا لم يتغيّر عن موضعها بزوال شيء ثالث، كالحائط إذا اخضرّ بانعكاس الخضرة إليه لم يتغيّر بانتقال الناظر، ولا لانعكاس الشّعاع من العين إلى الصقيل، ثمّ منه إلى المرئيّ.

Question 17: On the Remaining Accidents Concerning which the Theologians Differ

There are three of them.

The first is persistence, the Ashʿarites having established it as a ground that subsists through that which persists and entails its persistence, and likewise al-Kaʿbī, *pace* other Muʿtazilites. This is the truth, for otherwise regress would follow, or it would be made into an essence rather than an attribute. Moreover, the existence of an attribute follows the existence of an essence at every moment. If this was converted, it would become circular. Something's persisting after it did not persist is not evidence for persistence existing as a ground in itself, for many merely conceptual attributes come to be anew for an essence yet are not realised in concrete.

The second is annihilation. The verifiers maintain that bringing to non-existence results through an agent just as bringing to existence does, but a group of Muʿtazilites preclude that bringing to non-existence pertains to an agent, affirming the emergence of the opposite among the persisting.[151] Al-Naẓẓām has said that it is annihilated by virtue of its essence, for according to him, nothing that is receptive to annihilation can persist for more than one moment, and then in the second moment after its coming to be anew, it is non-existent.

151 According to this Muʿtazilite view, annihilation does not have to be created, because it is a necessary concomitant of the creation of the opposite of the annihilated thing.

المطلب السّابع عشر:
في بقيّة أعراض وقع فيها الخلاف بين المتكلّمين

وهي ثلاثةٌ:

الأوّلُ البقاء، وقد أثبته الأشاعرة معنى قائمًا بالباقي يقتضي بقاه. وكذا الكعبيّ، خلافًا لباقي المعتزلة، وهو الحقّ؛ وإلّا لزم التسلسل، أو كون جعله ذاتًا أولى من جعله صفةً، ولأنّ وجودَ الصّفة تابعٌ لوجود الذّات في كلّ آن. فلو انعكس دار. وكون الشّيء باقيًا بعدَ أن لم يكن لا يدلّ على وجود البقاء معنىً في نفسه، فإن كثيرًا من الصّفات الاعتباريّة تتجدّد على الذّات ولا تحقّق لها عينًا.

الثّاني الفناء، والمحققون ذهبوا إلى أنّ الإعدام قد يحصل بالفاعل كما يحصل الإيجاد به، وجماعةٌ من المعتزلة منعوا من تعلّق الإعدام بالفاعل وأوجبوا طريان الضّدّ في الباقي. والنّظام قال إنّه يفنى لذاته، وكلّ ما يقبل الفناء عنده لا يصحّ بقاؤه أكثر من آن واحد، ثمّ في ثاني حدوثه، يعدم. ومثبتوه جعلوه ضدًّا للجواهر، لأنّها باقيةٌ لذاتها، لا بمعنى تحتاج إليه فيه، ولا ضدّ لها من الأعراض سواه، ولا يصحّ عدمُها لذاتها ولا بالفاعل، وهي واجبة الفناء.

Those who have asserted it have made it opposite to substances, because they persist by virtue of their essence, not by virtue of any ground that they need for persisting, and none of the accidents is opposite to them, apart from annihilation. Substances cannot be non-existing either by virtue of their essence or by virtue of an agent, and so they require annihilation. Hence, they have asserted that annihilation is an accident, for substances are not opposites merely because one of two opposites cannot inhere in the other, and that it comes into being after substances, otherwise bringing it into existence would be in vain, although it does exist possibly before them by virtue of the fact that what has power over something also has power to bring its opposite into existence in that moment of present existence.[152] Also, if annihilation did not come into being after substances, it could only be made non-existent through an opposite, and this would regress without that which has a position,[153] *pace* Ibn al-Ikhshīd[154] and al-Ṣaymarī,[155] for otherwise annihilation would be spatial, since all that has a position not by way of association is spatial, and similar, because its individual instantiations would be equal in terms of annihilating substances, and unity of what is caused entails equality of the cause.[156]

152 Although it is true that atom-substances cannot inhere in each other, this is not sufficient to make them opposites to each other. Assuming that a substance can only cease to exist by being replaced with its opposite, the thinkers that Ḥillī is discussing here postulate annihilation as something metaphysically real that is opposite to substances. Since it cannot be a substance, annihilation must be an accident. It must be posterior to substances, since when there is no substance, it would not make sense to speak of its annihilation either.

153 This dense argument is not entirely clear to me, but perhaps it can be reconstructed as follows. If annihilation could exist independently of atoms, or "that which has a position", it would have to be annihilated by its opposite, namely its own annihilation. If the creation of atoms requires the non-existence of annihilation, this second-order annihilation would also have to be first annihilated by a third-order annihilation, and so on *ad infinitum*.

154 This is Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Maʿjūr ibn al-Ikhshīd, a Baghdādī Muʿtazilite famous for his learning, who died in 326/938.

155 Abū ʿAbdillāh Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Ṣaymarī (d. 315/927) was a student of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī and an opponent of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī's renovations to Muʿtazilism.

156 According to this second horn, individual instantiations of annihilation would be completely isomorphic atoms. Ḥillī does not present a counterargument to this alternative, perhaps because he finds it self-evidently absurd: annihilation, which was introduced to have an opposite to atoms, would then be an atom, and we have just learned that atoms are not opposites of each other.

فأثبتوا الفناء عرضًا، لأنّ الجواهر لا تتضادّ مجرّدا لامتناع حلول أحد الضّدّين في الآخر حادثًا بعدَ الجواهر وإلّا لكان إيجاده عبثًا وإن كان ممكن الوجود قبلها، لأنّ القادر على الشيء قادرٌ على إيجاد ضدّه في تلك الحال آنيّ الوجود، وإلّا لم يُعدم إلّا بضدّ ويتسلسل غير ذي جهة، خلافًا لابن الإخشيد والصميري، وإلّا لكان متحيّزًا، إذ كلّ ذي جهة لا على سبيل التّبعية متحيز، متماثلاً لتساوي أفراده في فناء الجواهر بها؛ واتّحاد المعلول يستلزمُ تساويَ العلّة، ليس مقدورًا لنا، وإلّا لقدرنا على الضّدّ الآخر، وهو الجوهر. والملازمةُ ممنوعةٌ، وأيُّ جوهر في بطريانه؛ فنيت جميعُ الجواهر لتجرّده وتساوي الجواهر في الماهيّة فتتساوى في النسبة إليه.

Annihilation is not within our power, for otherwise we would have power over the other opposite, namely substance. The implication is precluded, for regardless of which substance is annihilated by its emergence, all substances would be thereby annihilated, because it is abstract and substances are equal in terms of quiddity, and so they would be equal also in relation to it.[157]

The third is composition. The first to assert composition as a ground that subsists through two substrates was Abū l-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf, and he was followed by a group of Baṣrians, such as Abū ʿAlī, Abū Hāshim, and others. The rest contradicted him due to the impossibility of an accident subsisting through two substrates, just as it is impossible for a body to reside in two places.

Those who assert it have argued by saying that some bodies are difficult to disentangle, and this is no doubt due to a ground that necessitates that. It does not subsist through either of the two substrates, because neither is more appropriate for this, and so it must subsist through both substrates. This is false, because the difficulty of disentangling goes back to the choosing agent.

157 In other words, if we had the power to annihilate substance insofar as it is substance, we would have the power to annihilate all substances, each of them being a substance insofar as it is substance.

الثالث التأليف، أوّل من أثبت التّأليفَ معنىً قائمًا بمحلّين أبو الهذيل العلّاف وتبعه جماعةُ البصريين، كأبي عليّ وأبي هاشم وغيرهما. ونفاه الباقون، لامتناع قيام عرض بمحلّين، كما يمتنع حلول جسم في مكانين.

واحتجّ المثبتون بأنّ بعض الأجسام يصعب فكّها فلا بدّ من معنىً يوجبُ ذلك. وليس قائمًا بأحد المحلّين لعدم الأولويّة فيجبُ قيامه بالمحلّين. وهو باطلٌ لاستناد صعوبة التفكيك إلى الفاعل المختار.

ومنع أبو هاشم من قيامه بأكثر من محلّين وإلّا لزم التفكيك لواُزيد جزءٌ واحد منها؛ لعدم التأليف بعدم محله، والوجود بخلافه، وعدمُ الوجود لا يدلّ على الامتناع، وهو باق، وإلّا لزم امتناعُ التفكيك أو سهولته، لأنّ الله تعالى إن أراد إيجادَ التأليف حالاً بعد حال كان مراده أولى بالوجود وإلّا سهل فكّه، فينتفي الصعوبة بالكلّيّة.

Abū Hāshim precluded its subsistence through more than two substrates, for otherwise disentanglement would follow, if a single part were added to them, because a composition is non-existing when its substrate is non-existing, and conversely for existence. However, absence of existence is not evidence of impossibility.[158] Composition persists, otherwise it would follow that disentanglement is either impossible or easy, for if God most high wants to bring composition into existence one moment after another, what He wants is more appropriate to exist, but otherwise its disentanglement would be easy, and the difficulty vanishes entirely. Abū Hāshim has said that composition is produced from adjacency, and because of this, it takes place in accordance with it, for when two are adjacent horizontally, composition between them takes place, and so it can exist both in what are and what are not difficult to disentangle, given that its cause exists. Hence, the aforementioned premises are denied.[159]

According to Abū Hāshim, *pace* Abū ʿAlī, composition is not perceivable by either touching or seeing, for otherwise we would perceive the difference between little and much of it. It is similar throughout and there is neither opposition nor difference in terms of it, because all its individual instantiations are equal in terms of its most proper attribute, namely its need of two substrates in existence, and because the possibility of combining its individual instantiations precludes their mutual opposition. The respect in which combination is possible is that a single part can be composed with six of its like.[160] Composition does not have an opposite from without its genus, for no accident can be deemed its opposite, except detachment, but detachment is not its opposite, for otherwise the substrate of the two would be one, and detachment would need two adjacent substrates, just as its opposite does. The consequence is necessarily false, and likewise the premise. Composition is within our power, because it takes place from us according to intention and motive, albeit produced from adjacency, which we have indirectly made, *pace* Abūʿ Alī.

158 Abū Hāshim's argument may be that if composition subsisted through more than two atoms, then the annihilation of one of the atoms would annihilate the composition, even if the remaining atoms remained together. The only way to prevent this counterintuitive consequence is to say that composition subsists in the minimum of two substrates. Ḥillī's objection states that even if composition were factually annihilated through the annihilation of one atom in some cases, this does not demonstrate the impossibility, in other cases, of composition subsisting through the remaining atoms.

159 This last statement is puzzling and my translation is rather interpretative. I take Ḥillī to refer to God's willingness to create or not create composition: if composition follows by necessity, when two atoms are adjacent, then these alternative contradictories are precluded.

160 The idea is that one atom can be connected to six other atoms, in each of the main directions: up, down, left, right, front, and back from it.

قال أبو هاشم التّأليف يتولّد عن المجاورة، ولهذا يقع بحسبها، فإنّ المتجاورين طولاً يقع التأليف بينهما فيصحّ وجوده فيما يصعب تفكيكه وما لا يصعب لوجود سببه. والمقدّمات ممنوعة، وليس بمدرج لمسًا ولا رؤيةً عند أبي هاشم، خلافًا لأبي عليّ، وإلّا لأدركنا الفرقَ بينَ قليله وكثيره، وهو متماثل لا تضادّ فيه ولا اختلاف، لتساوي جميع أفراده في أخصّ صفاته، وهو افتقاره عندَ الوجود إلى محلّين، ولأنّ إمكانَ اجتماع أفراده ينفي تضادّها. ووجه إمكان الاجتماع أنّ الجزء الواحد يمكن أن يؤلّف مع ستّة أمثاله، وليس للتّأليف ضدّ من غير جنسه، إذ لا عرض يتوهم أنّه ضدٌّ له سوى الافتراق. وليس ضدًّا له وإلّا لاتحد محلّهما فكان يفتقر الافتراق إلى محلّين متجاورين كما افتقر ضدّه إليهما، والتّالي باطل بالضّرورة فكذا المقدّمُ، وهو مقدورٌ لنا لوقوعه منّا بحسب القصد والداعي متولّدًا عن المجاورة الّتي نفعلها لا مباشرةً، خلافًا لأبي عليّ.

Observation IV
On the Characteristics of Existing Things*

* For the central concept of characteristic (*ḥukm*), see p. 138, n. 141 above.

المرصد الرابع
في أحكام الموجودات وفيه مقصدان

Aim 1: On Common Characteristics

Question 1: On the One and Its Contrary

Conception of both unity and multiplicity is necessary due to the foregoing, but unity is better known to the intellect and multiplicity to the imagination. They belong to secondary intelligibles, for otherwise a regress would follow.[1] The ancients have asserted them. Since unity accedes upon accidents, it deserves to be accidental, and likewise multiplicity, for it is constituted by unity.

What is one is such either essentially or accidentally, like when it is said that the status of the king in the city is like the status of the captain in the ship. If the first is said of multiplicity,[2] it must participate in something through which it is unified and through the consideration of which it is not divided, so that if the multiplicity is an individual, it participates in the specific reality, and if it is specific, it participates in the generic reality, and there is difference in terms of closeness and remoteness.[3]

If it is not said of multiplicity, then it is one as an individual. If it does not admit of division in any respect, then either it has no concept added to its being something indivisible, in which case it is unity itself and is more deserving of the name 'one' than the others, or it does have something added. Then if it does not have a position, it is separate, otherwise it is a point. If it does admit of division, it is a line, a plane, or a body, in case it admits division by virtue of its essence, otherwise division accedes upon it or is acceded upon by it. Two things cannot be united, because if neither of them exist while something else exists, only one of them exists, or both remain as they were, there will be no union.[4]

1 If unity were not a secondary intelligible, or a concept without a really distinct extramental referent, then each thing that is one would be one because unity is added to it. Supposing, however, that the unity is itself one, it must also be one because of added unity, and so forth *ad infinitum*.

2 That is, if a multiplicity is said to be one in the essential sense.

3 The species and genera form a Porphyrian tree, in which some genera are species to higher genera. For this reason, we can say, for instance, that the genus 'substance' is further removed from the species 'horse' than the genus 'body'.

4 Implicit in the argument is that the three alternatives in the antecedent are exhaustive: there is no other sense in which the two could conceivably become one.

المقصد الأوّل: في الأحكام العامة

وفيه مطالب

[المطلب] الأوّل: في الواحد ومقابله

تصوّر الوحدة والكثرة ضروريٌّ لما مرّ، لكن الوحدة أعرفُ عندَ العقل والكثرة عند الخيال، وهما من المعقولات الثانية وإلّا لزم التسلسل. وأثبتهما الأوائل. ولما كانت الوحدة عارضةً للعرض كانت بالعرضيّة أولى، فالكثرةُ كذلك لتقوّمها منها. والواحدُ إمّا بالذّات أو بالعرض، كما يقال: حالُ الملك عند المدينة كحال الربان عند السّفينة.

والأول إن كان مقولاً على كثرةٍ وجب اشتراكها في أمر يتّحد به ولا ينقسم باعتباره؛ فإن كانت الكثرة شخصيّةً اشتركت في الحقيقة النّوعيَة، وإن كانت نوعيّةً اشتركت في الحقيقة الجنسيّة وتفاوت قربًا وبُعدًا.

وإن لم يكن فهو الواحدُ بالشّخص. فإن لم يقبل القسمةَ بوجهٍ مّا فإمّا أن لا يكونَ له مفهوم زائد على كونه شيئًا غير منقسم، وهو نفسُ الوحدة، وهو أولى باسم الواحد من البواقي، أو يكونَ؛ فإن لم يكن ذا وضع فهو المفارقُ وإلا فهو النقطة، وإن قبل القسمةَ فهو خطّ أو سطح أو جسم إن قبل لذاته، وإلّا فإمّا عارضٌ له أو معروضٌ، ولا يمكن اتّحادُ الاثنين لأنّهما إن عدما ووُجِد غيرهما أو أحدُهما أو بقيا كما كانا فلا اتحاد.

The ancients asserted number, because necessarily there are numbered things here, but their quiddities are not merely their being numbers. Instead, their quiddities are the realities of the things, and their being a certain number is something different from those. It is neither absolute non-existence nor just any characteristic. Indeed, if that were the case, unity would be non-existing, but number is composed of them, and a whole of existing things is not non-existent.

This is an error, because if the units of ten have nothing acceding upon them, with regard to which they are unified so that they become a substrate for tenness, then one will have become ten, which is absurd. Were that not the case, we will shift the investigation to that which accedes.[5] Indeed, unity is a mere consideration and subsists only insofar as it emerges from the units, because none of the species is more appropriate and a quiddity cannot subsist through multiple distinct parts.[6]

Question 2: On Similarity and Its Contrary

Multiplicity cannot be understood together with equality in every respect, for there is inevitably a distinguishing factor, namely the individuation, whereby difference comes to be. If one matches the other in every respect, the two are similar, otherwise they are different. If they cannot be combined in one thing at one time and in one respect, they are contraries. Since two similar things cannot be combined, in reality they are opposites, according to the ancients and the Ashʿarites, unless interdistance is posed as a condition, for otherwise any distinction between them in terms of essential, concomitant, and accidental things is eliminated.[7] The masters of the Muʿtazilites allow their combination because of the intensification of some colours, but we preclude the restriction of the cause to it.

5 That is, if the ten units are not the substrate of tenness together, then each unit on its own is a substrate of tenness, and one has become ten. Thus, we need a distinct accident to explain the initial togetherness of the units – but then the same question concerns its inherence in the units. The only conclusion is the one Ḥillī draws next.

6 Ḥillī brings together two objections here. First, the quiddity of the numbered things does not determine the number in any way. If there are ten horses in the pasture, it would be equally valid to count them as ten horses as to count them as two groups of five horses: neither species of number is more appropriate. Second, it is generally true that no metaphysically real quiddity can subsist through multiple substrates. Since any number subsists through multiple units, number cannot be a metaphysically real quiddity.

7 Two similar things can only occur simultaneously if they occur in different places. Supposing, *per impossibile*, that they occur in the same place, the principle of the identity of indiscernibles would hold: since they are similar, we cannot appeal to any of their properties in order to distinguish between them.

وأثبت الأوائل العددَ، إذ هنا معدوداتٌ بالضَرورة وليست ماهيّاتها مجرّد كونها أعدادًا، بل ماهيّاتها حقائقُ الأشياء، فكونُها أعدادًا أمر مغايرٌ لها، وليس عدمًا مطلقًا ولا أيّ ملكة كانت، بل إن كان فعدمُ الوحدة. لكنّه متركّبٌ منها. ومجموعُ الأمور الوجوديّة لا يكونُ عدميًا.

وهو خطأ لأنّ أفراد العشرة إن لم يعارض لها أمرٌ يتحد باعتباره ليصير محلاً للعشريّة صار الواحد عشرة، وهو محال وإلّا نقلنا البحثَ في العارض، بل هي أمرٌ اعتباريّ وتقوّمه إنّما هو من الآحاد لعدم الأولويّة في الأنواع وامتناع تقوّم الماهيّة بالأجزاء المتكثّرة المتباينة.

المطلب الثاني: في التماثل ومقابله

التكثّر لا يُعقل مع التساوي من كلّ وجه، بل لا بُدّ من مائز هو التعيّن، وحينئذ يحصل التغايرُ، فإن سدّ أحدهما مسدّ الآخر من كلّ وجه فهما المثلان، وإلّا فالمختلفان؛ فإن لم يمكن اجتماعهما في شيء واحد في زمان واحد من جهة واحدة فهما المتقابلان. والمثلان لا يمكنُ اجتماعهما فهما ضدّان في الحقيقة عند الأوائل والأشاعرة إن لم يشترط التباعد، وإلّا لارتفع الامتياز بينهما في الذاتيّات واللوازم والعوارض. ومشايخ المعتزلة جوّزوا اجتماعهما لاشتداد بعض الألوان ونمنع انحصار السبب فيه.

If both contraries are positively existing things, they are relata, in case they are understood as mutually concomitant and both of them are said in comparison to the other, otherwise they are opposites. If only one of them is positively existing, then they are a privation and a disposition, in case they are specific to one subject, but if not, they are mutually exclusive.

One thing does not have more than one opposite, if we pose the condition of extreme disparity, but otherwise multiplicity is possible. One of the two may be concomitant to a subject or it may not be such, either so that the substrate cannot be devoid of both of them, like health and sickness, or so that it can, like heat and coldness. The most strongly deviating contraries are negation and assertion, because the belief that something is not black is contrasted with what is essential, and the belief that it is white is contrasted with its not being white, which is accidental, and the contrast with what is essential is stronger in terms of deviation than the contrast with what is accidental. One and the same thing is not an opposite of two different things. All opposites have an ultimate genus, and no two genera are mutually opposed, based on induction.

Similarity, difference, and opposition are mere considerations that are secondary intelligibles. The intellect produces them as intelligible things, considering what is like them in terms of them, and there is no regress, for it ends when the consideration ends.[8] The ancient Muʿtazilites maintained that two different things differ due to a ground, and likewise for two similar, opposite, and unlike things. This is an error, for otherwise regress will occur.

Question 3: On the Cause and What Is Caused

Cause is that to which the existence of something is traced back, and that thing is called caused. It is either a part of what is caused or extrinsic to it. The first is matter, if what is caused exists potentially through it, and form, if its existence is associated with actuality. The extrinsic cause either produces an effect, and that is the efficient cause, or it is that for the sake of which the thing is, and that is the final cause.

8 That is, concepts do not give rise to vicious regress, even if they were in principle always applicable to themselves, because each factual application of concepts, no matter in how many higher orders, will always be finite.

والمتقابلان إن كان وجوديّين فهما المضافان إن لازما تعقّلاً وكان كلّ منهما مقولاً بالقياس إلى الآخر، وإلّا فهما الضّدان، وإن كان أحدهما فعدم وملكة إن تخصّصا بموضوع واحد، وإلّا فمتناقضان.

وليس للواحد أكثر من ضدّ واحد إن شرطنا غاية التباعد، وإلا جاز التكثّر، وقد يكون أحدهما لازمًا للموضوع وقد لا يكون، إمّا مع امتناع خلوّ المحلّ عنهما كالصّحّة والمرض، أولا كالحرارة والبرودة وأشدّ المتقابلات تعاندًا السلبُ والإيجاب، لأنّ اعتقاد أنّ الشّيء ليس بأسودَ له يرفع الذّاتي واعتقاد أنّه أبيض يرفع أنه ليس بأبيض، وهو عرضيّ، ورافعُ الذّاتي أقوى معاندة من الرافع العرضيّ، والشّيء الواحدُ لا يكون ضدّاً للمختلفين، وكلُ ضدّين فلهما جنسٌ أخير، ولا يتضاد جنسان بالاستقراء.

والتماثل والاختلاف والتّضاد أمورٌ اعتباريّة من المعقولات الثّانية. والعقلُ جعلهما أمورًا معقولة ويعتبر فيها مثلَها، ولا تسلسل، بل ينقطعُ بانقطاع الاعتبار. وزعم قدماء المعتزلة أنّ الغيرين يتغايران لمعنى، وكذا المثلان والضّدّان والمختلفان. وهو غلطٌ وإلّا لزم التسلسل.

المطلب الثالث: في العلّة والمعلول

العلّة ما يستند إليها وجود شيء، ويُسمّى ذلك الشّيء معلولاً. وهي إمّا جزء المعلول أو خارجةٌ عنه. والأوّل مادّةٌ إن وجد بها المعلول بالقوّة وصورةٌ إن قارن وجودها بالفعل. والخارجة إمّا مؤثرة فيه وهو الفاعل، أو التي لأجلها الشيء وهي الغاية.

The complete causes of an individual thing cannot be multiple, because it would be necessary through each of them and therefore independent of the others.[9] The causes of something belonging to a species can be multiple and different in quiddity, because it needs a certain cause by virtue of its essence but the individuation departs from it.[10] What a simple thing causes may be multiple, even though the respects in which it is considered were one, for otherwise all existing things would be in one series, which is necessarily false. The ancients precluded that, because the emergence of A is different from the emergence of B, and if the emergences were accidents of the essence, regress would follow, whereas if both or one of them were constitutive to it, it would be composite. This is an error, because it is a mere consideration, like negation, reception, and relation. The defence that they are relations was introduced in the case of emergence, but the circle is necessarily false, for what has an effect on that which has an effect on something has an effect on that thing.[11]

The causes cannot extend infinitely, because the whole of them is a whole of contingent things, each of which needs to be brought into effect by a distinct thing, as does the whole. What brings the whole into effect could not be its part, since the whole would not be necessitated by it, and the whole would entail that it is efficacious upon its causes that regress infinitely.[12] Hence, it remains that what brings the whole into effect must be extrinsic, namely the necessary. Since contingent things are intermediates and the endpoint exists, the First has been shown to exist.[13]

9 The concept of complete cause includes all the circumstantial conditions that are required for a cause to produce its effect. Thus, if we endorse the aforementioned Aristotelian theory of four kinds of cause, none of them can be a complete cause on its own – otherwise the remaining three would be redundant.

10 For instance, the birth of a new human being requires a certain cause by virtue of its essence – for the sake of argument, let us say that this is the emergence of an instantiation of the human essence. This, however, is a generic cause that is the same in every individual. To explain the emergence of *this* particular person, we need to include additional causes in the complete cause, such as the genetic contribution of the parents, the nourishment of the mother during pregnancy, and so forth.

11 The idea seems to be that a relation between the efficient cause and the recipient of its efficacy does not allow the emergence of multiple things from a single cause. If the recipient determines the efficacy of the single cause, and if the efficacy in turn brings the recipient into being, the recipient will have determined itself.

12 If we suppose, *per impossibile*, that the series of worldly causes is infinite, then the series cannot be caused by a worldly cause, for two reasons. First, it would not necessitate the series, but only those members that it precedes in the series. Second, a search for causal ancestry for the series as a whole would have to proceed without end along the infinite series.

13 This is an Avicennian argument; see, for instance, *Ishārāt*, namaṭ 4, 141-142.

ولا يمكن تكثّر علل الشخصيّ التّامّة لوجوبه بكلّ منهما فيستغني عنه الأخرى. ويجوز تكثر علل النوعي واختلافهما في الماهيّة؛ لأنّه لذاته يفتقر إلى علّة مّا والتعيين من قِبلها. ويكثر معلولُ البسيط وإن اتّحدت الاعتبارات، وإلّا لكان كلّ موجودين في سلسلة واحدة، وهو باطلٌ بالضّرورة. ومنع الأوائل من ذلك، لأنّ صدورآ غير صدورب، فإن عرضا للذّات تسلسل، وإن قوّماها أوأحدهما تركبت. وهو غلطٌ لأنّه اعتباريّ، كالسّلب والقبول والإضافة، والاعتذارُ بكونها إضافاتٍ واردٌ في الصّدور، والدّور باطل بالضّرورة فإنّ المؤثّر في المؤثّر في الشّيء مؤثّر فيه.

ولا يمكن ترامي العلل إلى مالا يتناهى لأنّ مجموعَها مجموع أمور ممكنة، كلُّ واحد منها مفتقرٌ إلى المؤثر المغاير فالمجموعُ كذلك. ولا يمكن أن يكونَ هو الجزء إذ لا يجبُ به الجملة وتستلزم تأثيره في علله المتسلسلة إلى مالا يتناهى، فبقي الخارج وهو الواجبُ؛ ولأن الممكنات وسط ووُجد الطرف الآخر، فيوجدُ الأوّل.

What is caused cannot lag behind its complete cause, for otherwise one moment would be preponderated for the occurrence instead of another. If that were not due to a preponderating factor, then it would follow that one of two contingent terms is preponderated over another without any preponderating factor, which is false. Should that not be the case, then the preponderating factor is included in being the cause, although it was supposed to be complete in the beginning, and this is incoherent.[14]

There is no impossibility in attributing something simple with both bringing into effect and receiving one and the same thing. Necessity is with respect to bringing into effect and contingency with respect to reception, and so there is no impossibility.[15]

Being a cause and being caused are attributes of mere consideration, which can be appended to both concrete and mental things according to one definition, and so there is no impossibility in attributing them to a privation of a disposition.[16] When it comes to absolute privation, however, that is not the case.

An intellectual cause can depend on a condition and be composite, even if what is caused were simple.[17] The final cause is a cause in terms of its quiddity and caused in terms of its existence. The animal motive faculty is triggered by desire, which is triggered by imagination or thinking. Had the goal of desire not occurred, the motion would have been in vain. The goal of a cause, which leads to what it causes always or for the most part, is essential, otherwise it is coincidental.

14 This is an argument that Avicenna applied to prove the eternity of the world; see, for instance, *Ishārāt*, namaṭ 5, 152.

15 Ḥillī's formulation is puzzling. The idea that one thing can have the two modal properties of necessity and contingency is an Avicennian commonplace: the created world is both necessary (with respect to God's creative act) and contingent (with respect to the world in itself, considered in isolation from God). Reception and bringing into effect, however, are not similarly attributable to the world, or indeed anything in it. By the same token, the two modal properties are commonly taken to signal that the subject that has them is *not* simple. One might think that the point concerns God, but attributing Him with receptivity, let alone contingency, seems problematic.

16 In other words, since causality is a mind-dependent concept, there is no problem in conceiving of a cause for privative things, or things that can have no positive existence.

17 For example, a sculptor's creative intention might include many motives from a passion of self-expression to the need to sustain one's offspring, yet it results in a sculpture that is simple (in relative terms, anyway).

ولا يجوز تخلّفُ المعلول عن علّته التّامّة وإلّا لكان ترجيح أحد الأوقات بالوقوع دونَ غيره إن كان لا لمرجّح لزم رجحان أحد طرفي الممكن على الآخر لا لمرجّح وهو باطل، وإلّا لكان [له] مدخلٌ في العلّيّة وقد فرض الأوّل تامًّا هذا خلفٌ.

ولا امتناعَ في اتّصاف البسيط بالمؤثريّة والقبول لشيء واحد، ويكون الوجوب من حيث المؤثريّة والإمكان من حيثُ القبول، فلا استحالةَ.

والعلّيَة والمعلوليّة من الأوصاف الاعتباريّة الّتي يمكن إلحاقُها بالأمور العينيّة والذّهنية على حد واحد، فلا امتناعَ من اتّصاف عدم الملكة بهما. أمّا العدمُ المطلقُ فلا.

ويجوز توقُف العلّة العقليّة على شرط وتركّبها وإن كان المعلول بسيطًا، والغايةُ علّة بماهيتّها معلولة بوجودها، والقوّة المحرّكة الحيوانيّة تنبعث عن شوق منبعث عن تخيّل أو فكر. فإن لم تحصل غاية الشوق فالحركة باطلة، والسبب المؤدّي إلى مُسبّبه دائمًا أو أكثريًّا غايته ذاتيّة وإلّا اتّفاقيّة.

Aim 2: On Specific Characteristics

Chapter 1: On the Characteristics of Substances

(a) It is specified by being in space.[18] According to the ancients, this is the corporeal form, but according to the theologians, what is spatial is what is specified by a state, such that by being in that state, its volume increases by the addition of another to it, or such that it occupies a share of place, insofar as it prevents another like it from occurring in that place.

(b) Bodies are composed of them, according to the theologians, *pace* the ancients. According to a group of Muʿtazilites, a body comes to be from eight of them arranged in terms of breadth, height, and depth. According to al-Kaʿbī, that is from four in the shape of a pine cone, three forming a triangle with a fourth on top of it,[19] whereas according to Abū al-Hudhayl, it is from six, and according to al-Ashʿarī, body is composed in an absolute sense and what is put together from two is already a body, but the dispute is terminological. It cannot be composed of accidents, *pace* Ḍirār ibn ʿAmr,[20] Ḥafṣ al-Fard,[21] and al-Naẓẓām, for otherwise there will be a circle.[22]

(c) A substance is perceivable by touch and by seeing, according to the Muʿtazilites, whereas according to the ancients, what is seen essentially is colour or light, and so substance is seen accidentally. According to the Kullābites, what is perceived is that which subsists by itself, and so colour is excluded from being seen.

18 Note that the paradigmatic concept of substance at issue here is the theologians' concept of atom.

19 For this shape, see Dhanani 1994, 135.

20 Ḍirār ibn ʿAmr (d. *ca* 200/815) was an independent early theologian associated with the early Muʿtazilites.

21 Abū ʿAmr Ḥafṣ al-Fard (d. early third/mid-ninth cent.) was a student of Ḍirār ibn ʿAmr.

22 Accidents, by definition, belong to a body. If a body were composed of accidents, then the accidents would belong to themselves.

المقصد الثّاني: في الأحكام الخاصّة

وفيه فصول [أربعةٌ]

[الفصل] الأوّل: في أحكام الجواهر

وهي «الف» اختصاصه بالتحيّز، وهو الصّورة الجسميّة عند الأوائل، وعند المتكلّمين المتحيّز هو المختصّ بحال لكونه عليها يتزايدُ قدره بانضمام غيره إليه، أو يشغل قدرًا من المكان بحيث يمنع غيره من أمثاله عن أن يحصل فيه.

ب- تركبت الأجسام منها عند المتكلّمين خلافًا للأوائل. فعندَ جماعة من المعتزلة حصول الجسم من ثمانية منها مترتبة في الطول والعرض والعمق. وعند الكعبيّ من أربعة مثلّث، وفوقها رابع صنوبريّ الشكل، وعند أبي الهذيل من ستّة، وعند الأشعريّ الجسم هو المركّب مطلقًا، والمؤلّفُ من اثنين جسمٌ، والنّزاع لفظيّ. ولا يمكن تركّبه من أعراض خلافًا لضرار بن عمرو وحفص الفرد والنّظّام، وإلّا دار.

ج- الجوهر يدرك لمسًا ورؤيةً عند المعتزلة، وعندَ الأوائل أنّ المبصر بالذّات هو اللّون أو الضّوء، فإبصار الجوهر بالعرض. وعندَ الكلابيّة المدرك هو القائمُ بنفسه، فاخرج اللّونُ عن كونه مرئيًّا.

(d) Substance can only be understood as being in a space or an expanse. Regardless of whether we posit place as an interval, as some of the ancients have said, or as the interior surface of an encompassing body that touches the exterior surface of the encompassed one,[23] along the lines of what others among them have held, or as that toward which what is solid, together with its weight, tends and upon which it rests, along the lines preferred by the theologians,[24] it will be inevitable that some bodies are independent of place, due to the impossibility of regress.[25] Those who speak of the surface bring to play the motions of a rock falling in water and flying in air or the stability of the Sun, whereas those who speak of the interval introduce and insist on the interpenetration of two intervals when what is solid assumes its place.

There are differences concerning place in both interpretations, namely on whether it can or cannot be empty. One group holds the first alternative, because the movement of one of two tangential surfaces without its counterpart entails intermediate emptiness, for since the gap is denied, the leap is impossible, and contact is supposed, motion would then be impossible.[26] Otherwise, interpenetration would follow, if that which was in the second space remained as it was, or a circle if it were transferred to the place of the first, and all parts of the world would move when ants move from one place to another.[27] Real rarefication and condensation would be based on matter, and we have already refuted it.[28]

23 This is the Aristotelian definition of place adopted by Avicenna; see *Shifāʾ: al-Samāʿ al-ṭabīʿī* II.9.1, 201.

24 For this definition of place, see Dhanani 1994, 70-71.

25 Note that the concept of absolute space (*ḥayyiz*, *muḥādhāt*) and the relational concept of place (*makān*) are contrasted here. Ḥillī is saying that corporeal substances entail space but not place, because place depends on a relation to other bodies. If all bodies were in a place, every body would have to have a surrounding body (or bodies), *ad infinitum*.

26 This resembles the Baṣrians' third argument for the void, as discussed in Dhanani 1994, 84-85. We should think of, say, a deflated bladder, which is compressed so that its two sides are in contact. Then one pulls apart the two sides. This should be impossible, unless there is void between the separated sides.

27 Here we are dealing with a different argument, and the *wa-illā* in the beginning of the argument should be interpreted not to refer to the previous sentence, but to the general debate: were there no void, the following difficulties would also follow. The argument here resembles the Baṣrians' first argument, as discussed in Dhanani 1994, 81-83. If the world were a plenum, how could things move from one place to another? If the thing in the place of destination of a moving thing does not budge, the two things will interpenetrate, which is impossible. If it moves to the place of the first, the slightest movement will put the entire universe in motion.

28 See III.2. The implication is that the phenomena of rarefication and condensation are due to less or more atoms, respectively, gathering in a certain magnitude of empty space.

د- الجوهر لا يعقل إلّا في حيّز ومُحاذاة، ولابُدّ من مكان إن جعلنا المكانَ هو «البعدُ»، كما قاله بعضُ الأوائل، وإن جعلناه السّطحَ «الباطن من الجسم الحاوي المماس للسطح الظاهر من المحويّ» على ما ذهب إليه بعضهم، أو «ما يعتمد عليه المتمكن وثقله ويثبتُ عليه» على ما اختاره المتكلّمون، استغنى بعض الأجسام عنه لاستحاله التسلسل. وألزم القائلون بالسطح حركة الحجر الواقف في الماء والطائر في الهواء وسكون الشمس، وألزم القائلون بالبعد تداخلَ البعدين عندَ حلول المتمكن في مكانه التزموه.

واختلف في المكان بكلا التفسيرين، هل يمكن خلوه أو يمتنع؟ فجماعةٌ على الأوّل لاستلزام حركة السطحين المتلاقيين دونَ صاحبه خلوّ الوسط؛ لانتفاء الفرج وامتناع الطفرة وفرض التلاقي ولامتناع الحركة حينئذ، وإلّا لزم التداخلُ إن بقي المتحيّز في الثّاني كما كان، والدورُ إن انتقل إلى مكان الأوّل، وحركة جميع أجزاء العالم بحركة النملة من مكان إلى غيره. والتخلخل والتكاثُف الحقيقيان مبنيان على المادّة، وقد أبطلناها.

Most of the ancients opted for the second alternative and al-Kaʿbī maintained it as well, because place comes in degrees and therefore is quantity or something that has quantity, and because matter is finite and therefore shaped. If the shape were essential, the part and the whole would be equal. If that is not the case, a recipient is necessary, and so a body has been established. Furthermore, it would follow that motion with an obstacle would be like motion without it, although quickness is in what is equivalent with thin and slowness in what is equivalent with its opposite. Hence, if we suppose unrestrained motion through a determined interval to take place in a certain time, with an obstacle it will take place in a longer time, let us suppose twice as long. Then let us suppose something thinner than the first in relation to the difference of the two times, so that the movement would take place in the time of a void.[29]

The measure is mental for a merely supposed body.[30] The shape is conflicted by the simple globe.[31] The error is in making the time to be because of the obstacle. Instead, motion has a measure of time by virtue of its essence and another measure with respect to the obstacle, so that in the case of that which has an obstacle, the two are combined. Since they differ by what is added with respect to the obstacle, they are never equal.

(e) Substance has no opposite, because subject is denied of it. He who posits species forms faces the consequence that opposition is possible for them.[32] Substance is that which is intended by pointing at it, for pointing depends on the individuation of what is pointed at, and the individuation of accidents follows the individuation of their substrate.

29 Cf. the argument in III.3.6. The idea here is that the differences in motion are only explicable by means of differences in resistance by the matter through which it takes place. Supposing a zero degree of resistance, as in the void, leads to an absurd conclusion.

30 That is, the initial ground of the plenum theorists, namely that place has a magnitude, is dependent on the mind's application of an imaginary measure to it, not a real feature of the world.

31 This argument against the plenum theory is not entirely clear, but perhaps Ḥillī is saying that this claim contradicts the plenum theorists' own view that the entirety of the material universe has a spherical shape. In this sense, matter would be spherically shaped by essence. The fact that it can also be otherwise shaped only points out the inconsistency of the plenum theory.

32 The target of critique here is hylomorphism.

وأكثرُ الا وائل على الثّاني وبه قال الكعبيّ لتقدّره، فيكون كمّاً أو ذا كمّ، ولأنّها متناهية، فهي مُشكّلة. فإن كان الشكل ذاتيًّا تساوى الجزء والكلّ وإلّا وجب القابل فثبت الجسم؛ ولأنّه يلزم أن يكون الحركة مع العائق كالحركة بدونه، فإنّ السرعة في مقابله الرقة والبطؤ في مقابلة ضدّها. فلوفرضنا الحركة في مسافة معيّنة خالية تقع في زمان وقعت مع العائق في أكثر، ولنفرضه الضعف، ثمّ نفرض أرقّ من الأوّل بنسبة تفاوت الزمانين فيتحرّك في زمان الخلا.

والتقدّرُ ذهنيّ لجسم مفروض. ويُنتقضُ الشّكلُ بالكرة البسيطة، والغلط في جعل الزمان بسبب المعاوقة، بل للحركة لذاتها قدرٌ من الزمان، وباعتبار المعاوقة آخر، (فسيجمعهما ذاتُ المعاوقة ويتفاوت في الزائد باعتبار المعاوقة فلا يتساويان) أصلاً.

هـ - الجوهرُ لا ضدّ له لانتفاء الموضوع عنه. ومن أثبت الصور النوعيّة يلزمه تجويز الضدية فيها. والجوهرُ هو المقصود إليه بالإشارة لتوقُفها على تشخّص المشار إليه، وتشخص الأعراض تابعٌ لتشخّص محلّها.

(f) A group of Muʿtazilites have asserted four attributes for substance that are different from the attributes asserted for it with respect to its composition with others, like life and that by which substantiality, which is an essential attribute of the genus, is conditioned.[33] They have asserted the two states of existence and non-existence for it, and it is through them that those that share something do so, and those that are different are such. Existence is the attribute that occurs through an agent. Spatiality is an attribute, which follows the coming to be anew that emerges from substantiality under the condition of existence. Occurrence in a certain space is the substance's being in a certain mode, and it is caused by a ground. For accidents, they have asserted an attribute of genus, which emerges from them when they exist, as well as existence.

(g) They have said: Increase of substantiality and spatiality is not possible, because increase is traced back to a cause that increases or a condition that increases, like the perceiver's being a perceiver when there are many things to perceive, but there is nothing to which these two attributes could be brought back and for which increase is possible. Moreover, if spatiality were to increase, it would necessarily be possible for a single substance to be in the form of a great mountain due to an increase taking place in the attribute that necessitates becoming great. Nor does existence increase, for otherwise we could bring an existing thing to existence, bringing it to be anew each moment. Since the consequent is necessarily absurd, the antecedent is likewise. The conditional is shown by saying that every essence, for which it is possible to be increased with respect to one attribute when it comes to be, can be increased when it persists. Some ancients did allow intensification and weakening in terms of existence. Regarding rest, they have allowed increase in terms of it.

33 The four attributes that an atom has on its own are existence, non-existence, spatiality, and being in a certain space, each of which Ḥillī briefly explains in what follows.

و - أثبت جماعةٌ من المعتزلة للجوهر أربعَ صفات غير الصّفات الثّابتة له باعتبار تركّبه مع غيره، كالحياة وما يشترط بها الجوهريّة، وهي صفة الجنس ذاتيّة، فثبت له حالتي الوجود والعدم، بها يشارك ما يشارك ويخالفُ ما يخالفُ؛ والوجود، وهي الصّفة الحاصلة بالفاعل. والتّحيز، وهي الصّفة التّابعة للحدوث الصادرة عن الجوهريّة بشرط الوجود؛ والحصول في الحيّز، وهي كونه كائنًا المعلّلة بالمعنى. وأثبتوا للأعراض صفة الجنس الصادرة عنها عندَ الوجود والوجود.

ز - قالوا: ولا يمكن تزايدُ الجوهريّة والتحيّز؛ لأنّ التزايد يستند إلى علّة تتزايد أو شرط يتزايدُ، ككون المدرك مدركًا عندَ كثرة المدركات، ولا شيء يستند هاتان الصّفتان إليه يصحّ فيه التزايد؛ ولأنّ التحيّز لو تزايد لجاز صيرورةُ الجوهر الفرد على صورة جبل عظيم للزيادة الحاصلة في الصّفة الموجبة للتعاظم، ولا الوجود وإلّا لصحّ منّا إيجاد الموجود وإحداثه حالاً فحالاً، والتّالي باطل بالضّرورة فالمقدّم مثله. وبيانُ الشرطيّة أنّ كلّ ذات صحَّ حصولها على أزيد من صفة واحدة حالة الحدوث صحّ حصولها على الزّائد حالة البقاء؛ وبعضُ الأوائل جوّز فيه الشّدّة والضعفَ. وأمّا السكون فجوّز وا فيه التزايد.

(h) Substances come to be, *pace* the ancients, because they are not devoid of [things] that come to be, and whatever is not devoid of things that come to be necessarily comes to be itself. As regards the minor premise, it is because they are necessarily not devoid of motion and rest, for if they remain in their places, they are at rest, otherwise they are moving, there being no mean between the two contraries, both of which come to be, because the quiddity of both requires the precedence of something else, whereas nothing that is eternal is like that. Moreover, if any individual motion or rest were eternal, it would never not exist, but the consequent is false by virtue of sensation, the admission of opposition, and the contingency of the category of position.[34] If the species of motion, or the whole of its individual instantiations, were eternal, the individual would be eternal, because a species cannot exist detached from the individuals, and because if no motion exists in eternity, then the whole has come to be, otherwise it would be eternal, although no individual motion can be eternal.[35] Furthermore, because every particular has come to be, it is preceded by pre-eternal non-existence, for which there is no beginning. Hence, the whole of non-existences is pre-eternal. If some motion existed together with them, it would be equal to both the preceded and the preceding, for otherwise the whole would have come to be. Hence, things that have come to be cannot extend infinitely.

If motions were infinite on the side of the past, then the existence of today would depend on the passing of what is infinite, which is absurd. If we suppose a whole from now to pre-eternity and another whole from the flood to pre-eternity, and then juxtapose one to the other, then if they are equal, what is more will be equal to what is less. That is necessarily false, but otherwise that which is less will have ended, and so both of them will have ended.[36]

34 We perceive that most, if not all, motions and rests have a limited temporal duration. Moreover, motion and rest are opposites, and nothing in the essence of either rules out the possibility of its counterpart. Thus, they cannot be eternal by essence. Finally, the philosophers, who endorse the eternity of the world, and thereby of motion, have held that the celestial spheres' revolution, which is motion in the category of position, is eternal. However, since everything in the category of position is contingent, celestial motion is such as well, and in a theological analysis, contingency just means that the thing has begun and has the possibility of ceasing.

35 This is an uncharitable, and it seems to me unsuccessful, argument against the philosophical doctrine of the eternity of the world. As far as I can see, there is no argument for why a series of revolutions of celestial spheres cannot be eternal, even if each individual revolution had a beginning and end in time. When it comes to the whole, the philosopher would say that the infinite cannot be adequately conceived as an ordered actual whole.

36 The first one is an ancient argument derived from Philoponus, cf. Davidson 1969. The second one resembles Avicenna's "mapping" argument against the infinite spatial extension of the world; see McGinnis 2010.

ح- الجواهر حادثة، خلافًا للأوائل؛ لأنّها لا تخلو عن الحوادث، وكلّ ما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادثٌ بالضّرورة. وأمّا الصّغرى فلأنّها لا تخلو عن الحركة والسّكون بالضّرورة؛ لأنّها إن بقيت في أحيازها كانت ساكنة وإلّا فهي متحرّكةٌ ولا واسطةَ بين النّقيضين، وكلاهما حادثان، لأنّ ماهيّة كلّ منهما يستدعي المسبوقيّة بالغير، ولا شيء من القديم كذلك؛ ولأنّ كلّ واحد من الحركة الشّخصيّة والسّكون لو كان أزليًّا لما عُدم، والتّالي باطلٌ بالحسّ وتسليم الخصم وإمكان مقولة الوضع.

ونوعُ الحركة لو كان قديمًا أو مجموع أفرادها كان الشّخص قديمًا، لامتناع وجود نوع منفك عن شخص، ولأنّه إن لم يوجد في الأزل شيءٌ من الحركة، فالكلّ حادثٌ وإلّا كان قديمًا. ولا يمكن قدمُ شخص ما للحركة ولأنّ كلّ جزئيّ حادث فهو مسبوق بعدمٍ لا أوّلَ له أزليّ، فمجموع العدمات أزليّ، فإن وجد معها شيء من الحركات يساوي المسبوق والسّابق، وإلّا كان الكلّ حادثًا، فلا يمكنُ ترامي الحوادث إلى ما لا نهايةَ له. ولأنّ الحركات لو كانت غيرَ متناهية في جانب الماضي لتوقّف وجود اليوم على انقضاء ما لا يتناهى، وهو مُحال. ولأنّا لو فرضنا من الآن إلى الأزل جملةٌ، ومن زمان الطوفان إلى الأزل جملة أُخرى، ثمّ أطبقنا إحداهما بالأخرى، فإن تساويا تساوى الزّائد والنّاقص، وهو باطلٌ بالضّرورة، وإلّا انقطعت النّاقصة فانقطعتا معا.

The ancients have argued by saying that for everything, which inevitably produces an effect, if it is eternal, eternity of the effect follows, for otherwise a regress would follow. The first implication is precluded,[37] whereas the second is contradicted by what comes to be anew today.[38] When it has been established that substances come to be, it has been established that what depends on them, namely bodies, come to be, because bodies are composed of them and because evidence concerning bodies leads to them and accidents.

(i) Substance is not within our power, neither directly, because interpenetration is impossible, nor as production, if there is a unity of substrate.[39] If, however, there is a distinction of substrates, that through which the act is carried out is a tendency, and it does not produce a substance. Otherwise, if we pressed on a receptacle for a time, we would bring substances to exist in them, as we do when we blow in them.

The ancients have another method in this topic, namely that the agent is the form, because the recipient is not an agent. The form, however, only acts by sharing position, and it is because of this that fire burns what it encounters, and then, by means of what it encountered, it burns something that encounters what it encountered. The agent in the composite is simultaneously active in a part of it, and there is no sharing of position between matter and form.

37 If the unhindered first cause is a voluntary agent, it does not entail an eternal effect.

38 The fact that new things are created by an eternal God at every moment shows that this entails no impossible regress.

39 We cannot create substances directly, because the created substance would have to come into being in our own substrate, which entails interpenetration of substances. For the same reason, if the atom is to be created in our own substrate, we cannot produce them by using our substrate as an instrument either.

احتجّ الأوائل بأنّ كلّ ما لابُدّ منه في المؤثريّة إن كان قديمًا لزم القدمُ وإلّا لزم التسلسل. والملازمة الأولى ممنوعةٌ والثّانيةُ منقوضةٌ بالحادث اليوميّ. وإذا ثبت حدوث الجواهر ثبت حدوثُ مايتوقّف عليها وهوالأجسام لتركّبها منها ولانسحاب الدّليل بعينه فيها والأعراض.

ط- الجوهر غير مقدور لنا. أمّا مباشرةً فلامتناع التّداخل، وكذا التّولُد مع اتحاد المحلّ. وأمّا مع التغاير فالّذي يُعدى به الفعل عنه هوالاعتماد، وهولا يولّد الجوهر، وإلا لكفّا إذا اعتمدنا على ظرف زمانًا أوجدنا فيه جواهر، كما نوجدها بالنّفخ فيه.

وللأوائل في هذا الباب طريقٌ آخرُ، وهوأن الفاعل الصّورة؛ لأنّ القابل لا يكون فاعلاً، والصّورة إنّما تفعل بمشاركة الوضع، ولهذا فإنّ النّار تسخّنُ مايُلاقيها. ثمّ ما يلاقي مايلاقيها بواسطة الملاقي، والفاعل في المركّب فعل في جزئه معًا، ولا مشاركة في الوضع بين المادّة والصّورة.

(j) We have already shown the falsity of matter.[40] Those who claim that it is established preclude its separation from form, for otherwise either it would come to be in every place once it is attributed with form, and it would follow that a body comes to be in more than one place, which is necessarily false, or it would come to be in some places, and preponderance without a preponderating factor would follow.[41] This is incomplete, because it only provides evidence for the impossibility of attributing form to what is separate. It is contradicted by the particulars of one element. They also preclude the form's separation from matter, for otherwise it would be a point or such that its divisibility is precluded by the transformation of the First.[42] Hence, division through matter follows.

Chapter 2: On the Characteristics of Bodies

It includes eleven investigations.

(a) Bodies are like each other, *pace* al-Naẓẓām, because they share quiddity, which is their being long, broad, and deep, or their being substances that are receptive to dimensions which intersect at right angles, and because they are assimilated in sensation when they coincide in terms of accidents. This is based on the observation of all and on real equality when there is equality in sensation.

(b) Bodies persist, *pace* al-Naẓẓām, due to the necessary knowledge that what is observed at a second moment is what was observed at first, and being brought to not exist is traced back to an agent.

(c) Interpenetration is impossible, *pace* al-Naẓẓām, due to the necessary knowledge that two intervals are greater than one, and to the impossibility of two bodies being together in one space.

40 See, again, III.2.

41 If prime matter were actual in its own right, when the form of corporeality occurs in it, it must occur throughout it. This makes the occurrence of multiple distinct bodies inexplicable. On the other hand, given that prime matter lacks all determinations, there is no non-arbitrary way to explain the occurrence of the form of corporeality in one part of it rather than another – supposing, *per impossibile*, that it has parts in the first place.

42 There are multiple instantiations of forms, such as the form of horse. If the form of horse were separate from matter, this multiplicity could not be explained by means of the recipient of matter. Hence, it would lead to transformation or multiplicity in the efficient causes of the form, and ultimately in God.

ي- قد بيّنا بطلانَ المادّة. والقائلون بثبوتها منعوا من تجرّدها عن الصّورة، وإلّا فإن حصلت بعدَ اتّصافها بها في كلّ مكان لزم حصول الجسم في أكثر من مكان واحد، وهو باطل بالضّرورة؛ أو في بعض الأمكنة لزم الترّجيحُ من غير مرجّح، وهو غير تامّ لدلالته على امتناع اتّصاف المجرّدة بالصّورة. ويُنتقض بجزئيّات العنصر الواحد. ومنعوا من تجرّد الصّورة عنها، وإلّا كانت نقطةً أو حالّةً إن انقسمت ويمتنعُ استحالة الأوّل واستلزام الانقسام المادّة.

الفصل الثّاني: في أحكام الأجسام

وهي [إحدى عشر] بحثًا:

ألف- الأجسام متماثلة خلافًا للنّظّام؛ لاشتراكها في الماهيّة، وهي كونها طويلة عريضة عميقة، أو أنّها الجواهر القابلة للأبعاد المتقاطعة على زوايا قوائم، ولاشتباهها حسًّا عند اتفاقها في الأعراض. ويبتني على مشاهدة الجميع وعلى التساوي في الحقيقة عند التساوي في الحسّ.

ب- الأجسام باقية خلافًا للنّظّام، للعلم الضّروريّ بأنّ المشاهدَ ثانيًا هو المشاهد أوّلاً، والإعدام مستند إلى الفاعل.

ج- التّداخل محالٌ خلافًا للنّظّام، للعلم الضّروريّ بأن بُعدين أعظمُ من أحدهما، وامتناع اجتماع جسمين في حيّز واحد.

(d) Bodies can be devoid of all accidents apart from the mode of being, *pace* the Ashʿarites, because air is like that. The analogy of colour with being is not comprehensive, and the analogy of what is before it to what is after it is rejected in the foundation.[43]

(e) Bodies are seen by means of light and colour, and this is necessary.

(f) Bodies are finite, *pace* the wise of India, for otherwise we could suppose two lines, like two sides of a triangle, that extend infinitely, but then the distance between them would do the same, and what is infinite would be confined between two limits, which is necessarily false. Furthermore, if a sphere is supposed such that its diameter is equivalent with an infinite line, then when it moves in position, the diameter is transferred from the equivalent position to the other side, and a point comes to be that is the first point on the other side. That is not possible in the case of the infinite, yet it is due to valid correspondence.[44]

(g) We have already shown that the world has come to be anew and does not have to be eternal, *pace* the ancients and the Karrāmites, because its quiddity allows non-existence, for otherwise it would be eternal and necessary due to its essence, and it could not be traced back to a necessitating factor. Non-existence, however, can be traced back to an agent.

43 As Ḥillī reports at slightly greater length in the *Nihāyat al-marām* III.1.4.3, II.590-591, the Ashʿarites argue that bodies necessarily have colour by virtue of the analogy of colour with *kawn*, which is uncontroversially necessary for bodies. Like here, Ḥillī flatly denies that the analogy is comprehensive, which amounts to saying that it is invalid. The point about the states before and after is related to a further argument by the Ashʿarites, namely that once an atom or a body has a certain attribute, such as colour, the colour can only cease to exist by being replaced by an opposite attribute from the same genus, in our example, another colour. Hence, the argument goes, in this qualified sense at least, a body cannot be devoid of some colour. Ḥillī objects by saying that first of all, the argument does not entail that initially uncoloured bodies must have colour, and secondly, the qualification is unacceptable once the possibility of body's lacking colour is asserted in a foundational sense (*fī l-aṣl*) – a coloured body can cease to have colour by the absolute annihilation of colour from it.

44 This resembles an argument against the infinitude of the body of the world presented in Suhrawardī, *Talwīḥāt* II.1.1.3, 106, where it is somewhat clearer. Suppose a sphere with an infinite diameter that rotates 180 degrees, or any number of degrees for that matter. If we consider any point on the diameter within a finite length from the centre of the sphere, it is obvious that the motion traverses a finite interval and can conceivably do so in a finite time. However, if consider another point on the diameter, this time infinitely far from the centre, we realise that that point must have traversed an infinite distance at that same, *finite* time. This is absurd, and since the principles we are applying are perfectly valid for finite spheres and diameters, the absurdity must be due to the assumption of the infinitude of the circle.

د- يجوزُ خلوّ الأجسام عن جميع الأعراض إلّا الكون خلافًا للأشاعرة، لأنّ الهواء كذلك؛ وقياس اللون على الكون خال عن الجامع وما قبله على ما بعده ممنوع الأصل.

هـ- الأجسام مرئيةٌ بواسطة الضّوء واللّون، وهو ضروري.

و- الأجسام متناهيةٌ خلافًا لحكماء الهند، وإلّا لأمكننا فرضُ خطّين كساقي مثلّث يمتدّان إلى غير نهاية؛ فالبُعد بينهما كذلك، فيكون ما لا يتناهى محصورًا بين حاصرين، وهو باطلٌ بالضّرورة؛ ولأنّ الكرة المفروض قطرها موازيًا لخطّ غير متناه إذا تحرّكت حركةً وضعيّةً انتقل القطر من الموازاة إلى المسامتة، فيحدث نقطةٌ هي أوّل نقط المسامتة. ولا يمكن ذلك في غير المتناهي؛ وللتّطبيق.

ز- قد بيّنا حدوثَ العالم، ولا يجبُ أن يكون أبديًّا خلافًا للأوائل والكرّاميّة؛ لأن ماهيته قابلةٌ للعدم، وإلّا لكان قديمًا واجبًا لذاته، ويمتنعُ استنادهُ إلى الموجب، ويجوزُ استنادُ العدم إلى الفاعل.

(h) A body is either simple, that is, such that there is no composition from potencies and natures in it, and its parts are similar to each other in terms of completeness of quiddity, or it is composite, that is, such that there is composition from potencies and natures in it, and its parts are not similar to each other.

The simple body is either celestial or elemental. All in all, the celestial spheres are nine, based on their not being receptive to tearing and rejoining, and so this is denied.[45] The encompassing sphere is finite in terms of directions, because the directions of up and down are different by nature, and it is not possible that a direction be privative, because there is no distinction between what is privative. Moreover, a direction is the objective for what is moving, that to which pointing pertains, and indivisible, for otherwise, if that which arrives at a midpoint in a certain direction were aiming beyond it in that direction, that would not be the same direction, and were that not the case, the midpoint would be the direction. A distinction in terms of an equidistance or by means of two bodies distinct in position is not possible, because each one is defined by its proximity to the encompassing sphere without that distance. Hence, it is inevitable that the proximity is defined by the surface of the encompassing sphere and the distance by their centres. Deprivations of disposition may be distinguished by means of their respective dispositions, for a body aims in its motion towards whiteness, which does not exist, as well as to something to which pointing pertains, such as certain spaces, distances, and their endpoints. One of two distances is different from the other by its specific determination and its position. This suffices for distinguishing the directions. Moreover, both are ends of the distance deemed between the centre and the circumference, and a distance results when distances are cut.

(i) They have said: The celestial sphere is simple, for otherwise it would be composite and it could come apart. The limiting sphere cannot come apart, for otherwise it would have a direction and be preceded by it. Hence, its motion is circular because its parts are equally related to things extraneous to it. Motion is possible for it and it has a circular inclination but no straight one, because the two inclinations are contraries. Hence, it is neither thin nor thick, it does not allow tearing apart or rejoining, it is neither hot nor cold and neither moist nor dry. Instead, it is a fifth nature, different from the natures of the elements.

45 The matter of the celestial spheres cannot be torn apart (*kharq*) or their parts rejoined (*iltiyām*). For the same reason, they cannot be penetrated (*kharq*), which makes space travel impossible.

ح- الجسم إمّا بسيط، وهو الّذي ليس فيه تركيبٌ من قوى وطبايع، ويتشابه أجزاؤه في تمام الماهيّة؛ وإمّا مركّبٌ، وهو ما فيه تركيبٌ من قوى وطبايع، ولا يتشابه أجزاءه.

والبسيط إمّا فلكيٌّ أو عنصريٌّ، وكلّيّاتُ الأفلاك تسعةٌ بناءً على عدم قبوله الخرق والالتيام، وهو ممنوعٌ. والفلك المحيط هو المحدّد للجهات؛ لأنّ جهتي العلو والسفل مختلفان طبعًا، ولا يمكن أن يكون الجهة عدميّةً إذ لا امتياز فيه؛ ولأنّها مقصد المتّحرك ومتعلّق الإشارة غير منقسمة، وإلّا لكان الواصل إلى منتصفها إن قصد الجهة ممّا وراءه ليس منها، وإلّا فهو الجهة. ولا يمكن التمايز في البعد المتساوي ولا بجسمين متباينين وضعًا؛ لأنّ كلّ واحد يُحدّد القرب منه دون البعد، فلا بدّ من محيط يتحدّد القرب بسطحه، والبعد بمركزه وإعدام الملكة قد تتمايز بملكاتها. والجسم يقصد الحركة إلى البياض وليس موجودًا ومتعلق الإشارة الأحياز والأبعاد وأطرافها. وأحد البعدين يخالفُ الآخر بخصوصيّته ووضعه، فهو كافٍ في تمايز الجهة، ولأنّهما طرفا بعد متوهّم من المركز إلى المحيط، والبعد يحصل بانقطاع الأبعاد.

ط- قالوا الفلك بسيط وإلّا لكان مركّبًا فصحّ عليه الانحلال، والمحدّد لا يصحّ عليه الانحلال وإلّا لكان ذا جهةٍ مسبوقًا بها، فحركته دوريّةٌ لتساوي نسبة أجزائه إلى الأمور الخارجة عنه، فأمكنت الحركةُ عليه؛ فكان ذا ميل مستدير، فلا يكونُ له مستقيمٌ للتّنافي بينَ الميلين؛ فلا يكونُ خفيفًا ولا ثقيلاً، ولا يقبلُ الخرقَ والالتيامَ، ولا حارًا ولا باردًا ولا رطبًا ولا يابسًا، بل هو طبيعةٌ خامسةٌ مخالفةٌ لطبائع العناصر.

These principles are false, first, because because even if admitted, they only apply to the limiting sphere. Second, because they are conflicted by eight spheres, since it is possible for every sphere to touch another equally on its concave side and its convex side. Third, because possibility of motion does not entail necessity of inclination, for otherwise the preparedness would have been complete, which is denied. Fourth, because if inclinations were not combined, the two motions from a weak and a powerful mover would be equal.[46] Fifth, why can two inclinations not exist in two moments in two states? For instance, inclination comes to exist in a moving thing when it departs from its place, and ceases to exist when it arrives at its place. We have told the remaining objections in the book *Nihāyat al-marām*.[47]

(j) The simple elements are four. There is earth, which is in the middle, with the centre of the world as its centre, and it has two qualities, an active one, namely coldness, and a passive one, namely dryness. It is surrounded by water, with the exception of one populated region that is revealed from water due to the wisdom of birthing animals. It has two qualities, an active one, namely coldness, and a passive one, namely moistness. Air surrounds water and has two qualities, an active one, namely heat, and a passive one, namely moistness, in the sense of being receptive to figures, not in the sense of humidity. Fire surrounds air and has two qualities, an active one, namely heat, and a passive one, namely dryness.

They are receptive to generation and corruption, because fire becomes air when it is extinguished, and conversely when it is blown into, air becomes water when it is cooled down, like the drops of water that conform on the side of a vessel that contains ice, and conversely when it is heated, and earth becomes water, like what the fellows of the elixir do, and conversely. Indeed, much of the water in springs sediments into hard rocks. From these elements are composed mineral, vegetative, and animal composites.

(k) When the elements are mixed, the purity of each quality is destroyed. Fire does not remain in the purity of its heat, nor does water in the purity of its coldness, air in the purity of its subtlety, or earth in the purity of its dryness, but an intermediate quality between these qualities comes to be in accordance with their ratio, and it is the mixture.

46 Combination of inclinations is ruled out by the argument for the circular motion of the encompassing sphere ("it has a circular inclination but no straight one, because the two inclinations are contraries"). The counterargument here is that if that were true, a strong force that moves a body in a circle and a weak force that moves it forward would remain distinct and with equal effect on the body. This is because in order for the strong force to overpower the weak one, they must first be combined.

47 *Nihāyat al-marām* III.243-246.

والأصولُ باطلةٌ، أمّا أوّلاً فلاختصاصها لو سُلِّمَت بالمحدّد. وأمّا ثانيًا فلاِنتقاضها بالأفلاك الثمانيّة، إذ يصحّ على كلّ فلك مماسّة غيره بمقعره، كما يصحّ بمحدبه. وأما ثالثًا فلأنّ إمكانَ الحركة لا يستلزمُ وجوبَ الميل، إلّا إذا تمّ الاستعداد، وهو ممنوعٌ. وأمّا رابعًا فلأنّ الميول لو لم تجتمع لتساوت الحركتان عن ضعيف وقوي. وأمّا خامسًا فلِمَ لا يجوزُ وجود ميلين في وقتين عند حالتين، كالمتحرّك يوجد فيه الميل عند مفارقة مكانه وعدمه عند حصوله فيه. وباقي الاعتراضات ذكرناه في كتاب نهاية المرام.

ي- بسائط العناصر أربعةٌ: «الأرض» وهي في الوسط مركزها مركزُ العالم، ولها كيفيّتان: فعليةٌ هي البرودةُ وانفعاليَةٌ هي اليبوسة. ويحيط بها «الماء» إلّا ربعًا واحدًا معمورًا، انكشف عن الماء لحكمة نشو الحيوان. وله كيفيّتان: فعليّةٌ هي البرودة، وانفعاليّة هي الرّطوبةُ. و«الهواء» محيط بالماء، وله كيفيّتان: فعليّةٌ هي الحرارة وانفعاليّةٌ هي الرّطوبة بمعنى قبول الأشكال، لا البلّة. و«النّار» محيطةٌ بالهواء ولها كيفيّتان: فعليّةٌ هي الحرارة وانفعاليةٌ هي اليبوسة.

وهي قابلة للكون والفساد لصيرورةِ النّار هواء عند الإنطفاء وبالعكس عند التّفخ؛ والهواء عندَ تبرّده ماء، كما يجتمع قطرات الماء على طرف الإناء الحاوي للجمد وبالعكس عند الإسخان؛ والأرض ماء كما يفعله أصحاب الاكسير وبالعكس؛ فإنّ كثيرًا من مياه العيون ينعقد حجارة صلدة. ومن هذه العناصر تتركب المركّبات المعدنية والنباتية والحيوانية.

يا- العناصر إذا امتزجت انكسرت صرافة كل كيفيّة؛ فإنّ النّار لا تبقى على صرافة حرارتها ولا الماء على صرافة برودته ولا الهواء على صرافة لطافته ولا الأرض على صرافة يبسها، بل تحدث كيفيّةٌ متوسطةٌ بين هذه الكيفيات على النسبة وهي المزاج.

There is a problem here, for if that which destroys and that which is destroyed are joined in action, then the one conquered conquers in the state of being dominated, which is absurd. If the act of either one were prior, the conquered one would conquer after its destruction, which is absurd.

They answer by saying that what acts is the form and what is acted upon is the quality, but this can be set in doubt by saying that the form only acts by means of the quality. Moreover, it is conflicted by hot water that is mixed with cold.

Chapter 3: On the Characteristics of Separate Substances

There are ten investigations here.

(a) Most theologians deny them, for otherwise they would share in the essence of the Necessary Existent, high is He. This is an error, for since equality in positive attributes does not entail equality in essence, how could equality in negative ones do so? Then again, evidence for asserting them is weak.

When it comes to the soul, their evidence for asserting it is that there are indivisible known things here, like the Necessary Existent, unity, and the point, and knowledge of them is also indivisible. Were that not the case, its part would be knowledge of the whole of what is known, so that the part would be equal to the whole in reality, or knowledge of some of what is known, so that what is simple would be divided, or it would not be knowledge at all. In the last case, either nothing would be added in combining the whole, but then the knowledge would not be knowledge, or something would be added and it would be knowledge, but then the composition would concern the efficient or the receptive cause of knowledge, not knowledge itself, and the substrate of knowledge would be indivisible.[48] Were that not the case, then if a part of knowledge subsisted through each part of the substrate, knowledge would be divisible, although we supposed it to be indivisible, whereas if knowledge subsisted through some of the parts, we would transfer the discussion to them, and if it did not subsist through any of them, the substrate would not be a substrate. Since all bodies and all things corporeal are divisible, the substrate of knowledge, that is, the soul, is something separate.

48 One could argue that the receptive cause *is* the substrate. However, Ḥillī's point is, I believe, that insofar as only the resulting composite as a whole is a substrate for actual knowledge, it is indivisible. If it is divided, knowledge dissolves and there is no substrate for it either.

وفيه إشكالٌ، فإنّ الكاسر والمنكسر إن اقترن فعلاهما كان المغلوب حال كونه مقهورًا غالبًا، وهو محالٌ؛ فإن تقدّم فعل أحدهما كان المغلوبُ بعدَ انكساره غالبًا، وهو محالٌ.

أجابوا بأنّ الفاعل الصّورةُ والمنفعل الكيفيّةُ. ويشكلُ بأنّ الصّورة إنما تفعل بواسطة الكيفية وينتقَضُ أيضًا بالماء الحارّ الممتزج بالبارد.

الفصل الثالث: في أحكام الجواهر المجرّدة

وفيه [عشرة] مباحث

الف- نفاها أكثرُ المتكلّمين وإلّا لشاركت واجب الوجود تعالى في ذاته وهو غلطٌ؛ فإنّ المساواة في الصّفات الثبوتيّة لا تقتضي المساواة في الذات؛ فكيف السلبية؟

نعم، أدلّةُ ثبوتها ضعيفةٌ.

أمّا النفس فاستدلّوا على ثبوتها بأن هُنا معلوماتٍ غيرَ منقسمة، كواجب الوجود والوحدة والنّقطة؛ فالعلم بها غيرُ منقسم وإلّا فجزؤه إمّا أن يكونَ علمًا بكلّ المعلوم فيتساوى الجزء والكلّ في الحقيقة، أو ببعضه فينقسمُ البسيط؛ أو لا يكون علمًا، فعند الاجتماع إن لم يحصل زائدٌ فالعلم غيرُ علم؛ أو يحصل فيكون هو العلم فالتركيب في فاعله أو قابله لا فيه، فمحل العلم غيرُ منقسم؛ وإلّا فإن قام بكلّ جزء منه جزء من العلم انقسم وقد فرضناه غيرَ منقسم، وإن قام ببعض الأجزاء نقلنا الكلام فيه، وإن لم يقم بشيء منه لم يكن محلاً؛ فكلّ جسم وجسمانيّ منقسمٌ، فمحلّ العلم الّذي هو النفس شيءٌ مجرّدٌ.

This is weak, because equality in terms of what pertains to that which is known does not entail equality in terms of quiddity, for it is a relation that is extrinsic to the quiddity. Even if something additional came to be through a compound, this does not entail the exclusion of composition from the compound, for it recurs in the case of every composite thing. Nor does the division of that which inheres follow from the division of the substrate, as they maintain concerning unity, the point, and other things, for we preclude the infinite divisibility of the body.

When it comes to the intellect, their evidence for positing it is that He most high is simple, with no more than one emerging from Him. This cannot be a body due to its being composite, nor can it be matter, due to the impossibility of a recipient's being efficient,[49] nor can it be form, for otherwise it would be independent of matter in its efficiency, and so it would also be independent of it in its existence. It cannot be a soul either, for otherwise it would be independent of body.

This is weak due to the possibility that more than one emerges from what is simple, according to the foregoing. Besides, this concerns that which necessitates, but when it comes to one who chooses, it does not hold.[50] Furthermore, we deny the composition of body, and we have already refuted hyle. The recipient can be efficient, as shown in the foregoing, even if we did concede that this is precluded in the sense in which it is recipient, or in an absolute sense. By the same token, a form can be intermediate by its essence, and likewise the soul.

(b) Since we have refuted the evidence for the rational soul but no demonstration stands for its impossibility, it remains to say that it is possible. If we say this, then the responsible human being is the rational soul, for otherwise he would the principal parts in this body, which are not affected by change or annihilation and persist from the beginning of life to its end. Nourishment, growth, and coming apart would concern the remaining parts.

49 In the philosophers' theory, the first emanated thing must in turn be capable of further emanation – that is, of functioning as an efficient cause in turn. Since matter is incapable of this, emanation stops at it, and so it cannot be the first emanated thing.

50 These are two conceptions of God as creator. According to the philosophers, He creates necessitated by His own essence, and creation should be understood as the necessitation (*ījāb*) of the existence of the created things. The theologians, by contrast, maintain that creation is a voluntary choice (*ikhtiyār*) by God.

وهو ضعيفٌ، لأنّ التساوي في المتعلّق بالمعلوم لا يستلزمُ التساوي في الماهيّة، لأنّها نسبة خارجة عن الماهيّة؛ وإذا حصل زائدٌ عندَ الاجتماع لم يحصل انتفاء التركيب عنه لعوده في كلّ مركّب. ولا يلزم من انقسام المحلّ انقسامُ الحالّ، كما يذهبون إليه في الوحدة والنقطة وغيرهما؛ ونمنع انقسامَ الجسم إلى ما لا يتناهى.

وأمّا العقل فاستدلّوا عليه بأنّه تعالى بسيطٌ، لا يصدرُ عنه أكثرُ من واحد؛ ولا يجوز أن يكون جسمًا لتركّبه ولا مادّةً لامتناع كون القابل فاعلاً، ولا صورةً وإلّا كانت مستغنيةً في فاعليّتها عن المادّة فتكون مستغنيةً في وجودها عنها. ولا نفسًا وإلّا لاستغنت عن البدن.

وهو ضعيف لإمكان صدور أكثر من واحد عن البسيط، على ما تقدّم؛ ثمّ هذا في الموجَب، أمّا المختار فلا، ونمنع تركّب الجسم، وقد أبطلنا الهيولى؛ والقابل جاز أن يكونَ فاعلاً كما تقدّم. سلّمنا لكن بالاستقبال أو مطلقًا ممنوعٌ وكذا الصّورة جاز أن تكونَ متوسّطةً بذاتها وكذا النفسُ.

ب- لما أبطلنا دليل النفس الناطقة ولم يقم برهانٌ على استحالتها بقي القولُ بالجواز، فإن قلنا بها فالإنسان المكلّف هو هي، وإلّا فهو أجزاءٌ أصيلةٌ في هذا البدن، لا يتطرّق إليها التغيّر ولا الفناء، باقيةٌ من أوّل العمر إلى آخره. والتغذية والتنمية والتحلّل في الأجزاء الفاضلة.

(c) Those who posit the soul differ concerning whether it is one in species or not. Some of them opt for the first alternative, because souls coincide in definition, but this is weak, since defining goes back to conception.[51] Others opt for the second, because souls differ in terms of wit, mercy, and their opposites, but difference in terms of attributes does not entail difference in terms of quiddity.

(d) Speaking of the soul, we say that it comes to be. Most ancients opt for this, because bodies necessarily come to be, and if the soul had preceded them, it would have been either one or many, but both alternatives are false. As regards the first, this is because if the soul remained one after the connection, human individuals would be one individual, which is necessarily false, and if it became many, it would have been a body, because what is divisible is a body. As regards the second, this is because it cannot be multiplied through essential or concomitant properties, since they are united in the species, but not through accidents either, because the determination of some particulars of a species, to the exclusion of others, by accidents is only because of matter, and the matter of soul is the body, and so there is no matter before it.[52]

(e) Transmigration is false. According to us, this is evident due to the soul's coming to be, once we have established this. According to most of the ancients, this is because what comes to be ends at a general and eternal principle of emanation, and coming to be is only by means of preparedness in the recipient. The recipient of soul is the body, and the body's coming to be necessitates the emanation of a soul connected to it. Hence, if another soul were transferred to it, then two souls would be combined in one body, which is absurd.[53]

51 This is a radical conceptualist point: since all definitions concern merely our concepts, and not the real essences of things, no reliable inferences concerning things in themselves can be drawn from them.

52 Cf. Avicenna's argument for the soul's coming to be in time in *Shifāʾ: Nafs* V.3, 223-225.

53 This is Avicenna's argument against transmigration; cf. *Najāt* II.6, 227.

ج- اختلف مثبتو النفس في أنّها واحدة بالنوع أولا، فبعضهم على الأوّل لاتفاقها في حدّ؛ وهو ضعيفٌ إذ التحديد راجعٌ إلى التصوّر؛ وبعضهم على الثاني لاختلافها في الذّكاء والرحمة وضدهما، ولا يلزم من اختلافِ الصّفات اختلاف الماهيّة.

د- النفس إن قلنا بها فهي حادثةٌ. وعليه أكثر الأوائل، لأنّ الأبدان حادثةٌ بالضّرورة، فلو كانت سابقةً عليها لكانت إمّا واحدةً أو كثيرةً، والقسمان باطلان. أمّا الأوّلُ فلأنّها إن بقيت واحدة بعد التعلّق اتّحدت الأشخاص البشرية بالشّخص، وهو باطلٌ بالضّرورة؛ وإن تكثّرت كانت جسمًا إذ المنقسم هو الجسم. وأمّا الثّاني فلامتناع تكثّرها بالذاتيّات واللّوازم لاتّحادها في النّوع، وبالعوارض لأنّ اختصاصَ بعض جزئيّات النوع بعارضٍ دونَ غيره إنّما هو بسبب المادّة، ومادّةُ النّفس البدن، فقبله لا مادّة.

هـ- التناسخ باطلٌ. أمّا عندنا فظاهرٌ لحدوث النفس إن أثبتناها. وأمّا [عند] أكثر الأوائل فلأنّ الحادث ينتهي إلى مبدأ قديم عامّ الفيض، والحدوث إنّما هو بواسطة استعداد القابل، وقابل النفس البدن فحدوثه يوجبُ فيضانَ نفس متعلّقةٍ به؛ فلو انتقلت إليه نفسٌ أخرى اجتمع نفسان على بدن واحد، وهو محالٌ.

(f) According to the ancients, the soul is not annihilated with the annihilation of the body. Were that not the case, the possibility of non-existence would need a substrate, and that is not the soul, because nothing can be the substrate for the possibility of its own non-existence, for what receives and what is received must be combined. Hence, there would inevitably be something else, namely matter, and so the soul would be material and therefore a body. We deny that possibility needs a substrate, but even if we did concede that, receiving would be an attribute of the recipient and so it would not inhere in another, for otherwise it would follow that possibility is denied in an absolute sense. The soul's being material does not entail its being a body, especially since according to you, it would be classified under the genus of substance, and so it would have a differentia and be composite.

(g) The soul perceives universals by itself, but when it comes to particulars, the ancients have precluded that, except by means of corporeal faculties. If we imagine a square with two squares as its wings, then inevitably something has made them distinct. This is not through essential or concomitant properties, because they are equal in terms of species, nor is it through accidents, and the distinguishing factor is not external, since the squares were supposed to be mental. Hence, the difference of the two substrates must be mental, and so we reject the restriction.[54]

(h) The ancients have asserted internal sensitive faculties, which are five.[55]

There is the common sense, which is a faculty appointed in the front of the first ventricle of the brain. All senses convey what they have perceived to it, in order for it to judge that what has this colour is what has this flavour. Were it not for the unity of the faculty, this judgment would not be possible. Yet this is false, because the judgment belongs to the soul with respect to the senses, and it tackles the particular by means of a judgment concerning the universal.

There is the imagery, which is a storehouse of the common sense. It retains but does not perceive, due to a difference between what retains and what receives, like water for instance.[56] But this is not universally necessary. Besides, retention inevitably involves reception, and so one faculty will be attributed with both.

54 That is, the restriction of the soul to perceiving only universals. The argument is derived from Avicenna, *Shifāʾ: Nafs* IV.3, 188-189. However, Avicenna uses it to argue for the *corporeality* of the faculty of imagination that enables us to conceive of the two squares on the sides of the central one as distinct.

55 The following classification is, again, derived from Avicenna; cf. *Shifāʾ: Nafs* I.5, 43-45.

56 Being fluid, water is highly receptive to new spatial forms, but for the same reason, it cannot retain them. In this regard, it is contrary to earth.

و - عند الأوائل النّفس لا تفنى بفناء البدن، وإلّا لكان إمكانُ العدم مفتقرًا إلى المحلّ، وليس هو النّفس لامتناع كون الشّيء محلاًّ لإمكان عدمه لوجوب اجتماع القابل والمقبول؛ فلا بدّ من شيء آخر هو المادّة، فتكونُ ماديَّة فتكون جسمًا. ونمنع افتقار الإمكان إلى محلّ؛ سلّمنا، لكنّ القبول صفة القابل فلا يحلّ في غيره وإلّا لزم نفي الإمكان مطلقًا، ولا يلزمُ من كونها ماديّة كونها جسمًا خصوصًا وعندكم أنّها مندرجةٌ تحتَ جنس الجوهر فتكون لها فصلٌ، فتكون مركّبةً.

ز - النفس تدرك الكلّيّاتِ بذاتها، أمّا الجزئيّات فمنع الأوائل منه إلّا بواسطة القوى الجسمانيّة، فإنّا إذا تخيّلنا مُربّعًا مُجنّحًا بمربّعين فلا بدّ من مايزٍ بينهما، وليس بالذّاتيّات واللّوازم لتساويهما نوعًا، ولا بالعوارض، وليس في الخارج لفرضهما ذهنيّتين، فليس إلّا مغايرة المحلّين ذهنًا، ونمنعُ الحصر.

ح - أثبت الأوائل قوى حسّاسة باطنة، وهي خمس:

الحسّ المشترك وهي قوّةٌ مرتبةٌ في مقدّم البطن الأوّل من الدّماغ يؤدّي إليها جميعُ الحواسّ ما أدركته للحكم بأن صاحبَ هذا اللّون هو صاحبُ هذا الطعّم، فلولا واحدة القوّة لما أمكن هذا الحكمُ. ويبطلُ بأنّ الحكمَ للنّفس باعتبار الحواسّ وينتقض بالحكم بالكلي على الجزئيّ.

والخيال وهو خزانة الحسّ المشترك وهو حافظ لا مُدرك للمغايرة بين الحافظ والقابل كالماء ولا يوجب الكليّة. ثمّ الحفظ لا بدّ فيه من القبول فيتصف بهما القوّة الواحدة.

There is the imaginative faculty, which is called thinking, although these are in two respects, and its characteristic is to combine and take apart. That does not belong to the perceiving faculties, because one cannot be the cause of two things. This is false, because operation requires knowledge.[57]

There is the estimative faculty, which perceives particular meanings, like particular amicability and hostility. Most human acts are based on it. It is distinct both from the faculties that do not perceive meanings and from the soul that does not perceive particulars by itself. It is refuted by the fact that the hostility connected to this individual is only intelligible as connected to it, and so the perceiver of both is one.[58]

There is the retentive faculty, which is the storehouse of estimation. It is called recollective, because of its power to bring back after an absence. The discussion concerning it is like that concerning the imagery.

(i) The ancients have posited three faculties for the vegetative soul.

There is the faculty of nourishment. It is a faculty inhering in that which is nourished, and it dissolves food into what resembles that which is nourished in order to substitute what has come apart by way of replacement.

There is the faculty of growth, and it is that which adds to the parts of the body in a natural relation suitable to the completion of the development.

There is the reproductive faculty, and it is that which separates a part from the excess in the final stage of digestion of that which is nourished, making that part into a power in its germ.

The faculty of nourishment is served by four faculties: that which attracts food, that which keeps it until digestion, that which digests, and that which ejects. The act of the faculty of nourishment is completed by three things: the coming to be of a mixture that potentially resembles that which is nourished, its becoming part of an organ, and its becoming like the organ in constitution and colour. When innate moistness is lacking after the age at which growth has ceased, it becomes slack, the innate heat is extinguished, and its activity is annihilated.

57 That is, the imagination's acts of analysis and synthesis require some kind of knowledge of the objects with which it operates.

58 Ḥillī argues that the hostility, which he takes to be intelligible, and the individual object, to which it is related, must be part of one cognitive act. One cognitive act, in turn, entails one subject of cognition, and this rules out the kind of co-operation proposed here between the soul and the estimation. Such a counterargument is a rather uncharitable reconstruction of Avicenna, who insists on the unity of cognition despite the distinctions between faculties (see *Shifāʾ: Nafs* V.7, 252-257).

والمتخيّلة وتسمّى المفكّرة لكن باعتبارين، وشأنها التركيب والتحليل. وليس ذلك للقوى المدركة لأنّ الواحدَ لا يكون علّةً لأمرين. ويبطل بأنّ التصرف يستدعي العلم.

والوهميّة وهي مدركةُ المعاني الجزئيّة كالصّداقة والعداوة الجزئيّتين.

وأكثرُ الأفعال البشريّة مستندةٌ إليها، وهي مغايرةٌ للقوى الّتي لا يدرك المعاني، وللنّفس الّتي لا تدرك الجزئيّات بذاتها. ويبطلُ بأنّ العداوة المتعلّقة بهذا الشخص لا تعقل إلّا متعلّقة به، فالمدرك لهما واحدٌ.

والحافظةُ وهي خزانةُ الوهم ويسمّى متذكرة، لقوّتها على الاسترجاع بعدَ الغيبوبة، والكلام فيه كالخيال.

ط- أثبت الأوائل للنّفس النّباتيّة ثلاث قوى:

الغاذية وهي قوةٌ حالّة في المغتذي، تحيلُ الغذاء إلى مشابهه ليخلف بدل ما يتحلّل.

والنّامية وهي الّتي تزيدُ في أقطار الجسم على تناسب طبيعي ليبلغ إلى تمام النشو.

والمولّدة وهي الّتي تفصل جزءًا من فضل الهضم الأخير للمغتذي وتودعه قوة من مشيجه.

فالغاذية تخدمها أربعُ قوى: الجاذبة للغذاء، والماسكة له حتى تهضمه، الهاضمة، والدّافعة. وفعل الغاذية يتمّ بأمور ثلاثة: تحصيل الخلط المشابه للمغتذي بالقوة وتصييره جزءًا للعضو، وتشبيه به في قوامه ولونه، فإذا انتقصت الرطوبة الغريزيّة بعد سنّ الوقوف الحلت، فانطفت الحرارة الغريزيّة وبطل عملها.

There is a problem, namely that what needs the replacement is not the compound of what ceases and what persists, because it does not exist after that which ceases has ceased, nor is it that which ceases alone, the compound of what persists and what follows, or just that which follows. If it were any of these, then it would be that which persists, but it is equal to that which follows and it cannot be in need of that. Besides, the income of food necessitates rupture, which necessitates pain. When it comes to that which persists, it is inevitable that something persists in it, but it is neither form nor matter, because the body is constantly coming apart and it is not the case that some of it especially deserves to persist. Hence, growth is being brought to be anew.

When it comes to the formative faculty, it is necessary to judge that the different formations and the extraordinary organs are traced back to a voluntary agent, not to a potency that has no sensation or perception.

(j) Angels, jinn, and devils are subtle bodies that are capable of different formations. The ancients asserted as angels the celestial souls that are separate. The earliest Muʿtazilites denied the jinn, because if they were subtle, they could not dominate over any acts, whereas if they were coarse, we would have to observe them. It is feasible that they are subtle in the sense of transparency.

Chapter 4: On the Characteristics of Accidents

There are four investigations here.

(a) Accidents cannot be transferred, according to both the ancients and the theologians, because the cause of their individuation is the substrate. Were that not the case, they would be independent of the substrate by virtue of that which brings them to existence and individuates them, and so they would not inhere in it, but the implication is precluded.

(b) An accident cannot subsist through its like according to the theologians, *pace* the ancients and Muʿammar,[59] because they inevitably end at a substance, which is their substrate. This is precluded, because it is possible to set an intermediate as a condition, like motion and speed, for instance. What is meant by subsistence here is qualified specification.[60]

59 Muʿammar ibn ʿAbbād al-Sulamī (d. 215/830) was a leading representative of early Baṣrian Muʿtazilism.

60 Qualified specification (*al-ikhtiṣāṣ al-nāʿit*) refers to the connection holding between an attribute and its subject.

ويشكل بأنّ المحتاج إلى البدل ليس مجموعَ الزّائل والباقي، لأنّه غيرُ موجود بعد زوال الزّائل، ولا الزّائل وحده، ولا مجموع الباقي والآتي، ولا الآتي؛ بل إن كان فالباقي، وهو مساوٍ للآتي، فلا يصحّ احتياجه إليه، ولأن مداخلة الغذاء، توجب التّفريق الموجب للألم. وأمّا الباقي فلا بُدّ من بقاء شيء فيه وليس الصورة ولا المادّة؛ لأن البدن دائمًا في التحلّل، وليس البعض أولى من الباقي، فيكون النمو إحداثًا.

وأمّا المصوّرة فالضّرورة حاكمة باستناد التشكّلات مختلفة والأعضاء الغريبة إلى فاعل مختار، لا إلى قوة لاحٍ لها ولا إدراكَ.

ي- الملائكة والجنّ والشياطين أجسامٌ لطيفةٌ قادرةٌ على التشكّلات المختلفة. وأثبت الأوائل النفوس الفلكيّة مجرّداتٍ هي الملائكة. وأنكر أوائل المعتزلة الجنّ، لأنّها إن كانت لطيفةً لم تكن قادرةً على شيء من الأفعال، وإن كانت كثيفةً وجب أن نشاهدها. ويُحتمل أن تكونَ لطيفةً بمعنى الشفافيّة.

الفصل الرابع: في أحكام الأعراض

وهي أربعةُ مباحثٍ:

الف- الأعراض لا يصحّ عليها الانتقال عند الأوائل والمتكلّمين؛ لأنّ علّة تشخّصه المحلّ، وإلّا لكان مستغنيًا بموجوده ومشخصّه عن المحلّ فلا يحلّ فيه؛ والملازمة ممنوعةٌ.

ب- لا يمكن قيامُ العرض بمثله عند المتكلّمين خلافًا للأوائل ومعمّر، إذ لا بدّ من الانتهاء إلى الجوهر فهو المحلّ. وهو ممنوعٌ لجواز اشتراط المتوسّط كالحركة والسّرعة. والمراد من القيام هنا الاختصاص النّاعت.

(c) Some accidents can persist, *pace* the Ashʿarites. Abū al-Ḥusayn insists that that is necessary, for we know necessarily that black persists in tar and white in cotton, just as we know that the body observed at two moments persists, and since they were possible in the first moment, for otherwise they would not have existed, they are such in the second as well, for otherwise it would follow that something is transferred from essential possibility to essential impossibility.

We have objected to this in the *Nihāya* by saying that the possibility of persisting is different from the possibility of existence in an absolute sense.[61] The second can be established without the first, and it does not follow that what is possible becomes impossible.

They argue by saying that persistence is an accident and therefore does not subsist through an accident, as well as by saying that the subsistence of an accident would entail the impossibility of its non-existence, because it would not cease to exist by virtue of its essence, otherwise it would have become impossible, nor would it cease due to the emergence of an opposite, for the non-existence of the first is a condition for the emergence of the opposite, and if it were caused by that, there would be a circle. The persistence would not cease to exist by virtue of a voluntary agent either, because to make something not exist is to deny an effect, not to bring anything to existence, and if at that denial nothing comes to be, there is no effect whatsoever for the agent, whereas if something does come to be, it will be something positively existing, and this is to bring into existence, not to make something not exist. Nor would the persistence cease due to the annihilation of a condition, because the condition for the persistence of an accident is the substance, and it does persist. The discussion concerning its non-existence is like the discussion concerning the non-existence of the accident.

We deny that persistence is an accident, but an accident can subsist through its like, and its non-existence can be traced back to its essence in a third moment, just as they have granted about the second moment. We deny that the annihilation of what precedes is a condition for emergence, but making something not exist can be traced back to an agent, and that which is brought forth does not have to anything positively existing. The denial of existence is an effect, just as bringing to be is an effect. We deny that the condition is restricted to the substance. Instead, what persists can be conditioned by accidents that do not persist. When they are no longer brought into existence, what persisted ceases to exist.

61 *Nihāyat al-marām* II.2.2.6, I.300-301.

ج- الأعراض منها ما يصحّ عليه البقاء خلافًا للأشاعرة، وادّعى أبو الحسين الضّرورة في ذلك فإنّا نعلمُ بالضّرورة بقاء السّواد في القار والبياض في القطن كما نعلم بقاء الجسم المشاهد زمانين، ولأنّها ممكنةٌ في الزمان الأوّل وإلّا لما وجدت فكذا في الثّاني؛ وإلّا لزم انتقال الشّيء من الإمكان الذّاتي إلى الامتناع الذّاتي.

واعترضناه في النهاية بأنّ إمكان البقاء مغايرٌ لإمكان الوجود المطلق. والثّاني ثابتٌ دون الأوّل، ولا يلزم استحالة الممكن.

احتجّوا بأنّ البقاء عرض فلا يقوم بالعرض، وبأنّ بقاءه يستلزم امتناع عدمه؛ إذ لا يعدم لذاته وإلّا لصار ممتنعًا؛ ولا لطريان ضدّ لأنّ شرط طريانه عدمُ الأوّل، فلو عُلّل به دار. ولا للفاعل المختار؛ لأنّ الإعدام نفيُ أثرٍ لا إيجادٌ، فعندَ ذلك النفي إن لم يتجدد شيء لم يكن للفاعل أثرٌ البتة، وإن تجدّد فهو وجودي فيكون إيجادًا لا إعدامًا. ولا لانتفاء الشّرط لأنّ شرطه الجوهر وهو باقٍ. والكلام في عدمه كالكلام في عدم العرض.

ونمنع كون البقاء عرضًا، ويجوز قيام العرض بمثله، وجاز استناد عدمه إلى ذاته في الزمن الثالث كما تجوّزونه في الثاني. ونمنع اشتراط الطريان بانتفاء السابق، ويجوز استناد الإعدام إلى الفاعل، والصادر لا يجب أن يكون وجوديًّا، ونفيُ الوجود أثرٌ كما أنّ تحصيله أثرٌ، ونمنع انحصار الشّرط في الجوهر، بل جاز اشتراط الباقية بأعراض لا تبقى، فإذا انقطع إيجادها عدمت.

(d) An accident cannot inhere in two substrates, *pace* Abū Hāshim concerning composition, and some of the ancients concerning coincidental relations, for otherwise a body could inhere in two places. The refutation by means of the impossibility of two bodies, unlike two accidents, inhering in one place is false, because the impossibility here is due to having volume, which is denied of the accident.

It is said that the inherence of an accident in two places – in the sense that what inheres in a substrate is identical to what inheres in another – is false, for otherwise the accident would be independent of each substrate by virtue of the other one, and so what inheres independently of each one would be in need of both. However, in the sense that it inheres in a compound of two things, which by being combined become one substrate for it, this is possible, like in the case of the tenness that subsists through the units when they are brought together, subsisting through them as one. The discussion concerning unity is like the discussion concerning the tenness.

د- لا يمكن حلول عرض واحد في محلّين خلافًا لأبي هاشم في التأليف ولبعض الأوائل في الإضافات المتّفقة، وإلّا لجاز حلول الجسم في مكانين. والنقض بامتناع حلول الجسمين في مكان واحد بخلاف العرضين باطلٌ، لأنّ الامتناع هناك للحجميّة المنفيّة عن العرض.

قيل حلولُ عرض في محلّين - بمعنى أنّ الحالّ في محلّ هو بعينه حالّ في آخر - باطلٌ، وإلّا لاستغنى بكل منهما عن الآخر فيكون محتاجًا إلى كل واحد منهما حال غناه عنه؛ وبمعنى حلوله في مجموع شيئين صار اباجتماعهما محلاً واحدًا له ممكنٌ كالعشريّة القائمة بالآحاد لما انضمّت وقامت بها وحده. والكلام في الوحدة كالكلام في العشريّة.

Observation V: On Establishing the Most High Necessary Existent and His Attributes

المرصد الخامس في
إثبات واجب الوجود تعالى وصفاته وفي مقاصد

Aim 1: On Establishing the Most High Necessary Existent

He is proven by means of either contingency or coming to be, and with regard to either the essence or the attributes, and so there are four divisions.

(a) The world is contingent by virtue of its change and multiplicity, and it will be concluded that what is necessary is one and persisting. Every contingent thing inevitably has a producer, and if that ends at what is necessary, then it is what was sought for, but if not, then there is a regress or a circle, and both are false due to the foregoing.[1]

(b) Bodies are equal in terms of corporeality, as has been mentioned, and so the specification of each of them by its accident, which subsists through it, is something contingent, and it no doubt has a producer.[2]

(c) Bodies have come to be, according to the foregoing, and so it is inevitable that they necessarily have something that has brought them to be. This is the method of the Friend, peace be upon him.[3] If that which brings into being is eternal and necessary, then it is what was sought for, but if not, there is regress.[4]

(d) Semen is transformed into a blood clot and then an embryo, then into flesh, bone, and blood, and it is inevitable that it has a producer. This is not the man himself, nor can it possibly be his parents, and so there is inevitably a wise producer. It is impossible to trace these extraordinary effects to the procreative faculty, for it has neither awareness nor choice, so that only one thing emerges from it, and its figure is spherical.

The first method is the most powerful of them, and just as it provides evidence for asserting the Maker, it proves His necessity, unlike the other methods, for they need the first for proving necessity.

1 This is a very concise account of Avicenna proof for God's existence; see, for instance, *Ishārāt*, namaṭ 4, 141-142.

2 This is the classical *kalām* proof for God's existence, reportedly introduced by Abū al-Hudhayl. For a concise historical account, see Davidson 1987, 134-143.

3 In Q 74:82, Abraham rejects a star, the Sun, and the Moon as worthy objects of worship on the grounds that they rise and set, which entails temporal finitude.

4 This comes close to the *kalām* cosmological argument popularised by Craig 1979.

[المقصد] الأوّل: في إثبات واجب الوجود تعالى

ويستدل عليه إمّا بالإمكان أو الحدوث، إمّا في الذّات أو الصّفات، فللأقسام أربعة:

الف- العالَم ممكنٌ لتغيّره وكثرته، وسيأتي أنّ الواجب واحدٌ باقٍ وكلّ ممكن فلا بدّ من مؤثِّر، فإن انتهى إلى الواجب فالمطلوب، وإلّا تسلسل أو دار؛ وهما باطلان بما تقدّم.

ب- الأجسام متساوية في الجسميّة على ما مرّ، فاختصاصُ كلّ واحدٍ منها بعرضه القائم به أمرٌ ممكنٌ فلا بدّ له من مؤثّر.

ج- الأجسام حادثة على ما تقدّم، فلا بدّ لها من مُحدِث بالضّرورة، وهي طريقة الخليل عليه السلام. فالمحدث إن كان قديمًا واجبًا فالمطلوب، وإلّا تسلسل.

د- النّطفة تنقلب علقةً ثمّ مضغةً ثمّ لحمًا وعظمًا ودمًا؛ فلا بدّ له من مؤثِّر، وليس هو الإنسان ولا أبواه بالضّرورة، فلا بدّ من مؤثِّر حكيم. ويمتنعُ استناد هذه الآثار الغريبة إلى القوّة المولدة، فإنّه لا شعورَ لها ولا اختيارَ، فكان يصدر عنها شيءٌ واحدٌ ويكونُ شكله الكرة.

والطريق الأوّل أقواها، فإنّه كما يدلُّ على إثبات الصانع يدلّ على وجوبه، بخلاف باقي الطرق لافتقارها في الدلالة على الوجوب إلى الأوّل.

Know that asserting the Necessary is almost self-evident, because here there is inevitably something that exists, and if this is necessary, then it is what was sought for, and if not, it is contingent. This regresses, and the whole of contingent things is contingent and inevitably has a cause. A cause in an absolute sense is not sufficient for the existence of what is contingent. Instead, there is inevitably a complete cause, with which it becomes necessary and without which it is impossible. The complete cause of all contingent things must be necessary, for if it were contingent, and if it were the complete cause of every contingent thing, it would be the cause of itself, because it belongs to the whole of contingent things, whereas if it were the complete cause of some contingent things but not others, then it would be both a part of the complete cause of all contingent things and identical to the cause of all contingent things. Hence, it would follow that something is a part of itself. The regress and the circle have already been falsified in the foregoing.

واعلم أنّ ثبوت الواجب قريبٌ من البديهة، لأنّ هنا موجودًا بالضّرورة، فإن كان واجبًا فالمطلوب، وإلّا كان ممكنًا. فإن تسلسل فمجموعُ الأمور الممكنة ممكنٌ لا بدّ له من علّة. ولا يكفي في وجود الممكن مطلق العلّة، بل لا بدّ من علّة تامّة يصير معها واجبًا، وبدونها ممتنعًا. فالعلّة التامّة لمجموع الممكنات يجبُ أن تكون واجبةً، لأنّها لو كانت ممكنةً فإن كانت علّةً تامّةً لكلّ واحد من الممكنات كانت علّةً لأنّها لو كانت ممكنةً. فإن كانت علّةً تامةً لكلّ واحد من الممكنات كانت علّةً لنفسها لأنّها من جملة الممكنات، وإن كانت علّةً تامّةً لبعض الممكنات دون بعض كانت جزءًا من العلّة التامّة لمجموع الممكنات، وهي بعينها علّةٌ لمجموع الممكنات، فيلزم كونُ الشّيء جزءًا من نفسه، ولما تقدّم من إبطال التسلسل والدور.

Aim 2: On His Attributes, High Is He

It includes two chapters.

Chapter 1: On the Positive Attributes

It includes several investigations.

Investigation 1: That He Most High Exists

The Necessary Existent, high is He, has already been established. Being established is necessarily existence because if He did not exist, He would be non-existent, for there is no middle between them, and non-existence is not valid for being an origin.

The heretics say that He most high is an origin of contraries, such as existence and non-existence, necessity and its two counterparts, and unity and multiplicity. An origin of contraries is not attributed with any of them, and so He is not an existent in the sense that is the counterpart of non-existence, nor is He one in the sense that is the counterpart of multiplicity, nor is He necessary in the sense that is the counterpart of contingency, nor is He indeed an origin in the sense that is the counterpart of not being an origin, nor is He an initiator in the sense that is the counterpart of its antithesis. He exists, is one, and initiates insofar as He is an origin for both unity and multiplicity, and initiates both existence and the non-existence that is conceived to be opposite to existence. This discussion yields no useful results.

Investigation 2: That He Most High Is Powerful

This means that He most high acts with the possibility of not acting. Indeed, when He has wanted to act, He has acted, and when He has wanted to refrain, He has refrained, because were that not the case, He would be one who necessitates. The consequent is false, for otherwise it would follow either that the world is eternal or that He most high has come to be, and both are false.[5]

5 If God were one who necessitates, that is, if creation were necessitated by God's essence (see p. 192, n. 50 above), and if He is eternal, then since He alone is the complete cause of the world, the world would always have emerged from Him. The world could have come to be from nothing only if God, as its complete cause, had come to be in time, but this is nothing short of outright blasphemy.

المقصد الثاني: في صفاته تعالى

وفيه فصلان

[الفصل] الأوّل: في الصّفات الثّبوتيّة

وفيه مطالب

[المطلب] الأوّل: في أنّه تعالى موجود

قد تقدّم إثبات واجب الوجود تعالى. والثبوت الوجود بالضّرورة، ولأنّه لولم يكن موجودًا لكان معدومًا إذ لا واسطة بينهما، والعدم لا يصلح للمبدائيّة.

والملاحدة قالوا إنّه تعالى مبدأ للمتقابلات كالوجود والعدم، والوجوب وقسيميه، والوحدة والكثرة؛ ومبدأ المتقابلات لا يتّصفُ بأحدها، فهو ليس بموجودٍ بالمعنى المقابل للعدم، ولا بواحدٍ بالمعنى المقابل للكثرة، ولا واجب بالمعنى المقابل للإمكان، بل ولا مبدأ بالمعنى المقابل لعدم المبدئيّة، ولا مبدع بالمعنى المقابل لنقيضه، وهوموجود وواحد ومُبدع من حيث كونه مبدأً للوحدة والكثرة، ومبدع للوجود والعدم المتصوّر بإزاء الوجود. وهذا الكلام لا فائدة فيه محصّلة.

المطلب الثاني: في أنّه تعالى قادرٌ

والمراد منه هوأنّه تعالى يفعل مع جواز أن لا يفعل، بل إذا شاء أن يفعل فعل وإذا شاء أن يترك ترك، لأنّه لولم يكن كذلك لكان موجبًا. والتّالي باطلٌ وإلّا لزم قِدَمُ العالم أوحدوثُه تعالى وهما باطلان.

Let it not be said: If the world can exist in eternity, we conclude to pre-eternity, but if not, then power will not be necessary, because the effect depends on the recipient just as much as on the agent and because an intermediate is possible.[6] Moreover, if the agent has brought together all aspects of bringing something into effect, then refraining is impossible, otherwise acting is impossible, and so there is no power. Finally, there is no power over refraining, for it is non-existence, and by the same token, there is no power over acting either.

For we say: The world could exist in eternity, if it were traced back to one who necessitates, but it cannot if it is traced back to one who has power. We concede its impossibility in an absolute sense, but not even its existence before it exists would cancel its having come to be, for it would have to have existed before its existence, because the complete cause existed and whatever obstacle had been annihilated. The intermediate is false according to consensus, for it would be contingent and so it would belong to the world. Hence, an intermediate between the Necessary and the world is unintelligible. The impossibility to refrain, considering that the conditions have been brought together, does not cancel the agent's power, for when one endowed with choice is taken together with his power, the two alternatives are equal with respect to him, but if a motive is appended to him, he is necessitated. Choice means that the two alternatives are equal in relation to power on its own. The one who has power is one who can both act and not act, not that he performs an act of refraining.

Investigation 3: That He Most High Is Knowing

The scholars concur on it, apart from the ancient philosophers, because He performs wise and masterful acts, and whoever is like that is knowing. Both premises are necessary. Moreover, He most high is endowed with choice and therefore knowing, for one endowed with choice is one who acts by means of an intention.

6 As becomes clear from Ḥillī's discussion in the next paragraph, 'intermediate' here refers to intermediary causes between God and each contingent thing. The idea is that since circumstantial conditions must be fulfilled for the creation of a contingent thing, genuine contingency of the world is compatible with the view that creation is necessitation.

لا يقال العالم إن كان صحيح الوجود في الأزل التزمنا القدم، وإلّا لم يجب القدرة لتوقُف الأثر على القابل كالفاعل، ولإمكان الواسطة؛ ولأنّ الفاعل أن استجمع جميعَ جهات المؤثريّة امتنع الترك وإلّا امتنع الفعل، فلا قدرةّ؛ ولأنّ الترك غير مقدور لأنه عدٌم فكذا الفعل.

لأنّا نقول العالم صحيح الوجود في الأزل إن استند إلى الموجب، مستحيلٌ إن استند إلى القادر. سلّمنا استحالته مطلقًا لكن وجوده قبل أن وجد لا يُخرجُه عن الحدوث فكان يجب أن يوجد قبل وجوده لوجود العلّة التامّة وانتفاء المانع، والواسطة باطلة بالإجماع. ولأنّها ممكنةٌ فتكون من العالم، فلا تعقل واسطة بينَ الواجب والعالم. وامتناع الترك باعتبار استجماع الشّرائط لا تُخرجُ الفاعلَ عن القدرة لأنّ المختار إذا أخذ مع قدرته تساوى الطرفان بالنّسبة إليه، وإن ضمّ إليه الدّاعي، وجب. ومعنى الاختيار استواء الطرفين بالنسبة إلى القدرة وحدها. والقادر هو الّذي يصحّ أن يفعل وأن لا يفعل، لا أن يفعل الترك.

المطلب الثالث: في أنّه تعالى عالمٌ

اتّفق العقلاء إلّا قدماء الفلاسفة عليه؛ لأنّه تعالى فعل الأفعال المحكمة المتقنة، وكلّ من كان كذلك فهو عالمٌ. والمقدمتان ضروريّتان. ولأنّه تعالى مختارٌ فيكون عالمًا؛ لأنّ المختار هو الّذي يفعل بواسطة القصد.

Let it not be said: What is wise may sometimes emerge coincidentally from one who is ignorant so that diversity is possible, for many animals perform wise acts without knowing, like the hornet. What is wise may also emerge from one who imitates. Moreover, knowledge is a relation and therefore changing by essence, and so God most high would be a substrate for many things.

For we say: Inevitability is the judge of the difference between something wise taking place rarely and constantly. Animals do know the wise things that they perform, and likewise the imitator, whereas relations do not exist and inherence is a mere consideration.

Investigation 4: That He Most High Is Alive

The scholars agree about it, but they differ concerning its meaning. According to Abū al-Ḥusayn and the earlier ones, it means that since it is not impossible for Him to be powerful and to know, and since He most high has been established to be powerful and knowing, He is necessarily alive.

According to the Ashʿarites and a group of Muʿtazilites, one who is alive is one who is endowed with an attribute due to which he can know and be powerful, because were it not for that, it would not be more appropriate for this attribute to occur rather than not occur. This is false, because what entails the possibility is His essence that is different in its reality from other essences.

Investigation 5: That He Most High Wills

The scholars agree about it, but they differ concerning its meaning, for according to Abū al-Ḥusayn, it means that He is Himself the motive, that is, His knowledge – high is He – of what common good there is in acting is a motive for bringing into existence and His knowledge of badness is a motive for refraining. According to al-Najjār,[7] it amounts to His being neither subdued nor compelled. According to al-Kaʿbī, it means that in His own acts, He knows them and in the acts of others, He orders them. According to the Ashʿarites and Abū Hāshim, it [means] that He has an attribute due to which He can determine an act to be brought into existence at one time rather than another, or to take place in one respect rather than another.

7 Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Najjār (d. 220/835) was an early theologian, many of whose beliefs were at odds with the Muʿtazilite views of his time.

لا يقالُ المحكم قد يصدر مرّةً اتفاقًا عن الجاهل بجواز التعدد، ولأنّ كثيرًا من الحيوانات تفعل أفعالاً مُحكمةً وليست عالمةً، كالزّنبور والمحتذى؛ ولأنّ العلم نسبة فتغاير الذات، فيكون الله تعالى محلاً للأمور الكثيرة.

لأنّا نقول الضّرورة قاضيةٌ بالفرق بين وقوع المحكم نادرًا ودائمًا. والحيوانات عالمةٌ بما يفعله من الأمور المحكمة وكذا المحتذى؛ والنّسب عدميّةٌ والحلول اعتباريٌّ.

المطلب الرابع: في أنّه تعالى حيٌّ

اتّفق العقلاء عليه واختلفوا في معناه. فعند أبي الحسين والأوائل أنّ معناه أنّه لا يستحيل أن يقدر ويعلم، وقد ثبت أنّه تعالى قادرٌ عالمٌ فيكون حيًّا بالضّرورة.

وعند الأشاعرة وجماعة من المعتزلة أنّه من كان على صفةٍ لأجلها يصحّ أن يعلم ويقدر، لأنه لولا ذلك لم يكن حصول هذه الصّحة أولى من عدم حصولها، وهو باطلٌ لأنّ المقتضي للصحّة ذاته المخالفة لغيرها من الذّوات بحقيقتها.

المطلب الخامس: في أنّه تعالى مريدٌ

اتّفق العلماء عليه واختلفوا في معناه، فعند أبي الحسين أنّه نفس الدّاعي، وهو علمُه تعالى بما في الفعل من المصلحة الدّاعية إلى الايجاد أو المفسدة الدّاعية إلى الترك. وعند النّجار أنّه عبارةٌ عن كونه غيرَ مغلوب ولا مستكره. وعند الكعبيّ أنّ معناه في أفعال نفسه كونه عالمًا بها، وفي أفعال غيره كونه آمِرًا بها. وعند الأشاعرة وأبي هاشم أنّه من كان على صفة لأجلها يصحّ منه تخصيص الفعل بالإيجاد في وقت دون آخر أو بإيقاعه على وجه دون وجه.

Further evidence for asserting will in an absolute sense of Him most high is that the world has come to be, and its being specified to come into existence at one time instead of before or after it, although both are possible, needs a specifying factor, which is not power, because it is equal in relation to them, nor is it knowledge, because it is subsequent. Hence, it is the will, because specifying that which exists to be brought into existence, instead of other things that are within the power, entails a specifying factor, which is the will.

Evidence for asserting a will to act in us is His order to obey and His prohibition from disobeying, for they entail will and aversion, *pace* the Ashʿarites, who assert an objective that is different from will due to a lack of understanding. They infer this from the introduction of an excuse to a master who is about to beat his servant for an infraction, since his order is ambiguous.[8]

Investigation 6: That He Most High Perceives

Muslims agree that He most high is hearing and seeing, but they also differ, with Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Kaʿbī, and the ancients saying that it means His knowledge of what is heard and what is seen, for it cannot be sensation through the senses or anything but knowledge, because that is not intelligible. It will be concluded that He most high knows all there is to know, also because of what is heard from reports.

The two Jubbāʾīs, al-Ashʿarī, al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā and al-Khwārizmī[9] have asserted something additional to knowledge, because our perception is additional to our knowledge, due to the difference between knowledge at observation and when observation is lacking. That entails that the perceiver is alive, and God most high is alive, and so His perception is additional. However, the premises are weak. Then they infer the assertion of perception on the evidence that He most high is alive, and so it is possible to attribute Him with hearing and seeing. Now, all that can be attributed with an attribute must be attributed with either it or its opposite, and the opposite of perception is a deficiency, which is impossible for God most high.

8 The point is that the master's order can be interpreted as either stating an objective or as expressing the master's will. See V.2.1.7, p. 222 below.

9 This is probably Rukn al-Dīn ibn al-Malāḥimī al-Khwārizmī (d. 536/1141), an important follower of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's Muʿtazilism.

ويدلّ على ثبوت الإرادة تعالى بالمعنى المطلق أنّ العالم حادث، فتخصيصه إيجاده بوقتٍ دون ما قبله وما بعده مع جوازهما يفتقر إلى المخصّص، وليس القدرة لتساوي نسبتها، ولا العلم لتبعيته، فهو الإرادة. ولإنّ تخصيص ما وجد بالإيجاد دون غيره من المقدورات يستدعي مخصّصًا هو الإرادة.

ويدلّ على إثبات إرادة الفعل منّا أمرُه بالطّاعة ونهيه عن المعصية، وهما يستلزمان الإرادة والكراهة خلافًا للأشعريّة الّذين أثبتوا الطلبَ مغايرًا للإدارة لعدم تعقّله والزامهم بتمهيد عذر السيّد الضّارب عبده للمخالفة إذا أمره مشتركٌ.

المطلب السّادس: في أنّه تعالى مُدرِكٌ

اتّفق المسلمون على أنّه تعالى سميعٌ بصيرٌ واختلفوا، فقال أبو الحسين والكعبيّ والأوائل إنّ معناه علمه بالمسموعات والمبصرات لاستحالة أن يكون هو الإحساس بالحواس ولا ما عداه غير العلم لأنّه غيرُ معقول، وسيأتي أنّه تعالى عالم بكل معلوم وللسّمع.

وأثبت الجُبّائيّان والأشعريّ والسيّد المرتضى والخوارزميّ أمرًا زائدًا على العلم، لأنّ إدراكًا زائدٌ على علمنا للفرق بين العلم عند المشاهدة وبينه عند عدمها. والمقتضي لذلك كون المدرك حيًّا، والله تعالى حيٌّ فإدراكه زائدٌ، والمقدّماتُ ضعيفةٌ. ثمّ استدلّوا على ثبوته بأنه تعالى حيّ فيصحّ أن يتصف بالسمع والبصر، وكل من صحّ اتصافه بصفة وجب أن يتّصف بها أو بضدّها، وضدّها نقصٌ، وهو على الله تعالى محال.

The truth is to trace that back to the tradition, and it is not necessary that what is alive is validly attributed with hearing and seeing, for most reptiles and fish have no hearing, whereas the scorpion and the mole have no sight. Worms and many reptiles have neither hearing nor sight. Even if it were not impossible to attribute those species with hearing and sight, all their individual instantiations are devoid of both. Since it is possible that some differentiae of the species can exclude that attribute, the universal is false. Nor is it necessary to attribute something with one of two opposites, like the transparent for example.[10] Yes, it is necessary that what is receptive to an attribute is attributed with either it or its privation, but we have precluded that the opposite of either can be a deficiency in the case of Him most high. The comparison is false, since His life, high is He, is different from our life. The commonality is not necessary, because being receptive is denied,[11] just as our life allows desire and dislike, unlike His life, high is He.

Investigation 7: That He Most High Speaks

Muslims agree about that, for He has said, *to Moses God spoke directly*,[12] and there is no circle, because His speech, high is He, is established on the basis of the report of the messenger who is known to be true through miracle. Moreover, He has power over everything.

They also differ, and according to the Muʿtazilites, He created sounds in inanimate bodies that refer to determined meanings, so that He speaks in this sense. The Ashʿarites allow that, but they assert a psychological ground that subsists through the essence of the speaker and is different from knowledge and will. It is referred to by these letters and sounds, and it is eternal and in His case, high is He, not an order, not a prohibition, and not a report. Since He is alive and can be attributed with speech, if He was not attributed with it, He would be attributed with its opposite, which is a deficiency.

10 The counterexample is the body's capacity of being coloured. This does not entail that a body necessarily has some colour, because there is the third option of being transparent.

11 Receptivity to objects of perception is, of course, central to human perception, but since receptivity entails passivity, it is ruled out from God.

12 Q 4:164.

والحق استناد ذلك إلى النقل، ولا يجبُ صحّة اتّصاف الحيّ بالسمع والبصر، فإنّ أكثر الهوام والسمك لا سمعَ لها، والعقربُ والخُلَدُ لا بصرَ لهما. والديدان وكثيرٌ من الهوام لا سمع لها ولا بصر. فلولم يمتنع اتصاف تلك الأنواع بالسمع والبصر لما خلا جميع أشخاصهما منهما.

وإذا جاز أن يكون بعض فصول الأنواع مزيلاً لتلك الصّحة بطلت الكليّة. ولا يجب اتّصاف الشيء بأحد الضّدَين كالشّفاف. نعم يجب أن يتصف القابل للصّفة بها أو بعدمها، ونمنع كون ضدّهما نقصًا في حقّه تعالى. والقياسُ باطلٌ على أنّ حياته تعالى مخالفةٌ لحياتنا. ولا يجب العموميّة لانتفاء القابليّة، كما أن حياتنا مصحّحةٌ للشهوة والنفرة دون حياته تعالى.

المطلب السابع: في أنّه تعالى متكلّمٌ

اتّفق المسلمون على ذلك لقوله تعالى، ﴿وَكَلَّمَ اللَّهُ مُوسَى تَكْلِيمًا﴾ ولا دور، لأنه إثباتٌ لكلامه تعالى بإخبار الرسول المعلوم صدقه بالمعجزة، ولأنّه قادرٌ على كلّ مقدور.

واختلفوا فعند المعتزلة أنّه خلق في أجسام جماديّة أصواتًا دالّة على معان مخصوصة، فهو متكلّمٌ بهذا المعنى.

والأشاعرة جوّزوا ذلك لكن اثبتوا معنى نفسانيًّا قائمًا بذات المتكلّم مغايرًا للعلم والإرادة. يدل عليه هذه الحروف والأصوات وأنّه قديمٌ في حقّه تعالى واحدٌ ليس بأمر ولا نهي ولا خبر؛ لأنّه حيّ يصحّ اتّصافه بالكلام. فلولم يكون موصوفًا به كان متصفًا بضدّه، وهو نقصٌ.

Moreover, since His acts – high is He – can be prior and posterior, we have asserted a specifying will. The acts of servants vacillate between forbiddance, permission, and other judgments, and there is inevitably a specifying factor other than will, for they are ordered what they do not want, and conversely. That is speech, which is a psychological objective. Moreover, He is a king that is heeded, for His are the order and the forbiddance.

The Muʿtazilites have objected by saying that evidence for an assertion is rooted in the conception of that for which it is evidence.[13] What you have told is inconceivable and the validity of His being attributed with it is precluded. By the same token, the necessity of attributing one of the two and the opposite's being a deficiency are precluded. Instead, asserting it is a deficiency, since ordering, forbidding, and reporting that which does not exist is foolish. The judgments are intellectual, not heard, and so the specifying factor is either the attributes or the aspects and considerations, under which the acts take place. It is bad to order what is not willed.

The excuse for killing a servant is introduced by bringing out the form of the order, and the order applies to both the objective and the will. If by being heeded they mean that His power permeates all contingent things, this is true, but if they mean what is their objective, we preclude it.

Investigation 8: On the Characteristics of These Attributes, Concerning Which There Are Eleven Investigations

(a) A group of Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites has maintained that these attributes are something positively existing, for otherwise it would be valid to predicate them of the non-existent. The implication is denied, for many privative things cannot be predicated of the non-existent. According to the ancients as well as Abū al-Ḥusayn, they are not something positively existing, for otherwise, there would be multiple eternal things.

13 In other words, in order for an argument to provide evidence for a claim, the claim must first be conceived – and thus conceivable, of course.

ولأنّ أفعاله تعالى لما جاز عليها التقدّم والتأخّر أثبتنا الإرادة المخصّصة، وأفعالُ العباد متردّدةٌ بين الحظر والإباحة وغيرهما من الأحكام فلا بدّ من مخصّص غير الإرادة، لأنّه قد يأمر بما لا يريد وبالعكس، فهو الكلام الّذي هو الطلب النفساني، ولأنّه ملك مطاع، فله الأمر والنهي.

اعترضت المعتزلة بأنّ الاستدلال على الإثبات فرع تصوّر المستدل عليه. وما ذكرتموه غير متصور ويمنع صحّة اتصافه تعالى به، ويمنع وجوب الاتصاف بأحدهما وكون الضّدّ نقصًا، بل ثبوته نقصٌ، إذ أمر المعدوم ونهيُه وإخباره سفه. والأحكام عقليّة لا سمعيّة فالمخصّص إمّا الصفات أو الوجوه والاعتبارات الّتي تقع عليها الأفعال، ويقبح الأمر بما لا يريدُ.

وتمهيد العذر في قتل العبد بإيجاد صورة الأمر، وهو مشترك بين الطلب والإرادة. والمطاع إن عنوا به نفوذ قدرته في جميع الممكنات فهو حقّ، وإن عنوا ما طلبوه منعناه.

المطلب الثامن: في أحكام هذه الصفات وهي إحدى عشر بحثًا

الف - ذهب جماعة من المعتزلة والاشاعرة إلى أنّ هذه الصّفات وجوديّةٌ، وإلّا يصحُّ حملها على المعدوم. والملازمة ممنوعة، فإنّ كثيرًا من العدميّات يمتنع حمله على المعدوم، وعند الأوائل وأبي الحسين أنّها ليست وجوديّةً وإلّا لزم تعدُّدُ القدماء.

(b) They are identical to the essence externally, even if they are additional in intellection, which is what the ancients and Abū al-Ḥusayn opt for, due to the foregoing as well as the fact that if existence were additional, it would be contingent, because it would be attributed to the quiddity, so that it would not be necessary, which is incoherent.[14] Furthermore, what produces it would be the quiddity either without the condition of existence, so that what does not exist would produce that which exists, or with existence as a condition, in which case a regress, a circle, or something other than the quiddity would ensue, so that He would be in need of another.

According to a group of Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites, they are additional, since there is a difference between our saying, 'the Necessary Existent exists', and our saying that He is powerful. Moreover, both of them are informative, unlike our saying 'the Necessary Existent is a necessary existent'. Finally, we may know the essence but be in doubt about the attributes. All of that is evidence for a mental distinction.

(c) These attributes are eternal, for otherwise, they would need a producer, and if that were His essence, a circle would ensue, whereas if it were another, He would be in need of the other. Moreover, His producing an effect in another requires that they are established, and so they would be established before their cause.[15]

(d) These attributes are essential, according to the Muʿtazilites and the ancients, because they cannot be traced back to anything apart from His essence, due to the foregoing. According to the Ashʿarites, they are caused by grounds, so that He is powerful through power, knowing through knowledge, alive through life, and so forth for other attributes.

Those among them who reject the states have said that knowledge is identical to being a knower and power is identical to being powerful, both being attributes added to the essence, whereas those who assert them have said that His most high being a knower is an attribute caused by a ground that subsists through Him, that is, knowledge.

14 God exists necessarily due to His essence. If His existence were really distinct and additional to His essence, this addition would need a cause, which means that it would be contingent.

15 God is powerful because He has the attribute of power. Now, if God were powerful because He produces effects on created things voluntarily, the created things are part of the complete cause of God's being powerful. However, since God's being powerful is due to His having the attribute, the attribute is a condition of, and thus prior to, its own cause.

ب - هي نفس الذّات في الخارج وإن كانت زائدةً في التعقّل، وهو اختيار الأوائل وأبي الحسين لما تقدّم، ولأنّ الوجود لو كان زائداً كان ممكناً لأنّه وصفٌ للماهيّة فلا يكون واجباً، هذا خلف. ولأنّ مؤثّره إمّا الماهيّة لا بشرط الوجود، فالمعدوم مؤثّر في الموجود أو بشرطه، فيتسلسل أو يدور أو غيرها فيفتقر إلى الغير.

وعند جماعة من المعتزلة والأشاعرة أنّها زائدةٌ للمغايرة بينَ قولنا واجب الوجود موجود وبين قولنا إنّه قادرٌ. وللاستفادة بكلٍّ منهما، بخلاف قولنا واجب الوجود؛ ولأنّا قد نعلم الذّات ونشكّ في الصّفات، وكلّ ذلك يدلُّ على المغايرة الذّهنيّة.

ج - هذه الصّفات أزليّةٌ وإلّا لافتقرت إلى مؤثّر، فإن كل ذاته دار، وإن كان غيره افتقر إلى غيره؛ ولأن تأثيره في غيره يستلزم ثبوتها فهي ثابتة قبل علّتها.

د - هذه الصّفات ذاتيّةٌ عند المعتزلة والأوائل لامتناع استنادها إلى غير ذاته لما تقدّم، وعند الأشعريّة أنّها معلّلةٌ بالمعاني، فهو قادرٌ بقدرة عالمٌ بعلم حيّ بحياة إلى غير ذلك من الصّفات.

قال نفاة الأحوال منهم إنّ العلمَ نفس العالميّة، والقدرة نفس القادريّة، وهما صفتان زائدتان على الذات وقال مثبتوها إنّ عالميّته تعالى صفةٌ معلّلةٌ بمعنى قائم به، وهو العلم.

(e) His will is either identical to the motive, as in the foregoing, or something added to it that is traced back to His essence, like the choice of a carpenter, *pace* the majority. According to the two Jubbāʾīs, He wills through a volition that comes to be but not in a substrate. This is because if He willed by virtue of His essence, His will would be general, like knowledge, so that He would be willing two opposites. If He willed by virtue of an eternal volition, it would follow that many eternal things are established. If He willed by virtue of a voliion that comes to be in His essence, He would be a substrate to things that come to be. If the volition came to be in another, then were that other alive, the characteristic would go back to it, for otherwise the volition could not inhere in it. The existence of a volition not in a substrate is unintelligible.

(f) His report, high is He, is veridical, because a lie is understood to be bad and thus not emerging from Him. Moreover, if a lie were eternal, no truth could come from Him, but the consequent is false, since it is known that truth can emerge from one who knows something. The best proof is that of the Ashʿarites, although it is incomplete, because it is based on the claim that the eternal speech is identical with the report, being one report, and because its evidence is not based on the truth of the expressions.

(g) His power, high is He, pertains to all that is subject to power, for it is equal in terms of the cause, which is contingency.[16] The ancients precluded the emergence of two from Him, because He is simple, but we would not arrive at one who is powerful, if that were possible. Dualists as well as the Magi have precluded the emergence of evil from Him, for otherwise He would be evil. According to the Magi, the agent of good is Yazdān and the agent of evil is Ahriman, and they mean thereby an angel and a devil, whereas God most high is deemed above the agency of good and evil.[17] The Manicheans trace that to light and darkness, and likewise the Dayṣānites.[18]

16 Whatever is subject to power (*maqdūr*) is such that its existence is not necessary, because its opposite could equally well take place, barring other things from consideration. Hence, contingency is the cause for such things' being subject to power. God's power is equally related to all contingent things, in the sense that He is the ultimate efficient cause of their existence. Hence, God's power is equally related to all that is subject to power, and this in the sense that they all are subject to His power.

17 The Magi are Zoroastrians, and Yazdān (Ahura Mazda) and Ahriman (Angra Mainyu) are the two primary principles of their dualistic cosmology.

18 The Dayṣānites of Arabic literature are a semi-mythical dualist sect. Historically, the name goes back to the Syrian gnostic Bardesanes (d. 222 CE).

هـ - إرادته إمّا نفس الدّاعي كما تقدّم أو أمرٌ زائدٌ عليه مستندٌ إلى ذاته، كاختيار النّجّار خلافًا للجمهور. وعند الجبّائيين أنّه مريدٌ بإرادةٍ حادثةٍ لا في محلّ؛ إذ لو كان مريدًا لذاته لعمّت إرادته كالعلم، فيريد الضّدّين، أو لإرادةٍ قديمةٍ لزم ثبوت القدماء، أو لإرادة حادثة في ذاته كان محلاً للحوادث، أو في غيره. فإن حيَّا رجع حكمها إليه وإلّا استحال حلولها فيه، ووجود إرادة لا في محل غير معقول.

و - خبره تعالى صدقٌ لقبح الكذب عقلاً، فلا يصدر عنه؛ ولأنّ الكذب إن كان قديمًا استحال منه الصدق، والتّالي باطل للعلم بإمكان صدور الصدق من العالم بالشّيء. والأخير دليل الأشاعرة ولا يتمّ لبنائه على أنّ الكلام القديم هو عين الخبر، وأنّه خبرٌ واحدٌ، ولعدم دلالته على صدق الألفاظ.

ز - قدرته تعالى تتعلّقُ بكلّ مقدور للتّساوي في العلّة الّتي هي الإمكان. ومنع الأوائل من صدور اثنين عنه لأنّه بسيط، ولا يتأتى في القادر لوصح. ومنع الثنويّة والمجوس من صدور الشرِّ عنه وإلّا كان شرّيرًا. فعند المجوس فاعل الخير يزدان وفاعل الشرِّ أهرمن. وعنوا بهما ملكًا وشيطانًا، والله تعالى منزّهٌ عن فعل الخير والشّر. والمانويّة تسند ذلك إلى النور والظلمة وكذا الديصانيّة.

According to all of them, good is that, all the acts of which are good, whereas evil is that, all the acts of which are evil. However, good and evil are not good and evil due to their essence, but in relation to something else. Since it is possible that one and the same thing is good in relation to one thing but evil in relation to another, it is possible that the agent of that thing is one.

Al-Naẓẓām precluded His power over what is sinful, because that is absurd, for what is sinful is evidence of ignorance or need. The impossibility is with respect to the motive, not insofar as power is concerned.

ʿAbbād[19] precluded His power over what is known to take place or to not exist due to its necessity or impossibility. That negates power and knowledge follows it.

Al-Balkhī precluded His power over what is like that which is subject to the servant's power, because it is either obedience or impudence, both of which are attributions that do not entail essential difference.

The two Jubbāʾīs preclude His power over the very thing that is subject to the servant's power, because it is impossible that two powers be conjoined over one thing that is subject to power. If that thing took place through either of them, each would be independent of the other. If it did not take place through either of them, the precluding factor would be its taking place through the other, so it would take place through either of them while not taking place through just either of them. Finally, if it took place through only one of them, the other would not have power, and the second power would be precluded.

(h) His knowledge, high is He, pertains to all that is knowable, because He is alive, and so it is possible that He knows all that is knowable. If it pertained specifically to only some knowable things, it would need a specifying factor, which is absurd. Moreover, since it is possible that He knows all that is knowable, it is necessary, because this is an attribute of the essence, which is necessary when it is possible.[20] The premise that He is alive and that it is possible for Him to know all that is knowable is evident, because one who is alive is one for whom it is not impossible to know. The relation of possibility is one and the same to all knowable things.

19 This is probably Abū al-Qāsim Ismāʿīl ibn ʿAbbād (d. 385/995), the Būyid vizier and Muʿtazilite commonly known as Ṣāḥibʿ Abbād.

20 Attributes of essence are attributes that God has simply due to His essence. Since the possibilities of His essence cannot be dependent on any extrinsic factor, they are necessarily realised. They are to be distinguished from attributes of act that He has due to His essence and the object of the relevant agency. In their case, the realisation of a possibility depends on the contingent objects.

وعند جميعهم أنّ الخير هو الّذي يكون جميع أفعاله خيرًا، والشّر هو الّذي يكون جميع أفعاله شرًّا. والخير والشّر لا يكونان لذاتهما خيرًا وشرًّا بل بالإضافة إلى غيرهما. وإذا أمكن أن يكون شيء واحد بالقياس إلى واحد خيرًا وبالقياس إلى غيره شرًّا أمكن أن يكون فاعل ذلك الشّيء واحدًا.

ومنع النّظام من قدرته على القبيح لأنّه محالٌ لدلالته على الجهل أو الحاجة. والاستحالة من جهة الدّاعي لا من حيث القدرة.

ومنع عَبّاد من قدرته على ما علم وقوعه أو عدمه لوجوبه أو امتناعه وهو ينفي القدرة، والعلمُ تابعٌ.

ومنع البلخي من قدرته على مثل مقدور العبد؛ لأنه إمّا طاعةٌ أو سفهٌ، وهما وصفان لا يقتضيان المخالفة الذّاتيّة.

ومنع الجبّائيّان من قدرته على عين مقدور العبد لامتناع اجتماع قدرتين على مقدور واحد؛ لأنّه إن وقع بهما استغنى بكلّ منهما عن الآخر، وإن لم يقع بهما كان المانع هو وقوعه بالآخر، فيقع بهما حال ما لا يقع بهما وإن وقع بأحدهما لم يكن الآخر قادرًا، والأخيرة ممنوعةٌ.

ح - علمُه تعالى متعلّق بكلّ معلوم لأنّه حيّ، فيصحّ أن يعلم كلّ معلوم. فلو اختصّ تعلقه بالبعض افتقر إلى مخصّص، وهو محال ولأنّه يصحُّ أن يعلم كلّ معلوم فيجب، لأنّها صفةٌ نفسيّةٌ متى صحّت وجبت. وبيانُ المقدّم أنّه حيّ، وهو يصحُّ أن يعلم كلّ معلوم، لأنّ الحيّ هو الّذي لا يستحيل أن يعلم. ونسبة الصّحّة إلى الكلّ واحدةٌ.

Some of the ancients preclude His knowledge of His own essence, because it is a relation and therefore entails distinction. This is contradicted by our knowledge of ourselves. Some of them preclude His knowledge of another, because forms cannot inhere in His essence. This is contradicted by the One's knowledge of Himself, because it is a relation, not a form, and because emergence from it obtains in a way superior to that of an extracted form, which emerges from one who understands by virtue of participating in an intelligible. Besides, even that form is known through itself, and all the more here.[21]

Some of them preclude His knowledge of particular things insofar as they are changing, except in a universal sense, so that He does not know whether the changing thing has taken place or will take place, for if knowledge were to persist during the thing's non-existence, ignorance would follow, and if not, knowledge would be changing.[22] Some of them have answered by saying that knowledge of a thing's being brought into existence in the future is different from knowledge of its existence during the existence. This is an error, because knowledge requires adequate correspondence. Instead, the truth is that the change concerns relations, just as the change of what is subject to power entails change in its relation to the power, not in the power.

(i) The necessity of His existence by virtue of His essence entails the impossibility of His non-existence at any moment. Hence, He is pre-eternal, everlasting, persisting, and sempiternal. His persistence is due to His essence, not due to a persistence through which He subsists, *pace* al-Ashʿarī, for otherwise He would need another in His existence, and this is incoherent. Furthermore, His persistence would persist, and so there would be either a regress or a circle, depending on whether it persisted through another or by essence, and if it persists due to His essence, all the more so He in His essentiality.

21 Ḥillī's argument builds on a comparison of God's knowledge of particular things with the knowledge an artisan has of the thing she is about to manufacture. That thing emerges from the artisan by virtue of an extracted form, or a blueprint she has acquired from prior experience with similar things. In the case of God, the emergence is superior, because the blueprint is not acquired from without but is included in God's knowledge of Himself as the complete cause of the world.

22 This is the Avicennian view according to which God knows particulars but "in a universal way". For an extended discussion, see Marmura 1962 and Adamson 2005.

وبعض الأوائل منع من علمه بذاته، لأنّه إضافةٌ فيستدعي المغايرة. وينتقض بعلمنا بأنفسنا. ومنهم من منع علمه بغيره لاستحالة حلول صور في ذاته. وينتقض بعلم الواحد بنفسه، ولأنّه إضافةٌ لا صورةٌ، ولأنّ الصّدور عنه أبلغ في الحصول من الصّورة المنتزعة الصّادرة عن العاقل لمشاركة المعقول، ثمّ تلك الصّورة تعلم بذاتها فهنا أولى.

ومنهم من منع من علمه بالجزئيّات من حيث هي متغيّرة إلّا على وجه كلّيّ، فلا يعلم أنّ المتغيّر وقع أو سيقع؛ لأنّه عند عدمه إن بقي العلم لزم الجهل وإلّا كان متغيّرًا. وأجاب بعضهم بأنّ العلم بأنّ الشّيء سيوجد هو غير العلم بالوجود حين الوجود. وهو غلطٌ، لاستدعاء العلم المطابقة، بل الحقُّ أنّ التّغيّرَ في الإضافات كتغيّر المقدور المستلزم تغيّر إضافة القدرة.

ط - وجوب وجوده لذاته يقتضي امتناع عدمه في وقتٍ مّا، فهو قديمٌ أزليّ باقٍ سرمديّ. وبقاؤه لذاته لا لبقاء يقوم به خلافًا للأشعريّ وإلّا افتقر في وجوده إلى غيره، هذا خلفٌ. ولأنّ بقاءه باق فيتسلسل أو يدور إن بقي بالغير أو بالذّات، وإن بقي لذاته كان أولى بالذّاتيّة.

The verified account is that persistence means the impossibility of an established essence departing from its being established and separating from existence for more than one moment after the first moment. The First is established on His own, high is He, with nothing added to Him. Any second moment is excluded, because such cannot be understood in the case of that in which nothing is annihilated. Just as the judgment that the whole is greater than the part cannot have taken place at any moment or at all moments, similarly it is not said that it takes place in any place or in all places.[23] This is founded on the fact that change requires time.

(j) His power is His knowledge, and His will is sufficient to bring into existence, because this is necessary when the two are combined,[24] *pace* some Ḥanafites, insofar as they have asserted generating as an eternal attribute of God most high.[25] One who generates is one who brings into being, because He most high has said: *when He wills something to be, His way is to say, "Be" – and it is!*[26] 'Be' is prior to being, and it is what is called order, word, generating, devising, bringing into existence, and creating, and since power is productive with respect to the possibility of the existence of what is subject to power, generating is productive with respect to the existence itself.

This is an error, for if generation were eternal, it would follow that the effect is eternal. Moreover, generation is a relation, and if it were brought into being, there would be regress. His saying 'Be' is not evidence for asserting an attribute additional to power, nor does power have an effect with respect to the possibility of existence, for that is essential to what is contingent.[27]

(k) Al-Ashʿarī asserted hand as an attribute additional to power, face as an attribute additional to existence, and being seated as yet another attribute. The Qāḍī asserted perception through smell, taste, and touch as three attributes.[28] ʿAbdullāh ibn Saʿīd asserted eternity as an attribute distinct from persistence, and mercy, benevolence, and satisfaction as attributes different from will. There is no evidence for any of that.

23 The point is that the truth of the principle is not dependent on time or place at all.

24 That is, creation is necessary when God's will and power are combined.

25 The Ḥanafites here is probably not intended to refer to the legal tradition but to some Māturīdī theologians, who often were Ḥanafites and who are known to have endorsed generating, or "making be" (*takwīn*), as an attribute of God distinct from both power (*qudra*) and will (*irāda*).

26 Q 36:82. The order *kun* is the root for the attribute *takwīn*.

27 That is, possibility of existence does not have to be created distinctly for anything that is contingent by virtue of its essence. Instead, possibility is the modal status inherent to a contingent essence.

28 This Qāḍī is Bāqillānī.

والتحقيق أنّ البقاء يراد به امتناع خروج الذات الثابتة عن ثبوتها ومفارقة الوجود لأكثر من زمان واحد بعد الزمان الأوّل، والأوّل ثابتٌ في حقّه تعالى لا زائد عليها. والثّاني منتفٍ لأنّه لا يعقل فيما لا يكون فانيًا. كما أنّ الحكم بأنّ الكلّ أعظم من الجزء لا يمكن وقوعه في زمان أو في جميع الأزمنة، كما لا يقال إنّه واقعٌ في مكان أو في جميع الأمكنة، وهو بناءٌ على أن التغيّر يستدعي الزمان.

ي - قدرته علمه؛ وإرادته كافيةٌ في الإيجاد، لوجوبه عند اجتماعهما، خلافًا لبعض الحنفيّة حيث أثبتوا التكوين صفة أزليّة لله تعالى. والمكوّن محدث، لقوله تعالى: (إِنَّمَا أَمْرُهُ إِذَا أَرَادَ شَيْئًا أَن يَقُولَ لَهُ كُن فَيَكُونُ) ف « كن» متقدّم «الكون» وهو المسمّى بالأمر، والكلمة والتكوين والاختراع والإيجاد والخلق، ولأنّ القدرة مؤثّرة في صحّة وجود المقدور، والتكوين مؤثّر في نفس وجوده.

وهو غلطٌ، لأن التكوين إن كان قديمًا لزم قدم الأثر لأنّه نسبةٌ، وإن كان محدثًا تسلسل، وقوله « كن» لا يدلّ على إثبات صفة زائدة على القدرة، والقدرة لا تأثير لها في صحة الوجود، لأنّها ذاتيّة للممكن.

يا - أثبت الأشعري «اليد» صفةً وراء القدرة، و«الوجه» صفةً وراء الوجود، و«الاستواء» صفةً أخرى. وأثبت القاضي إدراكَ الشّمِّ والذوق واللّمس ثلاثَ صفاتٍ. وأثبت عبدالله بن سعيد «القدم» صفةً مغايرةً للبقاء، و«الرّحمة» و«الكرم» و«الرّضا» صفاتٍ غير الإرادة. ولا دليل على شيء من ذلك.

The others maintain the denial of anything added to the seven, because we have been charged with knowledge, and if one is to acquire knowledge of the attributes, there must be a way to it. This can only be inference through effects and declaring above deficiency, and these two only point at seven. We deny being charged with the perfection of knowledge.

Chapter 2: On Negative Attributes

It includes eleven investigations.

Investigation 1: That He Most High Is Not Spatial

Those endowed with intellection agree about it, *pace* the corporealists, because no spatial thing is separable from motion and rest, and so He would have come to be. Moreover, He would then be either a body, and therefore composite and something that has come to be, or an impartitionable part, which is unintelligible, because it is impossible to attribute something like that with infinite power and knowledge. Besides, if He were a body, He would be composite. Hence, the knowledge that comes to be in one of two parts would not come to be in the other, and so gods would be multiplied. Manifest things are more appropriate, and the amazement of estimation is no match for intellectual decisiveness.

Investigation 2: That He Most High Does Not Inhere in Another

What is understood with inherence is that an existing thing subsists through another existing thing by way of subsequence and under the condition that its subsistence through itself is impossible. This is absurd in the case of the Necessary Existent, for the intellect judges that what is independent of a substrate cannot inhere in it. If He were to inhere in eternity, it would follow that the substrate is eternal, whereas if He were not, the need would have been brought into being. Besides, a thing's inherence in another is only conceivable if that which inheres is instantiated by means of a substrate, but the Necessary Existent is not instantiated by another.

According to some Christians, He most high inheres in the Messiah. According to the Sufis, He most high inheres in the sages. All of that is absurd. Hence, He is neither an accident nor a form, for they are in need of a substrate.

وجزم آخرون بنفي ما زاد على السبعة، لأنّا كلّفنا بالمعرفة، وإنّما تحصل بمعرفة الصّفات، فلابُدّ من طريق، وليس إلّا الاستدلال بالآثار والتنزيه عن النقصان، وإنّما يدلّان على السبعة ونمنع من التكليف بكمال المعرفة.

الفصل الثاني: في الصفات السلبية

وفيه مطالب [اثنى عشر]:

[المطلب] الأوّل: في أنّه تعالى ليس بمتحيّز

اتّفق العقلاء عليه خلافًا للمجسّمة، لأنّ كلّ متحيّز لا ينفكّ عن الحركة أو السكون فيكون مُحدَثًا، ولأنّه حينئذ إمّا جسمٌ فيكون مركّبًا فيكون حادثًا أو جزءًا لا يتجزّأ، وهو غير معقول، لإمتناع اتّصاف مثل ذلك بالقدرة والعلم غير المتناهيين؛ ولأنّه لو كان جسمًا لكان مركّبًا. فالعلم الحاصل لأحد الجزأين ليس هو الحاصل للآخر فيتعدد الآلهة. والظواهر متأوّلةٌ، وعجز الوهم لا يعارض القطع العقليّ.

المطلب الثاني: في أنّه تعالى لا يحلّ في غيره

المعقول من الحلول قيام موجود بموجود آخر على سبيل التبعيّة بشرط امتناع قيامه بذاته. وهو محالٌ في حق واجب الوجود، ولقضاء العقل بأنّ الغنيّ عن المحل يستحيل حلوله فيه. فإن كان حالًا في الأزل لزم قدم المحل، وإن لم يكن تجدّدت الحاجة، ولأنّ حلول الشّيء في غيره إنّما يتصوّر لو كان الحالُّ إنّما يتعيّن بواسطة المحل، وواجب الوجود لا يتعيّن بغيره.

وعند بعض النصارى أنّه تعالى حالٌّ في المسيح. وعند الصوفية أنّه تعالى حالٌّ في العارفين. والكلُّ محالٌّ فهو إذن ليس بعرض ولا صورة، لافتقارهما إلى المحل.

Investigation 3: That He Most High Is Different from Others Due to His Essence

Abū Hāshim maintained that the essence of He most high is equal to other essences in terms of essentiality and differs from them by virtue of a state that necessitates the four states, I mean being alive, knowing, being powerful, and existing. It is the divine state, because the concept of essence is what can be known and reported. This is an error, because this concept is a mere consideration, and it is not identical to realities established in concrete, but one of the secondary intelligibles.

The equality of all essences is not possible, because if the specification of one of them by something that necessitates difference were not due to a preponderating factor, then it would be preponderance of one of the alternatives of what is contingent without a preponderating factor. Were that not the case, there would be regress.

Investigation 4: That He Most High Is Not Composite

Every composite is contingent, because it is in need of its part, its part being different from it, and whatever is in need is contingent, whereas the Necessary Existent is not contingent. He does not have parts of quiddity, I mean matter and form, intellectual parts, I mean genus and differentia, or magnitudinal parts, nor is anything else composed of Him, so that He is not a genus, differentia, or species under which individuals would be classified. No other is composed of Him, since it is impossible that He should be acted upon by another.

المطلب الثالث: في أنّه تعالى مخالف لغيره لذاته

ذهب أبو هاشم إلى أنّ ذاته تعالى مساويةٌ لسائر الذوات في الذاتية، ويخالفها بحالة توجب الأحوال الأربعة. أعني الحييّة والعالميّة والقادريّة والموجوديّة. وهي الحالة الإلهيّة لأنّ مفهوم الذات هو ما يصحّ أن يعلم ويخبر عنه. وهو غلطٌ؛ لأنّ هذا المفهوم أمرٌ اعتباريٌ ليس نفس الحقائق الثابتة في الأعيان، بل من المعقولات الثانية.

ولا يمكن تساوي كلّ الذوات لأنّ اختصاص بعضها بما يوجب المخالفة إن لم يكن لمرجّح كان ترجيحًا لأحد طرفي الممكن لا لمرجّح وإلّا تسلسل.

المطلب الرابع: في أنّه تعالى غير مركّب

كلُّ مركّب ممكنٌ، لأنّه يفتقر إلى جزئه وجزؤه غيره، وكلُّ مفتقرٍ ممكنٌ. وواجب الوجود ليس بممكن فليس له أجزاء ماهيّة، أعني المادّة والصّورة، ولا عقليّة، أعني الجنس والفصل، ولا مقداريّة؛ ولا يتركّب عنه غيره فليس جنسًا ولا فصلاً ولا نوعًا يندرج تحته أفرادٌ، ولا يتركّب عنه غيره إذ يستحيل أن ينفعل عن غيره.

Investigation 5: That He Most High Is Not United with Another

The wise and those theologians endowed with understanding agree about the impossibility of union, with the exception of Porphyry and the leader in some of his books, because if two things remain two existing things after the union, they are two, not one. If neither exists, there is no union, but rather a third thing has come to be, and if one of the two does not exist, what does not exist has not been united with that which exists. This is a general judgment concerning all quiddities.[29] Yes, it may be said that union in a figurative sense is something's becoming another thing by divesting of its form and putting on another, as it is said that water becomes air, or so that a mixture or a state added to another comes to be for the parts, as it is said that gall and vitriol become ink. However, that is denied of the Necessary Existent, high is He, because He cannot depart from His reality nor is there anything added to it, and He cannot be composed of or with another.

The Christians speak of the unity of the three hypostases, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and the humanity of the Messiah is united with divinity. The Sufis say that He most high is united with the sages. All that is unintelligible.

Investigation 6: That He Most High Is Not in Any Position

Those endowed with understanding agree about it, with the exception of the corporealists and the Karrāmites, because He is not spatial nor does He inhere in anything spatial, and thus by necessity He is not in any position. Moreover, what is in a position is by necessity inseparable from the modes of being, having thus come to be, but the Necessary Existent has not come to be. Finally, His place would be equal to other places, and thus His being specified with it would be preponderance without a preponderating factor, and it would also follow that place is eternal and that what is separate inheres in space after not having inhered. That is unintelligible.

Some companions of Abū ʿAbdillāh ibn al-Karrām hold that He is in an infinite position above the throne, and the distance between Him and the throne is also infinite. Some of them say that it is finite. All of that is erroneous, due to the foregoing. Besides, the world is a sphere.

29 This is Avicenna's argument against the theory, which he attributes to Porphyry (d. *ca* 305 CE), that knowledge consists of a union between the subject and object of knowledge; see *Shifāʾ: Nafs* V.6, 239-241. However, the "leader" (*raʾīs*) Avicenna himself seems also to have endorsed the theory at some point in his career, most notoriously in the relatively early *al-Mabdaʾ waʾl-maʿād* (I.7, 6-10).

المطلب الخامس: في أنّه تعالى لا يتحد بغيره

اتفق العقلاء من المتكلّمين والحكماء إلى امتناع الاتّحاد، إلّا فرفوريوس والرئيس في بعض كتبه، لأنّ الشّيئين بعد الاتّحاد إن بقيا موجودين فهما اثنان لا واحد. وإن عدما فلا اتّحاد، بل حدث ثالث، وإن عدم أحدهما لم يتّحد المعدوم بالوجود. وهذا حكم عامٌّ في كلّ الماهيّات. نعم قد يقال الاتّحاد بالمجاز على صيرورة شيء شيئًا آخر بأن يخلع صورته ويلبس الأخرى، كما يقال صار الماء هواء؛ أو بأن يحدث للأجزاء مزاج وهيئة زائدة على الآخر كما يقال صار العفص والزاج حبرًا، وهو منفيٌّ عن واجب الوجود تعالى لاستحالة خروجه عن حقيقته وعدم أمر زائد عليها وامتناع تركّبه من غيره أو معه.

وقالت النصارى باتّحاد الأقاليم الثّلاثة: الأب والأبن وروح القدس، واتّحدنا سوت المسيح باللّاهوت. والصوفية قالوا أنّه تعالى يتّحد بالعارفين. والكلُّ غيرُ معقول.

المطلب السادس: في أنّه تعالى ليس في جهة

اتفق العقلاء عليه إلّا المجسّمة والكرّامية، لأنّه ليس بمتحيّز ولا حالّ في المتحيّز، فلا يكون في جهة بالضّرورة، ولأنّ الكائن في الجهة لا ينفك عن الأكوان بالضرورة، فيكون مُحدثًا، وواجب الوجود ليس بمُحدَث؛ ولأنّ مكانه مساو لسائر الأمكنة، فاختصاصه به ترجيحٌ عن غير مرجّح، ويلزم قدم المكان أو حلول المجرّد في مكان بعد أن لم يكن، وهو غير معقول.

وأصحاب أبي عبد الله ابن الكرّام ذهب بعضهم إلى أنّه في جهة فوق العرش لا نهاية لها، والبعد بينه وبين العرش غير متناه أيضًا. وقال بعضهم متناهٍ. والكل خطأٌ لما تقدُم، ولأنّ العالم كرةٌ.

Investigation 7: On the Impossibility of Pain and Pleasure in Him Most High

Those endowed with understanding agree about the impossibility of pain in Him, because it is a perception of what is incompatible but nothing is incompatible with Him most high. When it comes to pleasure, Muslims have already agreed about its impossibility, because pleasure and pain follow from balance and discord of the mixture, but He most high has no mixture. Moreover, if pleasure were eternal, it would be a motive for an act from the one enjoying it, and it would have to exist before its own existence due to the existence of the motive and the annihilation of any obstacle. If the pleasure had come to be, He would be a substrate for things that come to be. There is room for reflection about this, because it is possible that the motives of pleasure and bringing into existence are one.

The ancients asserted for Him an intellectual pleasure that is not through His act but with respect to His knowledge of His perfection, for anyone who conceives perfection in himself is exhilarated, just as one who conceives of a deficiency in himself feels pain. His perfection, high is He, is the mightiest of perfections and His knowledge of His perfection the most complete knowledge, and a greatest of pleasures follows from that. The minor premise is precluded, the analogy based on the manifest is weak,[30] and consensus denies it.

Appendix

It is impossible to attribute Him with any quality that is conditioned by position, such as colours, tastes, smells, and other accidents, because He most high cannot be acted upon.

30 The minor premise here is 'God knows His own perfection'. It is unclear to me why this should not be true. The analogy based on the manifest (*al-qiyās ʿalā al-shāhid*) is a method of inference used by the theologians, in which one infers something about God's attributes on the basis of connections between similar attributes of created things. On the method and its context, see van Ess 1970, 32-33.

المطلب السابع: في استحالة الألم واللذّة عليه تعالى

اتفق العقلاء على استحالة الألم عليه لأنّه إدراك منافٍ، ولا منافي له تعالى. أمّا اللذّة فقد اتفق المسلمون على استحالتها عليه لأنّ اللذة والألم من توابع اعتدال المزاج وتنافره، ولا مزاج له تعالى، ولأنّ اللّذّة إن كانت قديمةً وهي داعية إلى فعل الملتذّ به وجب وجوده قبل وجوده لوجود الداعي وانتفاء المانع، وإن كانت حادثةً كان محلاً للحوادث، وفيه نظرٌ لجواز اتّحاد داعي اللذّة والإيجاد.

والأوائل أثبتوا له لذّةً عقليّةً لا بفعله، بل باعتبار علمه بكماله، فإنّ كلّ من تصوّر في نفسه كمالاً ابتهج، كما أنّ من تصوّر نقصاناً في نفسه تألّم. ولما كان كماله تعالى أعظم الكمالات، وعلمه بكماله أتمّ العلوم استلزم ذلك أعظمَ اللّذات. والصغرى ممنوعةٌ والقياس على الشاهد ضعيفٌ، والاجماع ينفيه.

تذنيب

يستحيل اتصافه بكلّ كيفيّة مشروطة بالوضع، كالألوان والطّعوم والرّوائح وغيرها في الأعراض، لامتناع انفعاله تعالى.

Investigation 8: That He Most High Is Not a Substrate for Things That Come to Be

Most agree about it, *pace* the Karrāmites, due to the impossibility of Him being acted upon in His essence, and so change in Him is precluded. Moreover, if that which comes to be were an attribute of perfection, it would be impossible for Him to ever be without it, and were it not, He could not be attributed with it. Besides, if He could be attributed with it, that possibility would be concomitant to His essence, for it could not accede upon Him, otherwise there would be regress, and so it would be eternal. Hence, the possibility of attributing that which comes to be would require the possibility that what comes to be exist eternally, which is absurd.

Investigation 9: That He Most High Is Self-Sufficient

This is one of the most evident investigations, because He is necessary in every respect whereas all that is apart from Him is contingent and in need of Him, and so His, high is He, need for another is unintelligible. Moreover, His essence is necessary and His attributes are identical with His reality, and so He is self-sufficient in terms of both His essence and His attributes. Finally, He most high is not a substrate for things that come to be, whereas whatever is other than Him does come to be. Relations have no positive existence.[31]

Investigation 10: That He Is Unknown to Men

This is the doctrine of Ḍirār, al-Ghazālī,[32] and all of the ancients, because what is known of Him most high is nothing but negations, such as His not being a body or an accident, or relations, such as His being powerful, knowing, creating, and blessing. The reality is by necessity different from that. According to the majority of both Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites, He most high is known, because His existence is known and it is identical with His reality, but we deny the minor premise.[33]

31 The last sentence may seem unrelated, but the point is to say that the relations that God has to other things by virtue of attributes, such as knowledge, power, and will, do not compromise His self-sufficiency.

32 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) is one of the most prominent post-Avicennian Ashʿarite theologians. Student of al-Juwaynī, he was pivotal to the critical adoption of Avicennian philosophy into *kalām*.

33 The minor premise here is 'God's reality (or essence) is identical with His existence'.

المطلب الثامن: في أنّه تعالى ليس محلاً للحوادث

اتّفق الأكثر عليه خلافًا للكرّاميّة، لامتناع انفعاله في ذاته فيمتنع التغيّر عليه، ولأنّ الحادث إن كان صفة كمال استحال خلوّه عنها أزلاً، وإلّا استحال اتّصافه بها، ولأنّه لو صحّ اتّصافه به كانت تلك الصحّة لازمة لذاته لاستحالة عروضها، وإلّا تسلسل، فتكون أزليّة. وصحّة الاتصاف بالحادث تستدعي صحّة وجود الحادث أزلاً، وهو محالٌ.

المطلب التاسع: في أنّه تعالى غنيّ

هذا من أظهر المطالب لأنّه واجب على جميع الجهات، وكلّ ما اعداه ممكنٌ محتاجٌ إليه، فلا يعقل احتياجه تعالى إلى غيره، ولأنّ ذاته واجبة، وصفاته نفس حقيقته، فيستغني في ذاته وصفاته، ولأنّه تعالى ليس محلاً للحوادث، وغيره حادثٌ، والإضافات ليست وجوديّة.

المطلب العاشر: في أنّه غير معلوم للبشر

هذا مذهب ضرار والغزالي وجميع الأوائل، لأنّ المعلوم منه تعالى ليس إلّا السلوب، مثل أنّه ليس بجسم ولا عرض، أو الإضافات مثل أنّه قادرٌ عالمٌ خالقٌ رازقٌ. والحقيقة مغايرةٌ لذلك بالضّرورة. وعند جماهير المعتزلة والأشاعرة أنّه تعالى معلومٌ لأنّ وجوده معلوم وهو نفس حقيقته، ونمنع الصّغرى.

Investigation 11: On the Impossibility of Seeing in His Case, High Is He[34]

The Ashʿarites contradict all parties concerning that. When it comes to the Muʿtazilites and the philosophers, that is evident. When it comes to the corporealists, that is because if He were separate, seeing would be impossible in His case, according to them.[35] Those endowed with understanding, apart from the corporealists, agree that seeing must be denied in His case, for it would be due to impression or rays.[36]

The Ashʿarites say that we distinguish between our knowledge at the state of having the eyes open and the state of having them closed, and this is not due to either impression or rays. Hence, it goes back to another state that is asserted also in His case, high is He. Necessity decrees this false, because position has been denied, but whatever is seen is opposite or equivalent.[37] Moreover, if He were seen, we would be seeing Him now, for obstacles and the existence of conditions are denied, since here there is nothing but the possibility of His being seen and the soundness of the sense. Besides, He most high has said, *No vision can take Him in, but He takes in all vision*,[38] glorifying Him thereby for being between the two glorifications, so that asserting seeing would be a deficiency, which is absurd of Him most high. Finally, He has said, *You will never see Me*,[39] 'never' being used to deny eternally, and since that was denied in the case of Moses, peace be upon him, it is likewise for others.

34 This section deals with seeing in an ambiguous way. The most natural way of understanding the title *fī istiḥālati l-ruʾyati ʿalayhi taʿālā* is that it denies *seeing* as an attribute of God. However, some of the arguments Ḥillī addresses clearly deal with the question of whether God can be *seen*. I have tried to keep the translation similarly ambiguous, wherever appropriate.

35 In other words, Ashʿarites hold both that God is immaterial and that He can be seen.

36 This is a reference to intromission and extramission theories of vision, respectively. In both theories, seeing requires a physical process connecting the object and the subject, which is impossible for a non-physical entity like God.

37 That is, the object seen must be directly facing the seer, or situated in a position similarly related to the position of the seer.

38 Q 6:103.

39 Q 7:143. God is addressing Moses.

المطلب الحادي عشر: في استحالة الرؤية عليه تعالى

الأشاعرة خالفوا جميع الفرق في ذلك. أمّا المعتزلة والفلاسفة فظاهرٌ. وأمّا المجسّمة فلأنّه لو كان مجرّدًا لاستحال رؤيته عندهم. واتفق العقلاء إلّا المجسّمة على انتفاء الرّؤية بسبب الانطباع أو الشّعاع عنه تعالى.

والأشاعرة قالوا إنّا نفرق بين علمنا حالة فتح العين وتغميضها، وليس بالانطباع ولا الشّعاع، فهو راجع إلى حالة أخرى ثابتة في حقه تعالى. والضرورة قاضية ببطلانه لانتفاء الجهة، وكلّ مرئيّ مقابل أو في حكمه، ولأنه لو كان مرئيًّا لرأيناه الآن، لإنتفاء الموانع ووجود الشرائط، إذ ليست هنا إلّا صحّة كونه مرئيًّا وسلامة الحاسّة، ولقوله تعالى: ﴿لَا تُدْرِكُهُ الْأَبْصَارُ وَهُوَ يُدْرِكُ الْأَبْصَارَ﴾ تمدح به، لتخلّله بين مدحين، فإثباته نقصٌ، وهو مُحالٌ عليه تعالى، ولقوله ﴿لَن تَرَانِي﴾، و«لن» لنفي الأبد، وإذا انتفت في حقّ موسى عليه السلام فكذا غيره.

They have argued by saying that both substances and accidents are seen, and being judged together, they no doubt have a shared cause, which can only be existence or coming to be, but the latter is not suitable for being a cause, because a part of it is non-existing.[40] Furthermore, He most high has said, *on that Day there will be radiant faces, looking at the blessing of their Lord*.[41] Finally, He most high conditioned seeing upon the stability of a contingent mountain, because it is a body and because Moses, peace be upon him, asked for it.[42]

The answer is that His existence, high is He, is identical with His reality, and it is different from our existence, and so equality in terms of the two characteristics is not necessary. We deny that the possibility of seeing needs a cause, for if all characteristics had to be based on a cause, there would be regress. Moreover, possibility is privative. We deny that the possibility of seeing a substance and the possibility of seeing an accident are equal, and it is possible that something common to them is caused by two different causes. We deny the restriction to the existence of possibility, and so it is possible that there is a cause for the possibility of seeing, even if it were privative.[43]

Coming to be is existence that is preceded by something. The existence of what is caused does not follow from the existence of the cause, for dependence on a condition or the occurrence of an obstacle is possible. The word *īlā* is the singular of *ālāʾ*, 'blessings',[44] or it is elliptical and implies 'to the bounties of their Lord'. The condition of stability during motion is absurd. The questions took place because of Moses' people, for He most high has said, *they demanded even more than that of Moses when they said, 'Show us God face to face'*.[45]

40 The Ashʿarites' argument can be spelled out as follows: both substances and accidents are seen, and they must be so for the same reason; this reason can only be existence; but God has existence; hence, God must also be seen.

41 Q 75:22-23. I have modified Abdel Haleem's translation to fit Ḥillī's interpretation below.

42 The context is Q 7:143, cited above.

43 That is, Ḥillī denies that the capacity to be seen must be grounded in some really existing feature. Instead, he holds that the ground of being seen can be privative or something that does not exist as such (*ʿadamī*).

44 This refers to Q 75: 22-23, cited above.

45 Q 4:153.

احتجّوا بأنّ الجوهر والعرض مرئيّان، والحكم المشترك لا بد له من علّة مشتركة، وليس إلّا الوجود والحدوث، والأخير لا يصلح للعلّيّة لأنّ جزءه عدميّ، ولقوله تعالى ﴿وُجُوهٌ يَوْمَئِذٍ نَّاضِرَةٌ إِلَىٰ رَبِّهَا نَاظِرَةٌ﴾، ولأنّه تعالى علّقها على استقرار الجبل الممكن، لأنّه جسمٌ ولأن موسى عليه السلام سألها.

والجواب: وجوده تعالى نفس حقيقته وهو مخالفٌ لوجودنا، فلا يجب تساويهما في الأحكام. ونمنع احتياج صحّة الرّؤية إلى علّة إذ لو وجب تعليل كل حكمٍ تسلسل، ولأنّها عدميّةٌ. ونمنع تساوي صحّة رؤية الجوهر وصحّة رؤية العرض، ويجوز تعليل المشترك بعلتين مختلفتين. ونمنع الحصر بوجود الإمكان فيجوز أن يكون علّةً لإمكان الرؤية وإن كان عدميًّا.

والحدوث هو الوجود المسبوق، ولا يلزم من وجود العلّة وجود المعلول لجواز التوقّف على شرط أو حصول مانع. و«إلى» واحد «الآلاء»، أو أنّ فيها إضمارًا تقديره: «إلى نِعَم ربّها». والتعليق على الاستقرار حالة الحركة وهو محال. والسؤال وقع لقوم موسى لقوله تعالى ﴿فَقَدْ سَأَلُوا مُوسَىٰ أَكْبَرَ مِن ذَٰلِكَ﴾، فقالوا ﴿فَقَالُوا أَرِنَا اللَّهَ جَهْرَةً﴾.

Investigation 12: That He Most High Is One

If there existed two necessary existents, they would participate in this meaning and it would either be essential to both or one of them, or accidental to both. The first alternative entails composition in both of them, and so they would be contingent. The second and the third both entail that that to which it accedes is not necessary in its essence.

It is not possible that 'necessary due to essence' be a ground that is shared as a proprium, because it has external existence only as specified.[46] It is not possible that the specifying factor be negative,[47] for the negation of another is only available after the other has occurred. Moreover, the difference is contingent, for both would have power over all that is subject to power, and it would be possible that one of them intends the opposite of what the other intends, so that if both objectives occur, then two opposites would be combined, which is absurd. If both were lacking, then what precludes existence from the objective of each would be the objective of the other, but as a consequence, both would exist. If only one of them existed, then that would be God. Finally, this is because of what is heard from tradition.

The dualists have said that light and darkness are eternal, all that is good in the world being from light and all that is bad from darkness, and that neither of them has any end in the five directions.[48] Light is alive and knowing whereas darkness is alive but ignorant. The cause of the world's coming to be is parts of light mixing with parts of darkness. By the greatest light, they mean purity from those parts of darkness. That is only possible through the creation of this world and the creation of illuminated bodies in it, insofar as those luminous parts are purified from darkness through their light. When they have been purified, the world will be annihilated.

All of this speech is erroneous, for light is an accident that does not subsist by itself, whereas darkness is privative, and the lack of finitude is absurd, due to the foregoing.[49]

46 This means that 'necessity due to essence' cannot be concomitant to an essence, because it would only be realised once there is an individual instantiation of the essence. Then that individual instantiation would not have been necessary by its essence but due to something else, and the essence would only be necessary due to the cause of the instantiation, that is, it would be necessary through another.

47 The relevant specifying factor is probably 'not being due to another'. Alternatively, it could be 'not the other' for the two necessary beings, supposed *per impossibile*.

48 There are altogether six spatial dimensions: North, East, South, West, up, and down. According to this view, light and darkness are infinite in all but one, namely the direction in which they encounter an object.

49 See the proof for the finitude of the world in IV.2.2.

المطلب الثاني عشر: في أنّه تعالى واحد

لوكان في الوجود واجبا الوجود لكانا مشتركين في هذا المعنى، فإما أن يكون ذاتيًّا لهما أو لأحدهما أوعارض لهما. والأوّل يستلزم تركّب كلّ منهما فيكون ممكنًا. والثّاني والثالث يستلزم كلّ منهما أن لا يكون معروضه في ذاته واجبًا.

ولا يجوز أن يكون الواجب لذاته هو المعنى المشترك خاصّة إذ لا وجود في الخارج إلّا مخصّصًا. ولا يجوز أن يكون المخصّص سلبيًّا، فإن سلب الغير لا يتحصّل إلّا بعد حصول الغير؛ ولأنّ المخالفة ممكنةٌ، لأن كلّ واحد منهما قادرٌ على جميع المقدورات، فيصح أن يقصد أحدهما إلى ضدّ ما قصد الآخرُ، فإن حصل المرادان اجتمع الضّدّان وهو محال، وأن عدما كان المانع من مراد كل منهما وجود مراد الآخر فيلزم وجودهما وإن وُجِدَ أحدهما فهو الإله؛ وللسُمع.

وقالت الثنويّة بقدم النور والظلمة وكل خير في العالم فمن النور، وكلّ شر فمن الظلمة، وكلّ منهما لا نهاية له في الجهات الخمس. والنور حيٌّ عالمٌ والظلمة حيةٌ جاهلةٌ. وسبب حدوث العالم اختلاط أجزاء من النور بأجزاء من الظلمة. وأراد النور الأعظم استخلاص تلك الأجزاء من الظلمة. فلم يمكنه إلّا بخلق هذا العالم وخلق الأجسام النيّرة فيه، بحيث تستخلص بنورها تلك الأجزاء النورانيّة من الظلمة. فإذا خلصت في العالم.

وهذا الكلام كلّه خطأ، فإنّ النور عرضٌ لا يقوم بذاته، والظلمة عدميّة، وعدمُ التناهي مُحالٌ لما تقدّم.

The Magi have said that the world has a maker who is powerful, knowing, alive, and wise, calling him Yazdān, and that whatever is good in the world is from him. They have said that he thought, 'If I should have an opponent among the angels, what would be my situation with him?' The devil came into being from that thought, and whatever is evil in the world is from him. They called him Ahriman. Some of them say that the devil is eternal, which is also evidently false.

The Christians have said: The most high Creator is one substance and three hypostases, the hypostasis of Father, who is His existence, the hypostasis of son, who is His knowledge, and the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, who is His life. If they meant the attributes, there is no dispute except with regard to terms, otherwise that is an error, due to the foregoing.

وقال المجوس إنّ للعالم صانعًا قادرًا عالمًا حيًّا حكيمًا سمّوه يزدان، وكلّ خير في العالم منه، وأنّه أفكر لو كان لي ضدّ في الملك كيف تكون حالي معه، فحدث الشّيطان من تلك الفكرة، وكلُّ شرّ في العالم منه، واسمه اهرمن. وبعضهم قال بقدم الشّيطان وهو ظاهر الفساد أيضًا.

وقالت النّصارى الباري تعالى جوهر واحدٌ ثلاثة أقانيم، أقنوم الأب وهو وجوده، وأقنوم الابن وهو علمه، واقنوم روح القدس وهو حياته. فإن أرادوا الصفات فلا منازعة إلّا في اللفظ، وإلّا فهو خطأ لما تقدّم.

Observation VI: On Justice

المرصد السادس في العدل وفيه مطالب

Investigation 1: On Intellectual Good and Bad

If an act has no attribute added to its coming to be, it is like the motion of someone who is inattentive or sleeping. If it does have, it is good either without any attribute added to its being good, and then it is licit, or with an added attribute, so that if blame is entailed by its omission, it is obligatory, but if not, then it is permitted, or it is vice, that is, such that the knowing agent of it deserves blame by virtue of its state.

The Muʿtazilites agree that there are things, which are necessarily known to be good or bad, such as the goodness of beneficial truthfulness, justice, charity, or thanking the benefactor, or the badness of lying, injuring, oppression, or obliging what another is incapable of, and there are things, the goodness or badness of which is known through reflection by the intellect, such as the goodness of disadvantageous truthfulness or the badness of advantageous lying, and there are such that are known with respect to law, not in the sense that it is a cause for the goodness or badness but in the sense that it reveals the law concerning the thing also to the decision of one who does not believe. Were it not for it, miracles could become manifest from the hand of a liar and there would be variance in its promise and threat. Punishment would be for obedience and reward for disobedience, and so the benefit of obligation would be annihilated. Let the prophets be heeded!

The Ashʿarites have said that both are legislated, so that the good is that which the Legislator has ordered whereas the bad is that which He has denied, because knowledge concerning them is not a obtained through reflection or consensus, nor is it necessary, for otherwise it would be equal to knowing that the whole is greater than the part. The consequent is definitely false, and likewise the antecedent. Furthermore, lying may be good when it includes common good, like liberating a prophet from a tyrant, or when someone says, 'I shall lie tomorrow'.[1] Besides, He most high obliged the one whom He knew not to have faith, and it is absurd that anything should be different from God's knowledge, high is He, and He obliged Abū Lahab to have faith, according to all that is reported of him. It is among the reported things that he did not have faith, and so He obliged him to have faith in his not having faith, which is a compound of two contraries.[2] Finally, the acts of servants are coerced, and so there is no goodness or badness.[3]

1 This is a moral variation on the liar's paradox: if someone uttering this sentence lies on the day after, she acts morally by living up to her promise.

2 Cf. Q 111.

3 The Ashʿarites deny that human acts are due to the creature's exercise of free will, since this would compromise God's omnipotence. Human responsibility is due to the notoriously en-

[المطلب] الأوّل: في الحسن والقبح العقليّين

الفعل إن لم يكن له صفة زائدة على حدوثه فهو كحركة الساهي والنائم. وإن كان فهو إمّا حسنٌ لا صفة زائدة على حسنه وهو المباح؛ أو له صفة زائدة، فإن أوجبت الذم على الترك فهو الواجب وإلّا الندب؛ وإمّا قبيحٌ وهو ما يستحقّ فاعله العالم بحاله الذم.

واتّفقت المعتزلة على أنّ من الأشياء ما يعلم كونه حسنًا وقبيحًا بالضرورة، كحسن الصدق النافع والإنصاف والإحسان وشكر المنعم وقبح الكذب الضار والظلم والفساد وتكليف ما لا يطاق؛ ومنها ما يعلم حسنه وقبحه بنظر العقل، كحسن الصدق الضار وقبح الكذب النافع، ومنها ما يعلم من جهة الشرع، لا بمعنى أنّه علّةٌ في الحسن والقبح بل أنّه كاشف لجزم من لم يعتقد الشرع به، ولأنّه لولاه لجاز إظهار المعجزة على يد الكاذب، والخلف في وعده ووعيده والتعذيب على الطاعة والإثابة على المعصية فينتفي فائدة التكليف ولأفحمت الأنبياء.

وقالت الأشاعرة إنهما شرعيّان فالحسنُ أمر الشّارع به والقبيح ما نهى عنه؛ لأنّ العلم به ليس نظريًّا إجماعًا ولا ضروريًّا، وإلّا لساوى العلم بأنّ الكلّ أعظم من الجزء، والتّالي باطل قطعًا فكذا المقدّم. ولأنّ الكذب قد يحسن إذا اشتمل على مصلحة كتخليص نبيّ من ظالم، أو قال لأكذبنّ غدًا، ولأنّه تعالى كلّف من علم عدم إيمانه، وخلاف معلوم الله تعالى محال. وكلّف أبالهب بالإيمان بجميع ما أخبر به. ومن جملة ما أخبر أنّه لا يؤمن فقد كلّفه بأن يؤمن بأن لا يؤمن. وهو جمعٌ بينَ النقيضين؛ ولأنّ أفعال العبد اضطراريّة، فلا حسن ولا قبح.

The answer is to deny the implication, for certain assents differ due to the difference of conceptions in terms of perfection and deficiency,[4] as well as to falsify the consequent, for lying is never good. There must be ambiguity in the liberation of a prophet, so that lying disappears, or it results from the form of the reports, not being intended by the person but rather by the inquiry. Lying must be refrained from in the morrow, because that includes two aspects of goodness, namely refraining from lying and refraining from actualising the decision to lie, although it does also include an aspect of badness, but it is preferable to lying which includes two aspects of badness, namely lying and actualising the decision to lie, and one aspect of goodness, which is truth. Knowledge follows from it, and it has no effect on that from which it follows.

We deny lack of faith in His report about Abū Lahab. The Sura contains his disparagement, not information about the lack of his faith. This can arrive after his death. It is corroborated by His most high saying, *neither will help him*,[5] and His most high saying, *it makes no difference whether you warn them*,[6] the descent of the verses being possible both after their death and at the moment of their heedlessness. The heedless is not obliged. The choice of the servant will be clarified later.

Appendix

The sinner only sins in what is up to him. The same holds of obligations, for when those endowed with understanding come to know an injustice, a failure to return a deposit, or refraining from thanking a benefactor, they reproach the agent for that, and when they come to know of returning a deposit or thanking the Bestower, they commend the agent. When they are inquired for the cause, they hasten to resort to reporting the injustice, the withholding of deposit, the unbelief in the Bestower, or the giving or denial of thanks. Were their knowledge not necessarily known, they would not hasten to resort to these things, for that would be circular. Hence, it is necessary that when there is injustice, there is badness. When the injustice ends, its badness ends, and so it is a cause.

igmatic "acquisition" (*iktisāb* or *kasb*) of the acts God has created. Cf. VI.3 below.

4 In other words, the Ashʿarites' implication 'if there were moral intuitions, they would be as uncontroversial as logical axioms' is false, because even true conceptions come in degrees of epistemic certainty.

5 Q 111:2.

6 Q 2:6.

والجوابُ المنع من الملازمة فإنّ التصديقات الضرورية تتفاوت بتفاوت التصوّرات فيِ الكمال والنقصان، ومن بطلان التّالي، والكذب ليس بحسن مطلقًا. ويجب التورية لتخليص النّبيّ فينتفي الكذب، أو يأتي بصورة الإخبار من غير قصد له، بل للاستفهام. ويجب ترك الكذب في الغد لاشتمال على وجهي حسن، هما ترك الكذب وترك إتمام العزم عليه وإن اشتمل على وجه قبح، وهو أولى من الكذب المشتمل على وجهي قبح هما الكذب وإتمام العزم عليه، وعلى وجه حسن وهو الصدق، والعلم تابعٌ فلا يؤثّر في المتبوع.

ونمنع إخباره عن أبي لهب بعدم الإيمان. والسورة اشتملت على ذمّه لا على الإخبار بعدم إيمانه. ويُحتَمل نزولها بعد موته. ويؤيّده قوله تعالى ﴿مَا أَغْنَىٰ عَنْهُ﴾ وقوله تعالى ﴿سَوَاءٌ عَلَيْهِمْ أَأَنذَرْتَهُمْ﴾ يُحتَمل نزولها بعدَ موتهم أو حال غفلتهم. والغافل غير مكلّف. وسيأتي بيان اختيار العبد.

تـذنيبٌ

القبائح إنّما قبحت لما هي عليه. وكذا الواجبات، فإنّ العقلاء متى علموا الظلم أو منع ردّ الوديعة أو ترك شكر المنعم ذمّوا فاعل ذلك. ومتى علموا ردّ الوديعة أو شكر النعمة مدحوا فاعله. فإذا طلب منهم العلّة بادروا إلى ذكر الظّلم أو منه الوديعة أو كفران النعمة أو فعل الشكر أو الرد. فلولا علمهم الضّروريّ بالعلم لما بادروا إليها للدوران، فإنّ الضّرر متى كان ظلمًا كان قبيحًا. وإذا انتفى الظلم انتفى قبحه فكان علّة.

Investigation 2: That He Most High Does Not Perform What Is Bad or Violate What Is Obligatory

It is proven by saying that He is alienated from what is bad, because He is independent of it and knows its badness, and He has no motive to it, due to both lack of a motive of need and wisdom, and so the act does not emerge from Him at all.

The Ashʿarites trace bad acts back to Him, high is He above that, because He obliges the non-believer although He knows that faith is impossible in him, and obliging that which cannot be heeded is bad according to you. Moreover, He most high brings men and women together in this world, making some available to others and both producing and denying in them a tendency to union, and that is bad, just as it is bad of us to unite a servant with a maiden.

We have already shown that knowledge is subsequent. The objective of charging is to point at the ground that He produces in order to enable the acquisition of a benefit, and the objective has been reached.[7] If the one who brings the servant together with the maiden forbids them from acquiring each other, threatens them from it by great harms, does to them whatever brings them closer to consenting and distances them from dissenting, appoints them with someone that is quick to discipline them when they offend what they have been ordered, and promises for their consenting great benefit, which can only be acquired thereby, then that is not bad.

7 In other words, the point of moral obligation in the Revelation is to make believers attentive of their freedom and their consequent responsibility for their own acts.

المطلب الثاني: في أنّه تعالى لا يفعل القبيح ولا يُخِلّ بالواجب

يدل عليه أنّ له صارفًا عن القبيح، لأنّه غنيٌّ عنه وعالمٌ بقبحه، ولا داعيّ له إليه لانتفاء داعي الحاجة والحكمة، فلا يصدرُ الفعل عنه قطعًا.

والأشاعرة أسندوا القبائح إليه تعالى عن ذكر ذلك لأنّه كلّف الكافر مع علمه بامتناع الإيمان منه، وتكليف مالا يُطاقُ قبيحٌ عندكم. ولأنّه تعالى جمع بين الرجال والنساء في الدنيا ومكّن بعضهم من بعض، وجعل لهم ميلاً إلى الاجتماع وحرّمه، وذلك قبيح كما يقبح منّا جمع العبيد والإماء.

وقد بيّنا أنّ العلمَ تابعٌ، والغرض في التكليف هو التعريض على معنى أنّه يجعله بحيث يتمكن من الوصول إلى النفع وقد حصل الغرض، والجامع بين العبيد والإماء إذا نهاهم عن وصول بعضهم إلى بعض وتوعّدهم عليه بعظيم الضرر، وفعل بهم ما يُقرّبهم من الامتثال ويُبعّدهم عن المخالفة، ونصب لهم من يؤدّ بهم إذا أخلّوا بما أُمروا به عاجلاً ووعدهم على الامتثال بعظيم النفع الّذي لا يمكن الوصول إليه إلّا به لم يكن قبيحًا.

Investigation 3: On the Creation of Acts

Jahm ibn Ṣafwān[8] maintained that there is no agent apart from God most high, and Ashʿarites and Najjārites have said that the one who brings to be is God most high, whereas the servant merely acquires, and that He most high creates the act and the power in the servant together. They differ concerning acquisition, and Ashʿarī has said that it is an unfolding of God's custom, high is He, of bringing into existence the act and the power together at the choice of the servant, the servant's power having no effect. Some of his companions have said that it means that the servant's power is effective concerning the act's being obedience, disobedience, frivolous, or according to some other of those attributes of action, with which one is charged and through which praise and blame are deserved. Others have said that it is unknown.

The people of justice[9] have maintained that the animal has acts taking place through its power and choice, and according to Abū al-Ḥusayn and his followers this is known necessarily. This is the truth. According to other masters of the Muʿtazilites as well as the Imāmī masters following them, they are acquired.

In our view, everyone endowed with understanding knows necessarily the goodness of praising virtue and blaming offence, and this is based on the agency of the one praised or blamed, as well as on our acts taking place in accordance with our objectives and being excluded in accordance with our refusals. This is what it means to be an agent. Furthermore, the necessity is decisive due to the distinction between our voluntary and forced motions, and it would be bad of Him most high to order and prohibit the way it is bad to order and prohibit inanimate things. Finally, there is that which is heard from tradition.

8 Jahm ibn Ṣafwān (d. 128/746) was an early theologian who became notorious for his rigid determinism.

9 The people of justice are the Muʿtazilites who maintain that justice is a standard we can apply in reasoning about God's acts.

المطلب الثالث: في خلق الأعمال

ذهب جهم بن صفوان إلى أن لا فاعل إلّا اللهُ تعالى، وقالت الأشاعرة والنجّاريّة إنّ المحدِث هو الله تعالى والعبد مكتسبٌ؛ وأنّه تعالى يخلق قدرة للعبد والفعل معًا. واختلفوا في الكسب، فقال الأشعريّ هو إجراء العادة بإيجاد الله تعالى الفعل والقدرة معًا عند اختيار العبد، ولا أثر لقدرة العبد. وقال بعض أصحابه معناه تأثير قدرة العبد في كون الفعل طاعةً أو معصيةً أو عبثًا وغيرها من صفات الفعل الّتي يتناولها التكليف وبها يستحقّ المدح والذّمّ. وقال آخرون إنّه غير معلوم.

وذهب أهل العدل إلى أنّ للحيوان أفعالاً تقع بقدرتهم واختيارهم، فعند أبي الحسين ومن تابعه أنّ العلم به ضروريٌّ وهو الحقّ. وعند باقي مشايخ المعتزلة ومن تابعهم من شيوخ الإماميّة أنّه كسبيٌّ.

لنا أنّ كلّ عاقل يعلم بالضرورة حُسنَ المدح على الإحسان والذّمّ على الإساءة، وهو يتوقف على كون الممدوح والمذموم فاعلاً؛ ولأنّ أفعالنا واقعة بحسب قصودنا ومنتفية بحسب صوارفنا، وهو معنى الفاعل. ولأنّ الضّرورة قاضية بالفرق بين حركاتنا الاختياريّة والاضطراريّة، ولقبح منه تعالى الأمر والنهي كما يقبح أمر الجماد ونهيه؛ وللسمع.

The opponent has argued that if the servant cannot refrain at the time of acting, the act is coerced, but if he can, then if the preponderance is not based on any preponderating factor, it follows that something contingent is preponderated without a preponderating factor. If it is based on a preponderating factor and if this is from the agent, the investigation returns. Were this factor not from the agent, coercion would follow, because the act is impossible without it and necessary through it. Furthermore, if he brought his act into existence, then he would know its ramifications, for a universal objective is not sufficient for the occurrence of what is particular, because its relation to all particulars is equal. The consequent is decisively false, because there is no knowledge of the intermediate rests in slow motions.[10] Moreover, if the servant wanted to move a body but God most high wanted to keep it still, then were both or neither to take place, an absurdity would follow, whereas were one of them to take place, there would be preponderance without a preponderating factor, since both of them are independent. Finally, if He knows that something will take place, this is necessary, otherwise it is impossible, and so there is no power.

The answer is that he is capable of refraining with regard to power but incapable with regard to motive, and the motive does not emerge to him from the power, because the two alternatives are equal in relation to power alone, but terminates in what is the due share of the Necessary Existent. General knowledge is sufficient for bringing into existence. A particular act can be triggered by a universal objective when its specification by substrate and time is considered, but not with respect to the objective. The power of Him most high is stronger, so that His act emerges first, and the necessity that is traced back to knowledge is subsequent.

10 This counterargument is based on the theory, mentioned above in III.3.7.3, that differences in speed between motions are due to the amount of short intermediate phases of rest. In a slow motion, there are more such phases than in a fast motion. The argument here is that if we were the knowing and voluntary agents of our acts, we should know all that is included in carrying them out. For instance, if I were to walk slowly to the other room, I should be aware of the alteration of the phases of motion and rest – and indeed, of both phases as my own acts.

احتجّ الخصم بأنّ العبد حال الفعل إن لم يمكنه الترك فهو الجبر؛ وإن أمكنه فإن لم يتوقّف الترجيح على مرجّح لزم ترجيح الممكن من غير مرجّح، وإن توقّف فإن كان منه عاد البحث، وإلّا لزم الجبر لامتناع الفعل من دونه ووجوبه عنده؛ ولأنّه لو كان موجدًا لفعله لكان عالمًا بتفاصيله، فإنّ القصد الكلّيّ لا يكفي في حصول الجزئيّ لتساوي نسبته إلى الجميع. والتّالي باطل قطعًا، لعدم العلم بقدر السكنات المتخلّلة في الحركات البطيئة، ولأنّه لو أراد العبد حركة جسم وأراد الله تعالى تسكينه فإن وقعا أو لم يقعا لزم المحال؛ وإن وقع أحدهما كان ترجيحًا من غير مرجّح لاستقلال كلّ منهما؛ ولأنه تعالى إن علم الوقوع وجب وإلّا امتنع، فلا قدرة.

والجواب أنّه متمكنٌ من التّرك نظرًا إلى القدرة وغير متمكّن نظرًا إلى الدّاعي ولا يخرجه عن القدرة، لتساوي الطرفين بالنسبة إلى القدرة وحدها، وهو آتٍ في حقّ واجب الوجود. والعلم الإجماليّ كافٍ في الإيجاد. والقصد الكلّي قد ينبعث عنه الفعل الجزئي بإعتبار تخصيصه بالمحلّ والوقت لا بإعتبار القصد، وقدرته تعالى أقوى فكان صدور فعله أولى، والوجوب المستند إلى العلم لا حقَّ.

Just as supposing one of two contraries entails its necessity subsequently and without the impossibility of the other, the same holds when knowledge is supposed, for it corresponds to it.[11] The principle in the state of adequate correspondence is that which is known, although it terminates in His due share, high is He. Acquisition is useless, because the possibility of the emergence of a choice entails the possibility of the emergence of a different choice, since neither deserves to take place rather than the other. Moreover, their own evidence is applicable to it, for the choice of disobedience is different from the choice of obedience. Hence, if one of the two occurs not due to a preponderating factor, it follows that one of two alternatives has been preponderated without a preponderating factor, and if that is due to a preponderating factor, there is a regress. The same holds of the rest of the evidence.

11 If we suppose P instead of not-P, then P necessarily holds, but only by virtue of the supposition. By the same token, if we suppose (God's) knowledge that P instead of (God's) knowledge that not-P, then (God's) knowledge that P holds, but only by virtue of the supposition of knowledge *and* the entailed supposition of P as the ground of its truth. As Ḥillī has said time and again, he believes that knowledge universally conforms to what is known, not the other way around.

وكما أنّ فرض أحد النقيضين يقتضي وجوبه لا حقًا دون امتناع الآخر، كذا فرض العلم لأنّه مطابقٌ له. والأصل في هيئة التطابق هو المعلوم، مع أنّه آتٍ في حقّه تعالى. والكسب غير مفيد لأنّ تجويز صدور الاختيار يقتضي تجويز صدور غيره لعدم الأولويّة؛ ولا نسحاب أدلّتهم عليه، فإنّ اختيار المعصية مغايرٌ لاختيار الطاعة. فحصول أحدهما إن لم يكن لمرجّح لزم ترجيح أحد الطرفين لا لمرجّح، وإن كان لمرجّح تسلسل. وكذا باقي الأدلّة.

Investigation 4: That He Most High Wills Obedience and Detests Disobedience

This is the doctrine of those who endorse justice,[12] *pace* the Ashʿarites, because He has a motive for obedience but no distraction from it, and He has a distraction from disobedience and no motive for it, for He is wise and one who is wise has a motive for the good, obedience being good, and distraction from the bad, disobedience being bad. Moreover, willing what is bad is bad, for those endowed with understanding concur about the blame upon one who wants what is bad. Besides, He has ordered obedience and prohibited disobedience, which entail will and detest, for an order is an order with respect to willing what is ordered. Finally, He most high has said: *The evil of all these actions is hateful to your Lord*,[13] and he lies who says, *'If God had willed, we would not have ascribed partners to Him'*,[14] and He has said: *God does not will injustice for His creatures*,[15] *God does not like corruption*,[16] *He is not pleased by ingratitude in His servants*,[17] *I created jinn and mankind only to worship Me*,[18] *though all they were ordered to do was worship God alone, sincerely devoting their religion to Him*.[19]

They have argued by saying that willing obedience from an unbeliever entails its taking place and detesting disobedience entails its non-existence. Moreover, an order may be brought into existence without willing, like in the case of the one who seeks an excuse for hitting his servant in the latter's heedlessness towards him, for he orders the servant but does not will him to act, in order for his excuse to be evident. He most high has said: *Had your Lord willed, all the people on earth would have believed*.[20]

The answer is that He willed it to take place by choice and detested disobedience taking place by choice, lest the obligation be annihilated. The Lord brings to existence the form of the order, not its heeding, nor is there will for it, whereas the verse only refers to coercion.

12 Again, these are the Muʿtazilites (see n. 330).
13 Q 17:38.
14 Q 6:148.
15 Q 3:108.
16 Q 2:205.
17 Q 39:7.
18 Q 51:56.
19 Q 98:5.
20 Q 10:99.

المطلب الرابع: في أنّه تعالى يريد الطاعات ويكره المعاصي

هذا مذهب العدليّة خلافًا للأشاعرة، ولأنّ له داعيًا إلى الطاعة ولا صارفَ له عنها، وله صارفٌ عن المعصية ولا داعي له إليها، لأنّه حكيمٌ؛ والحكيم له داع إلى الحَسَن، والطاعة حسنة، وله صارفٌ عن القبيح والمعصية قبيحةٌ؛ ولأنّ إرادة القبيح قبيحةٌ لاستحسان العقلاء ذمّ مريد القبيح، ولأنّه أمر بالطاعة ونهي عن المعصية. وهما يستلزمان الإرادة والكراهة؛ فإنّ الأمر إنّما هو أمرٌ باعتبار إرادة المأمور به؛ ولقوله تعالى: ﴿كُلُّ ذَٰلِكَ كَانَ سَيِّئُهُ عِندَ رَبِّكَ مَكْرُوهًا﴾ وكذب من قال: ﴿لَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ مَا أَشْرَكْنَا﴾ وقوله: ﴿وَمَا اللَّهُ يُرِيدُ ظُلْمًا لِّلْعَالَمِينَ﴾، ﴿وَاللَّهُ لَا يُحِبُّ الْفَسَادَ﴾، ﴿وَلَا يَرْضَىٰ لِعِبَادِهِ الْكُفْرَ﴾، و ﴿مَا خَلَقْتُ الْجِنَّ وَالْإِنسَ إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُونِ﴾، ﴿وَمَا أُمِرُوا إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُوا اللَّهَ مُخْلِصِينَ لَهُ الدِّينَ﴾.

احتجّوا بأنّ إرادة الطاعة من الكافر تستلزم وقوعها وكراهة المعصية تستلزم عدمها؛ ولأنّ الأمر قد يوجد بدون الإرادة كطالب العذر عن ضرب عبده بعد مقبوله منه، فيأمره ولا يريد فعلَه ليظهرَ عذره؛ وقوله تعالى: ﴿وَلَوْ شَاءَ رَبُّكَ لَآمَنَ مَن فِي الْأَرْضِ كُلُّهُمْ جَمِيعًا﴾.

والجوابُ أنّه أراد إيقاعها اختيارًا وكره إيقاع المعصية اختيارًا، لئلّا يبطل التكليف. والمولى يوجد صورة الأمر ولا طلب كما لا إرادة، والآية يدلّ على القسر.

Investigation 5: On the Charge

It is the will of one who must be obeyed with respect to initiating[21] that which is laborious and under the condition of having been made known.[22] It is good because it is an act of Him most high, for God performs no bad acts. It inevitably has an objective, since frivolousness is bad, albeit not an objective that returns to Him most high, for He is self-sufficient, or to anything other than the one charged, for it would be bad to bestow labour for the benefit of another. When the one charged is harmed because of his badness, this is not initiated anew, nor is he availed by knowledge of his unbelief when he has rebelled against the charge, and his pleading for avail or about the harm due to his badness does not validate initiation anew, for then the charge would become frivolous. Hence, benefit cannot be initiated anew.[23]

The Ashʿarites have denied an objective in His acts, for otherwise He would be deficient in His essence and perfected by that objective, since by obtaining it He would obtain that which is appropriate to Him. This is not sound, for otherwise frivolousness would follow and goals would be nullified in products of evident wisdom. The benefit is preposterous, just as it is in the case of His being a creator.

The charge is necessary according to the Muʿtazilites, *pace* the Ashʿarites, for otherwise He would be seducing to what is bad, because one endowed with understanding has an inclination to what is bad and is alienated from the good. Were it not for the charge that restrains from what is bad, the inclination would be pursued.

21 That is, the servant must obey God in the acts he initiates himself.

22 That is, God must have informed the servant of His will.

23 The point here is that God will not intervene to save a sinner from his responsibility and its consequences, nor are there alleviating circumstances, such as God's alleged knowledge of the sinner's unbelief.

المطلب الخامس: في التكليف

وهو إرادة من يجب طاعته على جهة الابتداء ما فيه مشقّة بشرط الإعلام. وهو حسن لأنّه من فعله تعالى، والله لا يفعل القبيح؛ ولا بدّ من غرضٍ لقبح العبث، وليس عائدًا إليه تعالى لاستغنائه ولا إلى غير المكلّف لقبح إلزام المشقّة لنفع الغير، ولا ضرر المكلّف لقبحه ابتداء، ولا نفعه لا تتقاضه بتكليف من علم كفره، ولا تعريضه للضرر لقبحه، ولا لنفع يصحّ الابتداء به لأنّه يصير عبثًا؛ فهو التعريض لنفع لا يمكن الابتداء به.

والأشاعرة نفوا الغرض في أفعاله وإلّا لكان ناقصًا في ذاته مستكملاً بذلك الغرض، إذ بحصوله يحصل له ما هو الأولى له. وليس بجيّد، وإلّا لزم العبث وإبطال غايات المصنوعات الظاهرة حكمها. والاستفادة باطلة كما في الخالقيّة.

وهو واجب عند المعتزلة خلافًا للأشاعرة وإلّا لكان مغريًا بالقبيح، لأنّ للعاقل ميلاً إلى القبيح ونفورًا عن الحسن. فلولا التكليف الزاجر عن القبيح لزم ارتكابه.

Its condition is that the one charged knows the attribute of an act, lest he be charged with what is bad or what is indifferent, and the degree of reward it merits, so that he believes in ending oppression. Further conditions are that there is power to bring about the act, that he is above acting badly and free from necessity, and that what he is charged with is possible, for it would be bad to charge with the impossible, that the act is such that it merits reward, like a duty, a commission or refraining from what is bad, that the one charged have power over it when he distinguishes between it and that with which he is not charged but of which he is capable in terms of the instrument and the knowledge of what it requires. The reason for why it is good to charge the believer also holds of the unbeliever, for knowledge is not produced and the pleading for benefit is established for him, too. The choice of unbelief does not remove the goodness of what is good.

وشرطه كون المكلّف عالمًا بصفة الفعل لئلّا يكلّف بالقبيح أو المباح، وبقدر المستحقّ عليه من الثواب ليؤمن انتفاء الظلم، والقدرة على الإيصال، وكونه منزّهًا عن فعل القبيح والإخلال بالواجب، وأن يكون ما كلّف به ممكنًا لقبح التكليف بالمحال، وكونه ممّا يستحقّ به الثواب كالواجب والندب وترك القبيح، وقدرة المكلّف عليه مميّزًا بينه وبين ما لم يكلّفه متمكنًا من الآلة والعلم بما يحتاج إليه، والعلّة في حسن تكليف المؤمن آتيةٌ في الكافر؛ فإنّ العلم غير مؤثر والتعريض للنفع ثابت فيه. واختيار الكفر لا يُخرج الحَسن عن حُسنه.

When the one charged is endowed with it, he is closer to acting obediently and further removed from doing what is bad, but it has no share in enabling him, nor does it reach the limit of coercing. Hence, an instrument is not grace, because it is included in enabling. Coercing would deny the charge, unlike grace. Grace is necessary, *pace* the Ashʿarites, for otherwise it would follow that the objective is invalidated. Since He most high knows that the one charged will not choose to obey or is not close to it, unless there is an act, which He performs through him, He is necessitated to act, for otherwise He would have invalidated His objective. By the same token, if one has prepared food for another, knowing that the person will not eat unless an act of unlaborious and unobjectionable courteousness is performed towards him, but does not perform that act, he did not want the other person to eat.

Let it not be said: If an act is possible without grace, it does not depend on grace. Were that not the case, grace would become part of the whole enabling, like power. Moreover, the aspect of necessity is not sufficient in the case of one, from whom the aspects of badness have not been removed, but why cannot grace encompass the bad aspects as well? Finally, if grace entails preponderance that precludes the contradictory, it is coercing. If it does not preclude that, it does not suffice for the existence of the act, and if it does not entail preponderance at all, its use vanishes.

For we say: An act depends on a motive. Grace is a motive, its cause, or something that strengthens it, and so the act depends on it but it is not enabling. The aspects of badness are restricted and precisely determined, because we are charged with avoiding them, and they are precluded from grace. The consequence of preponderance that precludes the contradictory does not entail coercing, any more than does the motive through which an act is necessary, for even if it did not preclude the contradictory, it would suffice together with the motive and the power.

If grace is an act of His most high, His performing it is necessary, but if it is an act of the one charged, He most high must make him acquainted with it and necessitate it. If it is an act of something other than either, He could not charge him with an act depending on that grace, unless He knew decisively that that other performs the act.

المطلب السادس: في اللّطف

وهو ما كان المكلّف معه أقرب إلى فعل الطاعة وأبعد من فعل القبيح، ولم يكن له حظٌّ في التمكين ولم يبلغ إلى حدّ الإلجاء، فالآلة ليست لطفًا؛ لأن لها مدخلاً في التمكين. والإلجاء ينافي التكليف بخلاف اللّطف، وهو واجبٌ خلافًا للأشعريّة؛ وإلّا لزم نقض الغرض، فإنّه تعالى إذا علم أنّ المكلّف لا يختار الطاعة أولا يكون أقرب إليها إلّا عند فعل يفعله به وجب عليه فعله وإلّا كان مُناقضًا لغرضه؛ كمن قدّم طعامًا إلى غيره ويعلم أنّه لا يأكل إلّا إذا فعل معه نوعًا من التأدّب لا مشقّة فيه ولا غضاضة، فلو لم يفعله لم يكن مريدًا لأكله.

لا يقال الفعل بدون اللطف إن كان ممكنًا لم يتوقّف على اللّطف، وإلّا صار من جملة التّمكين كالقدرة، ولأنّ وجه الوجوب غير كافٍ فيه ما لم ينتف عنه وجوه القبح، فلِمَ لا يجوز اشتمال اللّطف على وجه قبح، ولأنّ اللطف إن اقتضى رجحانًا مانعًا من النقيض كان إلجاءً. وإن كان غير مانع لم يكف في وجود الفعل، وإن لم يقتض رجحانًا البتة انتفت فائدته.

لأنّا نقول الفعل يتوقّف على الدّاعي. واللّطف إمّا الدّاعي أو سببه أو مقوّيه، فيتوقّف عليه الفعل وليس تمكينًا. ووجوه القبح محصورة مضبوطة، لأنّا مكلّفون باجتنابها؛ وهي منفيّةٌ عن اللطف، واقتضاء الرجحان المانع من النقيض لا يستلزم الإلجاء، كالدّاعي الّذي يجب الفعل عنده، وإن كان غير مانع كفى مع الدّاعي والقدرة.

واللطف إن كان من فعله تعالى وجب عليه فعله، وإن كان من فعل المكلّف وجب عليه تعالى أن يُعرّفه إيّاه ويُوجبه عليه، وإن كان من فعل غيرهما لم يجز أن يكلّفه فعلاً متوقّفًا على ذلك اللّطف إلّا إذا علم أن ذلك يفعله قطعًا.

Investigation 7: On Pains and Compensations

Some pain is bad, namely that which emerges from us and the compensation of which belongs to us, and some is good. If this is from our activity, it is permitted, recommended, or obligatory, and its compensation belongs to Him most high, but if it is from His activity, high is He, it is either with respect to the desert of punishment or with respect to initiation.[24]

This is controversial, and Bakrites[25] have denied it, whereas Ashʿarites have said that there is no compensation from Him most high for the pain He has inflicted or ordered. The transmigrationists have said that He most high inflicts pain only with respect to punishment. According to the endorsers of justice, He most high inflicts pain by way of initiation, provided that it includes a common good, which cannot be brought about without it, and it is grace either for the one in pain or for another. If the one in pain were compensated for encountering it, it would be multiplied many times, insofar as the one suffering the pain would choose compensation and pain, for withholding compensation from the one in pain would be oppression, whereas withholding grace would be frivolous.

Compensation is a deserved benefit that is devoid of laudation and exaltation. That which belongs to us is equal to the pain, whereas that which belongs to Him most high due to His act, permission, order, or enabling the one not endowed with understanding, is more than the pain.

24 That is, pain can be a way for God to incite us into action.

25 These are followers of a certain Bakr ibn Ukht ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Zayd, an early adversary of the Muʿtazilites, who flourished probably in the second half of the second/eighth century.

المطلب السابع: في الآلام والأعواض

الألم منه قبيح، وهو صادر عنّا والعوض فيه علينا. ومنه حَسنٌ، فإن كان من فعلنا مباحًا أو مندوبًا أو واجبًا فالعوض عليه تعالى، وإن كان من فعله تعالى فإمّا على وجه الاستحقاق بالعقاب وإمّا على جهة الابتداء.

واختلف فيه فنفاه البكريّة، وقالت الأشاعرة لا عوض عليه تعالى في ما يفعله من الألم ولا في ما يأمر به. وقالت التناسخيّة إنّه تعالى يؤلم على وجه العقوبة لا غير. وعند العدليّة أنّه تعالى يؤلم ابتداءً بشرط اشتماله على مصلحة لا تحصل بدونه، وهو اللّطف؛ إمّا للمؤلَم أو لغيره. وإن يكون في مقابلته عوضٌ للمؤلَم يزيد عليه أضعافًا كثيرةً بحيث يختار المتألم العوض والألم؛ لأن عراءه عن العوض ظلمٌ وعن اللّطف عبثٌ.

والعوض هو النفع المستحقّ الخالي من تعظيم وإجلال، فالمستحقّ علينا مساوٍ للألم، والمستحقّ عليه تعالى بفعله أو إباحته أو أمره أو تمكينه لغير العاقل زائد عليه.

People of justice differ concerning the hereafter, some of them saying the foregoing while others say that animals are compensated as well. The others say there is no compensation here. According to us, He most high enables them and produces in them a strong inclination to inflict pain, but does not create in them any intellect that would restrain them from what is bad, although they are enabled. The opponent has argued by reference to his saying, peace be upon him, "the hornless will take their due from the horned",[26] which can only be by taking compensation from the perpetrator, as well as by reference to his saying, peace be upon him, "wounding the dumb is tyranny",[27] the demand for taking compensation being from the perpetrator or someone else. It can also be without consequences, because there is no retaliation.[28]

Compensation is obligatory, *pace* the Ashʿarites, for otherwise injustice would result, but the masters differ, Abū Hāshim and al-Balkhī having said that God most high can enable injustice without any immediate compensation equal to the act. Then al-Balkhī said that it is possible that the one who has suffered leaves this world without compensation, but God most high grants him compensation, paying him for the suffered injustice. Abū Hāshim precluded this and held that persistence is necessary for the desert of equal compensation, because the demand is obligating but granting is not necessary, and so what is obligating does not depend on it.[29] Al-Murtaḍā has said that persistence is not necessary, and the obligating demand does not depend on it. Instead, it is obligatory that he has an equal compensation in the state in which the injustice incurs upon him.

26 The same tradition is cited in Ḥillī, *Kashf al-murād* III.3.14, 312-313. It seems to be based on similar texts in *Bihār al-anwār*, cf. VII.92; VII.245; and LXIV.6.

27 Cf. *Bihār al-anwār* XC.267.

28 Ḥillī means that there are two ways of reading the crucial word in the *ḥadīth*: either as *jabbār*, meaning tyranny, or as *jubār*, meaning an act for which no retaliation is demanded, and which is without consequences in this sense.

29 In other words, since the obligatory compensation does not always take place in this life, one who has suffered injustice must persist in the hereafter in order to be compensated.

واختلف أهل العدل في الأخير، فقال بعضهم بما تقدّم وآخرون بأنّ العوض على الحيوان. والباقون قالوا لا عوض هنا. لنا، أنّه تعالى مكّنه وجعل فيه ميلاً شديدًا إلى الإيلام ولم يخلق له عقلاً يزجره عن القبيح مع إمكانه. احتجّ الخصم بقوله عليه السلام: «ينتصف للجمّاء من القرناء» وإنّما يكون بأخذ العوض من الجاني، وبقوله عليه السلام: «جرح العجماء جبارٌ» والانتصاف بأخذ العوض إمّا من الجاني أو غيره؛ وصحّ أن يكون جبارًا لانتفاء القصاص فيه.

والعوض واجب خلافًا للأشاعرة، وإلّا لزم الظلم. واختلف الشيوخ فقال أبو هاشم والبلخيّ يجوز أن يُمكّن الله تعالى من الظلم من لا عوض له في الحال يوازي فعله. ثمّ قال البلخيّ يجوز أن يخرج من الدنيا ولا عوض له، ويتفضّل الله تعالى عليه بالعوض فيدفعه إلى المظلوم. ومنعه أبو هاشم وأوجب التبقية إلى أن يستحقّ عوضًا موازيًا، لأنّ الانتصاف واجب والتفضّل ليس بواجب، فلا يعلّق عليه الواجب. قال المرتضى التبقية أيضًا ليست واجبةً، فلا يعلّق عليها الانتصاف الواجب. بل يجب أن يكون له في حال ظلمه عوضًا موازيًا.

Investigation 8: On Appointed Times, Provisions, and Prices

(a) The appointed time is a moment at which something comes to be. 'Moment' means something that comes to be and is made into a sign of the coming to be of another. For instance, it is said, 'Zayd will arrive at the sunrise'. The appointed time of life is the moment in which it comes to be, and likewise the appointed time of death. Hence, regardless of which deceased is about to die, and regardless of the variety of the causes of death, his death is in its appointed time.

There is a debate concerning the one to be executed if he is not executed, and it is said that he would definitely live, for should he definitely die, the slaughterer of a sheep in his stead would be charitable to him. It is also said that he would definitely die, for otherwise it would follow that His knowledge, high is He, would be transformed into ignorance, were he to live. The first implication is precluded, because it neglects the compensation belonging to God most high, which is greater than the compensation belonging to him. The second one is also precluded, because of the possibility that knowledge of death depends on the killing, and were it not for it, there would be life.

When it comes to provision, according to those who endorse justice, no one is to deny it from Him, if it is at all possible to benefit from it, for He most high has said, *Give out of what We have provided for you*,[30] and God most high does not order what is prohibited. According to the Ashʿarites, provision is something that is consumed, even if it were prohibited. It can be pursued as a whole, due to His most high saying, *disperse in the land and seek out God's bounty*.[31]

When it comes to the price, it is the measure of the replacement for which things are sold. Let it not be said that it is the replacement, because the replacement is of a value or an object of value. Neither of them is a price. It is either cheap, which is a price that is lower than what follows the custom, time and place being one, or it is expensive, which is the opposite of that, and both of them are either from God most high or from the servants.

30 Q 63:10.
31 Q 62:10.

المطلب الثامن: في الآجال والأرزاق والأسعار

الأجل هو الوقت الّذي يحدث فيه الشّيء، ويعنى بالوقت الحادث الّذي جعل علمًا لحدوث غيره. كما يقال: قدم زيد عند طلوع الشمس. وأجل الحياة هو الوقت الّذي يحدث فيه، وأجل الموت كذلك. فأيّ ميّتٍ مات على اختلاف أسباب الموت فإنّ موته في أجله.

واختلف في المقتول لو لم يقتل فقيل: يعيش قطعًا، لأنّه لو مات قطعًا لكان ذابح غنم غيره محسنًا إليه. وقيل: يموت قطعًا، وإلّا لزم انقلاب علمه تعالى جهلاً لو عاش. والملازمة الأولى ممنوعة لأنّه فوّته العوض على الله تعالى. وهو أزيد من العوض عليه. والثانية أيضًا لجواز تعلّق علم الموت بالقتل والحياة لولاه.

وأمّا الرزق فعند العدليّة ما صحّ الانتفاع به ولم يكن لأحد منعه منه، لقوله تعالى ﴿وَأَنفِقُوا مِمَّا رَزَقْنَاكُمْ﴾، والله تعالى لا يأمر بالحرام. وعند الأشاعرة الرزق ما أكل وإن كان حرامًا. ويجوز طلبه إجماعًا ولقوله تعالى ﴿فَانتَشِرُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَابْتَغُوا مِن فَضْلِ اللَّهِ﴾.

وأمّا السّعر فهو تقدير البدل فيما يباع به الأشياء. ولا يقال هو البدل؛ لأنّ البدل هو الثمن أو المثمن. وليس أحدهما سعرًا. وهو إمّا رخصٌ، وهو السّعرُ المنحطّ عمّا جرت به العادة، والوقت والمكان واحدٌ؛ وإمّا غلاءٌ، وهو ما يقابله؛ وكلّ منهما إمّا من الله تعالى أو من العباد.

Observation VII: On Prophecy

المرصد السابع في النبوة وفيه مطالب

Preface: Who Is the Prophet?

The prophet is a man informed by God most high without the mediation of any human being, which excludes the angels, the one who is informed by someone other God, and the one who knows. It is inevitable that he is distinguished by the evidence of a miracle by his hand, which proves his truthfulness. A miracle is that which breaks with the custom, either establishing what is unusual or precluding what is usual while matching his claim, and it is included in his genus and among his attributes.

مقدمة: [من هو النّبيّ]

النّبيّ هو الإنسان المخبر عن الله تعالى بغير واسطة أحدٍ من البشر، فخرجت الملائكة والمخبر عن غير الله تعالى والعالِمُ. ولا بدّ من اختصاصه بظهور المعجزة على يده تدلّ على صدقه، والمعجزة ما خرق العادة من ثبوت ما ليس بمعتاد أو نفي ما هو معتاد مع مطابقته للدّعوى ويعدده في جنسه وصفته.

Investigation 1: On the Possibility of the Mission

The ones endowed with understanding concur about it, except the Brahmins and the Sabians,[1] because there is common good for the world but nothing corrupt in the mission, and what is such will take place. Hence, it is possible.

They argue by saying that the messenger, peace be upon him, only brings forth what conforms to the intellect. Hence, there is no need for it, because the benefit is denied. Were that not the case, he would have been rejected.[2]

The answer is that the benefit is evident even concerning that which conforms to the intellect, for the intellectual is confirmed by means of the traditional, and the excuse of the one charged is undermined, as He most high has said: *so that mankind would have no excuse before God, after receiving the messengers*.[3] Moreover, the intellect may be incapable of perceiving the truth and in need of revelation, like in the case of the useful attributes that are heard from the tradition, or like the bad things that are traced back to it and the benefits known from it, or like the arts and other such things. What does not conform to the intellect is not rejected, if the intellect does not entail its contrary.

1 By the Brahmins, Ḥillī probably refers to Hindu believers in transmigration. The Qurʾānic Sabeans may here refer to Mandaeans, according to whose gnostic soteriology the body is fundamentally evil and the soul's salvation requires liberation from it.

2 That is, if the prophet's message did not conform to the intellect, he would not have been received favourably by anyone in her right mind. The argument here is that of those who deny the mission of prophets, such as the Brahmins and the Sabeans.

3 Q 4:165.

المطلب الأوّل: في إمكان البعثة

اتّفق العقلاء عليه إلّا البراهمة والصّابئة، لأنّ فيها مصلحةً للعالم ولا مفسدة فيها؛ وما كان كذلك فهو واقعٌ فيكون ممكنًا.

احتجّوا بأنّ الرسول عليه الصلاة والسلام إنّما جاء بما يوافق العقل فلا حاجة إليه، لانتفاء الفائدة وإلّا كان مردودًا.

والجوابُ الفائدةُ ظاهرةٌ في ما يوافق العقل، وهو تأكيد العقليّ بالنقليّ؛ وقطع عذر المكلّف كما قال تعالى: ﴿لِئَلَّا يَكُونَ لِلنَّاسِ عَلَى اللَّهِ حُجَّةٌ بَعْدَ الرُّسُلِ﴾ ولأنّ العقل قد يعجز عن إدراك الحقّ فيحتاج إلى كاشف، كالصّفات المستفادة من السّمع، وكالقبائح المستندة إليه والمنافع المعلومة منه، كالصّنائع وغيرها. وما لا يوافق العقل لا يكون مردودًا إذا لم يقتض العقل نقيضه.

Investigation 2: On the Necessity of the Mission

Those who endorse justice concur about it, *pace* the Ashʿarites, because things reported by the tradition are altogether necessary and a grace bestowed upon intellectual things. This is known necessarily, for the one who perseveres in the obligations reported by tradition is closer to performing the intellectual obligations, God most high having pointed at this in His saying, high is He: *prayer restrains outrageous and unacceptable behaviour.*[4] Grace is necessary and things heard from the tradition can only be known through the mission. Furthermore, knowledge of punishment and its duration, as well as of the duration of reward, is definitely grace, which is included in the charge, and the grace is necessary, for that can only be known through what is heard from tradition.

The ancients have another method in this topic, namely that man is urban by nature by virtue of the constant need in his state for assistance and co-operation, insofar as each of them is devoted to some good of the other, so that each of them acquires from the community the matters of livelihood he needs. It is inevitable that a community is a place for conflict and competition, and its benefit only endures by custom and justice that are ordered with respect to the use that the affairs of the species derive from them. That custom and justice no doubt are pronounced by one who is distinguished above the sons of the species, because none of them is prior in status, and each prefers that which is closest to himself. That distinction is through an act, which no other from among his likes can attain, that is, through a miracle.

Besides, many people are such that they despise the disturbance due to the affairs of the species when they have obtained what they need as individuals, and so there is a need to scare and threaten them with the obtainment of reward and punishment in the hereafter, according to dispute and congruence. At the occasion of forgetting, man needs, as a reminder of that, repeated remembrance of the Lord most high and His threat and promise. That takes place by applying legal obligations, and so the mission of messengers, who warn of reward and punishment, is necessary in His wisdom, high is He, who legislates the frequent reported obligations according to what is entailed by divine wisdom.

4 Q 29:45.

المطلب الثاني: في وجوب البعثة

اتّفقت العدليّة عليه خلافًا للأشاعرة، لأنّ السّمعيّات واجبةٌ إجماعًا وهي ألطافٌ في العقليّات للعلم الضّروريّ بأنّ المواظب على فعل الواجبات السمعيّة أقرب إلى فعل الواجبات العقليّة؛ وقد نبّه الله تعالى عليه في قوله تعالى: ﴿إِنَّ الصَّلَاةَ تَنْهَىٰ عَنِ الْفَحْشَاءِ وَالْمُنكَرِ﴾. واللّطف واجبٌ، ولا يمكن معرفةُ السّمعيات إلّا بالبعثة؛ ولأنّ العلم بالعقاب ودوامه ودوام الثّواب ألطافٌ في التكليف قطعًا، واللّطف واجبٌ ولا يمكن معرفة ذلك إلّا بالسّمع.

وللأوائل في هذا الباب طريق آخر، وهو أنّ الإنسان مدنيّ بالطبع لافتقاره في انتظام أحواله إلى معاون ومشارك بحيث يفرغ كلّ منهم لبعض مصالح الآخر، فيحصل من المجموع لكلّ واحد ما يحتاج إليه في أمور معاشه. ولا شكّ في أنّ الاجتماع مظنّة التنازع والتغالب، فلا يستمر فائدته إلّا بسُنّةٍ وعدل ينتظم باعتبار استعمالهما أحوال النوع. وتلك السنّة والعدل لا بدّ لها من ناصب متميّز عن بني النوع لعدم الأولويّة في الواضع وكان يفضي إلى ما يقرب منه. وذلك الامتياز إنّما هو بفعل لا يتمكن غيره من الإتيان بمثله وهو المعجزة.

ثمّ إنّ كثيرًا من النّاس من يستحقر اختلال حال النوع بوصول ما يحتاج إليه بحسب الشخص، فيحتاج إلى تخويف ووعد بوصول ثواب وعقاب إليه أُخرويّين عند المخالفة أو الموافقة. ولما كان الإنسان في معرض النسيان احتاج في تذكار ذلك إلى تكرير ذكر الرّب تعالى ووعده ووعيده. وذلك باستعمال التكاليف الشرعيّة، فوجب في حكمته تعالى بعث رسول منذر بثوابٍ وعقابٍ، شارع للتكاليف السمعيّة المتكرّرة بحسب مقتضى الحكمة الإلهيّة.

Investigation 3: On the Necessity of Being Safeguarded

The Imamites in particular maintain the necessity of the prophet's being safeguarded from acting badly or violating what is obligatory, *pace* the entire sect, for the majority of Ashʿarites and superficialists[5] allow all sins for them, except unbelief and lying in executing their task. Some Muʿtazilites have said that only small sins due to inattention are possible for them, whereas others maintain, by way of interpretation, that this can be intentional, and still others that it can be by way of an objective, lest the sins turn out as unbelief.

According to us, denying their being safeguarded results in denying the objective of mission, namely their acceptance and imitation of their orders and prohibitions, for if they allow the one charging to sin, then it is also possible that the ones ordered by him are sinful. Moreover, it would be permissible to perform some of what is ordered to be performed as well as to perform what is not ordered, and so the benefit of mission would be annihilated. Besides, if he performs a sin, he must be disowned and his status falls from being accepted. Finally, if we allow sin for him, we are not obliged by the example of his statement except after knowing its truth, and a circle follows.

He must be safeguarded from inattention in what he carries out, *pace* the entire sect, for otherwise it would follow that the objective of mission is denied. He must be declared above the baseness of pride and adultery with mothers, for otherwise, he would become loathsome and his status would fall from being accepted.

5 The term *al-ḥashwīya* is a condescending reference to literalist *ḥadīth* scholars.

المطلب الثالث: في وجوب العصمة

ذهب الإماميّة خاصّةً إلى وجوب عصمة النبي عن فعل قبيح أو إخلال بواجب خلافًا لجميع الفرق؛ فإنّ جمهور الأشاعرة والحشويّة جوّزوا جميع المعاصي عليهم إلّا الكفر والكذب في الأداء. وقال بعض المعتزلة إنّما يجوز عليهم الصغائر سهوًا، وبعضهم عمدًا على سبيل التّأويل، وبعضهم على سبيل القصد إلّا أنّها تقع مكفّرةً.

لنا: أنّ انتفاء العصمة يستلزم نقض الغرض بالبعثة، وهو القبول منهم والامتثال لأوامرهم ونواهيهم. فإنّه لو جوّز المكلَّف المعصية عنهم جوّز كون ما أمروا بع معصيةً، ولأنّه يجوز أن يؤدّي بعض ما أُمِر بإدائه وأن يؤدّي غير ما أمر به، فينتفي فائدة البعثة؛ ولأنّه إذا فعل المعصية وجب الإنكار عليه، فيسقط محلّه من القلوب. ولأنا لو جوّزنا المعصية عليه لم يجب علينا امتثال قوله إلّا بعد العلم بصدقه، ويلزم الدّور.

ويجب أن يكون معصومًا من السّهو في ما يؤدّيه خلافًا لجميع الفرق، وإلّا لزم نقض غرض البعثة؛ وأن يكون مُنزّهًا عن دناءة الآباء وعهر الأمّهات، وإلّا لزم التنفير عنه وسقوط محلّه من القلب.

Investigation 4: On the Prophecy of Muḥammad, God Bless Him and His Family and Grant Him Peace

Since he has laid claim to prophecy and a miracle has become manifest by his hand, he is truthful. The first statement is necessary. When it comes to the second, it is because the Qurʾān was manifested by his hand, and it is a miracle, because he challenged with it the eloquent of the Arabs and they found themselves incapable of attaining anything like it. He asked the opposition for either something like it or war, and they chose war, and it is known that had they been able to oppose, they would not have resorted to the more laborious of the two things. Furthermore, many miracles were manifested by his hand, such as the splitting of the Moon, the gushing forth of water from between his fingers, the satiation of a great number of people by little food, as well as others. Even if all of them were not reported uninterruptedly, the meaning is reported uninterruptedly.

When it comes to the third, it is necessary, for if one who lays claim to being sent by a king says in the presence of a large crowd, 'Oh king, if I am truthful, make an exception to your custom', and the king does that time after another, those present will be ascertained of his truthfulness.

The Jews have argued by saying that abrogation is false, for otherwise it would follow that the bad had been ordered and the good prohibited. Furthermore, if Moses, peace be upon him, had appeared during his law, the abrogation of his truthfulness would have been false. Had its end been announced, then necessarily there would have been an uninterrupted report, for uninterrupted report is the foundation of his law. If nothing is announced, then acting just once is entailed. Besides, he, peace be upon him, has said: "Keep the Sabbath forever."

The answer is that the good and the bad vary according to the variation of common goods and harms that are different in different times. The Jews' sequence of tradition has been cut, and declaring something to last forever is not evidence of persistence, for He said in the Torah to Noah, peace be upon him, at his exiting the Ark: "I have made every living animal edible to you and to your offspring, designating them for you forever, just like the growing plants, but do not eat that which lacks blood",[6] but then He prohibited many animals in the tongue of Moses, peace be upon him.

6 Cf. Gen 9:3-4.

المطلب الرابع: في نبوّة محمّد صلى الله عليه وسلم

لأنّه ادّعى النبوة وظهرت المعجزة على يده فيكون صادقًا. والأولى ضروريّةٌ. وأمّا الثانيّة فلأنّه ظهر على يده القرآن وهو معجزٌ، لأنّه تحدّى به فصحاء العرب وعجزوا عن الإتيان بمثله؛ لأنّه سألهم المعارضة بمثله أو الحرب، فاختاروا الحرب؛ ومعلومٌ أنّه لو تمكّنوا من المعارضة لم يلجأوا إلى أشقّ الأمرين. ولأنّه ظهر على يده معجزاتٌ كثيرةٌ كانشقاق القمر، ونبوع الماء من بين أصابعه، وإشباع الخلق الكثير من الطعام القليل، وغير ذلك. وإن لم يكن كلّ واحدٍ منها متواترًا فإنّها متواترة المعنى.

وأمّا الثالثة فضروريّة، فإنّ من ادّعى رسالة ملك وقال بحضور جمع عظيم أيّها الملك إن كنت صادقًا فخالف عادتك، ففعل الملك ذلك مرّةً بعد أخرى جزم الحاضرون بصدقه.

احتجّت اليهود بأنّ النّسخ باطلٌ، وإلّا لزم الأمر بالقبيح أو النّهي عن الحَسن؛ ولأنّ موسى عليه السلام إن بيّن دوام شرعه بطل النّسخ لصدقه، وإن بيّن انقطاعه وجب تواتره، لتواتر أصل شرعه، وإن لم يبيّن شيئًا اقتضى الفعل مرّةً. ولقوله عليه السلام: «تمسّكوا بالسبت أبدًا».

والجوابُ: أنّ الحسن والقبيح يختلف باختلاف المصالح والمفاسد المختلفة باختلاف الأزمان، وتواتر اليهود انقطع، والتأبيد لا يدلّ على الدّوام لقوله في التّوراة لنوح عليه السلام عند خروجه من الفلك: «إنّي جعلت كلّ دابّة حيّة مأكلاً لك ولذرّيتك وأطلقتُ ذلك لكم كنبات العشب أبدًا ما خلا الدّم فلا تأكلوه»، ثمّ حرّم على لسان موسى عليه السلام كثيرًا من الحيوانات.

It is written in the Torah: "Every day sacrifice two lambs, the morning lamb and the evening lamb between sunsets. This is a continuing sacrifice incumbent upon you."[7] Then that continuity was cut.

He has said: "A slave shall serve six years, then he shall go free, but if he does not, his ear shall be pierced and he shall serve forever."[8] However, in another place it is written: "He shall serve for fifty years, then at that year he shall go free."[9] These are many.

7 Cf. Num. 28:3-5.
8 Cf. Ex. 21:2-6.
9 Cf. Lev. 25:40-41.

وفي التوراة: «قرّبوا إليّ كلَّ يوم خروفين، خروف غدوة وخروف عشيّة بين المغارب قربانًا دائمًا لا حقًا بكم». ثمّ انقطع ذلك الدّوام.

وقال: «يستخدم العبد ستّ سنين، ثم يعرض عليه العتق، فإن لم يقبل ثُقِبَ أُذنه واستُخدِم أبدًا». وفي موضع آخر: «يستخدم خمسين سنةً ثمّ يعتقُ في تلك السّنة». وهي كثيرةٌ.

Investigation 5: On the Aspect of Inimitability of the Qurʾān

The two Jubbāʾīs have maintained that it is eloquence. Al-Balkhī has said that something of the kind of the Qurʾān is not within the power of men. Al-Juwaynī has said that it is eloquence and style. Al-Murtaḍā and al-Naẓẓām have maintained that God most high diverted and prevented the Arabs from resisting despite their ability, because the Arabs were capable of both the individual terms and composition, and so they had the power over the whole. The early ones argued by saying that if the inimitability were due to diverting, then it would have to be extremely weak, and power over authoring would be admitted in absolute terms, but when it comes to power over authoring the Qurʾān, it is denied, and the implication is denied.

المطلب الخامس: في وجه إعجاز القرآن

ذهب الجبائيّان إلى أنّه الفصاحة. وقال البلخيّ إنّ جنس القرآن غير مقدور للبشر. وقال الجوينيّ إنّه الفصاحة والأسلوب. وذهب المرتضى والنّظّام إلى أنّ الله تعالى صرف العرب ومنعهم عن المعارضة مع تمكّنهم؛ لأنّ العرب كانوا متمكّنين من المفردات والتّركيب، فكانوا قادرين على الجميع. واحتجّ الأوّلون بأنّ الاعجاز لو كان للصّرفة لوجب أن يكون في غاية الرّكاكة والقدرةُ على مطلق التّأليف مُسلّمٌ أمّا على تأليف القرآن فإنّه ممنوعٌ، والملازمة ممنوعة.

Investigation 6: On the Verification of Being Safeguarded

Some people deny the power to sin from one who is safeguarded, so that he is equal with others in terms of corporeal properties, but being safeguarded is the power to obey, or so that there is no power to sin, which is the statement of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, or so that he is specified in his soul or body with a property that entails the denial of his audacity to sin, as some of them maintain. Some of them assert the power and explain the safeguarding by saying that it is an order, which He most high has given to the servant, such that with it he will not have the audacity to sin, provided that it does not end up coercing, for otherwise laudation would not be deserved and the charge would be nullified. Furthermore, He most high has said: *I am just a mortal like you*.[10]

According to them, the causes of being safeguarded are four: the occurrence of a property in his soul or body that entails a disposition preventing immorality, the occurrence of knowledge of the laudation due to obedience and the blame due to sin, the confirmation of that knowledge through a succession of inspiration, and refraining from negligence of the blame due to refraining from the first. The condition of successive inspiration must be reflected upon, because the imams, Maryam, and Fāṭima, God bless them, were safeguarded without inspiration. The verified account is that God most high performed this as a grace, with which the motive to sin was erased, although there was power to it.

10 Cf. Q 23:33.

المطلب السادس: في تحقيق العصمة

من النّاس من سلب القدرة على المعاصي عن المعصوم، إمّا مع مساواة الغير في الخواصّ البدنيّة؛ لكن العصمة هي القدرة على الطاعة أو عدم القدرة على المعصية، وهو قول أبي الحسن الأشعريّ، أو مع اختصاصه في نفسه أو بدنه بخاصيّة تقتضي امتناع إقدامه على المعاصي كما ذهب إليه بعضهم. ومنهم من أثبت القدرة وفسّر العصمة بأنه أمرٌ يفعله تعالى بالعبد بحيثُ لا يقدم معه على المعصية بشرط أن لا ينتهي إلى الإلجاء، وإلّا لما استحقّ المدح ولبطل التكليف؛ ولقوله تعالى: ﴿إِنَّمَا أَنَا بَشَرٌ مِثْلُكُمْ﴾.

وأسباب العصمة عندهم أمورٌ أربعةٌ: حصول خاصيّة لنفسه أو بدنه تقتضي ملكةً مانعةً من الفجور، وحصول العلم بالمدح على الطاعة والذّمّ على المعصية؛ وتأكيد تلك العلوم بترادف الوحي وترك اهمال معاتبته عند ترك الأولى. وفي اشتراطِ ترادف الوحي نظرٌ، فإنّ الأئمة ومريم وفاطمة عليهم السلام معصومون من غير وحي. والتحقيق أنّ الله تعالى يفعل به لطفًا ينتفي معه داعي المعصية مع قدرته عليها.

Investigation 7: On the Time of Being Safeguarded

The Imāmites concur concerning their being safeguarded both before and after the prophecy, in matters both small and great, and with regard to both intent and inattention, for otherwise it would follow that the objective in obeying and venerating them would be nullified, because one who is a sinner would have fallen from his status. Faḍlites among Khārijites allowed the mission of one whom God most high knows to be an unbeliever.[11] Ibn Fūrak allowed the mission of one who is an unbeliever, but this has not come to pass.[12] Some superficialists have maintained that the messenger of God, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, was an unbeliever before the mission, because He most high has said: *find you lost and guide you*,[13] but those who have ascertained the truth are in agreement about its falsity.

Most Ashʿarites allow great sins for prophets before the mission, because of the story of Yūsuf's brothers.[14] The remaining ones deny their prophecy. Some counted among the Imāmites concur in allowing small sins for them before the mission, but al-Naẓẓām and al-Aṣamm[15] allow it by way of inattention.

11 The Khārijites were a radical group that emerged in the early period of dissent over the caliphate. They held that any morally blameless Muslim was fit to serve as a caliph, and that a caliph must be dethroned, should he be found guilty of sin. Many Khārijites also held that sinning amounts to unbelief. The Faḍlites were Khārijite followers of a certain Faḍl ibn ʿAbdillāh. Reportedly, they believed that faith amounts to the sum of righteous acts, and this belief might be behind Ḥillī's mention of them here. See van Ess 2017, II.199.

12 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015) was an Ashʿarite theologian.

13 Q 93:7.

14 This is probably a reference to the plot, which Yūsuf designed against his brothers and which involved a certain amount of dishonesty. Cf. Ṭabarī, *History* II, 167-174.

15 Abū Bakr ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn Kaysān, better known as al-Aṣamm (d. 200-201/806-807), was a maverick theologian often associated with the Muʿtazilites.

المطلب السابع: في وقت العصمة

اتّفقت الإماميّة على عصمتهم قبل النبوة وبعدها عن الصّغائر والكبائر عمدًا وسهوًا، وإلّا لزم نقض الغرض من الانقياد إليهم والتعظيم لهم لسقوط محلّ من كان عاصيًا؛ وجوّزت الفضليّة من الخوارج بعثة من يعلم الله تعالى منه أنّه يكفرُ، وابن فورك جوّز بعثة من كان كافرًا ولم يقع. وبعض الحشوية زعم أن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم (أنه) كان كافرًا قبل البعثة، لقوله تعالى: (وَوَجَدَكَ ضَالًّا فَهَدَى)، وأطبق المحققون على بطلانه.

وأكثر الأشاعرة جوّزوا الكبيرة على الأنبياء قبل البعثة لقصّة إخوة يوسف. ومنع الباقون من نبوّتهم. واتفق من عدا الإماميّة على جواز الصغائر منهم قبل البعثة، لكنّ النّظّام والأصمّ جوّزه على سبيل السّهو.

Investigation 8: On Marvels

The Ashʿarites concur about their possibility, which is the truth in my view, because of the stories of Maryam[16] and Āṣaf[17] as well as the miracles that are uninterruptedly reported of the Imāms, peace be upon them. The Muʿtazilites deny miracles of them, because they cannot be evidence of prophecy. The answer is that marvels are distinguished from miracles by the challenge.[18]

16 Cf. Q 3:42, 19:19, and 23:50.

17 Cf. Q 27:40. The unnamed scholar is often identified in the tradition as Solomon's vizier Āṣaf ibn Barakhyā.

18 Only the Qurʾān was introduced with the challenge to its opponents to come up with a work matching its excellence.

المطلب الثّامن: في الكرامات

اتّفقت الأشاعرة على جوازها، وهو الحقّ عندي؛ لقصّة مريمَ وآصفَ وما تقل متواترًا عن الأئمة عليهم السلام من المعجزات. ومنع منه المعتزلة لامتناع الاستدلال به على النّبوّة. والجوابُ: أنّه يتميّز عن المعجزة بالتحدّي.

Investigation 9: That Prophets Are More Excellent than Angels

With the exception of al-Qāḍī, the Ashʿarites agree about it, because He most high has said that *God chose Adam, Noah, Abraham's family, and the family of ʿImrān, over the two worlds*,[19] including the angels. Moreover, in their service they are preoccupied with the attractions of desire and anger as well as external obstacles, so that their service is more laborious, and he, peace be upon him, has said, "the most excellent labour is the most bitter".[20] But the Muʿtazilites and the philosophers have said: The angels are more excellent, because He most high has said, *'Your Lord only forbade you this tree to prevent you becoming angels or immortals'*,[21] and He has said, *The Messiah would never disdain to be a servant of God, nor would the angels who are close to Him*,[22] as well as, *'He cannot be mortal! He must be a precious angel'*.[23] Moreover, angels are separate substances and therefore nobler than men.

The answer is that the verse points at the preference of angels over Adam at the moment of His speech to Iblīs, not after the election. Alternatively, the intention is only that they are two angels that do not eat food. Denying the pride of angels is not evidence of preferring them above the Messiah. Instead, they are mentioned after the Messiah, whom the Christians claim to be the son of God, like the polytheists say that they are sons of the Merciful. People imagine that although the magnificence of angels is greater than the magnificence of men, this is not evidence of the preference of angels to them.

19 Q 3:33, modifying Abdel Haleem's translation.
20 Cf. *Bihār al-anwār* LXXXII.229.
21 Q 7:20.
22 Q 4:172.
23 Q 12:31.

المطلب التاسع: في أنّ الأنبياء أفضل من الملائكة

اتّفقت الأشاعرة عليه إلّا القاضي، لقوله تعالى: ﴿إِنَّ اللَّهَ اصْطَفَى آدَمَ وَنُوحًا وَآلَ إِبْرَاهِيمَ وَآلَ عِمْرَانَ عَلَى الْعَالَمِينَ﴾ وهو يتناول الملائكة؛ ولاشتغالهم بالعبادة مع جواذب الشّهوة والغضب والموانع الخارجيّة، فتكون عبادتهم أشقّ؛ وقال عليه السلام: «أفضل الأعمال أحمزها». وقالت المعتزلة والفلاسفة: الملائكة أفضل لقوله تعالى: ﴿مَا نَهَاكُمَا رَبُّكُمَا عَنْ هَذِهِ الشَّجَرَةِ إِلَّا أَنْ تَكُونَا مَلَكَيْنِ أَوْ تَكُونَا مِنَ الْخَالِدِينَ﴾، وقوله: ﴿لَنْ يَسْتَنْكِفَ الْمَسِيحُ أَنْ يَكُونَ عَبْدًا لِلَّهِ وَلَا الْمَلَائِكَةُ الْمُقَرَّبُونَ﴾، ﴿مَا هَذَا بَشَرًا إِنْ هَذَا إِلَّا مَلَكٌ كَرِيمٌ﴾، ولأنّ الملائكة جواهر مجرّدة فتكون أشرف من البشر.

والجوابُ: أنّ الآية تدلّ على تفضيل الملك على آدم وقت مخاطبته أبليس، لا بعد الاجتباء؛ أو أنّ القصد إلّا أن تكونا ملكين لا يأكلان الطعام ونفي الاستنكاف عن الملائكة لا يدلّ على تفضيلهم على المسيح. بل إنّما ذكرهم بعد المسيح الّذي قالت النّصارى إنّه ابن الله، كقول المشركين إنّهم بنات الرّحمن. وتخيّل النّساء أنّ جمال الملك أكثر من جمال البشر لا يدلّ على تفضيل الملك عليه.

Observation VIII: On the Imamate

المرصد الثامن في الإمامة وفيه مطالب

Investigation 1: On Its Necessity

The imamate is general leadership by an individual in matters of religion and this world. Its necessity is debated. It is denied by al-Aṣamm and al-Fuwaṭī,[1] but others endorse its necessity. According to the Imāmites, Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, and the Baghdadians, the method for showing its necessity is the intellect, but the Imāmites make it incumbent on God most high, because it is necessarily a gift of grace, for when they have a leader, people seek justice for one who is wronged and repel the wrongdoer, approaching the right-minded and distancing from the corrupt, and grace is necessary, due to the foregoing.

Let it not be said: The imamate can be a grace, such that something else may subsist in its place, and it is not necessary itself,[2] for there is grace, such that nothing else may subsist in its place, like knowledge of the desert of reward and punishment, and there is grace, such that something else does subsist, like the charges from tradition, for otherwise the one charged could not dispense with the charge from tradition. We grant this, but it can include a bad aspect. It is not sufficient for necessity to assert the respect in which it is necessary, unless the corrupt aspects have been eliminated from it.[3]

For we say: The consensus of those endowed with understanding, at all times and places, concerning the institution of leadership is evidence for denying any other form of grace, and the aspect of badness is restricted. It is beneficial here.

Abū al-Ḥusayn and the Baghdadians have said that it is necessary according to those endowed with understanding. This is an error, because there is disagreement about it that leads to corruption. The two Jubbāʾīs and the Ashʿarites maintain that it is necessary, according to what is heard from tradition.

1 Hishām ibn ʿAmr al-Fuwaṭī (d. before 230/845) was an early Muʿtazilite from Baṣra.

2 That is, the function of the imamate is necessary, but the function may be served by other institutions as well.

3 That is, even if the imamate were good in a certain respect, or fulfilled a certain function, this does not make it necessary, unless one can also show that it is the best way of fulfilling that function – or at least the one with the fewest counterproductive consequences.

[المطلب] الأوّل: في وجوبها

الإمامة رياسة عامّة في أمور الدّين والدّنيا لشخص من الأشخاص. واختلف في وجوبها. فمنع منه الأصمّ والفوطي، وذهب الباقون إلى وجوبها. فعند الإماميّة وأبي الحسين البصريّ والبغداديّين أنّ طريق وجوبها العقل؛ لأن الإماميّة أوجبوها على الله تعالى لكونها لطفًا بالضّرورة، فإنّ النّاس متى كان لهم رئيس ينتصف للمظلوم ويردع الظالم كانوا من الصّلاح أقرب وعن الفساد أبعد؛ واللّطف واجبٌ لما تقدّم.

لا يقال: يجوز أن تكون الإمامة لطفًا يقوم غيرها مقامها فلا يجب عينًا، فإنّ من اللّطف مالا يقوم غيره مقامه كالعلم باستحقاق الثّواب والعقاب، ومنه مايقوم غيره كالتّكاليف السّمعية، وإلّا لم يخل مكلّف من التكليف السمعي. سلّمنا لكن يجوز اشتمالها على وجه قبح. ولايكفي في الوجوب ثبوت وجهه مالم ينتف عنه وجوه المفاسد.

لأنّا نقول: اتّفاق العقلاء في كلّ مكان وزمان على نصب الرّؤساء دليل على انتفاء غيرها من الألطاف، ووجوه القبح محصورة. وهي منفيّةٌ هنا.

وقال أبو الحسين والبغداديون إنّها واجبةٌ على العقلاء، وهو خطأٌ لما فيه من التّنازع المؤدّي إلى الفساد. وهذب الجُبائيّان والأشاعرة إلى أنّها واجبةٌ سمعًا.

Investigation 2: On the Necessity of the Imam's Being Safeguarded

The Imāmites and the Ismāʿīlites endorse it, *pace* the remaining groups, for otherwise regress would follow, because the aspect of necessity is the possibility of error in the imams. If the leader is such, another leader is needed, and regress ensues. Furthermore, he is the preserver of law, and so he must be safeguarded.

When it comes to the first point, it is because the book and the custom are not exhaustive with regard to legal judgments, and because conflict has taken place concerning them, and because they are finite whereas there is no end for things that come to be.

Consensus is not sufficient, because error is possible for each person singly, and the same holds of the whole.[4] Nor is analogy sufficient, because it is not an argument, for our law is founded upon the coincidence of different things, like the unity of urination and sleep in judgment,[5] as well as upon the difference of coinciding things, like the obligation to fast at the end of Ramaḍān and the breaking of the fast at the first of Shawwāl. Hence, the law does not remain without the imam. If error were possible in him, no confidence would remain for his word, because of the possibility of his error and his inattention.

4 The consensus of the community of Muslims, an influential jurisprudential principle for the Sunnīs, is unreliable, because the judgment of each individual member is fallible, and as a consequence, the consensus is fallible.

5 Both urination and sleep are judged to invalidate ablution, and in this sense they are one. The point is that this connection cannot be inferred by any analogy between the two things.

المطلب الثاني: في وجوب عصمة الإمام

ذهب إليه الإماميّة والإسماعيليّة خلافًا لباقي الفرق، وإلّا لزم التّسلسل؛ إذ وجه الوجوب جواز الخطأ على الأمّة. فلو كان الرّئيس كذلك افتقر إلى رئيس آخر ويتسلسل.

ولأنّه حافظٌ للشّرع فيجب أن يكون معصومًا.

أمّا الأولى فلأنّ الكتاب والسّنة غير وافيين بالأحكام الشرعيّة ولوقوع النّزاع فيهما وتناهيهما وعدم تناهي الحوادث.

ولا الإجماع لجواز الخطأ على كلّ واحد، فكذا المجموع. ولا القياس لأنّه ليس حجّة، إذ مبنى شرعنا على اتّفاق المختلفات، كاتّحاد البول والنّوم في الحكم، واختلاف المتّفقات، كإيجاب صوم آخر رمضان وإفطار أوّل شوّال، فلم يبق سوى الإمام؛ فلو جاز الخطأ عليه لم يبق وثوقٌ بقوله لجواز خطائه وسهوه.

Investigation 3: That He Must Be Most Excellent and Appointed

This is because if he were equal, he would not more appropriate for leadership, and if he were more imperfect, his precedence to the excellent would be disgraceful to the intellect. Moreover, He most high has said: *Say, 'God shows the way to the Truth. Is someone who shows the way to the Truth more worthy to be followed, or someone who cannot find the way unless he himself is shown? What is the matter with you? How do you judge?*[6] Hence, he is the most knowing, the bravest, the most generous, the most abstinent, the most pious, and the gentlest, and likewise for other attributes of perfection. He is above the lowliness of pride and adultery with mothers, lest his status fall from acceptance.

He must be appointed, because being safeguarded is an internal thing, which is not known to anyone but God most high. The appointment is either through the creation of a miracle by his hand subsequent to the claim to imamate, or through his being specified as safeguarded, the way a prophet or an imam is.

6 Q 10:35.

المطلب الثالث: في أنّه يجب أن يكون أفضل [ومنصوصاً]

لأنّه لو كان مساويًا لم يكن أولى بالرّياسة، ولو كان أنقص قبح تقديمه على الفاضل عقلاً؛ ولقوله تعالى: ﴿أَفَمَن يَهْدِي إِلَى الحَقِّ أَحَقُّ أَن يُتَّبَعَ أَمَّن لاَّ يَهِدي إِلاَّ أَن يُهْدَى فَمَا لَكُمْ كَيْفَ تَحْكُمُونَ﴾. فيكون أعلم وأشجع وأكرم وأزهد وأروع وأحلم إلى غير ذلك من صفات الكمال. ويكون منزّهًا عن دناءة الآباء وعهر الأمّهات، لئلا يسقط محلّه من القلب.

ويجب أن يكون منصوصًا عليه، لأنَّ العصمة من أمور الباطنة الّتي لا يعلمها إلّا الله تعالى. والنّصُّ إمّا بخلق معجزٍ على يده عقيبَ ادّعاء الإمامة أو بتعيين المعصوم عليه كنبيّ أو إمام.

Investigation 4: That the Imam after the Prophet, God Bless Him and His Family and Grant Him Peace, Was ʿAlī, upon Whom Be Peace

The Shīʿites maintain that for a number of reasons.

(a) If one is to be the imam, one must be safeguarded, and such a one was ʿAlī, peace be upon him. Now, the antecedent is true due to the foregoing, and likewise the consequent. The conditional is shown to be true by consensus, since no one has spoken of anyone else being safeguarded.

(b) A citation from the prophet, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, reported in an unbroken transmission by the Shīʿites, sets him as the substitute from among the forefathers, as in his statements, "Grant him the order of the believers", "Listen and obey him", and "You are the substitute after me".[7]

(c) He most high has said: *Your only true allies are God, His Messenger, and those who believe...*[8] The verse and the word 'only' are in order to limit the transmission and to stabilise the situation, as well as to prevent the conflict of several rivals for one position and the arrival of the denial, as was mentioned before. Hence, the converse was requisite.

What is meant by 'true ally' is one who is first in governance with regard to custom and position. It means 'someone', because it is attributed with a specific attribution. Such is ʿAlī, peace be upon him, because the attribution is not there for anyone else yet it has been asserted of him, due to what was assented by his seal at his kneeling.

7 Cf. *Bihār al-anwār* XXVIII, 266; XI, 265; and III.311, respectively.

8 Q 5:55, slightly modifying Abdel Haleem's translation.

المطلب الرابع: في أنّ الإمام بعد النبيّ صلى الله عليه وسلم هو عليّ عليه السلام

ذهبت الشّيعة إلى ذلك لوجوهٍ:

الف - إنّ كان الإمام يجب أن يكون معصومًا فهو عليّ عليه السلام، لكنّ المقدّم حقٌّ لما سبق، فالتّالي مثله. وبيان الشّرطيّة الإجماع إذ لا قائل بعصمة غيره.

ب - تواتر النّصّ من النبيّ صلى الله عليه وسلم تنقله الشّيعة خَلفًا عن سلف في قوله: «سَلّموا عليه بإمرة المؤمنين»، و «اسمعوا وأطيعوا له»، و «أنتَ الخليفة من بعدي».

ج - قوله تعالى: (إِنَّمَا وَلِيُّكُمُ اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا. . . . . .) الآية ولفظة إنّما للحصر بالنّقل، ولبقاء الوضع وامتناع توارد النقيضين على محلّ واحد، وورود النّفي على المذكور فتعيّن العكس.

والمراد بالوليّ هو الأولى بالتصرّف عرفًا ووضعًا. والمراد البعض، لاتّصافه بوصف خاصّ. فهو عليّ عليه السلام لانتفاء الوصف عن غيره، وثبوته فيه لما تصدّق بخاتمه حال ركوعه.

(d) The unbroken tradition transmits from him, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, a saying on the day of Ghadīr: "Am I not prior to yourselves for you? They said: Indeed. He said: He for whom I am lord has ʿAlī as his lord. Oh god, befriend his friend, be an enemy to his enemy, support his supporter, and abandon the one who abandons him!"[9] What is meant by 'lord' is the most prior. This is because earlier a principle was introduced for it and because it cannot mean any other of its meanings, for it is absurd that the prophet, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, should have gathered the community at the time of midday heat, erect something like a pulpit, and raised ʿAlī's arm, peace be upon him. He meant: He for whom I am his cousin has ʿAlī as his cousin, he for whom I am the substitute has ʿAlī as the substitute, and he for whom I am the support has ʿAlī as his support. Besides, He most high has said: *The believers, both men and women, support each other.*[10]

(e) He, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, has said, "You are to me in the same position as Aaron to Moses, except that there will be no prophet after me",[11] and the exception entails generalisation. All in all, his position is such that if he survives the prophet, he remains the substitute, for otherwise the position would collapse. Because he is safeguarded, he deserves to be the substitute.

9 Cf. Ibn Bābawayh, *ʿUyūn akhbār al-Riḍā* II.58.

10 Q 9:71.

11 Cf. *Biḥār al-anwār* III, 238.

د - تواتر النقل عنه صلى الله عليه وسلم يوم الغدير في قوله: «ألستُ أولى منكم بأنفسكم، قالوا بَلى، قال: فَمَن كنتُ مولاه فعليٌّ مَولاه؛ اللَّهُمَّ والِ مَن والاه وعادِ مَن عاداهُ، وانصُر مَن نصَرَه واخذُل مَن خَذَله». والمراد بالمولى الأولى. ولسبق تمهيد القاعدة به ولا متناع إرادة غيره من معانيها، لا ستحالة أن يجمع النبيّ صلى الله عليه وسلم الأمّة وقت الهجير وينصب شبه المنبر ويأخذَ بعَضُد عليّ عليه السلام ويريدُ «مَن كنتُ» ابن عمّه، فهذا عليّ ابن عمّه؛ أو من كنت خليفتَه فهذا خليفته، أو من كنتُ ناصره فهذا ناصرُه. مع قوله تعالى: ﴿والْمُؤْمِنُونَ والْمُؤْمِنَاتُ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ﴾.

هـ - قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: «أنتَ منّي بمنزلة هارون من موسى إلا إنّه لا نبيّ بعدي»، والا ستثناء يقتضي التعميم. ومن جملة منازله أنّه لو عاش بعده لكان باقيًا على الخلافة، وإلّا لزم هبوط منزلته، ولأنّه معصوم يستحقّ خلافته.

(f) ʿAlī, peace be upon him, was the most excellent, and so he was the imam. As regards the implication, it is due to the foregoing concerning how bad it would be to prefer someone who is excelled. As regards the truth of being the most appropriate, it is because all scholars associate it with him. He, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, has said, "Appoint ʿAlī". This was on the condition of knowledge and abstinence, and because the companions went back to him on their matters. ʿUmar has said in a number of occasions, "Were it not for ʿAlī, ʿUmar would have perished."[12] Furthermore, he made extraordinary judgments, such as 'the slave's chain is measured by water',[13] or the eighth part per dirham in the judgment concerning the eighth part of bread, donating one dirham to the fellow with three loaves and the rest to the other.[14] There are other extraordinary judgments.

The exegetes agree that what is meant by His saying *ourselves*[15] is ʿAlī, peace be upon him. Unity is impossible, and so what is meant is that which is equal. Furthermore, there is the report of the bird, when he, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, said: "Oh God, bring the dearest of Your creation to me so that he can eat this bird with me."[16]

12 See Aḥmad ibn ʿAbdillāh al-Ṭabarī, *Dhakhāʾir al-ʿuqbā*, 82.

13 Cf. *Biḥār al-anwār* XL, 280-281. Two men are arguing over the weight of a slave's chain but are not allowed to remove it for weighing. ʿAlī advises them to have the slave standing in a tub filled with water, first with the chain in the water, then having it lifted out. The difference in the level of water is then made up with pieces of scrap iron. Weighing the scrap iron gave the men the answer they were looking for.

14 Cf. Ibn Shahrāshūb, *Manāqib*, I.329. This is a report about two men, one with five loaves of bread and the other with three, who share the meal with a third fellow. Each of the eight breads is divided in three (yielding 24 pieces), and then each of the three men eats eight pieces. The third fellow pays for his meal with eight dirhams, one dirham per piece of bread, leaving the two in an argument about how to divide the payment. The fellow who donated the five breads demands five dirhams, whereas the fellow with the three breads wants to divide the money equally. ʿAlī then intervenes on behalf of the first fellow, telling the litigant that should he find this unsatisfactory, a more exact distribution would leave him with only one dirham. This is because he has eaten eight of the nine pieces his three loaves amounted to, and thus given only one piece to the third fellow, whereas the person with the five breads has given the remaining seven pieces.

15 Q 3:61.

16 Ibn Bābawayh, *Amālī* XCIV.3.

و - عليّ عليه السلام أفضل، فهو الإمام. أمّا الملازمة فلما تقدّم من قبح تقديم المفضول. وأمّا صدقُ الأولى فلانتساب العلماء بأسرهم إليه. وقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: «أقضاكم عليٌّ» وهو مشروط بالعلم والزّهد، ولرجوع الصّحابة في وقائعهم إليه؛ وقول عمر في عدّة مواطن «لولا عليّ لهلك عمر». ولقضاياه الغريبة «كوزن قيد العبد بالماء» وقسمة ثمانية دراهم في قضيّة «الأرغفة الثّمانية» وإعطاء صاحب الثّلاثة درهمًا والباقي للآخر، وغير ذلك من غرائب القضايا.

ولإجماع المفسّرين على أنّ المراد بقوله (وأَنفُسَنَا) عليّ عليه السلام؛ والاتّحاد محالٌ، فالمراد: المساوي؛ ولخبر الطائر حين قال صلى الله عليه وسلم: «اللهمّ ائت بأحبّ خَلقِك إليك يأكلُ معي من هذا الطائر».

He adopted him as his brother alone among the companions. He said, God bless him and his family and grant him peace: "He who wants to see Adam in his knowledge, Joshua in his power, Abraham in his patience, and Jesus in his service, let him regard ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib",[17] and he said, God bless him and his family and grant him peace: "ʿAlī is good among men, and he who refuses is an unbeliever".[18] There are other reports and verses mentioned in the book *al-Nihāya*.

(g) There is consensus about Abū Bakr and al-ʿAbbās having been unbelievers and therefore unfit for the imamate, for He most high has said, *My pledge does not hold for those who do evil*,[19] whereas there was no prior unbelief with ʿAlī, peace be upon him, and so he was distinguished for the imamate.

17 Nīshābūrī, *Rawḍat al-wāʿiẓīna* 301, I.295.

18 Ibn Bābawayh, *Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīḥ* 4474, III.365.

19 Q 2:124.

واتّخذه أخًا لنفسه دون غيره من الصّحابة. وقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: «من أراد أن ينظر إلى آدم في علمه وإلى يوسع في تقواه وإلى إبراهيم في حلمه وإلى عيسى في عبادته، فلينظر إلى عليّ بن أبي طالب»، وقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم «عليّ خير البشر، فمن أبى فقد كفر»، وغير ذلك من الآثار والآيات مذكورٌ في كتاب النّهاية.

ز - الإجماع على أنّ أبا بكر والعبّاس كانا كافرين، فلا يصلحان للإمامة لقوله تعالى: (لا يَنَالُ عَهْدِي الظَّالِمِينَ). وعليّ عليه السلام لم يسبق له كفرٌ فتعيّن للإمامة.

Investigation 5: On the Imamate of the Others among the Twelve Imams, Peace Be upon Them

What has been said before on the imamate of ʿAlī, peace be upon him, is evidence for that, namely the necessity of being safeguarded and the passages and reports about the substitute, in an unbroken transmission from the forefathers, to the effect that ʿAlī appoints each of the ones after him. The report is transmitted from the prophet, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, in his saying to Ḥusayn, peace be upon him: "This is my son, the imam, the son of an imam, the brother of an imam, the father of nine imams, the ninth of whom will be the one standing among them." The occultation of the imam, peace be upon him, is traced back to the refusal of grace by those charged by themselves, or it is due to a hidden benefit of which God most high alone has knowledge. Grace does not vanish, because it can become manifest at every moment in which vices are restrained.

المطلب الخامس: في إمامة باقي الأئمّة الاثني عشر عليه السلام

يدلّ عليه ما سبق في إمامة عليّ عليه السلام من وجوب العصمة والنّصّ والنقل المتواتر خَلفًا عن سَلفٍ بأنّ كلّ واحدٍ منهم نصّ على من بعده، وتواتر النقل عن النّبي صلى الله عليه وسلم في قوله للحسين عليه السلام: «هذا إبني إمامٌ ابنُ إمامٍ أخو إمامٍ أبو أئمّة تسعةٍ، تاسعُهم قائمُهم». وغيبة الإمام عليه السلام مُستندةٌ إلى منع المكلّفين أنفسهم اللّطف أو لمصلحة خفيّة استأثر الله تعالى بعلمها؛ ولا ينافي اللّطف، لأنّ تجويز ظهوره في كلّ آنٍ زاجرٌ عن القبائح.

The Seal

It is necessary to order what is recognised and prohibit what is denied, due to common consensus and what is heard from tradition, for otherwise that which is recognised would not be maintained and that which is denied would take place, or God most high would necessarily be offended, because the order of what is recognised is attributed to Him, and the prohibition is preclusion from what is denied. If they are necessary according to the intellect, they are necessary for Him most high, because whatever is necessary according to the intellect is necessary for one to whom the aspect of necessity pertains. They do have the conditions that what is recognised should be known as recognised and what is denied as denied, and that it should be possible to both perform and to refrain from what is denied, both for one who is corrupt and for other believers.

خاتمةٌ

يجب الأمرُ بالمعروف والنّهي عن المنكر إجماعًا، سمعًا على الأشهر، وإلّا لما ارتفع معروفٌ ولما وقع منكرٌ، أوكان الله تعالى مُخلّاً بالواجب؛ لأنّ الأمر بالمعروف هوالحمل عليه، والنّهي هوالمنع من المنكر. فلو وجبا بالعقل لوجبا على الله تعالى، لأنّ كلّ واجبٍ عقليّ فهو واجبٌ على من حصل له وجه الوجوب. ولهما شرائط: أن يعلم المعروف معروفًا والمنكر منكرًا، وتجويز تأثير الإنكار وانتفاء المفاسد عنه وعن بعض المؤمنين.

Observation IX: On the Return

المرصد التاسع في المعاد وفيه مطالب

Investigation 1: On the Possibility of the Creation of Another World

Those who are religious agree about it, *pace* the philosophers, because two like things are to be judged equally, and possibility is one of the concomitants of quiddity according to both common consensus and His most high saying, *Is He who created the heavens*,[1] and the rest of the verse.

They argue by saying that the world is spherical, and the existence of another one would entail a void. The minor premise is denied, and we deny both the impossibility of the void and the implication.

1 Q 36:81. The full verse reads: "Is He who created the heavens and earth not able to create the likes of these people? Of course He is! He is the All Knowing Creator."

[المطلب] الأوّل: في إمكان خلق عالم آخر

اتّفق المليّون عليه خلافًا للفلاسفة لتساوي المثلين في الأحكام، والإمكان من لوازم الماهيّة؛ وللإجماع، ولقوله تعالى: ﴿أَوَلَيْسَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمَوَاتِ﴾ الآية.

احتجّوا بأنّ العالَمَ كرةٌ ويلزم الخلأ من وجود أخرى. والصّغرى ممنوعةٌ ونمنع استحالة الخلأ ولزومه.

Investigation 2: On the Possibility of the World's Non-Existence

Those who are religious, with the exception of the Karrāmites, agree about it, *pace* the philosophers, because the world is contingent and has come to be, and so its non-existence is possible. The non-existence of time is also possible, and the non-existence of the world does not need time, as is the case in the case of the priority of some of its parts to others. The Karrāmites argue that its non-existence is not due to an agent, because if withholding existence were something positively existing, it would not be identical to the world's non-existence, but something that annihilates it, and so it would be withholding existence through its opposite. If it were not something positively existing, it could not be traced back to anything that produces an effect, since there is no difference between not having an effect and having non-existence as an effect. The world's non-existence is not through its opposite either, because then its coming to be would depend on the annihilation of the other opposite.

If it were reasoned that the opposite is annihilated by coming to be, this would be a circle. Furthermore, the annihilation of neither of the two by the other would be more appropriate than the converse, and the potency of that which comes to be, due to dependence on a cause, is common to both. The world's non-existence is not due to the non-existence of a condition, because it is nothing but an accident, and so a substance would be in need of an accident. It is a false circle, because the withholding of existence does not exist.

The difference between denying an act and performing non-existence is evident, for the first is judged when nothing whatsoever emerges whatsoever and the state of affairs stays as it was, whereas the second is judged when it emerges from the agent.

المطلب الثاني: في إمكان عدم العالم

اتفق المليّون إلّا الكراميّة عليه خلافًا للفلاسفة، لأنّه ممكنٌ ومُحدثٌ فجاز عدمه؛ ويجوزُ عدم الزّمان ولا يفتقر إلى زمان، كما في تقدّم بعض أجزائه على بعض. واحتجاج الكراميّة بأنّ عدمه ليس بالفاعل لأنّ الأعدام إن كان وجوديًّا لم يكن عين عدم العالم بل مفضيًا له، فيكون أعدامًا بالضّدّ؛ وإن لم يكن وجوديًّا امتنع إسناده إلى المؤثّر، إذ لا فرق بين لا أثر له وبين أثر العدم؛ ولا بالضّد، لأنّ حدوثه متوقف على انتفاء الضّدّ الآخر.

فلو علّل انتفاء الضّدّ بحدوث هذا دار. ولأنّه ليس انتفاء أحدهما بالآخر أولى من العكس، وقوّة الحادث لتعلّق السّبب مشتركة. ولا بعدم الشّرط إذ ليس إلّا العرض، فيكون الجوهر محتاجًا إلى العرض. وهو دورٌ باطلٌ؛ لأنّ الاعدام ليس وجوديًّا.

والفرق بين نفي الفعل وفعل العدم ظاهرٌ، فإنّ الأوّل حكم بعدم صدور شيء البتة وأنّ الحال مستمرّ على ما كان، والثّاني حكمٌ بصدوره عن الفاعل.

Non-existence is renewed after not having been there, and the two non-existences are distinct, either by being related to two existences or by one of them being specifically related. That which comes to be does not depend on the non-existence of what persists. Instead, the non-existence of what persists is caused by that which came to be as well as the need, even if it is common to both, except that that which brings to existence is stronger than that which maintains.[2] This is because bringing into existence is bestowing an existence, which was not there at all, whereas maintaining is preservation of an existence that has already occurred. Because it is stronger, it makes that which comes to be preponderate, and what is preponderated upon no longer exists. Constricting the condition to the accident is precluded, because it can be privative.

We admit that, but the respect of need is different, for a designated substance needs some accident, not a specific one, whereas a designated accident needs a designated substance.

2 Think of two temporally successive created things in the same material substrate. For as long as it exists, the prior thing persists because God maintains its existence. God never causes the thing's non-existence, but when He creates the posterior thing in the same substrate, the prior thing's non-existence necessarily follows. Both created things are in similarly need of God as the cause of their existence, but in this case the cause's aspect of bringing something new into existence overpowers its aspect of maintaining what was already there.

وبتجدد العدم بعد أن لم يكن والعدمان يتمايزان: إمّا بالانتساب إلى وجودين أو بانتساب أحدهما خاصّةً. والحادث لا يتوقف على عدم الباقي، بل عدم الباقي معلول الحادث والحاجة وإن اشتركت؛ إلّا أنّ الموجد أقوى من المبقي، لأنّ الإيجاد إعطاء الوجود الّذي لم يكن أصلاً. والتّبقية حفظ الوجود الحاصل. ولكونه أقوى يترجّح الحادث ويعدم المرجوح ويمنع انحصار الشّرط في العرض لجواز أن يكون عدميًّا.

سلّمنا، لكن جهة الاحتياج مختلفةٌ؛ فإنّ الجوهر المعيّن محتاجٌ إلى عرض مّا لا بعينه، والعرض المعيّن محتاج إلى جوهر معيّن.

Appendix

The majority of the theologians maintain that the world is made to not exist, because He most high has said: *Everyone on earth perishes*,[3] *Everything will perish except His Face*,[4] *He is the First and the Last*,[5] and *We shall reproduce creation just as We produced it the first time*,[6] and just as the initiation was from non-existence, so is the reproduction.

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī has said that the world does not cease to exist but its parts are scattered, because if it ceased to exist, it could not return, and since the consequent is false, likewise the antecedent. As regards the conditional, it is false because of what follows. When it comes to the falsity of the consequent, it is because the one charged deserves reward, and if the world did not return, injustice would follow. Besides, necessary knowledge from the religion of Muḥammad, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, as well as the unbroken transmission of verses point towards it.

3 Q 55:26.
4 Q 28:88.
5 Q 57:3.
6 Q 21:104.

تذنيبٌ

ذهب جمهور المتكلّمين إلى أنّ العالم يعدم، لقوله تعالى: ﴿كُلُّ مَنْ عَلَيْهَا فَانٍ﴾، ﴿كُلُّ شَيْءٍ هَالِكٌ إِلاَّ وَجْهَهُ﴾، ﴿هُوَ الأَوَّلُ والآخِرُ﴾، ﴿كَمَا بَدَأْنَا أَوَّلَ خَلْقٍ نُعِيدُهُ﴾؛ ولما كان الابتداء عن عدم فكذا الإعادة.

وقال أبو الحسن البصريّ: إنّه لا يُعدم بل يتفرق أجزاؤه؛ لأنّه لو عدم لم يَعُد، والتّالي باطلٌ فالمقدّم مثله. أمّا الشّرطيّة فلما يأتي. وأمّا بطلان اللازم فلأنّ المكلّف يستحقّ الثّواب. فلو لم يعد لزم الظلم، وللعلم الضّروري من دين محمّد صلى الله عليه وسلم، وتواتر الآيات الدّالّة عليه.

Investigation 3: On the Possibility of the Return of the Non-Existent

People differ on that but the majority maintain it, because its quiddity is receptive to both existence and non-existence, so that they can succeed each other upon it. Were that not the case, pure contingency would not be transformed into either alternative, which is necessarily false.

The philosophers, Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, and the Karrāmites maintain that it cannot return, because it is pure negation, so that the possibility of returning cannot be judged of it. Moreover, if it did exist, it could not be distinguished from its like, and because if it were to return, its time would also return, and it would both be initiated and return.

The answer is that if the possibility of return cannot be judged of it, neither can its impossibility be judged of it. Moreover, judgment requires mental assertion, and a lack of distinction for us does not entail its lack in the thing itself, and it can be judged to both return and be initiated in two considerations.

المطلب الثالث: في إمكان إعادة المعدوم

اختلف النّاس في ذلك، فذهب الجمهورُ إليه؛ لأنّ ماهيّته قابلة للوجود والعدم، فأمكن تعاقبهما عليه، وإلّا لانقلب الإمكان الصّرف إلى أحد قسيميه وهو باطلٌ بالضّرورة.

وذهبت الفلاسفة وأبو الحسين البصريّ والكراميّة إلى امتناع إعادته لأنّه نفيٌ محضٌ، فلا يصحّ الحكم عليه بصحّة العود؛ ولأنّه لو وجد لم يتميّز عن مثله، ولأنّه لو أعيد لأعيد وقته، فيكون مبتدأً معادًا.

والجواب: لولم يصح الحكم عليه بإمكان العود لامتنع الحكم عليه بامتناعه، ولأنّ الحكم يستدعي الثبوت الذّهنيّ، وعدمُ الامتياز عندنا لا يقتضي عدمه في نفس الأمر؛ ويصحّ الحكم عليه بالإعادة والابتداء باعتبارين.

Investigation 4: On Establishing the Return

Muslims as a whole agree that a corporeal return has been established. As regards those who allow the return of what does not exist, that is evident, because it is possible, and God most high has announced that it will take place. As regards those who deny the return of what does not exist, they say the return takes place in the sense that parts are gathered after being dispersed. This is also possible in itself. With regard to the recipient, this is because the body is receptive to the accidents that subsist through it, this receptivity being essential. With regard to the agent, this is because He most high knows all that is knowable, thus knowing the parts of every individual, and He has power over all that is subject to power, so that He gathers together the parts of every body and creates life in them.

The ancients precluded corporeal return, because a mixture's coming to be entails that a soul comes to be, and then two souls would depend on one body. Moreover, if a man eats another, one of them would be lost.[7]

The answer is what has preceded concerning the denial of the existence of soul and its dependence on a body prepared for a second soul. What is eaten are superfluous parts in relation to the eater.

7 The first argument is the Avicennian refutation of transmigration mentioned above in IV.2.3. The second is an ancient argument against the idea that in resurrection, the parts of the original body are gathered together again. If a missionary has been eaten by a cannibal, will the parts of the missionary's body that have been digested and become parts of the cannibal's body rejoice in Heaven or burn in Hell?

المطلب الرابع: في ثبوت المعاد

اتفق المسلمون كافّةً على إثبات المعاد البدنيّ. أمّا من جوّز إعادة المعدوم فظاهرٌ؛ لأنّه ممكنٌ، والله تعالى أخبر بوقوعه. وأمّا من منع من إعادة المعدوم فإنّه يقول: الإعادة بمعنى جمع الأجزاء بعد تفريقها. وهو في نفسه ممكنٌ أيضًا، أمّا بالنّظر إلى القابل فلأنّ الجسم قابلٌ للأعراض القائمة به، وهذا القبول ذاتيّ؛ وأمّا بالنّظر إلى الفاعل فلأنّه تعالى عالمٌ بكلّ المعلومات، فيعلم أجزاء كلّ شخص، وهو قادرٌ على جميع المقدورات، فيجمع أجزاء كل بدن ويخلقُ فيها الحياة.

ومنع الأوائل من المعاد البدنيّ، لأنّ حدوث المزاج يقتضي حدوث نفس، فيتعلق نفسان ببدن واحد؛ ولأنّ إنسانًا لو أكل آخر ضاع أحدهما.

والجواب ما تقدّم من المنع من وجود النفس ومن تعلّقها ببدن مستعدّ لنفس ثانية، والمأكول أجزاء فاضلة بالنّسبة إلى الآكل.

Admonition

Everyone, who has a right in front of both God most high and others, must return in order that justice be meted out to him. Muslims have agreed about the return of unbelievers and the children of believers, even if they did not deserve compensation and no compensation were deserved against them.

تنبيهٌ

كلّ من له حقّ على الله تعالى وعلى غيره يجب إعادته للانتصاف منه، وقد أجمع المسلمون على إعادة الكفّار وأطفال المؤمنين وإن لم يستحقّوا عوضًا ولا يستحقّ عليهم عوضٌ.

Appendix

Other things heard from the tradition, such as the torment of the grave, the path, the scale, the opening of the books, the speech of animals, or the states of the jinn and the fire, are possible things, even if they did not deserve compensation and no compensation were deserved against them.

تذنيبٌ

سائر السّمعيات من عذاب القبر والصّراط والميزان وتطاير الكتب وإنطاق الجوارح وأحوال الجنّة والنّار أمورٌ ممكنةٌ، وقد أخبر الصادق بوقوعها فتقع.

Investigation 5: On the Promise and the Threat

The people of justice, with the exception of al-Kaʿbī, agree that one who obeys deserves a reward for his obeisance, *pace* the Ashʿarites, for otherwise charging would be wrong, because of what has been said above concerning uncompensated labour. If the like of that compensation had been possible to begin with, charging would have been in vain, and so it is such that it is not possible initially, that is, a reward.

They argue by saying that if obeisance necessitated reward, then even if an apostate died in his apostasy, he would be rewarded with the reward of a believer, but the consequent is false according to common consensus, and likewise the antecedent.[8] The conditional is shown by saying that he deserves a reward for his faith, and it will no doubt be conveyed to him.

The answer is that the desert of reward depends on arriving at the end, and the people of justice agree that the sinner deserves a punishment for his sin, *pace* the Ashʿarites, for according to the Murjiʾites[9] and some Imāmites, knowledge of it is acquired from the reported tradition. According to the Muʿtazilites and some Imāmites, this knowledge is acquired by the intellect, for there is grace in it, because knowledge of the punishment for renouncing obeisance and performing sins brings one closer to performing obeisance and renouncing sin, and so knowledge of the punishment is inevitable. Moreover, God most high has obliged certain acts, and this only because of what benefit there is in them. This is false, because of supererogatory acts or because of the harm there is in renouncing them. This is what was sought for.

8 The idea here is that the apostate deserves reward for having been a believer.

9 Murjiʾites were an early Islamic sect that adopted an intermediate position concerning the sinner's status as a believer and denied that sinning makes a Muslim an apostate.

المطلب الخامس: في الوعد والوعيد

اتّفق أهل العدل إلّا الكعبيّ على أنّ المطيع يستحقّ بطاعته الثّواب خلافًا للأشعرية، وإلّا لكان التكليف قبيحًا لما مرّ من المشقّة من غير عوض. وذلك العوض إن صحّ الابتداء بمثله كان التكليف عبثًا، فهو ممّا لا يصحّ الابتداء به وهو الثّواب.

احتجّوا بأنّ الطاعة لو أوجبت الثّواب لأثيب المرتدّ لو مات على ردّته ثواب المؤمن، والتّالي باطلٌ إجماعًا فكذا المقدّم. بيان الشّرطيّة: أنّه بإيمانه يستحقّ الثّواب، فلا بُدّ من إيصاله إليه.

والجواب أنّ استحقاق الثّواب يتوقّف على الموافاة، واتّفق أهل العدل على أنّ العاصي يستحقّ بمعصيته العقاب خلافًا للأشعريّة. فعند المرجئة وبعض الإماميّة أنّ العلم به مستفادٌ من السّمع. وعند المعتزلة وبعض الإماميّة أنّه مستفادٌ من العقل لما فيه من اللّطف، لأنّ العلم بالعقاب على ترك الطاعة وفعل المعصية يقرّب إلى فعل الطاعة وترك المعصية، فلا بدّ من العلم بالعقاب؛ ولأنّه تعالى أوجب أفعالاً فإمّا لما فيها من النفع، وهو باطلٌ بالنّوافل، أو لما في تركها من الضّرر، وهو المطلوب.

Moral

The Muʿtazilites and those Imāmites that agree with them maintain that knowledge of the eternal duration of reward and punishment is intellectual, because thereby the one who is charged is brought closer to performing obeisance and refraining from what is bad. Hence, it is included under the heading of grace, and it is also included under the heading of necessity. Moreover, what entails reward and punishment, or praise and blame, is obeisance and sin, and as long as praise and blame endure, reward and punishment must endure in the hereafter, for what is caused endures as a consequence of its cause enduring, which in turn follows from the enduring of what it causes. The Murjiʾites and those Imāmites that agree with them maintain that this is heard from the tradition.

فائدةٌ

ذهبت المعتزلة ومن وافقهامن الإماميّة إلى أنّ العلم بدوام الثّواب والعقاب عقليّ، لأنّ المكلّف معه يكون أقرب إلى فعل الطاعة وترك القبيح؛ فيكون أدخل في باب اللّطف، فيكون أدخل في باب الوجوب. ولأنّ المقتضي للثّواب والعقاب والمدح والذّمّ هو الطاعة والمعصية، فلماكان المدح والذّمّ دائمين وجب دوام الآخرين؛ لاستلزام دوام المعلول دوام علّتها المستلزم لدوام معلولها. ذهبت المرجئة ومن وافقها من الإماميّة إلى أنّه سمعيّ.

Admonition

It is possible that reward depends on a condition, for otherwise one who knows God most high but does not reflect on, and thereby does not know, the prophet's order, would deserve reward, but the consequent is false by common consensus, and likewise the antecedent. The conditional is shown by saying that knowledge of God most high is obeisance that is independent in itself. Hence, if the desert were not conditioned, it would follow that the prophet is paid the reward of a liar, which is false.

تنبيهٌ

يجوز توقّف الثّواب على شرط وإلّا لكان من عرف الله تعالى ولم ينظر في أمر النبيّ فلم يعرفه مستحقًّا للثّواب، والتّالي باطلٌ إجماعًا فالمقدّم مُثله. بيانُ الشّرطيّة: أنّ معرفة الله تعالى طاعةٌ مستقلّةٌ بنفسها. فلولم يكن الاستحقاق مشروطًا لزم إثابة المكذّب للنّبيّ، وهو باطلٌ.

Appendix

The desert of reward, or punishment for the one who has fallen, is conditioned by arriving at the end, for He most high has said, *If you ascribe any partner to God, all your work will come to nothing*,[10] but not because the work took place for nothing, for the annihilation pertains to polytheism. Hence, if desert has been established, annihilation means the fall of the deserved reward due to a new ascription of a partner. If desert has not been established, the annihilation of the work means not having reached the condition of desert, which is arriving at the end, and so it does not deserve reward, and the work takes place for nothing.

10 Q 39:65.

تذنيبٌ

استحقاق الثّواب مشروط بالموافاة أوساقطٌ بالعقاب، لقوله تعالى: ﴿لَئِنْ أَشْرَكْتَ لَيَحْبَطَنَّ عَمَلُكَ﴾، وليس لأنّ العمل وقع باطلاً لتعليق البطلان بالشّرك، فإن كان الاستحقاق ثابتًا كان معنى البطلان سقوط الثّواب المستحقّ بالشّرك المتجدّد؛ وإن لم يكن كان معنى بطلان العمل عدم الإتيان بشرط الاستحقاق الذّي هو الموافاةُ، فلم يستحقّ الثّواب، فيكون العمل باطلاً.

Investigation 6: On Cancellation and Declaring Unbelief

The Imāmites, the Ashʿarites, and the Murjiʾites endorse the denial of both, because if reward and punishment are not denied, that is what was sought for, whereas if they were denied, it would not be more appropriate for the new occurrence to end that which remains than it would be for that which remains to preclude the new occurrence from existing.

Moreover, if the addition is considered in the new occurrence, as Abū Hāshim says about the balance, and if the one lacking it does not miss anything, then existence and non-existence are equal for the one lacking it. This is false, for He most high has said, *whoever has done an atom's-weight*.[11] If he does miss something with respect to it, none of the units will more appropriately be missed, but if all are missing, there will be a difference in balance.[12] If the addition is not considered in it but the posteriority of the new occurrence is sufficient for its being the one that denies, regardless of whether it adds or diminishes, it follows that one who is a servant of God most high for the period of his life and then decides to sin at the end will be equal to one who has not served at all.

The Muʿtazilites endorse asserting both, because if none of the rewards and punishments cancelled each other when they are added or posterior, both would come upon the one who is charged, for the desert would remain. However, the combination is not possible, for it is a condition of the reward that he is clean of taints and associated with exalting and venerating Him. Neither of them will be prior because both must endure, which is denied on the grounds of what has been mentioned.

11 Q 99:7.

12 Suppose that a person has lived a virtuous life but sins just before her moment of death. If this new addition is concerned in the calculation of her desert in the hereafter, as seems to be Ḥillī's preferred view, then it should be considered on par with her earlier acts, for when we consider all the morally relevant acts she has performed during her entire life, none of them deserves to be added more than another (or "is more appropriately missed") – the temporal order in which the acts are performed is irrelevant for their moral value.

المطلب السادس: في الإحباط والتكفير

ذهبت الإماميّة والأشعريّة والمرجئة إلى نفيهما؛ لأنّ الثّواب والعقاب إن لم يتنافيا فالمطلوب، وإن تنافيا لم يكن الطارئ بإزالة الباقي أولى من منع الباقي الطارئ من الوجود.

ولأنّ الطارئ إن اعتبر فيه الزّيادة، كما يقوله أبو هاشم في الموازنة، فإن لم يسقط الناقص منه شيئًا كان وجود الناقص وعدمه سواءً؛ وهو باطلٌ لقوله تعالى: ﴿فَمَن يَعْمَلْ مِثْقَالَ ذَرَّةٍ﴾. وإن سقط بإزائه لم يكن بعض الآحاد أولى بالسّقوط. وإن سقط الجميع لزم خلافُ الموازنة. وإن لم يعتبر فيه الزّيادةُ، بل يكفي في كونه نافيًا تأخّره، سواء زاد أو نقص، لزم أن يكون من عَبَدَ الله تعالى مدّة عمره ثمّ عزم في آخره على معصية مساويًا لمن لم يعبد البتة.

وذهبت المعتزلة إلى إثباتهما؛ لأنّ كلّ واحد من الثّواب والعقاب لو لم يحبط الآخر عند زيادته أو تأخّره لوصلا إلى المكلّف لبقاء الاستحقاق، ولا يمكن الجمع؛ فإنّ شرط الثواب خلوصه من الشوائب، ومقارنة التّعظيم والإجلال له، ولا سبق أحدهما لوجوب دوامهما، وهو ممنوعٌ لما يأتي.

Investigation 7: On Repentance

The Bahshamites have said that it is remorse for sin and a determination to refrain from lapsing again, but al-Khwārizmī did not make the latter either a condition or a part. It is necessary, because it repels the harms of punishment.

If it is for a bad act which includes bringing harm to another, such as injustice or slander, it is not valid, unless one reaches out to the victim of injustice or to his heirs with what is his due, if possible, or determines to amend, if that is not possible. If it is for deception, it is not valid, until one has revealed to the deceived person the falsity of one's word and revoked it, if possible. If the act does not include bringing harm to another, like adultery or drinking wine, remorse and determination to refrain from doing it again suffice.

If it is for an offence against what is obligatory and can be performed at any moment, like giving alms, it is only valid once that has been executed, if possible, but if it is specified for a certain time, like prayer, one needs to heed the ordinance, if possible.

المطلب السابع: في التوبة

قالت البهشميّة إنّها النّدم على المعصية والعزم على ترك المعاودة، ولم يجعل الخوارزميّ الأخير شرطًا ولا جزءً. وهي واجبةٌ لأنّها دافعةٌ لضرر العقاب.

فإن كانت من فعل قبيح تتضمّن إيصال ضرر إلى الغير، كالظلم والقذف، لم تصحّ إلّا بعد الخروج إلى المظلوم أو ورثته من حقّه إن أمكن والعزم على الأداء إن لم يكن؛ وإن كان إضلالاً لم يصحّ إلّا بعد أن يبيّن للضّال بطلان قوله ورجوعه منه إن أمكن. وإن لم تتضمّن إيصال ضرر إلى الغير، كالزّنا وشرب الخمر، كفى النّدم والعزم على ترك المعاودة.

وإن كانت من إخلال بواجبٍ يمكن فعله في كلّ وقتٍ كالزكاة لم يصحّ إلّا بعد أدائه إن أمكن، وإن اختصّ بوقتٍ كالصّلاة افتقر إلى الاشتغال في القضاء إن أمكن.

Admonition

The Muʿtazilites maintain that the punishment must be erased through it, for otherwise it would be bad to charge the sinner after his sinning, because he would be left with no way to evade the punishment, nor would he be left with any way to be rewarded, based on the eternal duration of the punishment. The Murjiʾites demand that he make amends. Were that not the case, we would have to accept the apology of one who has caused the greatest harm to us.[13]

13 If the sinner repents, he will still suffer the consequences, but because he has thereby become a better person, he will be spared from further punishments. Should he choose to not repent, the further harm he does to any of us will lead to correspondingly harsher punishment to himself.

تنبيهٌ

ذهبت المعتزلة إلى وجوب سقوط العقاب عندها، وإلّا لقبح تكليف العاصي بعد عصيانه إذ لم يبق له طريقٌ إلى الخروج من العقاب، فلم يبق له طريقٌ إلى الثّواب، وهو مبنيّ على دوام العقاب. وذهبت المرجئة إلى أنّه تفضّلٌ، وإلّا لوجب قبول عذر من أساء إلينا بأعظم الإساءة.

Appendix

Abū Hāshim maintained that it is not possible for one bad thing but not another,[14] because repentance for what is bad must be due to its being bad, otherwise it is not satisfactory as repentance or not satisfactory at all. Now, badness takes place in all, and if he repents only some of them, the others will reveal that his repentance is not for the badness.[15]

Abū ʿAlī has said that it is possible, for otherwise it would not be possible to perform some obligatory things but not others, because just as repentance for what is bad is necessary by virtue of its badness, similarly what is obligatory is necessary by virtue of its obligatoriness. If sharing something entails a preclusion concerning specification in the first case, then the same holds in the second case as well.[16] The difference between doing and refraining is evident.[17]

14 In other words, the younger Jubbāʾī held that it is not possible to repent one sin while carrying on with another; for instance, one cannot repent drinking wine while happily carrying on a fornicacious relationship. On this debate, see Schmidtke 1991, 245-248.

15 That is, one must repent one's being a sinner, not any other aspect of the particular sin. This entails repenting for this aspect in all sinful acts, including the fornicacious relationship in our example.

16 In other words, if repentance must be for all sins because of the general aspect of sinfulness, then the same holds for obligation: one performs an obligatory act because of its obligation, not any other feature of the particular act, and so determination to perform one obligatory act for the right reason entails determination to perform all obligatory acts. However, since it is agreed, for instance, that one's fasting remains valid even if one failed to abide by the prayer, the conclusion must be rejected – and likewise for the negative case of repentance. (The example is Ḥillī's own, see Schmidtke 1991, 246.)

17 This probably refers to Abū Hāshim's counterargument, according to which the positive and the negative case are different. To use Ḥillī's own analogy again (Schmidtke 1991, 246), if one dislikes sour pomegranates, one refrains from eating all sour pomegranates, whereas even if one were fond of sour pomegranates, it would not follow that one would try and eat them all. In the same context in the *Manāhij*, he maintains that particular aspects of the act must therefore be included in that which one repents, just as further qualifying factors enter into the positive case. In our example, the sinner repents the vileness only of the act of drinking wine, and by way of an analogous qualification, love of sour pomegranates only entails the willingness to eat some of them.

تذنيبٌ

ذهب أبو هاشم إلى أنّها لا تصحّ من قبيح دون الآخر، لأن التّوبة من القبيح يجب أن تكون لقبحه، وإلّا لم تكن توبةً مقبولةً أو لم تكن مقبولة، والقبحُ حاصل في الجميع؛ فلو تاب من بعضه لكشف غيره أنّ توبته لا للقبح.

وقال أبو عليّ تصحُّ، وإلّا لما صحّ الإتيان بواجبٍ دون واجبٍ؛ لأنّ التوبة كما يجب من القبيح لقبحه، كذا فعلُ الواجبِ إنّما يجب لوجوبه. فإن اقتضى الاشتراك في الأوّل المنعَ من التّخصيص فكذا في الثّاني. والفرق ظاهرٌ بينَ الفعل والتّرك.

Investigation 8: On the Possibility of Forgiving

The Muʿtazilites have precluded it on the basis of what is heard from tradition, but Baṣrians take it to be intellectually possible, whereas Baghdādians take it to be intellectually precluded. The truth is that it is possible on the grounds of both the tradition and the intellect, because it is charitable and therefore good. Besides, it is proper to God most high, and so it can be inferred. Furthermore, He most high has said, *your Lord is full of forgiveness for people, despite their wrongdoing*,[18] and He has said, *God does not forgive the joining of partners with Him: anything less than that He forgives to whoever He will*.[19] Finally, intercession is asserted by consensus of the prophet, God bless him and his family and grant him peace. It is not about additional benefit, for otherwise we would be interceding for the prophet, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, and so it merely relieves the burden of harms. The denial of intercession that is asked for does not entail absolute denial of intercession.

They have argued by saying that there is an incitement to what is bad in it, for when one endowed with understanding comes to know of forgiveness, he engages in it. Moreover, it entails that the verses concerning the threat are lies. The first statement is disproved by the fact that punishment is lifted through repentance, and allowing its non-existence is like allowing the non-existence of forgiveness. The verses of threat are to be understood under the condition that there is no forgiveness.

18 Q 13:6.
19 Q 4:48.

المطلب الثامن: في جواز العفو

منع المعتزلة منه سمعًا، فالبصريّون على جوازه عقلاً، والبغداديّون على منعه عقلاً. والحقّ جوازه سمعًا وعقلاً، لأنّه إحسانٌ فيكون حسنًا، ولأنّه حقّ الله تعالى، فجاز إسقاطه. ولقوله تعالى: ﴿وَإِنَّ رَبَّكَ لَذُو مَغْفِرَةٍ لِلنَّاسِ عَلَىٰ ظُلْمِهِمْ﴾. وقوله: ﴿إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَغْفِرُ أَن يُشْرَكَ بِهِ وَيَغْفِرُ مَا دُونَ ذَٰلِكَ لِمَن يَشَاءُ﴾. وللإجماع على ثبوت الشّفاعة للنبيّ صلى الله عليه وسلم، وليست في زيادة المنافع؛ وإلّا لكنّا شافعين في النبيّ صلى الله عليه وسلم، فهي من إسقاط المضارّ. ونفي شفيع يطاع لا يستلزم نفيَ مطلق الشفيع.

احتجّوا بأنّ فيه إغراءً بالقبيح، فإنّ العاقل متى علم العفو أقدم، ولا ستلزامه الكذبَ في آيات الوعيد. وينتقض الأوّل بسقوط العقاب بالتّوبة، وتجويز عدمها كتجويز عدم العفو، وآياتُ الوعيد مشروطةٌ بعدم العفو.

Investigation 9: That the Pain of the Violator Is Brought to an End

This differs from those who endorse the threat. As to us, He most high has said, *whoever has done an atom's-weight of good will see it*,[20] and it is deserved by the repentant due to his faith. Hence, it is inevitable that it will be brought about for him. By consensus, it cannot be prior to the punishment, for he is not free from stains, and so the converse must hold.

They have argued by means of verses that refer to perpetuity, like His most high saying: *and they will remain in torment, disgraced*,[21] and *if anyone kills a believer deliberately, the punishment for Him is Hell, and there he will remain*,[22] and others. Either this is specific to unbelievers or perpetuity denotes a long time. As regards unbelievers, Muslims as a whole have conceded that they have perpetuity in the fire.

20 Q 99:7.
21 Q 25:69.
22 Q 4:93.

المطلب التاسع: في أنّ عذاب الفاسق منقطعٌ خلافاً للوعيديّة.

لنا، قوله تعالى: ﴿فَمَن يَعْمَلْ مِثْقَالَ ذَرَّةٍ خَيْرًا يَرَهُ﴾، وهو مستحقّ للثّواب بإيمانه، فلا بُدّ من إيصاله إليه. ولا يمكن أن يكون قبل العقاب إجماعًا، ولعدم خلوصه من الشوائب، فيتعيّن العكس.

احتجّوا بالآيات الدّالّة على الخلود كقوله تعالى: ﴿وَيَخْلُدْ فِيهِ مُهَانًا﴾، ﴿وَمَن يَقْتُلْ مُؤْمِنًا مُّتَعَمِّدًا فَجَزَاؤُهُ جَهَنَّمُ خَالِدًا فِيهَا﴾، وغير ذلك. ويختص بالكفّار أوان الخلود للزمان المتطاول. أمّا الكفّار، فقد أجمع المسلمون كافّةً على خلودهم في النّار.

Investigation 10: On Names and Judgments

In terms of language, faith is assent, but in terms of the law, it is assent to the messenger, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, in all that he is necessarily known to have brought forth. Assent of the heart is not sufficient without assent of the tongue, or conversely, for He most high has said, *even when there came to them something they knew to be true, they disbelieved in it*,[23] asserting knowledge and unbelief, and *they denied them even though their souls acknowledged them as true*,[24] and He has said, *some people say, 'We believe in God and the Last Day', when really they do not believe*,[25] asserting confession by the tongue without the heart.

According to the Ashʿarites, it is an assent of the soul, but according to the Karrāmites, it is a confession by means of the two testimonies, and according to earlier Muʿtazilites and Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, it is an act of obedience by the limbs.

When it comes to unbelief, it is absence of faith, either through the opposite of a belief that one knows or not through an opposite. Violation is detaching from something, and hypocrisy is to hide something as opposed to revealing it. In the law, it is the manifestation of faith and hidden unbelief.

They differ concerning the violator, for according to the Muʿtazilites, he is neither faithful nor an unbeliever but in a situation between the two situations, because faith is doing what is obligatory and withholding from what is prohibited. Hence, he is neither faithful nor an unbeliever, because he is washed, is dressed for the grave, is buried in the graveyard of believers, is prayed for, married to, and retaliated for. According to Ḥasan al-Baṣrī,[26] he is a hypocrite, because one who believes in the harmfulness of an act abstains from it. Hence, if the violator believed in the punishment, he would not sin. According to the Khārijites, he is an unbeliever, but according to the Azraqites[27] among them, he is a polytheist, whereas according to the Murjiʾites, the Imāmites and the Ashʿarites, he is a believer, because he has necessarily assented to the prophet, God bless him and his family and grant him peace, in all that he has brought forth.

23 Q 2:89.

24 Q 27:14.

25 Q 2:8.

26 Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728) was a major scholar, preacher, and ascetic of the Umayyad period. He is venerated by most Sunnī schools of thought, from mainstream theology to Sufis.

27 The *Azāriqa* were an extreme Khārijite movement.

المطلب العاشر: في الأسماء والأحكام

الإيمان لغةً التصديق، وشرعًا تصديق الرّسول صلى الله عليه وسلم في كلّ ما علم مجيئه به ضرورةً، ولا يكفي التّصديق بالقلب عن التّصديق باللّسان وبالعكس، لقوله تعالى: ﴿فَلَمَّا جَاءَهُم مَّا عَرَفُوا كَفَرُوا بِهِ﴾، فأثبت المعرفة والكفر؛ ﴿وَجَحَدُوا بِهَا وَاسْتَيْقَنَتْهَا أَنفُسُهُمْ﴾. وقوله: ﴿وَمِنَ النَّاسِ مَن يَقُولُ آمَنَّا بِاللَّهِ وَبِالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ وَمَا هُم بِمُؤْمِنِينَ﴾، فأثبت الإقرار باللّسان دون القلب.

وعند الأشاعرة أنّه التصديق النفسانيّ وعند الكرّامية أنّه الإقرار بالشّهادتين، وعندَ قدماء المعتزلة والقاضي عبد الجبّار أنّه فعل الجوارح من الطاعات.

وأمّا الكفر فهو عدم الإيمان إمّا بضدّ اعتقاد علمه أولا بضدّ. والفسق الخروج عن الشّيء، والنّفاق أن يبطن خِلاف ما يُظهر، وهو في الشّرع إظهار الإيمان وإبطان الكفر.

واختلفوا في الفاسق، فعند المعتزلة أنّه لا مؤمنٌ ولا كافرٌ، بل هو منزلةٌ بينَ المنزلتين؛ لأنّ الإيمان فعل الواجبات والامتناع عن المحظورات، فلا يكون مؤمنًا ولا كافرًا، لأنّه يُغسّلُ ويكفّنُ ويُدفّن في مقابر المسلمين، ويُصلّى عليه، وينكح ويُقاد به. وعند الحسن البصريّ أنّه منافقٌ لأنّ من يعتقد الضّرر في فعلٍ يمتنع عنه. فلو اعتقد الفاسق العقاب لم يعص. وعند الخوارج أنّه كافرٌ وعند الأزارقة منهم أنّه مشركٌ، وعند المرجئة والإماميّة والأشعريّة أنّه مؤمنٌ لأنه يُصدّق للنّبيّ صلى الله عليه وسلم في جميع ما جاء به بالضّرورة.

Know that since faith is assent, it does not allow strength and weakness or increase and decrease. According to the Muʿtazilites, it is a name for acting obediently, and so it does allow them.

According to the Imāmites, the principles of faith are assent to God, to His unity, to His justice, to prophecy, and to the imamate. The Muʿtazilites say that the principles of faith are five: unity, justice, prophecy, ordering what is accepted and denying what is prohibited, and the promise and the threat. He who fails to acknowledge any of these is not a Muslim, whereas he who acknowledges that but performs a great sin is not a believer.

The charge ceases in the hereafter. When it comes to people of reward, this is because it is necessary to free them from the toil. When it comes to one who is punished, that is because it is a kind of compelling.

Let this be the last that we intended to establish in this book. God gives success in righteous efforts.

***

[The book is complete, praise be to God, the Lord of the two worlds.]

واعلم أنّ الإيمان لما كان هو التصديق لم يقبل الشدة والضعف ولا الزيادة والنقصان، وعند المعتزلة أنّه اسمٌ لفعل الطاعات فكان قابلاً لهما.

وعند الإماميّة: أصول الإيمان التصديق بالله وبتوحيده وبعده وبالنّبوّة وبالإمامة. والمعتزلة قالوا أصول الإيمان خمسةٌ: التّوحيد والعدل والنّبوّة والأمر بالمعروف والنّهي عن المنكر والوعد والوعيد. ومن لم يُقرّ ببعض هذه لم يكن مسلمًا، ومن أقرّ بذلك وفعل كبيرةً لم يكن مؤمنًا.

والتكليف ساقطٌ في الآخرة. أمّا أهل الثواب فلوجوب خلوصه من المشاقّ. وأمّا المعاقب فلأنّه نوع إلجاء.

وليكن هذا آخر ما قصدنا إثباته في هذا الكتاب، والله الموفّق للصواب.

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[تمّ الكتاب والحمد لله ربّ العالمين]

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